Appendix 1
Cicero:
Rhetorical Theories

Cicero spent his adulthood in the last decades (106-43 BCE) of the Roman Republic (509-31 BCE). His life reflects and represents that of people of power and high social status in the Rome of his day. Cicero was one of the most powerful and influential men in the civic society of Rome in the first century BCE. As Plutarch (c. 45-120 CE) states: “He had the greatest power in the state.”\(^1\) He goes on to describe Cicero’s status; “Cicero’s power in the city (or Rome) reached its greatest height at this time, and since he could do what he pleased… (Octavianus) Caesar sent messengers to Cicero begging and urging him to…manage affairs as he himself thought best.”\(^2\)

Cicero was a significant figure in the history of Roman politics and rhetoric. Moreover, it seems impossible to speak of Roman history without dealing with him. Thus, Quayle states,

> Whatever estimate you may retain concerning Cicero, you cannot leave him out of the history of Rome…you cannot write a history of Rome and leave Marcus Tullius Cicero out…He was not the greatest man in his day, but he was the most versatile man in Rome. I take it he was the greatest man produced, save Julius Caesar only, who was a Hercules. All other men only reached to this Hercules’s belt.\(^3\)

For these reasons, the Romans of his time and the next generations were greatly

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\(^1\) Plutarch, *Cicero*, 24.1; also 40.1; 43.1.

\(^2\) Plutarch, *Cicero*, 45.4-6. Dio Cassius supports this. He highlights in his *Roman History* Cicero’s political career and his power by the time Julius Caesar was assassinated (March 44 BCE). When Rome was politically chaotic, he took control in the senate and united the members of the senate and protected it from factionalism. The senators valued and followed all Cicero’s advice. Cassius says, “Cicero, whose advice they (the senators) actually followed…” (Dio Cassius, *Roman History*, 44.22).

As a contemporary of Julius Caesar and Pompey, Cicero began his political career as a magistrate or *Quaestore* in 75 BCE. He then took several different positions: senator (74 BCE), *Curule Aedile* (69 BCE), *Praetor Urbanus* (66 BCE), consul (63 BCE), *Augur* (53 BCE), and proconsul of Cilicia (51-50 BCE). He was then in exile and retired from public service before the death of Julius Caesar in 44 BCE (see Cicero, *Post Reditum in Senatu*, 21; *Epistularum ad Atticum*, 1.4; *Epistulae ad Familiares*, 15.4.8-10; 16.11.3; 16.12.5; Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities*, 14.66; Strabo, *Geography*, 10.2.13; Plutarch, *Cicero*, 8.1; see also Cowell, *Cicero and the Roman Republic*, 1-2, 165-269; T. Robert S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*: vol. 2: 99 BCE–31 BCE [Chico: Scholars Press, 1984], 97-357).


\(^3\) Quayle, “Cicero and Paul,” 711.
influenced by Cicero and his theory of rhetoric and eloquence. An example from Plutarch illustrates this point. “I (Plutarch) learn that (Octavianus) Caesar…paid a visit to one of his daughter’s sons; and the boy…had in his hands a book of Cicero…Caesar took the book (from him) and read a great part of it as he stood…then gave it back to the youth, saying: ‘a learned man, my child, a learned man and a lover of his country’.” Furthermore, many Romans in the first and second century CE, who spoke either Latin or Greek, were inspired by Cicero. In other words, he still lived on in the spirit of Roman and Greco-Roman culture and became an icon of Greco-Roman rhetoric in the first century Roman world. This is clearly evidenced in Plutarch’s language, “his (Cicero’s) fame for oratory abides to this day.” In addition, Cicero appears frequently in such Greek and Latin writings of the first and second century CE as Tacitus (c. 55-120 CE)’s Dialogue de Oratoribus, Suetonius (c. 75-140 CE)’s De Rhetoribus, and Dio Cassius (c. 150 CE- c.235 CE)’s Roman History. It is appropriate, therefore, to use Cicero and his rhetorical theories as a model of Greco-Roman rhetorical patterns in the first century Roman colony of Corinth.

