Educating for democracy in Australian schooling: towards a secular global age through an inquiry into the religious

By

Audrey Challis Statham

B.A.(Hons) (Durham University), B.A.(Hons) (Oxford University)

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Abstract

This thesis examines how the Australian Values Framework does not appear to be actualising UNESCO’s call to promote a particular notion of democracy which they consider as necessary in order to pursue world peace. Specific consideration is given to religious groups which do not appear to be included as legitimate participants of values formation in the Australian context through the Australian Values Framework. The major approach of this research is theoretical. The main theorists that this inquiry engages with are philosopher and educator, John Dewey, and theologian, Stanley Hauerwas, because these are argued to be highly relevant for evaluating different interpretations of democracy in light of the concerns of a religious perspective. The separate chapters of this thesis address distinct dimensions of the Australian context in order to find out how they might be understood in such a way as to be valuable for engaging with UNESCO’s aspiration to realise world peace through a particular conception of democracy. This particular understanding of democracy is one that is inclusive of all groups globally – including those who are religious. Chapter One examines the concept of the secular. Chapter Two examines aims of mass schooling in a secular context. Chapter Three explores different understandings of democracy. Chapter Four undertakes an analysis of the Australian Values Framework. Chapter Five examines a religious response to the Australian Values Framework. Chapter Six
explores an understanding of democracy as a personal way of life at the heart of which is an understanding of values as an activity of valuation. This study finds that there is an intrinsic relation between inclusive democracy, secularism and education and that all three of these together necessarily promote participation in political life for all groups, including the religious and the non-religious together, in order that UNESCO’s aspiration for world peace might become actualised.
**Declaration**

I hereby declare that this PhD thesis entitled "Educating for democracy in Australian schooling: towards a secular global age through an inquiry into the religious" is my own work and where reference is made to the work of others, due acknowledgment is given. It contains no material that has been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award of any other degree or diploma, to any university or institution.

Signed ……………………………

Audrey Statham

2\textsuperscript{nd} January 2014
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Preface

In light of the principle that it makes a difference who conducts an investigation, it seems fitting to offer a brief account of some features and episodes of my own individual history that have influenced me to organise my life in pursuit of doing this thesis for the past several years.

I had a keen interest from a young age in words, language and the complexity of meaning that can arise through the interweaving of literary narratives in novels, which influenced my decision after I finished school to study that quintessentially ‘feminine’ subject, English Literature, at Durham University. Durham was a predominantly non-religious milieu that seemed largely indifferent to faith. At that time I was disturbed by painful misgivings that I may have unthinkingly accepted the religious convictions of my parents and I struggled with doubt over the question of whether I would have become a Christian had I not had a Christian upbringing. After temporising for some time, towards the end of my first undergraduate degree I reached a point where I felt unable to evade the question of faith any longer. In hindsight, my decision to study Theology at Oxford immediately after completing my literature degree served, in part, as a means for me to ‘come out’ openly as a religious person in a world that seemed to me to be growing increasingly suspicious and even fearful of religion.

At Oxford, I became interested in the discipline of Christian moral reasoning and particularly in the writings of Stanley Hauerwas, a North American theologian and social ethicist whose work offers resources for thinking about how religious persons,
particularly Christians, can live well in a 'post-Christendom' cultural environment.
Consequently, after completing my theology degree I returned to Australia and enrolled at the University of Divinity in Melbourne to study for a Masters degree by thesis in Christian moral reasoning, in which I focussed on providing a Christian critique of a then new, and controversial, Australian national government policy for teaching values in state and faith schools. I was then permitted to undertake the thesis as a PhD. This has been the trajectory by which I came to inquire from a particular religious perspective into the nature of education in a global era with a view to proposing a way forward from the kind of approach that a policy like the National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools promotes.

When I began my inquiry into the Australian values education initiative I did so from a position of already being quite sympathetic towards Stanley Hauerwas’s work. Hauerwas’s radical Christian critique of the nation-state and neutralist liberalism – particularly his argument that religious persons are required to remain silent about their most cherished convictions in public forums – greatly influenced my attitude towards the secular and democracy. Under the influence of my understanding of Hauerwas, I had come to regard the secular and democracy as forces ‘external’ to me that were, at best, benignly neutral, and, at worst, actively hostile and suspicious of religion and religious persons like myself. But during the course of research for this thesis my understanding of how I relate as a religious person to democracy and to the secular changed profoundly. This personal transformation came about through my introduction to the writings of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century North American philosopher and educator, John Dewey.
My understanding of Dewey's conception of democracy as a personal way of life enabled me to re-evaluate my earlier position. I determined that my former attitude towards democracy and the secular had been one of indifference and unconsidered ambivalence and that such an outlook was characteristic of a kind of religious person that has not yet been enabled to contribute towards making this global age more inclusive of those with and without religious faith. Consequently, the focus of my research shifted considerably with the result that one of the key questions driving my inquiry then became: might a particular kind of democracy in a global age be rooted in an inquiry into the religious?

Now I believe that democracy is intrinsically related to the kind of religious person that I am being. Also, whether or not this global age becomes a bit more secular and a bit less secularist depends largely on whether religious and non-religious persons are enabled through a process of education to live well as democratic persons. This informs my position that Australian state and faith schools ought to educate for democracy as a personal way of life because this version of democracy does not relegate religion to the private sphere but enables those with and without religious faith to engage in valuation of their purposes in public forums, which is conducive to a secular global age.
**Introduction**

This thesis seeks to examine how the Australian Values Framework does not appear to be actualising UNESCO’s call to promote a particular notion of democracy which they consider as necessary in order to pursue world peace. Specifically, the Australian context, through the values framework, does not appear to be educating for a democratic inclusivity of religious groups as legitimate participants of values formation and indeed of political life in general. In order to more clearly examine this problem, it is valuable to set the context by giving a brief overview of the educational discourse, policies and practice in which it is embedded. For that reason I will now unpack the relationship between three key documents that have had a significant bearing on Australian schooling over the past two decades, and which also give sense to the challenge to which this thesis is responding: *Learning: the Treasure Within*, an international report on education published in 1996 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO); the *Adelaide Declaration of National Goals: Australia’s Common and Agreed National Goals for Schooling in the Twenty-first Century*, a national document for Australian schooling issued in 1999 by an Australian government ministerial council for education, MCEETYA; and the *National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools*, a framework that identified nine values for Australian schooling which MCEETYA endorsed in 2005.1

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1 MCEETYA, the Ministerial Council for Employment Education Training and Youth Affairs, is a forum for Australian state, territory and federal education ministers to make common decisions regarding Australian schooling. In 2008, the *Adelaide Declaration* was superseded by the *Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians*. See, MCEECDYA, *Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians*. See, MCEECDYA, *Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians*.

... footnote cont’d on next page
UNESCO's Delors Report, *Learning: the Treasure Within*, has come to be regarded by educators, governments and associated organisations as a key reference for the conceptualisation of education and learning worldwide. According to the Delors Report, globalisation is posing challenges to the ability of the increasingly heterogeneous, multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious populations of nation-states to peacefully co-exist with each other, which is, in turn, placing the future of life on our planet at risk.² The Delors Report argues that these challenges urgently need to be addressed through education for democracy and world peace. In the context of Australia, MCEETYA sought to respond to UNESCO's challenge by issuing in 1999 the *Adelaide Declaration of National Goals: Australia's Common and Agreed National Goals for Schooling in the Twenty-first Century*. While this has been superseded by the 2008 *Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians*, it is the *Adelaide Declaration³* which specifically endeavoured to put the Delors Report into a regional context and to use it as a basis for discussion on how Australia should best develop policies and

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strategies for education in the twenty-first-century. MCEETYA endorsed in 2002, a values education initiative that the then Australian Federal Education Minister instigated called the *Values Education Study*, which claimed to be consistent with the *Adelaide Declaration*'s vision for education.

The findings of the *Values Education Study* provided the basis for the formulation in 2005 of the *National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools*, which was published and disseminated to all Australian schools along with a poster that listed “nine values for Australian schooling”, which the *Values Education Study* identified.

This poster bore, at the behest of the then Australian Federal Education Minister, the superimposed image of 'Simpson and his donkey', an Australian war hero, who, with his donkey, survived forty days at Gallipoli in World War I. The Australian Federal Government allocated $29.7 million over a period of four years from 2004-2008.

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One of the participants in the Taskforce that produced the document for Australian schooling proposed that "the Delors Report can serve as a template to apply to our goals for schooling and their directions" and identified that the "[Australian national] goals appear to capture well the central themes of the Delors Report, particularly the four pillars". See, Geoff Spring, "Education for the 21st Century: A South Australian Perspective - Keynote Address," in *Forum of South Australian Education Leaders* (Flinders University, Adelaide, South Australia: 17 November, 1998), 12.


towards school-based implementation of the Australian national framework.\textsuperscript{7} All Australian schools – not just those schools that participated in the values education initiative – were required to display the values framework poster in a prominent place as a condition of federal funding. Funding was also tied to the requirement that every Australian school have a functioning flagpole and fly the Australian flag.\textsuperscript{8}

The \textit{National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools} bases its claim to legitimacy on its alleged link to the \textit{Adelaide Declaration} and on the unanimous endorsement that the \textit{Values Education Study} received from MCEETYA in 2002.\textsuperscript{9} Given the Australian national framework’s claim to be consistent with the \textit{Adelaide Declaration}, one would expect the Australian national framework to reflect the Delors Report’s objectives, which informed the \textit{Adelaide Declaration}.\textsuperscript{10} However, the importance that both the Delors Report and the \textit{Adelaide Declaration} place on educating for democracy and world peace in a globalised environment is not evident in the Australian values framework.\textsuperscript{11}

The \textit{National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools} provides no philosophical justification for the nine values that it stipulates Australian state and faith schools ought to promote. It lacks grounding in theoretical inquiry into the nature of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 3. \\
\textsuperscript{8} Anna Clark, "Flying the Flag for Mainstream Australia," \textit{Griffith Review} 11, (2006): 107. \\
\textsuperscript{9} DEST, 1. \\
\textsuperscript{10} Spring, 12. \\
\textsuperscript{11} R. Scott Webster, "Does the Australian National Framework for Values Education Stifle an Education for World Peace?," \textit{Educational Philosophy and Theory} 42, no. 4 (2010): 468.
\end{flushleft}
education, democracy and values. Moreover, no investigation was undertaken to establish whether the understanding of values and democracy which informs the Australian values education initiative is one that can educate citizens capable of building a democratic society that is inclusive of those with and without religious faith. In short, it is not clear that the conception of democracy that informs the *National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools* is inclusive and not exclusionary of religious faith. Nor is it clear that the conception of values that informs the Australian national framework is educative and not indoctrinatory.