In agreement with Aristotle, Cicero claims that there are three different types of oratory or rhetorical discourse – deliberative (deliberativo), epideictic

\[\text{Plutarch, Cicero, 49.5.}\]
\[\text{No doubt this included contemporaries of the Corinthians addressed in 1 Corinthians 1-4, in whose civic society Greco-Roman rhetoric and patronal structures were important in relation to social class.}\]
\[\text{Plutarch, Cicero, 2.5.}\]
\[\text{For more details see 2.1 above.}\]
\[\text{The characteristics of Aristotle’s three genres of oratory may be summarised in this way: An orator or author uses a deliberative rhetoric when s/he intends to persuade his/her hearers to take some action in the future. This sort of speech is either ‘exhortation’ (protropē) or ‘dissuasion’ (apotropē). Its primary concern is to promote the beneficial or advantageous (to sumpheron). The orator employs a judicial oratory when s/he is seeking to urge the audience to make a judgment about events that occurred in the past. This judicial speech is either ‘prosecution’ (katēyoria) or ‘defence’ (apologia). Its central issue is justice (to dikaiōn). An author or speaker uses epideictic oratory when s/he wants to persuade hearers to reaffirm or take hold of some viewpoint in the present, while the author celebrates (or praises) or denounces (or blames) some people or some quality. This kind of speech is ‘praise’ or ‘encomium’ (epainos) or ‘blame’ or ‘invective’ (psogos). The central concern is what is honourable (to kalon).}\]
\[\text{Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1:3 1358b8-28; see also Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation, 19; Fiorenza, “Rhetorical Situation,” 390-1). These rhetorical genres also appear in Cicero’s description of rhetoric, but with some further developments.}\]
Epideictic (or demonstrative) discourse is present-situation-oriented oratory. It is used when an orator praises and censures a person. This sort of speech has to do with what is honourable about the person. Epideictic speech deals with the person’s attributes: mind (animi), body (corporis), and external circumstances (extraneae).

The virtue of mind (animi) comprises wisdom (sapientia or prudentia), justice (institia), courage (fortitudo), and temperance (temperantia). The virtue of body (corporis) consists of health (valentudo), beauty (dignitas), strength (vires), and speed (velocitas). And the external circumstances are public office (honos), money (pecunia), connexions by marriage (affinitas), high birth (genus), friends (amici), country (patria), and power (potentia). In speaking of these virtues and circumstances, an orator praises and censures his subject and also his audience and promotes honourable attitudes within the audience. In summary, epideictic speech focuses on issues of honour.

Deliberative rhetoric is future-oriented discourse. It is commonly employed in political debates. Using this class of speech, an orator expresses his/her opinion on a political subject. Cicero argues that deliberative oratory is delivered to “retain, increase or acquire some advantage (utilitas)” and some honour (honesta), “or on the other hand to throw off, lessen or avoid some disadvantage” or dishonour. Cicero further states, “in the deliberative type…Aristotle accepts advantage as the end, but I

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9 Cicero, De Inventione, 2.59.177.  
10 Cicero describes wisdom as “the knowledge of what is good or bad” (Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.159-165).  
11 Cicero, De Inventione, 2.59.177; 2.51.156. The elements of epideictic type are found in 1 Cor 1-4 (see 2.1.2 above).  
12 Cicero, De Inventione, 2.4.13.  
13 Cicero, De Inventione 2.5.18.
prefer both honour and advantage." This is evidence that Cicero’s definition of rhetoric is slightly different from Aristotle and that he developed his theory of rhetoric further on the basis of Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric.

Cicero also argues that in using deliberative oratory, an orator seeks in his/her audience the following things: The first thing has to do with something honourable (honesta) that attracts the audience not by any prospect of gain but by its natural merit and its own worth. Belonging to this category are virtue (virtus), knowledge (scientia), and truth (veritas). The second has to do with something advantageous (utilia) that draws an audience’s attention not because of its own worth and intrinsic goodness, but because of some profit and advantage that is derived from it. Money belongs to this class. The last thing is sought by uniting qualities of honour and advantage, such as a good reputation, friendship, rank, glory, and influence. These have to do with something that “entices people and leads them on, and also holds out

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14 Cicero, De Inventione, 2.51.156.
15 “On the opposite side an equal number to be avoided” (Cicero, De Inventione, 2.52.157).
16 See Cicero, De Inventione 2.52.157. The virtue here refers to virtues of mind such as wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance. They themselves are honourable (Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.159).
17 See Cicero, De Inventione, 2.52.157.
18 These possess their own intrinsic merit. They bring about advantages as well. “Friendship is a desire to do good to some simply for the benefit of the person whom one loves, with a requital of the feeling on his/her part. Rank is the possession of a distinguished office which merits respect, honour, and reverence. Glory consists in a person’s having a widespread reputation accompanied by praise. Influence is a fullness of power, dignity, or resources of some sort” (Cicero, De Inventione 2.55.166).

These four elements are all found in the mentality and behaviour of some of the Corinthian Christians as addressed in 1 Corinthians and 1-4. They built patronal relationships with other Corinthian Christians of lower classes. These relationships were beneficial for both patrons and clients. The two parties exchanged resources for mutual benefits. So they seemingly appear to be friendships between the patrons and the clients. Yet they were in fact hierarchical and unequal relationships between the two parties. They were like a relationship of a ruler and the ruled (see 1 Cor 4:8; 11:22). So these relationships didn’t necessarily include loving each other. In reaction to these patronal relationships, Paul appeals to the Corinthian Christians to build true friendship between themselves. In this friendship ‘love’ (agapē) is the most important element. Paul says, “Love is not arrogant or rude. Love doesn’t insist on its own way” (1 Cor 13:4). Paul commends, “Make love your aim” (14:1). Paul took himself as an example for love. He called them brethren (e.g. 1:10; 2:1; 3:1; 10:1; 12:1).

Some of the Corinthian Christians possessed wealth and power and ranked highly on the social scale (see 1:26). They were held in honour and respect (see 4:8, 10). By using their social power and wealth they influenced other Corinthian Christians of low classes to join their party and opposed Paul (1:12; 3:4). They desired glory and boasted of what they possessed in terms of worldly standards. They boasted about their wisdom, eloquence, wealth, high social status, and social power. They gave glory to themselves rather than to Christ crucified as the wisdom of God (1:29; 4:7; 5:6; cf. 2 Cor 11:18, 21, 30; 12:1).
to them a prospect of some advantage to induce them to seek it more eagerly.”¹⁹ In summary, in the deliberative speech, honour and advantage are the qualities to be sought, while baseness, disadvantage, and dishonour to be avoided.²⁰

Forensic or judicial speech is used in courts of law. This type of speech includes accusation and defence. Its inquiry is towards what is just.²¹ Forms of argumentation which fit forensic rhetoric are “conjectural issues (or issue of fact),” “inference,” “definition” “transfer,” “comparison,” “retort of the accusation,” “shifting the charge,” “confession and avoidance,” “plea for pardon,” and “reward and punishment.”²² Cicero, however, comments that many of the topics and principles of forensic rhetoric are not clearly distinct from those of epideictic and deliberative orations.²³ Here is an example: “from the principles of advantage and honour he may show how inexpedient and base is the course of conduct which the opponents say we were or are bound to follow, and how advantageous and honourable is our act or request.”²⁴

Cicero provides a brief description of the function of parts of the art of rhetoric²⁵:

Invention (inventio) is the discover of valid or seemingly valid arguments (argumenta) to render one’s cause plausible. Arrangement (dispositio) is the distribution of arguments thus discovered in the proper order. Expression (elocutio) is the fitting of the proper language to the invented matter. Memory (memoria) is the firm mental grasp of matter and words. Delivery (pronuntiatio) is the control of voice and body in a manner suitable to the dignity of the subject matter and the style.²⁶

¹⁹Cicero, De Inventione 2.52.157.
²⁰Cicero, De Inventione 2.52.158. I argue that these elements are to justify interpreting 1 Cor 1-4 as deliberative rhetoric (see 2.1.2 above).
²¹See Cicero, De Inventione, 2.4.12.
²²Cicero, De Inventione, 2.4.14-2.51.155. Here Cicero provides a great number of examples for each argumentative form.
²³Cicero, De Inventione, 2.4.13; 2.51.155-6.
²⁴Cicero, De Inventione, 2.47.141.
²⁵“The material of the art of rhetoric seems to me to be that which…Aristotle approved” (Cicero, De Inventione, 1.7.9). This is another evidence of Cicero’s development of his theory of rhetoric based on Aristotle’s theory.
²⁶Cicero, De Inventione, 1.7.9. Paul uses some of these elements to invent his arguments in 1 Corinthians 1-4 (see 2.1.2 above).
Finally, in his *Topica* Cicero demonstrates how to invent arguments. Some arguments are drawn from the following: Conjugation (which means words of the same family, for example, wise, wisely, wisdom), similarity (or analogy), difference, contraries, corollaries, antecedents, consequents, and contradictions. Others are derived from efficient causes, effects, comparison with events of greater, less or equal importance, etc.\(^{28}\)

\(^{27}\)This *Topica* was written in 44 BCE, and was inspired by Aristotle’s writings (see Cicero, *Topica*, 1.1-2).