The challenge to which thesis is offering a response is the disparity between UNESCO’s project to realise world peace through a notion of democracy and the Australian values framework’s response, which can be read as inadequate and even as hindering UNESCO’s mission. The kind of democracy that the Delors Report argues a globalised environment is now creating a need for countries to promote through their systems of education appears quite different from common sense understandings, which usually associate democracy with voting in periodic elections. It seems a certain type of democracy is more suited to UNESCO’s international role to enable diverse minority groups and nations to collaborate with each other. This version of democracy takes a particular stance towards values, tolerance, plurality and participation, which can be understood to distinguish it from prevailing interpretations of democracy in the West. For example, the following quote from the Delors Report takes a particular view towards tolerance and values:

> Education in tolerance and respect for other people, a prerequisite for democracy, should be regarded as a general and ongoing enterprise. Values in
general and tolerance in particular cannot be taught in the strict sense: the desire to impose from the outside predetermined values comes down in the end to negating them, since values only have meaning when they are freely chosen by the individual.\textsuperscript{12}

In another passage, the Delors Report reemphasises its view on the kind of approach that education ought to take towards values:

Education cannot be satisfied with bringing individuals together by getting them to accept common values shaped in the past. It must also answer the question as to what for and why we live together and give everyone, throughout life, the ability to play an active part in envisioning the future of society (original emphasis).\textsuperscript{13}

Finally, the Delors Report connects a notion of ‘the democratic spirit’ to a form of tolerance that seems more profound than a common sense view of tolerance and argues that both can be cultivated through ‘an education for pluralism’:

The democratic spirit, however, cannot be satisfied with a minimalist form of tolerance that consists merely of putting up with otherness ... The simple notion

\textsuperscript{12} Delors, 60.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 61.
of tolerance must therefore be transcended in favour of an education for pluralism based on respect for, and appreciation of other cultures.\textsuperscript{14}

The emphasis that the Delors Report can be seen to place in these excerpts upon tolerance, plurality, participation and a notion of values as only meaningful if they are freely chosen by the individual suggests that UNESCO’s understanding of democracy is one that is hospitable towards ‘otherness’ or difference. It seems that UNESCO is working for a kind of world or global environment in which all groups are able to participate and is therefore promoting a version of democracy that can be interpreted as inclusive of non-religious and religious groups. Yet the requirement that all Australian schools display in a prominent position a poster of the \textit{National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools} listing the nine values as a condition of federal funding can be seen to contradict and even to oppose UNESCO’s idea, for example, that values are only meaningful if they are freely chosen. The uniform imposition of ‘common values’ also runs counter to UNESCO’s emphasis on pluralism, which is necessarily inclusive of non-religious and religious groups. Throughout the next coming chapters I am going to explore in detail why the Australian values framework is not actualising in the Australian context the possibility that the Delors Report identifies of pursuing world peace through a particular notion of democracy that is inclusive of all groups globally.

\textbf{Australia is clearly a secular society}\textsuperscript{15} and this is the context which frames the Australian values framework. However, it is not clear what the secular means or

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., 60.
whether it is something that is inclusive or exclusionary of the religious. For that reason, Chapter One investigates the meaning of the secular. Since all government policy occurs within a secular context in Australia, then if the outcome of this inquiry into the meaning of the secular finds the secular to be exclusionary of the religious it follows that every Australian policy is problematic with respect to plurality and not just the Australian values education policy. Consequently, it might be that secularism is a condition that is influencing the Australian values framework to prefer to seek unity through the imposition of common values rather than through support for pluralism that is inclusive of religious groups. This chapter aims to add clarity to what is now unclear about the meaning of the secular in order to determine whether this term is appropriate to use as something that is inclusive of the religious and the non-religious together. Depending on the outcome of this inquiry, the notion of the secular may or may not be promoted as being the basis of a kind of democracy that UNESCO is pursuing, which is inclusive of all groups globally.

In order to further explore why the Australian values framework is not actualising UNESCO’s project of pursuing world peace in the Australian context, Chapter Two examines how the history of the aims of mass schooling in a particular Western society has contributed towards an understanding of citizenship. Following on from the previous chapter’s inquiry into the secular, this inquiry into aims of mass schooling investigates what being a secular society means for citizenship formation in the Australian system of mass schooling. This chapter enquires into what kind of citizenship

15 For example, Section 116 of the Australian constitution states that the Commonwealth may not legislate to establish any religion or to impose any religious observance.
has been promoted in mass schooling in the West and into whether democratic citizenship has been promoted. It seeks to find out whether the kind of citizenship that the aims of Australian schooling currently promote are actualising or hindering the sort of democracy that UNESCO requires to attain world peace.

In addition to being a secular society, the Australian context in which the Australian values framework was implemented is also a democracy. However, it is not clear whether the kind of democracy practiced in Australia is in keeping with a type of democracy that is inclusive of all groups globally which UNESCO argues is necessary for attaining world peace. Chapter Three aims to find out whether prevailing understandings in Australia of democracy count as sophisticated and profound or limited and superficial through an inquiry into the relationship between democracy, citizenship and education. It might be that UNESCO’s project of pursuing world peace is not being actualised in the Australian context by the Australian values framework because of the kind of democracy that prevails in Australia.

Chapter Four investigates the nature of the National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools through an inquiry into various debates in which the policy is embedded. It conducts an evaluation of the Australian values framework in order to find out what kind of conception of values and what sort of attitudes towards tolerance, plurality, and participation it promotes. This evaluation is necessary in order to determine whether the nature of the policy and its conception of values is one that is able to actualise UNESCO’s project of pursuing world peace in the Australian context.
In order to explore how certain religious groups are positioned by a policy like the Australian values framework and also how such groups respond to those positionings, Chapter Five examines the stance adopted by a particular North American theological perspective towards the nation-state and neutralist liberal interpretations of democracy. This chapter seeks to find out whether the response of such a religious perspective to a policy like the Australian values framework is one that is able to contribute to UNESCO’s project of pursuing world peace through a particular notion of democracy.

Chapter Six explores a particular, participatory interpretation of democracy as a personal way of life in order to investigate its conception of values, its attitude towards tolerance, and the extent to which it may or may not be inclusive of pluralism, including religious groups. The inquiry that this chapter undertakes is necessary in order to find out if it is possible to identify a comprehensively worked out version of democracy that can support UNESCO’s role to be inclusive of all groups globally and help to operationalise UNESCO’s pursuit of world peace. This chapter also investigates whether a factor that might be contributing to UNESCO’s project not being at present actualised in Australia might be the absence of this kind of participatory democracy from the Australian political context and from citizenship formation in Australian schooling.

Chapter Seven discusses the findings of each chapter, addresses implications of the study and suggests areas for future research.
Chapter One – Education in a secular society

Globalisation is now transforming the parameters within which countries operate and radically redefining the foreign relations and domestic politics of most nations within an emerging global interstate system. Prior to learners even entering the institution of mass schooling the first challenge to their way of thinking is now coming from a feature of the globalised environment itself in the form of daily confrontation with pluralism. The increasing diversity of populations is also placing pressure on the notion of the secular, which has hitherto been linked in the west to a conception of the nation-state as founded on shared ethnicity, language, blood ties and a common history.

In order to explore opportunities that exposure to pluralism might offer for working with an aspect of globalisation to enrich humanity and to guard against possible inhumane long-term consequences of globalisation, this chapter examines the meaning of the concept of ‘a secular society’. It concludes by posing a challenge to which this thesis seeks to offer a response: is there a need to develop an approach to education which is secular in the sense of inclusive of the concerns of those with and without religious faith that aims to educate non-religious and religious learners through engaging with values towards being a democratic kind of person?

1.1 The concept of ‘a secular society’

It is frequently observed in the West that we live in ‘secular’ societies and that this state of affairs is ‘increasing’. Yet, as Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor, observes, if one
delves beneath the surface of this commonplace perception "it's not so clear in what this secularity consists".16

*The concept of ‘secular’*

In Western European history, according to Saudi American anthropologist, Talal Asad, “the secular is neither singular in origin nor stable in its historical identity, although it works through a series of particular oppositions”.17 Etymologically, it derives from the Latin, *saecularis*, the adjective of the noun, *saeculum*, meaning age or “a big tract of time”.18 Charles Taylor refers directly to this temporal meaning of ‘secular’, which sounds strange to contemporary ears, in the title of his book, *A Secular Age*. The etymology of *saeculum* is unknown and according to Dutch scholar of ancient Greek and Roman religion, Jan N. Bremmer, the meanings of *saecularis* and *saeculum* underwent important changes “only in Christian times”.19 Christian theologians such as Tertullian20 (c.160 – c.225 AD) and Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430 AD) developed the notion of *saeculum* which “remained alive during the whole time Latin played an important role

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18 Taylor, 264.
20 For an account of the distinction that Tertullian drew between on the one hand, *saeculum*, the world or cosmos, and, on the other hand, *saecularia*, interpreted as attachment to worldly affairs more than to God, see Jeffrey Burton Russell, *Satan: The Early Christian Tradition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981).
For an account of Tertullian’s understanding of the relationship between ‘Church’ and ‘world’, which argues that Tertullian held them to be mutually exclusive, see Robert Austin Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St Augustine* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
in the world of scholars and clergy”. Augustine inaugurated a Latin phrase, *saeculum senescens*, which referred to the epoch after the appearance of Christ as ‘the Age growing old’ (*senescens* is from the Latin, *senēscō*, which means ‘ageing’, ‘decaying’ or ‘declining’). This expressed an Augustinian sentiment towards the world as one that is ‘ageing’ and towards the present as a period of waiting in expectation for Christ’s return when history – which runs its course through this ‘Age passing away’ – will end, and, simultaneously, the end of time as a historical event is held to mean the fulfillment or completion of historical existence. The secular as an age can therefore be described as an epoch in which Christians and non-Christians alike co-exist. This older, temporal sense of secular can be understood to be a meaning that is inclusive of the religious and the non-religious.

English medieval historian and theologian, Robert Markus, argues that the meaning of *saeculum* was central to Augustine’s confrontation in 411 C. E. with a group called the Donatists, a schismatic Christian movement that opposed what they perceived to be the ‘apostate church’ legalised by the Roman Emperor, Constantine I in 313 C. E. This group regarded themselves as “the true Church”, defined themselves in opposition to the “Catholic” establishment and considered themselves to be the pure “representatives

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21 Bremmer, 432.

of orthodoxy". According to Markus, Augustine did not juxtapose the sacred to the profane, which “for him, interpenetrate in the *saeulum*; the ‘secular’ is neutral, ambivalent, but no more profane than it is sacred. His image of the Church is that of a ‘secular’ institution. In this dispute between Augustine and the Donatists, Markus argues that "the nature of the church and of the relation between it and the world" was at stake. This can be taken to illustrate that Christianity has been prone to schism and internal conflict since the earliest days of Christendom. My discussion in this chapter of different religious perspectives on the secular aims to show that religious thinkers have continued throughout the twentieth- and twenty-first-centuries to grapple with the question of the meaning of the secular.

The meaning of the term ‘secular’ in common usage is hard to pin down because it is widely applied as an adjective to a broad range of concepts. For example, ‘secular state’, ‘secular reason’, ‘secular authority’, ‘secular discourse’, ‘secular beliefs’, ‘secular humanism’, ‘secular law’, ‘secular context’, ‘secular institution’, ‘secular instruction’,

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26 Markus, "Donatus, Donatism," 286.
'secular education' and 'secular schooling' to name a few. 'Secular' can be used interchangeably with 'state' to denote government schooling although a native English-speaker in the West would know instinctively not to say, for example, 'secular funding’ instead of ‘government funding’. ‘Secular’ is associated with 'liberalism' in the sense of a tradition or way of life, however, many people with religious beliefs may also have a 'liberal outlook'.27 A person with a liberal outlook might say that she or he has a ‘secular worldview’, which in ordinary usage tends to be a synonym for either an ‘agnostic’ or ‘atheistic worldview’.28

Sometimes ‘secular’ occurs as a noun preceded by the definite article – ‘the secular’ – as a contrast to the concepts of ‘the sacred’, ‘the spiritual’, ‘the monastic’ and ‘the religious’. Because 'the sacred' is often distinguished from 'the profane' there is a sense in which the latter is a synonym for ‘the secular’. The adjective ‘religious’ is often attached by way of contrast to the same range of concepts mentioned above to give: ‘religious state’, ‘religious institution’, ‘religious context’, and so on. One commentator, North American political philosopher, Jean Bethke Elshtain, finds that “the secular/religion divide is no longer particularly helpful”.29 In order for ‘secular’ to be used interchangeably with ‘state’ or ‘government’ it seems that there must be a religious


equivalent, such as ‘religious instruction’ or ‘religious schooling’ because there is no such thing as ‘religious funding’ only ‘state/government funding’. In common usage, then, the meaning of ‘secular’ often suggests that which is ‘separate from’ or ‘contrasts to’ religion.

A stronger meaning of ‘opposed to’ religion comes out in the family of words that derive from ‘secular’. ‘Secularity’ is the condition or quality of being secular. ‘Secularism’ is used by Taylor\textsuperscript{30} as a synonym for ‘secularity’ whereas for English sociologist of religion, Grace Davie, it has the more specific sense of a “creed” such as “rationalism” or “communism”.\textsuperscript{31} North American scholar of religion, Jeffrey Stout, seems to allude to the latter when he observes that one might speak of a person’s “commitment to secularism (original emphasis)”.\textsuperscript{32} A person could then be called ‘a secularist’ by others and their commitment or beliefs described as ‘secularist’. This adjective of ‘secularism’ qualifies nouns to give ‘secularist ideology’, ‘secularist régime’ or ‘secularist theory’. Stout describes ‘secularist liberalism’ as a negative categorisation that religious persons sometimes use to denote a non-religious position that they find objectionable and are opposed to.\textsuperscript{33}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{30}Taylor, 4.
\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., 93-94.
\end{flushleft}
Given the pejorative connotation of ‘secularist’, non-religious persons tend to describe themselves as ‘secular’, which is neutral. The nuance of ‘secularist’ suggests a form of intolerant extremism that is neither willing to re-evaluate beliefs nor open to engage with differing or opposing points of view. Interestingly, the adjective ‘religious’ is neutral and there is no such word as ‘religiousist’ to connote a sense of ‘extremist’ faith affiliation, which is conveyed by another word, ‘fundamentalist’. The word ‘fundamentalism’ originated in a branch of Protestant Christianity but has shifted in meaning since the 1970s so that people often use it now to refer to a person who is excessively devoted to a set of religious beliefs.34 Also, Christian believers who claim that the tenet of ‘the inerrancy of Scripture’ justifies a literal interpretive approach to the Bible are often termed ‘fundamentalist’ by non-literalist Christians as well as non-religious persons. The term ‘religious’ acquires a negative meaning through being qualified by its noun, for example, ‘religious zealot’ or the wider context of the sentence (for example, the phrase ‘fanatically devoted to a set of religious beliefs’).

The sense that ‘secular’ refers to an influence that leads to a decline in religious belief is linked to ‘secularisation’, the final term derived from ‘secular’ that I will discuss. The ‘thesis of secularisation’ was appealed to by sociologists of religion in the 1960s to predict that religion would wane as a result of modernisation. According to Stout, this thesis posited that “modernity is a progressively secularising force in the sense that it tends to produce increasing levels of disbelief”.35 This tied the flourishing of the ‘secular’


35 Stout, 101.
to the diminishment of the ‘religious’. ‘Secularisation’ is often used as a synonym for what German sociologist, Max Weber, termed the “disenchantment of the world”.36 In the 1960s, religious thinkers such as English New Testament scholar and Bishop of Woolwich, John A. T. Robinson,37 and North American theologian, Harvey Cox,38 responded to the ‘decline of religion’ thesis, according to Stout, “by extolling the virtues of the secular city”.39 Cox drew on sociological accounts of ‘the secular’ and ‘secularisation’ to address challenges he perceived modernity to be posing for the Christian faith.40 He argued that Christians and Christian churches should not oppose but welcome secularisation because it can be understood to liberate religion from the constraints of the state and to enable Christians to gain a different perspective on the wider society in order to change it for the better.41 This religious position sought to turn the sociological thesis on its head and to challenge the widespread perception that secularisation posed a threat to the ‘survival’ of Christianity. It maintained that the ‘religious’ could flourish with the ‘secular’.


39 Stout, 92.

40 Cox, 105. For an account of public response in America to the publication of The Secular City, see Daniel Callahan, ed. The Secular City Debate (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1967).

41 Cox, 105, 114.
The secularisation thesis is now held to have been too narrow and too specific to Europe.⁴² According to Stout, the secularisation thesis “lies in shambles, having had nearly all of its predictions falsified over the last four decades”.⁴³ North American postliberal theologian, Stanley Hauerwas, notes that the “staying power” of religion has particularly undermined the thesis that religion “will disappear given the development of secular societies”.⁴⁴ North American sociologist, Peter L. Berger, observes that “the world today, with some exceptions ... is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever”.⁴⁵ Much has consequently been written by sociologists about ‘religious revivalism’.⁴⁶ However, it seems the discredited theory’s central claim that the secular and the religious are diametrically opposed to one another has been taken up and recast by certain religious intellectuals in America and England.⁴⁷ Stout describes


⁴³ Stout, 101.


⁴⁶ Turner, 11.

practitioners of "radical orthodoxy" as part of a movement of "new traditionalism", which "refuses the secular".48

The sense that secular and religious discourse are incommensurable informs English theologian, John Milbank’s, critique of sociology,49 which rejects Cox’s account of why Christians can welcome rather than avoid or fear the secular.50 Milbank argues that ‘secular reason’ “confines” and “positions” theology within social theories of the secular and secularisation, which led to a “redefinition of Christian virtue” within terms antithetical to Christian faith.51 Milbank sets theology the task of going ‘beyond’ sociological accounts of the secular in order to “rescue virtue”.52 In response, Stout describes ‘radical orthodoxy’ as “theological resentment of the secular”:

John Milbank and his fellow proponents of “radical orthodoxy” hold that “for several centuries now, secularism has been defining and constructing the world. It is a world in which the theological is either discredited or turned into a harmless leisure-time activity of private commitment”. The only appropriate response, they conclude is a theology that “refuses the secular”. This means rejecting both “secular reason” and the “secular state” as spheres of discourse not essentially “framed by a theological perspective”.53

48 Stout, 92, 2, 92.

49 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason.

50 Cox, 21.

51 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 1, 47.

52 Ibid., 380.

53 Stout, 92. Stout quotes Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward, Radical Orthodoxy, 1, 14, 13.
According to Stout, Milbank’s position reinforces “the sort of boundary-drawing it officially opposes”.54 In a similar vein, North American theologian, James M. Gustafson, identifies Milbank and Hauerwas as representative of a “rejection-strategy” against secular learning.55 Stout also picks out Milbank, Hauerwas and North American philosopher, Alasdair C. MacIntyre, who identifies as Roman Catholic, as the three main figures under whose influence “the perception of modern democratic societies as morally and spiritually empty” has made new gains since the 1980s (Chapter Five of this thesis will explore the work of Hauerwas and MacIntyre in order to gain an understanding particularly of the former’s concerns about the nation-state and neutralist liberalism’s perceived treatment of religion).56 This kind of religious perspective, which can be interpreted as portraying the secular as inherently exclusionary of ‘Christian virtue’, is controversial. As English liberal philosopher of education, Graham Haydon argues, “a different, inclusive, interpretation of secularity is possible”, whereby, for example, “an institution is secular, not by excluding religion, but by not being biased in its favour (original emphasis)”.57

54 Stout, 101.


56 Stout, 2.

57 Haydon, 157.
The characterisation of ‘secularist’ discourse as “parasitic” upon theological discourse is at odds with secular perceptions of religion in “liberal society”. North American liberal political theorist, Judith N. Shklar, argues that “liberalism … was born out of the cruelties of the religious civil wars, which forever rendered the claims of Christian charity a rebuke to all religious institutions and parties”. Stout concurs:

Theology got into trouble, on my account, largely because of its own inability to provide a vocabulary for debating and deciding matters pertaining to the common good without resort to violence. The distinctive vocabularies of modern politics and ethics – the languages of human rights, of utility, of respect for persons, and so on – owe their existence in part to a complicated history of attempts to minimise the unhappy consequences of religious conflict.

From one perspective, then, a ‘liberal society’ can be perceived to guarantee ‘the space’ that leaves churches and religious groups free to flourish and prevents denominations from going to war with one another over their differences. North American political philosophers, John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin endorse a theory of the modern nation-state as ideally neutral in order to adjudicate impartially between different

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visions of what constitutes a good life and to guard against “religious conflict like that of early modern Europe”.

However, supporters of radical orthodoxy dismiss this account of the need for the ‘secular state’ so that their ‘refusal of the secular’ seems to be partly tied to a rejection of a conception of the nation-state as impartial. The prospect for constructive engagement between this group of religious thinkers and the non-religious political philosophers and theorists whose accounts of the secular the former reject seems poor.

Stout strives to mediate what he perceives to be “the current standoff” between religious ‘traditionalism’ and secular liberalism in America. However, he may overestimate the extent to which the rest of the American public cares if ‘theologians’ reject the secular or are open to it. ‘Theologian’ is an obscure occupation that outside – and perhaps even inside – church circles is perceived to lay dubious claims to the status of a ‘profession’ or sphere of ‘expertise’. Christians might sooner seek guidance from their minister or pastor, who might have ‘qualifications’ in Theology, than seek out a theologian. Etymologically, ‘theology’ is derived from the Greek, theologia, which derives from theos, meaning ‘God’, and from logia, which has an adjectival meaning of either ‘learned’, ‘eloquent’ or ‘cultured’, and a plural noun meaning of ‘divine revelations’, ‘words’, or ‘messages’ (logia is related to logos, meaning word, reason, rational discourse, explanation, utterance, discussion and debate). ‘Theology’ can be understood literally as ‘reasoning or discussion concerning God’, and the term is used specifically to refer to the Christian religion. From the outset, the meaning of the word,

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64 Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 13.
‘theology’, is controversial in secular societies because in such contexts Taylor observes there are “millions” of people today “to whom faith never even seems an eligible possibility”.65

Haydon claims that “the thinking of many people in modern societies is secular”, which makes the credibility of theology – an academic discipline that assumes it is possible to reason about God – appear questionable.66 The idea of theology can conjure images of spurious, arcane or ‘monastic’ learning whose detachment from the world is vulnerable to accusations of irrelevance for the ‘real world’. Theologians are often associated with what Davie describes as “institutional religion”,67 which people in Western societies outside of America seem to find less and less appealing.68 To the extent that ‘reasoning about God’ could again lead to the conflicts that characterised the ‘wars of religion’, theology’s detachment from the real world might even be regarded by some as necessary for social cohesion. It seems unlikely that the opinions of theologians would be brought to the attention of people for whom faith never even seems an eligible possibility. If such opinions were widely made known, non-religious persons may “without repressing non-secular views, not really listen to them”.69 In England, according to Haydon, religious points of view in various institutional settings –

65 Taylor, 3.
66 Haydon, 153.
69 Haydon, 156.
including schools and universities – may unintentionally get “bracketed out” because of “a widespread tendency in our secular society ... to think in altogether non-religious terms”. In a sense, ‘the secular’ can be understood to not need the ‘approval’ of theologians like Milbank. For a majority of non-religious persons, whether or not theologians and religious persons reject or embrace ‘the secular’ may be largely a matter of indifference. A main aim of this inquiry is to investigate how attitudes on the part of non-religious and religious persons towards each other may contribute to nurture or undercut democratic participation.