\(^{28}\)For detailed explanations of each element, see Cicero, *Topica* 3.13: 3.11-7.31.
We now turn to a brief examination of the life of T’oegye. There is no question that Yi T’oegye was one of the most respected and honourable sonbis in Korean history and a yangban of integrity. He was also the most distinguished scholar of Korean Neo-Confucianism and the pioneer contributing to “the establishment of a golden age” in Korean Neo-Confucianism, and his philosophy and thought has profoundly influenced Koreans until today. It is no exaggeration, therefore, to claim that the name of T’oegye itself represents Korean (Neo-)Confucianism as a whole. Yi Ik, a 17th century Confucian scholar, said that what T’oegye was in Korea was the same as

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29Without tackling the philosophy of the prominent Confucian scholar, Yi Hwang whose honorific name is T’oegye, it would not be possible to discuss Korean Confucianism and Confucian wisdom (정의, jeehye) just as it isn’t reasonable to talk about Reformation theology without dealing with Calvinism and the theology of Calvin. In order to help understand the value and importance of Yi T’oegye in the history of Korean Confucianism and philosophy I wish to continue this comparison with John Calvin and his Reformation theology. They were contemporaries in the 16th century, John Calvin (1509-1564) in Europe and Yi T’oegye (1501-1570) in East Asia, though they had such different backgrounds in religion, thought and philosophy. Calvin was one of the key originators of Reformation theology, and his theology and theological perspective has deeply affected many Christian scholars throughout Christian history until today. In a similar sense, Yi T’oegye is esteemed in terms of a Korean context. Due to such interesting connections between the two, in fact, some Korean Christians have recently attempted comparative studies between T’oegye’s philosophy, especially the thought of Kyung referring to ‘reverence’, and Calvin’s theology, especially his Christology and the Christian idea of reverence for God (see Sang-Syub Yi, T’oegyeui Kyung Sasang gwa Calvinesui Christo Jungshim Sasang Beegyo [comparative study between T’oegye’s thought of reverence and the Christology of Calvin] [unpublished MA thesis; Hanil Presbyterian University, 2000]; Il-Gwang Choi, The Comparative Study of the Kyung-Idea of T’oegye and the Christian Reverence Thought [unpublished MA thesis; the Catholic University, 1996]; Do-Kyung Heo, A Comparative Study of Tien and God: Centred on Confucianism and Christianity [unpublished MA thesis; WonKwang University, 1996]). Consequently, the importance of Yi T’oegye in the history of Korean Confucianism and philosophy deserves comparison with that of John Calvin in the history of Christianity and Reformation theology in particular.

30Both yangban and sonbi referred to those who were well-educated and elite people. They were the highest social class. The yangban took all the high-ranking government positions, but the sonbis dedicated to learning rather than had desire for government posts (for details of sonbi and yangban see 4.1 above).

31Tomaeda Ryūtarō, “Yi T’oegye and Chu His: Differences in their Theories of Principle and material Force” in The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea, 243-60, esp. 243; see also Yao, Introduction to Confucianism, 118-20.
what Confucius was in China.32 There were thousands of Confucian scholars in Korean history. Yet none of them is compared with T’oegye in terms of his influence on Korean mentality and national cultural traditions and contribution to the development of Korean Neo-Confucianism. Due to this, T’oegye is one of the most frequent topics explored in Korean Confucianism and philosophy today. For instance, a great number of postgraduate students have recently written their doctoral dissertations on T’oegye’s thought and philosophy. Many universities have academic institutes of T’oegye studies which have constantly conducted a number of annual conferences on T’oegye and have published thousands of articles regarding T’oegye. Furthermore, beyond the Korean peninsula, conferences and significant studies on T’oegye have recently been occurring in other countries such as Japan, China, America, and European countries like Germany.33

To focus our attention on T’oegye’s contribution to the development of Korean Neo-Confucianism, we should observe his life at the time he first entered a Confucian academy.34 At age of 22 in 152335 with the purpose of disciplining himself in the