Refusal of the secular by theologians seems to be more of a pressing issue in America than in other Western societies because political parties have come to power there by promoting ‘anti-secular’ or ‘anti-liberal’ policy positions to court the ‘Christian vote’. During the 1980s, for example, the Republican Party won support from the then dominant conservative religious organisations, ‘Moral Majority’ and ‘The Christian Coalition’. Conservative and evangelical churches have grown in the United States since the 1960s, according to Berger, while the number of ‘liberal’ Christians has declined. In other Western societies interest in religion (if not church-going) persists. Stout points out that theological reflection is mediated to ordinary American Christians through their pastors:

70 Ibid., 154, 208.


72 Quoted by Heelas and Woodhead, 89.
Radical orthodoxy is currently the hottest topic being debated in seminaries and divinity schools in the United States, and thus a significant part of the subculture within which future pastors are being educated.\textsuperscript{73}

The implication here is that ministers and pastors who learn to regard secular discourse as ‘secularist’ may instruct or ‘teach’ congregations, in sermons, pastoral guidance or in faith schools, to ‘reject the secular’.

‘A secular society’ can be taken to mean the outcome or result of a process of ‘dechristianisation’ of a political order.\textsuperscript{74} ‘Decline of religious belief’ still informs what people often mean when they use the term ‘secular’.\textsuperscript{75} Taylor refers to another meaning as “secularised public spaces”.\textsuperscript{76} This is the contrast between, on the one hand, earlier periods when Christian clergy laid down authoritative prescriptions in spheres of social activity like the economy and politics, and on the other hand, “the emptying of religion from autonomous social spheres”.\textsuperscript{77} The norms and principles we follow now in economic, political, cultural, educational, professional, and recreational spheres “generally don’t refer us to God or to any religious beliefs”.\textsuperscript{78} A third sense of ‘secular’ that Taylor identifies is a change relating to conditions of belief: “The change I want to

\textsuperscript{73} Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 92.


\textsuperscript{75} Taylor, 2.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 20.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
define and trace is one which takes us from a society in which it was virtually
impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer,
is one human possibility among others”.79 Taylor thereby shifts the discussion away
from religion that defines “itself in relation to credal statements”, where the decline of
Christian beliefs and church attendance is seen to be “largely powered by the rise of
other beliefs, in science, reason”.80 He focuses on “the different kinds of lived experience
involved in understanding your life in one way or the other, on what it’s like to live as a
believer or an unbeliever”.81 Secularity in this sense “is a matter of the whole context of
understanding in which our moral, spiritual or religious experience and search takes
place”.82

Taylor observes that in secular societies “it may be hard to sustain one's faith”
because “belief in God is no longer axiomatic”.83 In such contexts, refusing the secular
can appear to be an attractive strategy to religious believers because it claims to draw
clear lines between ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’, which gives a sense of ‘certainty’ that can give
meaning to life. Stout argues that this could foment Christian “retreat” from collective
action, like the Civil Rights movement, which brought religious and non-religious
persons together in “identification with the American people”.84 In systems of
education, ‘retreat’ can take the form of the removal by religious parents of their

79 Ibid., 3.
80 Ibid., 4.
81 Ibid., 5.
82 Ibid., 3.
83 Ibid.
84 Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 299.
children from the state schooling system or ‘common schools’ to ‘separate schools’, which is a category that includes ‘faith schools’ (Chapter Four of the thesis will examine the idea of ‘separate religious schooling’ and how it relates to the ideal of ‘common schooling’ at greater length).

Many parents within religious traditions, according to Haydon, feel “that the values that secular schools are promoting are incompatible with the values of their tradition”.85 Religious groups in England have appealed to this as a justification for why separate faith schools ought to receive state funding.86 However, many educators within the liberal tradition are uneasy about the existence of schools that are “committed to a non-secular education”.87 Israeli political philosopher, Joseph Raz,88 who is a proponent of a perfectionist variant of liberalism, suggests that the state should intervene to protect the rights of children “to be liberated from the constraints of their cultural environment and to grow up into personally autonomous adults”.89 On the other hand, Haydon argues that “it is only the secular school that can expose its pupils to one sort of thinking only”, which he identifies as a shortcoming of the state or common school.90

85 Haydon, 151.


87 Haydon, 152.


90 Haydon, 160.
society the ideal of free and open discussion in which all voices are heard requires that pupils from non-religious backgrounds be given the basis on which “to understand contributions to discussion that are expressed in religious terms, or depend on religious assumptions”. According to Haydon, “contributions that have a religious dimension will need to be taken seriously rather than dismissed as irrelevant” in religious and non-religious contexts of schooling and “not only in religious education”.

My aim in this section has been to show that the relationship between the concept of ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ is ambiguous and complex. Talal Asad, for example, takes the view that “the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular’ are not essentially fixed categories” and argues that “the sacred and the secular depend on each other”. However, the meaning of the concept of society is itself also ambiguous and complex. In common usage, for example, the term ‘society’ is often used as a synonym for the idea of the ‘nation-state’. For example, North American theologian and Christian social ethicist, William T. Cavanaugh, observes: “the nation-state is simply what sociologists mean when they say ‘society' in contemporary life”. Yet according to a classical Aristotelian understanding, the spheres of marriage and the family constitute ‘societies’ in their own right. Such different applications of the concept of ‘society’ draw from starting-points that disagree fundamentally about whether human socialising is natural or derived from an original

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91 Ibid., 156,159.

92 Ibid., 159.

93 Asad, 25, 26.

state of nature. In the next section, I explore the concept of 'society' in order to further clarify the scope of what is meant by the phrase, 'a secular society'.

**The concept of 'society'**

Margaret Thatcher, then leader of the British Conservative party government (1979-1996), once claimed, “there is no such thing as society”, a statement that immediately raises the question of what she meant by the term, ‘society’.\(^{95}\) Etymologically, it derives from the Latin, *societas*, meaning ‘fellowship’, ‘companionship’ and a ‘union for a common purpose’ (*societas* in turn is derived from *socius*, meaning ‘companion’ and ‘ally’). This is interesting because ‘fellowship’ and ‘companionship’ are the very qualities that the influential 1980s sociological study, *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life*, found to be missing from modern societies. This study of white middle-class North Americans found that “anxiety and uncertainty about more important and enduring relationships are increasing rather than decreasing. Therapists have grown increasingly concerned about the lack of ‘community’ in modern life”.\(^{96}\)

Medieval Christian thinkers Latinised the term, *societas*, from the Greek, *koinōnia*, which in classical Greek, meant ‘an association’, ‘common effort’ or ‘partnership in common’. The classical understanding of *koinōnia* is typically represented by Aristotle (385 – 322 B.C.E.), who used the notion in conscious opposition to the Sophistic movement of his day, which taught that human socialising is a means of overcoming the predicament of natural deficiencies. Aristotle defined man from the outset as a political

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animal, *kata phusin zoon politikon*, which means "a creature formed by nature to live a political life". He thereby portrayed human socialising as natural rather than as a remedy for natural deficiencies. According to Aristotle, humans naturally live in *koinōnia*: the most basic level being the union between a couple in marriage, then the family, the household, village and city-state, which is translated from the Greek, *polis*. Aristotle contended that there is no prospect of any kind of community at all if there is no commonality of values of some kind.

In this scheme, *koinōnia* exist in each level, including the smallest, so that the notion of society was not only reserved for the wider community such as the *polis* or *koinōnia politikē*, meaning ‘political community’. Aristotle defined marriage and the family as ‘societies’ or types of communities and partnerships by virtue of every social unity being directed towards, and capable of, the goal of a ‘common good’ specific to it. For example, human action in the sphere of marriage is oriented towards procreation and the family towards education. ‘Virtues’ in an Aristotelian framework are tools for achieving the goals of human activities. North American Aristotelian philosopher, Martha Nussbaum, notes that “for Aristotle, each of the virtues is an organised way of cherishing a particular end that has intrinsic value”. The highest good of the *polis* is

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eudaimonia, which Nussbaum describes as “the ordered set of all the goals an agent pursues in a human life”.\textsuperscript{101} German moral theologian, Bernd Wannenwetsch, describes the concept of eudaimonia or flourishing of the life of the political class of the free, male citizen, as ‘self-referential’ in that the good of the polis consists in the flourishing of the life of the citizens.\textsuperscript{102} This sphere of influence excluded women, slaves, and non-citizens, who were confined to the inferior life of the household and who were regarded as incapable of achieving the virtues of eudaimonia.\textsuperscript{103}

Medieval Christian thinkers translated koinonia into the Latin, societas, and brought a theological interpretation to the classical understanding of human sociality. In his commentary on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 1274 AD) developed Aristotle’s doctrine of human sociality by emphasising that man is a social animal because God created humans that way. Aquinas argues in Summa Theologiae (Question 94 of the Prima Secundae) that God gives his law, which is the basis upon which human society can be nurtured and come to flourish. In this scheme, the Latin concept of the summum bonum, which can be translated as ‘the highest common good’, builds on Aristotle’s notion of a goal towards which human action is directed in ‘society’. Aquinas theologised Aristotle’s idea that a society finds its identity socially in its directedness towards its specific good by introducing a sense of ‘externality’, which the ‘self-referential’ good of the polis had not assumed.\textsuperscript{104} Where the common good of the

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 182.


\textsuperscript{104} Wannenwetsch.
polis refers to what is woven inherently into the fabric of social life, Aquinas’s scheme of societas is directed towards God, the highest sumnum bonum, which informs the concrete life of inner human society. In this religious conception of society, the political community was held “to be ordained by Providence to serve the end of earthly perfection”.