32 Jong-suk Kim, T’oegye hakeui Ihae (Understanding of T’oegye studies) (Seoul: Il Song Media, 2001), 18.
33 The universities which focus on T’oegye are Dankuk University, Gunkook University, Kyungbook University and Andong University. In addition, there are several journals published whose titles borrow his name, such as T’oegye-hak-bo (Journal of T’oegye Studies), T’oegye-hak (T’oegye Studies), T’oegye-hak-yangu (Research of T’oegye Studies), T’oegye-hak-non-chong (Collection of Journal of T’oegye Studies), T’oegye-hak-gwa-hankook-moonhwa (T’oegye studies and Korean Culture). At the government level there was an exhibition on Neo-Confucianism in the Choson dynasty in November 2003, which was conducted by the Department of Archaeology and the National Museum of Korea. There I witnessed firsthand the important position T’oegye takes in Korean Confucianism.
34 On the 25th of November in 1501 Yi Hwang was born youngest of seven brothers and a sister in a modest yangban family in the village of Ongye, located near Andong in modern Kyungsan Bukdo, about 200 kilometres southwest of Seoul. He is known worldwide by his honorific name, T’oegye, which was taken from the small village which used to be called T’ogye, near his birthplace, where he spent the last two decades of his life fully devoted to study, writing and teaching (Kalton, Ten Diagrams, 14-5).
35 The year 1523 was just four years after the purge of Gimyo in 1519. Briefly, this was a purge of the literati, the enthusiastic Confucian scholar-officials, whose head was Cho Kwangjo who entered office first in 1515. They attempted a political and social reform with an ethical and political ideology of Neo-Confucianism, with the assistance of King Chungjong. But soon after the king tired of their uncompromising reform which they pushed too far and too fast, and he purged Cho Kwangjo and his group in 1519. At that time the movement which Cho Kwangjo and his group led was “a centre of attention and hopes,” especially for young (Confucian) students including T’oegye. This purge
Confucian way of learning, T’oegye entered the Confucian Academy, Songgyun’gwan. During this time he experienced the deep effect of the purge of 1519. It caused students to be disinterested, to lack concentration on study, and to leave the academy. He oftentimes heard from his fellow students that there was no point in studying hard. Yet T’oegye was still absorbed in reading and study, facing the wall, so that he was “made an object of mockery.” T’oegye then obtained the book Simgyong (Classics of the Mind-and-Heart) which became the most important book in establishing his Confucian thought systematically. He used to read it early morning every day until his death.

In 1534, the 29th year of King Chungjong, T’oegye passed the national examination which led to an official career, and began to enter government service. For 15 years he served in office with four kings (Chungjong [1506-1544], Injong [1544-1545], Myongjong [1545-1567], Sonjo [1567-1508]). During their reigns, they highly valued T’oegye’s study and personality, and all of these kings fervently desired him to become their assistant, teacher and advisor. He was appointed to the ministries generally concerned with “drafting royal documents, compiling dynastic history, or composing documents addressed to the Ming court” (that was the Chinese kingdom), which provided opportunities for him to utilise his “scholarly and literary talents.”

Besides such ministries, he was appointed to other high-ranking government positions, but he politely refused to accept the positions. Rather, he seriously desired

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36 Kalton, Ten Diagrams, 16; Chongun Yun, T’oegye Yi Hwang uhdekkye salatnonga? (How did T’oegye Yi Hwang live?) (Seoul: Nuhryntuh, 2003), 72-3.
37 Myoung-Jong Ryu “T’oegye’eui sam (shang ae)” (Life of T’oegye), T’oegyehak nonchong 7 (2001) 273-90, esp. 276.
38 Park, Choson, 178-220.
39 Kalton, Ten Diagrams, 16.
to retire from public service due to his ill health. He also had some other reasons for retiring, such as his own experience of the effect of the literati purges of the Neo-Confucian scholar-officials (which occurred in 1498, 1504, 1519 and 1545), his non-interest in political power, and his lifelong desire to immerse himself in the Neo-Confucian fashion of study and self-cultivation, and writing and teaching.\(^{40}\) During the period of government service T’oegye was gradually becoming known to the government and the people. He built a high reputation as a “conscientious official” and a “man of integrity” and became famed as the master of Chu Hsi’ Learning (so-called Neo-Confucianism, founded in the 12\(^{th}\) c. in China) and as a poet.\(^{41}\)