In contrast to the classical and medieval concepts of koinonia and societas, the seventeenth-century tradition of contract-theory introduced the idea of an original ‘state of nature’ as pre-political. This claimed to describe the way that society is constituted by explaining how society comes into being, or is ‘founded’, through the establishment of a “notional compact whereby each individual citizen … surrendered sovereignty over his own person in return for certain protections”. The starting-point of this tradition rejects the classical view that the natural state of the human person is one of living in koinonia and also discards the medieval, religious conception of society as directed towards and ordained by God, the highest sumnum bonum. Modern accounts of society like that offered by political philosopher, John Rawls, draw from the models of social-contract constructed by liberal political theorists, Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1639 C.E.), John Locke (1632 – 1704 C.E.), and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712 – 1778 C.E.).


107 O’Donovan, 8.

108 Rawls, 10-11, 14-15.
According to Hobbes, sovereign power, the Leviathan, is the absolutist state that is created by the people, who, in the state of nature, share no commonality but are locked in the war of all against all.\textsuperscript{109} There is an individual right in Hobbes to fight for survival and advantage and the foundation of the state is “not enacted to realise a common good or common \textit{telos}, but rather to liberate the individual to pursue his or her own ends without fear of interference from other individuals”.\textsuperscript{110} Locke presents a more amicable idea than Hobbes of the original state of human kind but, like Hobbes, he conceives that a transfer of individuals’ rights to state power is necessary.\textsuperscript{111} In contrast to Hobbes, who thought this to be a complete surrender, Locke argued that the transferral of individual rights must be limited because it is designed “from the need of the solitary individual to protect his person and possessions”.\textsuperscript{112} The rationale is that Locke conceives of the original state of self-ownership of one’s body and labour so that if a person invests labour into something she or he has a legitimate claim to property right by virtue of the investment of labour. In Locke’s individualistic conception of human society and the state, property rights are retained by the individual over against the state whose prime task is to protect those rights that individuals have. Finally, Rousseau’s model of society begins from the assumption that the social contract must

\textsuperscript{109} Hobbes.

\textsuperscript{110} Cavanaugh, “Killing for the Telephone Company: Why the Nation-State Is Not the Keeper of the Common Good,” 252.

\textsuperscript{111} Locke.

\textsuperscript{112} Cavanaugh, “Killing for the Telephone Company: Why the Nation-State Is Not the Keeper of the Common Good,” 253.
be the function of the will of the people. Like his forebears, Rousseau relates a myth of an original state of nature, but he characterises it optimistically and portrays humans as independent and isolated virtuous beings in the state of nature. Civilisation is a corrupting influence on the innocence, self-love and compassion of people in the state of nature, particularly through the introduction of property, which introduced strife and the existence of the state. In contrast to Hobbes's notion of the warlike nature of the state of nature, Rousseau understands 'civil society' as a state of war. This model of society pictures civilised society and the state as an unfortunate development, and Rousseau conceives the idea that society should be ruled by the 'general will' of its people rather than by state power.

In the previous section I referred to the argument that the 'secular' nation-state was necessary to act as an impartial adjudicator between religious groups that were unable to resolve their differences peaceably. From my discussion in this section it can be seen how this 'neutralist liberal' reading of the nation-state has roots in the contract-theory family of thought, rather than in the earlier classical and medieval conceptions of society and human socialising. It seems that the meaning of both the concept of 'secular' and the notion of 'society' in contemporary usage is closely tied to a third term, 'the nation-state'. In everyday speech, the term 'society' is applied to the idea of the 'nation-state' rather than to 'the family' in the Aristotelian sense of koinōnia. According to

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113 Rousseau.

114 Rawls.
Cavanaugh “the nation-state is simply what sociologists mean when they say ‘society’ in contemporary life”.\textsuperscript{115} I now therefore turn to examine the concept of ‘the nation-state’.

\textit{The concept of ‘the nation-state’}

“Modern ‘societies’”, according to English sociologist, Anthony Giddens, “are nation-states, existing within a nation-state system”.\textsuperscript{116} Throughout the twentieth-century, the idea of the ‘nation-state’ has been “endorsed or attacked, and frequently both endorsed and attacked”.\textsuperscript{117} The term ‘nation-state’ fuses the idea of the ‘nation’ with the concept of the ‘state’. ‘State’ can mean the mechanism or apparatus of government and another meaning is ‘political community’, which recalls the classical civic republican notion of the Greek city-state or \textit{koinōnia politikē}.\textsuperscript{118} The hyphen implies that the nation is a reality distinct from both the mechanism of government and from the political community. However, the concept of the ‘nation’ is frequently employed as a synonym for ‘state’ in its second meaning. In this duality of meaning, English historian of Christian political thought, Joan Lockwood O’Donovan, suggests there “lurk significant and long-standing issues concerning which referent has historical and moral priority so as to justify and determine the reality of the other”.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{115} Cavanaugh, “Killing for the Telephone Company: Why the Nation-State Is Not the Keeper of the Common Good,” 259.


\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 278.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
In contrast to neutralist liberalism’s notion of the modern nation-state as impartial between conceptions of the good life, the idea of the ‘nation’ is often associated with particularistic attachments.\textsuperscript{120} Shared ethnicity, language, blood ties and a common history are features that are often used to define a ‘nation’.\textsuperscript{121} The related concepts of ‘nationalism’ and of being ‘nationalistic’ are similar to the terms, ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘secularist’ in that they describe someone who is fanatically or dogmatically devoted to a set of beliefs, in this case, about the supposed superiority of their ‘nation’. A synonym for ‘nationalism’ is ‘patriotism’, which can have a more neutral connotation, according to Alasdair MacIntyre, because a ‘patriot’ can be regarded as having “a perfectly proper devotion to one’s own nation”.\textsuperscript{122} If someone exhibits what is perceived as an ‘improper devotion’ to their country this ‘excessive’ form of loyalty could be described as ‘blind patriotism’.

Lockwood O’Donovan identifies ‘romantic’ and ‘civic’ concepts of the nation as stances that have “dominated historical, social, and political analysis for a century”.\textsuperscript{123} Although these concepts reflect different accounts of what the nation is and of its historical genesis, they “exhibit an underlying likeness as distinctively modern”.\textsuperscript{124} Their modernity resides in the idea of the nation as a totality distinguishable from the state, to


\textsuperscript{121} Lockwood O'Donovan, 278.

\textsuperscript{122} MacIntyre, 212.

\textsuperscript{123} Lockwood O’Donovan, 277.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
which the state is instrumental.\textsuperscript{125} On the ‘romantic’ view, the nation as a unique communal totality gives rise to and justifies the sovereign state.\textsuperscript{126} Such features as a common language, ethnic inheritance and a continuous relation to a particular soil are constitutive of the “prior totality” of the nation.\textsuperscript{127} According to Lockwood O’Donovan, when such an organic socio-cultural reality becomes self-conscious, “it seeks to express its subjectivity in the realms of power and law. In assuming statehood it becomes self-determining: it takes control of its historical destiny”.\textsuperscript{128}

The ‘civic’ concept of the nation, according to Lockwood O’Donovan, was regarded “not as a prior cause of the state but as coterminous with it and, to some extent, a work of it”.\textsuperscript{129} The ‘civic nation’ comprises the ongoing moral-political reality of the ‘popular will’ and “the unifying moral and affective bonds of the citizenry in a free democratic polity”.\textsuperscript{130} Formed over time through the operation of political and legal institutions according to universal principles of justice, the civic nation “is also a deliberate project of public education and mobilisation: of educating citizens in the principles of liberal-democratic political culture and mobilising them for political action”.\textsuperscript{131} Lockwood O’Donovan argues that a ‘blend’ of civic and romantic concepts of the nation informs the “twin planks” of the post-World War II global political order defined by UN

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 278.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 279.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
Declarations: “the ‘equal and inalienable rights of individuals ... and the equal and
inalienable rights of ‘peoples’ to ‘self-determination’”. 132

My aim in discussing the ‘romantic’ and ‘civic’ concepts of the ‘nation’ has been to
explore different understandings of the ‘nation-state’, which in ordinary speech is often
understood to be a synonym for ‘society’. 133 Clearly, the scope of what is at stake in the
phrase, ‘a secular society’, extends beyond the relationship between the secular and the
religious. Of equal importance is the question of what it means to belong to a nation or
to be a citizen of a particular nation-state that is perceived to exist within a nation-state
system. A view of social order tends to bring in its train a corresponding view of
international order. 134 Clearly, what is understood by ‘a secular society’ bears directly
on the wider question of what it means to dwell in the world during the early decades of
the twenty-first-century.

In the foregoing section I have discussed different understandings of the ‘nation-
state’. Given the apparent close relationship between the nation-state and modern
democracy it seems valuable to now explore the concept of democracy, the classical
Greek version of which I touched upon in my discussion of Aristotle’s conception of
society as koinōnia.

132 Ibid., 280.
133 Cavanaugh, “Killing for the Telephone Company: Why the Nation-State Is Not the Keeper of the
Common Good,” 259.
134 O’Donovan, 279.
The concept of ‘democracy’

A testament to modern democracy’s roots in the institutions of the 5th and 4th century B.C.E Greek city-state is the etymology of the word, ‘democracy’, which derives from the Greek, dēmos, meaning ‘people’ and krátos from krattein, which means ‘rule’ in the sense of ‘power’. The combination of these two elements can be interpreted to mean ‘all the people rule’ or ‘the common people rule’, a system of government that Aristotle contrasted with other forms of government, including rule by a king (monarchy), rule by a few (oligarchy) and rule by a social elite (aristocracy).

Aristotle

The polis, on Aristotle’s account, was the koinōnia politikē that was ordered towards the eudaimonia or flourishing of the life of the free, male citizen. The citizen was one who participates in the activity of ruling his fellow citizens and being ruled in turn. The constitution that Aristotle favoured was a mixture of oligarchy and democracy that he described as ‘polity’. Modern democracy differs significantly from its ancient forebear. A defining characteristic of modern democratic citizenship is the capacity to be represented by another. This informs early twentieth-century Austrian American democratic theorist, Joseph Schumpeter’s, rather acerbic observation that “democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them”. In modern democracies, the professed purpose of elected

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137 Ibid., 1277a26-27.

politicians in governing is to ensure non-interference in the freedom of the individuals they represent.

The difference between the modern and classical conceptions of democracy is often articulated through a contrast between an ‘instrumental’ and ‘non-instrumental’ account of politics. Modern democracy ordinarily interprets politics as “a means to private life”.\(^{139}\) This definition of politics is usually described as ‘instrumental’ because government is conceived as a mechanism or instrument for regulating the social institutions of a nation-state so as to maintain the conditions for people’s enjoyment of liberty, which is understood to have its origins prior to politics.\(^{140}\) The belief that freedom is pre-political and that political action is therefore instrumental to goods beyond it defines the modern view of citizenship.\(^{141}\) By contrast, the classical Greek tradition of democracy is often described as a ‘non-instrumental’ conception because it does not interpret politics as a means to pursuing freedom in private life.

In Aristotle’s account of the *polis*, the direct participation of citizens in ruling and being ruled in turn was itself understood as the way of realising freedom. This presupposed that politics was an end in itself. Consequently, a *polis* could only be said to be ‘just’ if the citizens within it were enabled to realise freedom through participation in


\(^{141}\) Kymlicka and Norman, 294.
politics. Seen through the eyes of a 4th century B.C.E. Greek citizen, the modern conception of liberty as pre-political would most likely appear to be no freedom at all. The ancient Greek word for someone who was caught up in private affairs and did not take an active interest in politics was *idiōtēs* and such persons were regarded with contempt, a sentiment that continues to be expressed in the ancient Greek term’s modern-day descendant, ‘idiot’. Modern democracies would also most likely appear in the eyes of an ancient Greek citizen to be lacking in justice since citizens do not participate directly in self-rule but are ‘ruled’ by elected politicians.\(^{142}\) However, the drawbacks of the non-instrumental definition of political life are well-known: the classical civic republican understanding of citizenship “is famously exclusive and exploitative”.\(^{143}\) In the ancient world, only an elite group could participate in the *koinōnia politikē*.

The classical conception of political life as an activity in which citizens could realise freedom by ruling and being ruled by their equals depended on the existence of a second debased, domestic sphere. A strict separation between political life and private existence meant that the *polis* was the exclusive domain of free, male, propertied citizens, which restricted everyone else to the household *oikos*. The *oikos* was the realm of material things, women, children, servants and slaves, whose disparaged labour brought about the material conditions necessary for the elevated sphere of the *polis*. It was taken for granted that males received, in addition to their private life, a second life


in “the ideal superstructure in which one took actions which were not means to ends but ends in themselves”.\textsuperscript{144} Citizenship entailed an escape from the \textit{oikos} into the \textit{polis} and only the citizen could “leave his household behind, maintained by the labour of his slaves and women” and go between the two at will.\textsuperscript{145} Freedom and equality in the ancient world were only extended to a minority, which was homogenous in makeup.\textsuperscript{146} Despite such drawbacks, twentieth-century German-born Jewish political theorist, Hannah Arendt, sought to retrieve the classical conception of politics and citizenship.

\textbf{Hannah Arendt}

Arendt’s retrieval of a non-instrumental conception of politics was part of her wider project following World War II of identifying and defending against the conditions that had provided fertile soil for the growth of totalitarian ideologies in European democracies during the period between the two world wars.\textsuperscript{147} Arendt argues in \textit{The Origins of Totalitarianism}, that the amenability of European populations to totalitarian ideologies during the interim between World War I and World War II was due in part to the erosion of politics, conceived of as deliberation about ends among fellow citizens in the public sphere.\textsuperscript{148} In the following passage, which seems worth quoting at length, Arendt describes what she perceives to have been the consequences for “the world”

\textsuperscript{144} Pocock, 32.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{146} Pettit, 33.


\textsuperscript{148} Arendt, \textit{The Origins of Totalitarianism}. 
since the ancient notion of freedom was displaced by the modern idea of liberty as “freedom from politics”:

More and more people in the countries of the Western world, which since the decline of the ancient world has regarded freedom from politics as one of the basic freedoms, make use of this freedom and have retreated from the world and their obligations within it. This withdrawal from the world need not harm an individual; he may even cultivate great talents to the point of genius and so by detour be useful to the world again. But with each such retreat an almost demonstrable loss to the world takes place; what is lost is the specific and usually irreplaceable in-between which should have formed between this individual and his fellow men.149

Here, Arendt identifies that in Western countries the prevailing view of freedom as “freedom from politics” holds that it is in the private sphere of the family, in a career, and in the pursuit of personal interests outside of work that the highest fulfilment of the individual is to be found. On Arendt’s account, the disengagement from the political that ordinarily results from such a conception of freedom prevents the formation by persons of resources (an “in-between”), which are for Arendt vital for “the world”. Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century North American philosopher and educator, John Dewey, expressed concerns that seem similar to Arendt’s.150 Dewey was troubled by what he perceived as the American public’s disengagement from the political.151 He

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too investigated the conditions that had made the populations of European nations vulnerable between the two world wars to the rise of the totalitarian ideas of fascism.\textsuperscript{152}

\textit{John Dewey}

Like Arendt, Dewey’s dissatisfaction with received understandings that identify democracy as primarily a set of institutions, formal procedures and legal guarantees caused him to develop an alternative account of democracy. He believed that the crisis of World War II was due in part to the mistaken belief on the part of many in the West that democracy was “something that perpetuated itself automatically”.\textsuperscript{153} Consequently, Dewey proposed a conception of democracy as “a personal, an individual, way of life”, which emphasised the responsibility of individual citizens to participate in free discussions and cooperate together in public forums.\textsuperscript{154} Revitalising democracy was considered by Dewey to be essential to the tasks of combatting the growth of fascism and building a society that is democratic in the sense of being infused by “the democratic spirit” of participation.\textsuperscript{155} Yet Dewey believed that a far greater danger to


\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 226.

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 227.
democracy than the ‘external’ threat of fascism and other totalitarian ideas was an ‘internal’ threat that he perceived as potentially arising from within democracy itself.\footnote{Bernstein: 216.}

For Dewey, “respect for freedom of intelligence” was so much the central issue of democracy that he described freedom of intelligence in public communication “by means of speech, publication in daily and weekly press, in books, in public assemblies, in scientific inquiry” as “the heart from which flows the life-blood of democracy”.\footnote{John Dewey, "What Is Democracy?,” in The Later Works, 1925-1953: 1885-1953, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, Illiniois: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008/c.1946), 473, 474.} The notion of ‘freedom of intelligence’ is related to a conception of inquiry that Dewey developed in order to challenge traditional epistemology where knowledge was understood to be separate from the subject or knower who was consequently reduced to a passive spectator.\footnote{John Dewey, "The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action," in John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988/1929).} Dewey opposed ‘knowledge’ because he thought it inhibited the struggle of human intelligence to address problematic situations that arise in what he regarded as just the one realm of nature. The greatest threat to democracy for Dewey is an internal one constituted by those forces that erode, distort and manipulate the conditions for freedom of intelligence or inquiry upon which the flourishing of a particular kind of democracy depends.\footnote{Bernstein: 216.} For that reason he argued that “powerful present enemies of democracy can be successfully met only by the creation of personal attitudes in individual human beings”, the kind of attitudes that are conducive to

\footnote{Bernstein: 216.}
freedom of intelligence or inquiry. Dewey acknowledged that his position would most likely seem unconvincing not only to “the enemies of democracy” but also to democracy’s friends who might regard his idea of democracy as a way of personal life as “utopian” (Chapter Six of this thesis will explore Dewey’s work at greater length in order to gain insight into his interpretation of democracy).161

A contemporary of Dewey’s, North American public intellectual and journalist, Walter Lippman, rejected the ideal of “the omnicompetent, sovereign citizen”. Dewey also rejected this ideal and described it as what lies behind the common, misguided assumption that “each individual is of himself equipped with the intelligence needed ... to engage in political affairs”. Lippmann questioned the belief of participatory democracy that the average person is capable of the intelligent deliberation required to be an active responsible citizen. Lippman argued that democracy’s limitations could be overcome by establishing organisations of experts who have the scope and depth of knowledge necessary to advise the administrators and rulers of society. Such scepticism about the ability of the dēmos to negotiate complex and volatile situations can be traced back to the critique of Athenian democracy offered by Aristotle’s teacher, the classical Greek philosopher, Plato (427-347 B.C.E.).

161 Ibid., 226, 227. Richard J. Bernstein observes that “a standard objection to .... Dewey” is that he is “nostalgic, romantic and even utopian”, in Bernstein: 224.
Canadian philosopher, Paul Fairfield, observes, “The warnings of Plato and Aristotle regarding the unruliness of a politics of the *demos* continue to ring in the ears of contemporary political theorists, including those professing an unwavering commitment to democracy”.\(^{165}\) According to North American philosopher, Richard J. Bernstein, “… the truth is that for most of its history, political thinkers … have been suspicious and wary about democracy. The rule of the *demos* was frequently taken to mean rule by the mob with its fluctuating unstable passions”.\(^{166}\) It was the Athenian *dēmos* that called for the trial and execution of Plato's own teacher, the classical Greek philosopher, Socrates (469-399 B.C.E.). The danger of democracy for Plato lay in what he perceived as the inability of the average person to distinguish between *doxa* and *epistēmē*.

*Doxa* can be translated as a domain of 'public opinion' or 'common belief' and *epistēmē* can be translated as a realm of 'knowledge' or 'justified true belief' (from *epistēmē* derives the modern word, 'epistemology', which refers to the branch of philosophy that investigates the nature and grounds of human knowledge). A distinction between *doxa* and *epistēmē* was central to Plato's philosophy of Idealism, which undergirded Plato's controversial recommendation in *The Republic* (written in about 375 B.C.E.) that – given democracy's shortcomings – a different kind of society ought to be established that was ruled not by the *dēmos* but by a highly educated

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\(^{165}\) Fairfield, 53.

\(^{166}\) Bernstein: 217-218.
Plato used the contrast between doxa and epistēmē to critique what he described as the manipulation of doxa by a group of intellectuals referred to as the ‘Sophists’, whom Plato argued only sought to persuade rather than to discover justified true belief.¹⁶⁸

Plato also used the juxtaposition of doxa and epistēmē to establish his theory of Forms or doctrine of Ideas, which informed his division of existence into two separate worlds.¹⁶⁹ On the one hand, an invisible, timeless and transcendent realm characterised by certainty is referred to as the world of Being (the ‘really real’), which is inhabited by the perfection of the pure essences (also called Ideas or Forms). On the other hand, the visible, natural or physical realm of appearance, flux and ambiguity characterised by uncertainty is referred to as the world of Becoming (appears real), in which reside all imperfect, mutable and perishable entities. Plato devised an idea of truth as a counterpart of his two-realm theory of reality.

In response to the Sophists, Plato proposed that what belongs to the realm of changing and becoming cannot be true. A Platonic conception of truth can be summarised roughly as the view that a belief ceases to be mere doxa and becomes epistēmē the more it corresponds to the fixed or absolute essences that reside in the supposedly transcendent world of Being. Epistēmē and doxa can be described

respectively as awareness of the Forms and awareness of the realm of Becoming. Plato sought in a time of extreme political uncertainty “absolute standards of validity to settle political arguments and keep citizens from deteriorating into a mob”. On Plato’s account, only those who attain an awareness of absolute values residing in the Ideal realm are capable of making crucial decisions of governance.

Since the process of becoming educated – in the Platonic sense of attaining an awareness of the Ideal realm – is demanding, long and arduous, it seems to follow that only a small number of people in each generation will be prepared to persist in the task of becoming educated (Plato’s cave allegory in The Republic describes four stages that a person must pass through in order to become an educated person). In the society envisaged by The Republic, only an educated person – Plato’s philosopher-kings and queens – would be deemed fit to rule. Clearly, Plato’s vision of a republic and conception of an education appropriate to it differs greatly from John Dewey’s vision of a democratic society and entailing conception of education. From a Platonic standpoint, Dewey’s idea of a democratic society that aims to enable all citizens rather than just an elite minority to participate in free discussions and cooperate together in public forums might seem to place a blind faith in the capacities of ordinary people who would most likely prefer to remain in ignorance. Dewey’s eschewal of the existence of an Ideal realm of absolute standards and a Platonic notion of truth, and Dewey’s emphasis on the


172 Bernstein: 219.
democratic exchange of opinions in dialogue, might also appear to a Platonist to place politics on too risky a foundation.