When he was forty-nine years old in 1549, his yearning for retirement from public life finally came to a reality. He went to T’ogye (which was renamed T’oegye later), near his birth place where he fully devoted himself to learning, and he wrote and taught his disciples as well. During the period of his retirement for 21 years T’oegye was visited by the brilliant young Confucian student, Yi Yulgok (1536-1584) in 1558. Soon after, this meeting led to a disciple/teacher relationship between them for 13 years until T’oegye’s death. This was historically significant, because later Yulgok’s disciples formed “the school of the primacy of ki (material force) (Chukip’a)” whereas T’oegye’s followers became “the school of the primacy of li (principle) (Chulip’a).”\(^{42}\) These were the two divergent parties representing Korean Neo-Confucianism as a whole. Soon after the encounter with Yulgok, for seven years from early 1559 to late 1566, T’oegye carried on the debate of the ‘Four-Seven thesis’ (sachillon) with the young scholar Ki Taesung (Kobong, 1529-1592). This became


recorded as the first free scholarly debate and a genuine philosophical debate between a master and a disciple (a free debate between the two was abnormal in a Korean Confucian context then, and even still today) in the whole history of Korean Confucianism. In this debate T’oegye discussed psychology (emotions or feelings) and anthropology (human nature). Moreover, this debate symbolises “a major landmark of philosophical sophistication in the tradition of East Asian Confucianism.”

In 1568, King Sunjo called him again and appointed to a position as a teacher of the King. At this time T’oegye wrote *Sunghak sipdo* (the Ten Diagrams of the Learning of the Sages), the greatest work of his entire thought and philosophy with his comments on Chu His’ Learning. T’oegye attributed it to the king, and the king then ordered a big screen to be made with it on and it surrounded his throne so he could read it every day. Of all his writings, this is the most important work to understand T’oegye’s Confucian thought, which has been deeply affecting Korean Confucian wisdom ever since. On the 8th of December in 1570 T’oegye died. After T’oegye a great number of scholars were influenced by his Neo-Confucian thought. There were more than 300 disciples who carried on his Confucian philosophy from

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44 Additionally, a list of T’oegye’s writings is as follow: Ch’umnyang tosul (Diagrammatic Explanation of the Mandate of Heaven) in 1553, *Kyemong chunui* (Problems Regarding the Study of Changes) in 1557, *Chuju churyo* (Essentials of Mater Chu’s Correspondence) and *Chusung nok* (Record for Self-Reflection) in 1558, Songge Wan Myung ihak t’ongnok (Comprehensive Records of the School of Principle in the Sung, Yüan, and ming Periods) in 1559, Three “Four-Seven Letters” in 1559-1566, *Paeksia Sigyo Chunsannok ch’ojuan insu kihu* (Postscript to a Conveyed Copy of Ch’en Hsien-Chang’s *Instructions through Poetry and Wang Yang-ming’s Instruction for Practical Living*) and *Chunsannok nonbyun* (Critique of Wang Yang-ming’s *Instruction for practical Living*) and *Heoan sansaeng haengjjang* (Biographical Account of Master Chu His) in 1566, *Yukcho so* (Six-Article Memorial) in 1568, *Sasu haeui* (A Commentary on the Four Books) in 1569, *Samgyung haeui* (Commentary on the Three Classic) and *Sim mu ch’eyeong pyun* (Critique on the Saying “the Mind Does Not Have Substance and Function”) and *Pi iki wi ilmul pyunchang* (Treatise on the Saying That “I and Ki Are Not One”) are not dated (Chung, *Neo-Confucianism*, 199-203).

the 16th century to the 18th century such as Yu Sungryong, Ki Taesung, Yi Dukhong, Yi Yulgok, Cho Mok, Yi Jae, Yi Ik, and Yi Hangro.\textsuperscript{46}

Throughout his whole life the most striking point in his contribution to Korean history, especially the history of Korean Confucianism, was that T’oegeye contextualised or incarnated into a Korean soil Chungjuhak (the Ch’eng-Chu school) and Chujahak (the Chu Hsi School) of Chinese Neo-Confucianism.\textsuperscript{47} In other words, he shaped a new creative form of Neo-Confucianism which was most relevant to the Korean spirit or culture. It was so called Choson Sunglihak (the school [hak] of human nature [sung] and principle [li or i]) or Korean Neo-Confucianism. T’oegeye theoretically systemised Choson Sunglihak in terms of ontology, epistemology, anthropology and ethics. Moreover, his idea of the i or li (principle) and ki (material force) dualism profoundly influenced his contemporaries and his disciples who formed the school of the primacy of li (Chulip’a) later. Such a dualistic tendency appears in his ‘Four-Seven thesis’ and involves the good-evil opposition.\textsuperscript{48} Accordingly, it is appropriate to say that since T’oegeye in the Korean peninsula there has truly been established an authentic Korean Confucianism that clearly differs from Confucianism in China.

T’oegeye therefore takes the most prominent position in Korean Confucianism and culture. There is no doubt that he still lives on in the spirit of Korean culture and has become an icon of Korean Confucianism today. It can be said, therefore, that

\textsuperscript{46}Kyungsang buk’do, \textit{T’oegeyehak yeungu} (T’oegeye Studies: vols. 8-10, 15, 16-21) (Daegu: Hankok Chulp’an’ sa, 1995).

\textsuperscript{47}This school was a Chinese Neo-Confucianism legacy, which was primarily formulated in association with the Sung Chinese philosophers, Ch’eng I (1033-1107) and Chu Hsi (1130-1200). In other words, it is described as Sungnihak or Hsing-li hsüeh referring to the school (hak) of human nature (sung) and principle (li or ni in a Korean pronunciation) which came to and dominated the Korean peninsula in the Choson dynasty (1393-1910). Due to T’oegeye’s influence, it was introduced into Japan (Chung, \textit{Neo-Confucianism}, xiii).

\textsuperscript{48}It is not my interest here to deal with his Four-Seven thesis (for detail see Chung, \textit{Neo-Confucianism}, 53-118; Sa-soon Yoon (trans. and comm.), \textit{T’oegeye Sunjip} (Collection of T’oegeye) (Seoul: Hyunam’ sa, 1993), 31.
Korean Confucian wisdom is grounded in T’oegye’s Confucian philosophical thought, so that it is even called, ‘T’oegye-ism’.

Prior to the study of T’oegye’s idea of wisdom it is helpful to briefly describe a Confucian understanding of wisdom in general, for T’oegye developed his idea of wisdom in accordance with the Confucian tradition. In a Confucian tradition, wisdom (jeehye/sulgi)\(^49\) is interchangeably used with ‘knowledge’ (jee shik) in general and it, in a broader sense, refers to ‘knowledge’ and ‘to know’. In Chinese characters the word 智 (jee, wisdom) is composed of the word 知 (jee, knowledge) and the word 日 (il, day), as it stands, and used in a verbal sense it means ‘to be wise’ and ‘to know’. In this regard it can be interpreted that a human being can obtain wisdom in the course of accumulating (or piling up) knowledge or learning everyday.\(^50\)

The Korean Confucian scholar, Jang-Tae Keum sees wisdom and knowledge (jeesik) in the same way. He replaces wisdom by knowledge in tackling the problem of knowledge in Confucianism. Here, for wisdom he substitutes knowledge as one of the Four Beginnings. The rest are “benevolence” (in), “righteousness” (eui), “propriety” (ye).\(^51\) Likewise, in Confucianism both wisdom and knowledge are interchangeably used or have an interdependent relationship.

In a narrower sense, however, wisdom in Confucianism specifically refers to the attempt to distinguish between what is right and what is wrong in terms of a moral or ethical perspective. In short, wisdom refers to a virtue of discernment between the right and the wrong. Mencius especially understood wisdom in a close relation with benevolence (in) and righteousness (eui) that are a moral standard or principle. He, in

\(^49\)In a Korean Confucian context for the meaning of wisdom we are interchangeably using the two words jeehye and sulgi. They have the same meaning of wisdom, but it is a difference that the former originally derives from a Chinese character while the latter is a pure Korean. Therefore, in this essay I will interchangeably use the two words.

\(^50\)Jung, Ukyo ihae, 209.

a strict way, narrowed wisdom down only to the knowledge which could be compatible with benevolence and righteousness. In other words, for him wisdom is knowledge to know what is right morally, what is benevolent, and what is righteous. He further claimed that a person is not able to be human, who doesn’t have wisdom, which is the sense of discernment between right and wrong. As seen above, in Confucianism wisdom refers to knowledge in a broad sense, but more interestingly it is seen, in terms of a moral or ethical perspective, as sense or ability to distinguish what is right from what is wrong. It seems clear, therefore, that in Confucianism wisdom is closely related to moral or ethical behaviour. Such an idea was surely carried on by T’oegye.