The risk and uncertainty that democracy symbolises, according to Paul Fairfield, is “the danger that is posed by plurality, disorder, rhetoric, and open confrontation, and the history of the West is the history of efforts toward its general abolition”.\(^{173}\) Democratic politics is “disorderly, agonistic, unkempt, and fundamentally unstable”; consequently, the rationality of democracy is “profoundly dialectical; it is the logic of the back and forth, the both/and, and the neither/nor”.\(^{174}\) This understanding of ‘democratic logic’ that “resists all finality” seems consistent with Dewey’s conception of democracy as a personal way of life.\(^{175}\) It particularly calls to mind Dewey’s proposition that “the heart and final guarantee of democracy” is to be found:

... in free gatherings of neighbours on the street corner to discuss back and forth what is read in uncensored news of the day, and in gatherings of friends in the living rooms of houses and apartments to converse freely with one another (my emphasis).\(^{176}\)

In response to critics who object that Dewey’s conception of democracy is “naively utopian”, Bernstein observes that an intelligent way of reading Dewey is to emphasise the way he “sought to invigorate ‘really existing’ large-scale complex ‘democratic’

\(^{173}\) Fairfield, 89.

\(^{174}\) Ibid., 73, 88-89.

\(^{175}\) Ibid., 88.

societies”. At the same time, “it is intrinsic to the very idea of such a democracy that it is always a task before us”. This suggests there is a tension between what democracy is in actuality and what democracy could be. Fairfield seems to allude to this tension at the heart of a Deweyan conception of democracy in his claim that “‘rule by the people’ is not a definition but an aspiration, a trope, and the beginning of a narrative that includes while extending beyond the political narrowly conceived”.

On Fairfield’s account, it is possible to accept such prosaic accounts of democracy as the somewhat uninspiring assessment that “the essence of democratic citizenship” is “the right to vote in occasional elections” because, in addition to what democracy “merely is as an actuality”, there is also “what it is as a possibility”. Far from being something that perpetuates itself automatically, democracy is a fragile aspiration: “It is against neither unity nor difference that democracy stands, but the fetishizing of either”. The dynamic tension at the heart of what Fairfield describes as ‘democratic rationality’ or ‘democratic logic’ did not always exist and it could be all too easily lost altogether. If democracy “is forever confronted with the task of creating and recreating itself (original emphasis)” in response to new situations and unexpected challenges that arise, might there be a need for individuals to be enabled to assume responsibility for

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177 Bernstein: 224.
178 Ibid., 227.
179 Fairfield, 77.
180 Ibid., 79.
181 Ibid., 89.
ensuring the renewal and continuation of what Dewey described as ‘the democratic spirit’?\textsuperscript{182}

Just as the extreme uncertainty of the political situation in 4\textsuperscript{th} century B. C. E. Athens prompted Plato to write *The Republic*, might the state of affairs that we are currently living through call for a wholesale rethinking of education in light of a kind of global society that is considered to be *worth* aspiring and striving for? For it seems we are now living through a time – as a consequence of such factors as the international ‘information economy’, international job market, global travel and rapidly advancing communication technologies – in which a global society is emerging. “‘Globalisation’

\textsuperscript{183}, according to Bernstein, “is what everybody talks about, and nobody quite understands”. UNESCO, a specialised agency of the United Nations, has acknowledged in two landmark documents that globalisation is a central issue of our times. The 1972 Faure Report, *Learning to Be*, and the 1996 Delors Report, *Learning: the Treasure Within*, argue that the challenges that globalisation poses for the possibility of peaceable relations between persons who disagree fundamentally, and the future of life on our planet, ought to be addressed through education.\textsuperscript{184} Given the emerging social setting of global interdependence, it seems education for the twenty-first-century must be global.

\textbf{UNESCO}

\textsuperscript{182} Bernstein: 226.

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., 227.


Delors, 100.
After World War II, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation was created by leaders of nations from around the world who declared that it was ignorance of each other’s ways and lives and the denial of democracy that had made war possible. The preamble to UNESCO’s 1946 Constitution states: “Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed”. Educating the minds of individuals in order “to form people ready to refuse wars of aggression” is a task that the Faure Report directly addresses, which is in keeping with UNESCO’s main objective to “contribute to the building of peace, the eradication of poverty, sustainable development and intercultural dialogue through education, the sciences, culture, communication and information”.

In *Learning to Be*, the eponymous central theme emphasises the importance of developing the human potential to its fullest. Two other basic assumptions that inform the document are belief in “the existence of an international community” and “belief in democracy”. The report states that “the keystone of democracy... is education – not only education that is accessible to all, but education whose aims and methods have been thought out afresh”. The emphasis that the Faure Report places

186 Faure, 153.
187 The UNESCO webpage that describes the main of objectives of the organisation can be viewed at http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/about-us/who-we-are/introducing-unesco/
188 Faure, vi.
189 Ibid., v, vi.
190 Ibid., vi.
on the emergence of an international community, and upon the resultant need for
democratic education for world peace, was built upon just over two decades later by the
Delors Report. *Learning: the Treasure Within* endorses the main theme, ‘learning to be’
of the earlier UNESCO document but goes beyond this principle and stresses a further
imperative: “none of the talents which are hidden like buried treasure in every person
must be left untapped”.191 This seems strikingly similar to John Dewey’s conception of
‘democratic faith in human equality’, which he described as a “belief that every human
being, independent of the quantity or range of his personal endowment, has the right to
equal opportunity with every other person for development of whatever gifts he has”.192
Both UNESCO documents promote an understanding of democracy that seems
consistent with the sort of democracy that Dewey developed.193 The Delors Report
defines four ‘Pillars of learning’, which the Commission describes as “the foundations of
education”.194

The four pillars are: ‘learning to know’, ‘learning to do’, ‘learning to live together,
learning to live with others’ and ‘learning to be’.195 According to the report, the third
pillar, ‘learning to live together, learning to live with others’ is the most important
because it forms the overarching purpose for a globalised era: “the other three pillars of

191 Delors, 23.
193 R. Scott Webster, "Dewey's Democracy as the Kingdom of God on Earth," *Journal of Philosophy of
Education* 43, no. 4 (2009): 618.
194 Delors, 22.
195 Ibid., 85-98.
education … provide, as it were, the bases for learning to live together”.

The commission considers the third pillar to be most important in comparison to the others because it relates directly to the pursuit of peaceful global relations. If one accepts UNESCO’s proposal that the question of globalisation is central for this era and that consequently the task of education for the twenty-first-century must be global, then there seems to be a need for direct educative intervention in, for example, the institutions and practices of mass schooling.

While UNESCO published and widely distributed its aspiration of educating for democracy and world peace in a global era, the responsibility to consider the Delors Report and to adapt its recommendations to the state, national and regional context, falls on regions and individual nations and states. In response to UNESCO’s challenge, the authors of a key national document for Australian schooling, the 1999 *Adelaide Declaration of National Goals: Australia’s Common and Agreed National Goals for Schooling in the Twenty-first Century*, endeavoured to put the Delors Report into a regional context and to use it as a basis for discussion on how Australia should best develop policies and strategies for education for the twenty-first-century. One of the participants in the Taskforce that produced the document for Australian schooling proposed that “the Delors Report can serve as a template to apply to our goals for schooling and their directions” and identified that the “[Australian national] goals

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196 Ibid., 23.

197 Webster, "Does the Australian National Framework for Values Education Stifle an Education for World Peace?," 463.

198 Aspin, Collard, and Chapman, 204.
appear to capture well the central themes of the Delors Report, particularly the four pillars”.

### Conclusion

This chapter began with an inquiry into the meaning of the secular in order to establish that contrary to increasingly prevalent interpretations that portray the secular as inherently exclusionary of the religious, and therefore as something that religious persons and groups ought to either reject or wage ‘holy war’ upon, a different understanding of the secular as inclusive of the non-religious and the religious is possible. The ‘archaeological’ inquiry that this chapter undertook into the meaning of ‘a secular society’ uncovered different layers of concepts and meanings that everyday common-sense understandings usually conceal, which led via a discussion of ‘society’ and ‘the nation-state’ to the concept of ‘democracy’. This can be taken to demonstrate that democracy is not an extrinsic property but is, rather, an intrinsic feature of a secular society and that, by the same token, the secular is intrinsic to democracy. Moreover, in a global age it also seems to follow that a secular society can no longer be contained to the nation-state and that a secular society must therefore be global.

The chapter concluded with a discussion of a challenge posed by UNESCO’s third pillar, ‘learning to live together’, which argues that an aspect of globalisation which is seeing heterogeneous worldviews living side by side and interacting with greater frequency than ever before is creating a need for diverse groups to be enabled to live harmoniously together through education for democracy. However, this thesis is
arguing that it would be valuable for a secular society to educate for democracy not only because a global agency such as UNESCO decreed it but because my inquiry in this chapter into the meaning of a secular society has demonstrated that being democratic is intrinsic to what it means to be secular. In a democracy, educational provision is commonly associated with the institution of mass schooling. Therefore the next chapter examines different aims of mass schooling in light of UNESCO's third pillar, 'learning to live together', which is an undertaking that the authors of the *Adelaide Declaration* can be understood to have set a precedent for in the Australian context.
Chapter Two – Aims of mass schooling

The purpose of this chapter is to explore different aims of mass schooling. This task is relevant to the overall claim of the thesis that a globalised environment is creating a need for the institution of mass schooling to educate non-religious and religious learners towards being democratic. Since it was first established, the institution of mass schooling has served in Western democracies as a key site for the formation of citizens. Aims of mass schooling have, historically, provided a means for socially influential groups to direct the enterprise of citizenship formation. This thesis argues that the task of educating a democratic kind of person for a globalised environment requires that state and faith schools promote an educational aim of the educated person in addition to established aims of mass schooling.

This chapter consists of two main sections. The first section, ‘The case of England and Wales’, examines how the institution of mass schooling first came about in a particular Western democracy, which provides a historical context for the discussion in the next section of the evolution of the aims of mass schooling. The second section, ‘Aims’, explores what some aims of mass schooling have been and gives an account of different educational aims that certain philosophers of education and cultural theorists have argued ought to be included amongst the aims of schooling in a democratic society.

2.1 The case of England and Wales

It might be objected that this section ought to explore the rise of mass schooling in Australia rather than in England and Wales. However, the main concern of this section is
to examine the history of the aims of the institution of mass schooling. Since the first schools established in Australia were ‘transplanted’ to the Australian colonies from England, this section investigates the origins of the institution of the mass school in the charitable activities of the churches in England.

**Church schools: pre-1830-1870**

The first ‘mass’ schools in England were religiously sponsored institutions.¹ According to one historian of education, “Popular education in Britain grew out of the social conscience of the Christian churches”.² A new type of school emerged in the early part of the nineteenth-century which is a recent ancestor of the ‘modern’ school. However, the institution of the school is much older than that and can be traced back to the Middle Ages.³ Since the primary concern of this section is to explore the emergence of the ‘modern’ institution of the school, it will limit its focus to a discussion of initiatives that different churches, religious organisations and the State undertook with respect to schools for poor children prior to, and following, the Industrial Revolution.