T’oegye’s perception of wisdom (智, jeehye) is certainly shown in his Four-Seven thesis. This Four-Seven topic was originated by Mencius (Mengzi, 371-289 BCE) in the Book of Mencius and Confucius (Kong Fuzi, 552-479 BCE.) in the Book of Rites. According to T’oegye, it is argued that the Four Beginnings (S’adan), such as benevolence (or humanity), righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, are assigned to human nature (sung) and refer to “the issuance of principle” (li or i), and the Seven Feelings (or Emotions) representing pleasure, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred, and desire, are assigned to “the mind-and-heart (sim)” and refer to “the issuance of material force” (ki). As seen above, T’oegye regarded wisdom as part of the Four Beginnings or human nature. If so, in order to grasp T’oegye’s conception of wisdom it is proper to see what he discussed about human nature (sung) or the Four Beginnings (S’adan). In

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52See Jung, Ukyoyihae, 210; Il-Whan Chun (ed.), Meng’ja; Jungchichulhak (the Book of Mencius; Political Philosophy) (Seoul: Jayoomoong’go, 1998), 110-1.
53See Hwang, “Spiritual Cultivation,” 223. It was Kwon Kun (Yangch’on, 1352-1409) who was the first Neo-Confucian scholar speaking of the four-seven topic in Korea (Chung, Neo-Confucianism, 13).
so doing, it is noteworthy that T’oegye’s perception of the Four Beginnings was deeply influenced by Mencius’ idea of human nature. T’oegye’s consideration of human nature as perfectly good certainly accorded with Mencius’ insistence upon “the ultimate justification” of human nature.\textsuperscript{55} According to Mencius it is said that the Four Beginnings (or human nature) are imparted or endowed by Heaven (\textit{T’ien}, Nature) and thus intrinsically good.\textsuperscript{56} And also in the Mencius doctrine it is an interesting point that the Four Beginnings are regarded as “innate, moral characteristics” of the fundamentally perfect goodness of human nature or, similarly, as “the four roots of moral goodness inherent in human nature,” or “indications of the human potential for moral self-cultivation.”\textsuperscript{57} So it is an integral part of Mencius’ perception of human nature that the Four Beginnings described as moral qualities are essentially good, because they are imparted by Heaven (\textit{T’ien}). On this basis it is clear that Mencius regarded the Four Beginnings (or human nature) as the roots and sources of morality. In other words, it can be said that wisdom as part of the Four Beginnings should be seen in an intimate relationship with a moral or ethical sense. This idea deeply influenced T’oegye’s perception of the Four Beginnings (or human nature), especially his idea of wisdom.

Besides Mencius, in understanding the Four Beginnings (or human nature) T’oegye was directly or indirectly influenced by Chu Hsi and Chung Chiun (Ch’uman, 1509-1561) in \textit{Ch’unmyungdo} (Diagram of Heaven’s Imperative). Like them T’oegye interpreted human nature in the theory of principle (\textit{li}) and material force (\textit{ki}). It is T’oegye’s claim that the Four Beginnings as “inborn moral qualities”

\textsuperscript{55}Wei-ming, “T’oegye’s Perception,” 263.
\textsuperscript{56}Wei-ming, “T’oegye’s Perception,” 263-4.
are purely good. This is because they originate with or are initiated and dominated by li ([heavenly] principle). This principle, in a metaphysical sense, is the Supreme Ultimate (Tae’geuk) and the origin of goodness or goodness itself. As seen earlier, T’oegye’s perception of the Four Beginnings does not differ from Mencius’. Accordingly, in T’oegye it seems that wisdom is purely good, because it is initiated by the Supreme Ultimate, and that this wisdom should be seen in a close connection with a moral or ethical sense, just as in Mencius. This is certainly attested in T’oegye’s emphasis on the close relationship between wisdom and becoming a sage.

Wisdom (jeehye) plays the most significant role in becoming a sage (hyun’in, in a similar sense, sung’in 聖人 or gun’ja 君子). In T’oegye’s mind it was the ultimate purpose (or eventual goal) of study or learning that he would become a sage by virtue of wisdom like Confucius (Kong Fuzi) or Mencius (Mengzi). In T’oegye, thus, it was understood that obtaining wisdom or to be wise and becoming a sage had the same connotation. Accordingly, it is clear that T’oegye highly valued wisdom as part of human virtue in an anthropological perspective in his Confucian thought. This has strongly influenced Korean Confucian wisdom in our time.

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60 Cho, Sunghak sipdo, 20-42.