A distinction can be drawn between ‘charity schools’ and ‘elementary schools’, which roughly reflects different stages in the history of the involvement of different church

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groups in establishing schools for children of the poor and then, later on, children of the working class.\textsuperscript{4} The elementary schools established in the early years of the nineteenth-century can be understood to have built upon the foundations that the Charity School movement laid from the end of the seventeenth-century.\textsuperscript{5} The charity schools were “a social experiment” that were invented or devised as a way to respond to the growth of urbanisation in the towns and cities from around the end of the seventeenth-century.\textsuperscript{6} However, this novel ‘solution’ to the problem of urbanisation was not without its critics. Contemporary opponents of the charity schools were not convinced of the desirability of educating the poor. Some objected “to all forms of education for the poor ... as dangerous and misconceived prototypes of benevolence”.\textsuperscript{7} Aspects of the Charity School movement that can be perceived from a twenty-first-century vantage point as problematic are its combination of a new kind of intention of ‘rescuing’ the poor from immoral behaviour – not so much because ‘vice’ jeopardised their place in an afterlife but because it was seen to be disruptive of the social status quo – with the idea that elementary schooling is that which is appropriate to a particular class.\textsuperscript{8} This rather

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., 69.


\textsuperscript{7} Clyde Chitty, \textit{Eugenics, Race and Intelligence in Education} (London: Continuum, 2007), 14.

dubious legacy was inherited by the early nineteenth-century elementary school movement.

The creation of charity schools in the early part of the eighteenth-century was in part a response to the impact of growing urbanisation. By the end of the eighteenth-century, according to Hamilton, the charity schools “were in a state of crisis”. A key factor that contributed to put pressure on the charity schools in England was the Industrial Revolution that began in the second half of the eighteenth-century, a development which coincided with, and also stimulated further growth in, urbanisation, population and in the number of children in the population.

The perceived need to address such social problems associated with industrial and urban development led to the establishment in the late eighteenth-century of the Sunday schools movement. It also drove the creation of elementary schools in the early part of the nineteenth-century “as a Christian upper and middle class charitable mission to the children of the labouring poor”. The architects of the Sunday schools and elementary schools took up from the creators of the eighteenth-century charity schools the belief in the need for the ‘moral rescue’ of the working class in the service of

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9 Hamilton, 80.
11 Ibid., 157.
social discipline and the notion that schooling was appropriate to a particular social class.

The predecessor of the modern institution of the mass school can be said to have emerged in England with the implementation of the ‘monitorial system’ of instruction in church-sponsored elementary schools. Two rival systems evolved at about the same time, which were the work of an Anglican, Andrew Bell, and a nonconformist Quaker, Joseph Lancaster. The older charity schools were beginning to be regarded as expensive and unable to cope with larger class sizes that were due to the growing population in the cities and towns. In both Bell’s and Lancaster’s system, a hierarchy of low paid student monitors – who were older children – taught younger children; it was thought that this would be a cheaper and more efficient way of teaching larger groups of children. As a result of Bell’s and Lancaster’s innovations, the form of the school transformed radically.

A key difference between the elementary school and the earlier charity school was the former’s adoption of methods that were similar to those used in the operation and organisation of the new factory system that arose with the Industrial Revolution. The rewards and punishments used in the monitorial school corresponded to the system of wages and fines in the factories. Although Bell’s and Lancaster’s systems came to be widely criticised by figures such as Robert Owen, Samuel Wilderspin, David Stow and

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15 Silver and Silver, 10.
James Kay-Shuttleworth, their work significantly influenced England and Wales’s later elementary school system.\(^{16}\)

In 1811, a voluntary organisation sponsored by the Church of England, called the National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church (known also as the National Society), was established to provide working class children with elementary schooling organised in line with Bell’s system.\(^{17}\) An organisation promoting Lancaster’s system was established in 1814, called the British and Foreign School Society for the Education of the Labouring and Manufacturing Classes of Society of Every Religious Persuasion (British Society). Both kinds of elementary schooling taught the three ‘Rs’ of reading, writing and arithmetic and included a fourth ‘R’ of religion, which took the form of Bible-reading with explanatory comment, catechism and prayer book services.\(^{18}\)

The motivations informing the two societies for elementary schooling may have been rather mixed and could have consisted of: concern for the wellbeing of the children of the working class, a desire on the part of the upper and middle classes to inculcate

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\(^{17}\) The first schools to be established in the first Australian colony, New South Wales, in the 1820s were based on the National Society model that promoted Bell’s system, which reflects the privileged position held by the Anglican Church in the early days of the colony. See, Albert Gordon Austin, *Church, State and Public Education in Colonial Australia* (Melbourne: Pitman, 1961), 8-9.

compliant, non-disruptive behaviour in their perceived social inferiors and also a desire on the part of Anglicans and Dissenters to ensure the propagation of their own faith at the expense of the other's. The latter kind of motive derived from 'the religious difficulty', which was a significant feature of nineteenth-century life in England and Wales.

As with the charity schools, the creation of the elementary schools attracted criticism from some quarters for running the risk of giving working class people ideas above their station. Early nineteenth-century opinion was deeply divided on the question of state-sponsored national schooling and classical liberal mistrust of government interference "kept the state out of education much longer in England than elsewhere". So strong was opposition that when the State did enter into the provision of elementary schooling in 1833, this took the form of public subsidy to the existing schools of the National and British societies rather than direct initiative.

1870 ‘Forster’ Elementary Education Act

A significant shift in State policy on schooling took place from the mid-1860s that led to the passing in 1870 of the Forster Elementary Education Act (applying to England and Wales). The Act mandated the state-provision of elementary schooling and committed an unprecedented level of public funding to national schooling. Although the reasons

19 Silver and Silver, 7.
are unclear for why the sea-change in public opinion about state provision of schooling took place, it seems likely to have been influenced by contemporary developments in English domestic politics and also a perception that England’s relative standing in the wider competitive interstate system was declining.\textsuperscript{22}

The stated objective of the Forster Education Act was to supplement or “fill the gaps” in the existing subsidised elementary schools by building new schools only where there was a shortage of places.\textsuperscript{23} The new board schools that were built after the 1870 Education Act differed from the monitorial schools and were a new form of institution that is closely related to the school as it is known today. But there were significant overlaps in the purposes of the early nineteenth-century monitorial school and its late nineteenth-century successor. The Forster Education Act appealed to different groups: those concerned about the widening of the electorate, those concerned about industrial prosperity and those who were sympathetic to the growth of democracy.\textsuperscript{24} The Act responded to political, economic and social necessities and the reformers’ success seems to have rested on three elements.\textsuperscript{25}

One element was linked to the extension of the franchise to working class men through the 1867 Reform Act. Some members of Parliament voiced their unease about


\textsuperscript{23} Quoted by ibid., 159.

\textsuperscript{24} Williams, \textit{The Long Revolution}, 161.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
the likely behaviour of the newly enfranchised electors. The argument that the working classes needed to be prepared for their new voting rights through a kind of ‘crash course’ of elementary schooling stemmed from this kind of concern, which can be described as a “protective response” to the growth of democracy during the nineteenth-century. An aim of elementary schooling was thus conceived of as a kind of ‘democratic training’. This presupposed what can be described as a ‘minimal’ conception of democratic participation as preparation for periodically casting a vote in the ballot box. In order to vote for their preferred representative, the new electors at a minimum needed to be equipped with the basic ability to read and write. Schooling was also regarded as a means to civilise the lower classes so as to “avoid anarchy”.

A second element leading to the passing of the Forster Education Act was an argument that linked Britain’s continuing industrial prosperity, and dominance as a world power, to the need for a state-provided elementary system of schooling designed to improve the skills of the British workforce. In the 1860s, a perception emerged that Britain was failing to keep pace with industrial developments in rival countries, particularly Germany and America. Both countries threatened to undermine Britain’s standing and industrial supremacy in an international environment of competitive States. Germany’s and America’s rise was widely attributed to their more efficient systems of mass schooling. The views expressed by British industrialists that the expansion of elementary schooling was essential to the nation's ability to avoid losing

26 Jackson, 145.


28 Lowe, quoted by Ramirez and Boli: 9.

29 Ibid.
power and status on the world stage carried considerable weight in Parliament. This kind of economic argument regards schooling as a means to prepare learners for future adult work and to unify the population in the enterprise of enhancing a nation's economic competitiveness within an international system.

A third element that can be understood to have contributed to the successful passage of the Forster Education Act was its appeal to thinkers that one commentator refers to as “public educators”. This group’s response to the growth of democracy was influenced by the early nineteenth-century philosophic radicals and utilitarians, the later Jeremy Bentham and James Mills. These thinkers made a connection early on between the expansion of the franchise and the idea of mass elementary schooling for the working classes. In the years leading up to the first Great Reform Act of 1832, Bentham (1748 – 1832) argued for radical democratic reform as a means by which the industrial and commercial middle class might overturn the self-interested rule of the aristocracy and gain control of Parliament. Bentham perceived a need for the working classes to be ‘educated’ and ‘enlightened’ in the sense of being brought to understand

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30 Jackson, 142; Ramirez and Boli: 3.

31 Williams, The Long Revolution, 163.


33 Ibid., 104.
that their true interest lay in uniting with the middle class.\textsuperscript{34} This position can be described as a democratic argument for schooling for all citizens in a democracy.\textsuperscript{35}

The foregoing section explored how it came about that a system of mass schooling first came to be established in a particular Western democracy. It found that the massive expansion of elementary schooling for the labouring poor that took place in England and Wales during the latter half of the nineteenth-century was largely a response to an unprecedented growth of industry and democracy, which was bringing about radical changes in the nature of society. The next section will examine the main aims of schooling, with particular reference to how aims developed in England in response to the political, social and industrial upheavals of the eighteenth, nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries.

\textit{2.2 Aims}

The diverse aims of the institution of the modern school have developed over several centuries. A variety of religious, social and political upheavals can be understood to have contributed to the various transformations that the institution of the school has undergone, including, for example, the evolution of the school from the eighteenth-century charity school to the late-eighteenth-century Sunday school, the early nineteenth-century monitorial school and the late nineteenth-century board school. Some key events that seem to have informed the evolution of the aims of schooling in England include: the late fifteenth-century Reformation, the Glorious Revolution of

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{35} For John Dewey’s account of the relationship between utilitarian social thought and laissez-faire economic theory, see Dewey, \textit{The Public and Its Problems}, 90-92.
1688, the Industrial Revolution from the mid-eighteenth century, the American and French Revolutions of the late eighteenth century, the extension of the franchise during the nineteenth-century and the two world wars of the twentieth-century. The wider environment in which these religious, political, social and industrial upheavals took place was the waning power of the Roman Catholic Church – which had for a millennium after the fall of the Roman Empire provided a centre around which Europe was loosely integrated – the rise and decline of absolutism and the rise of the liberal State, together with the emergence of an interstate system of European nations.\textsuperscript{36} While the institution began to take its present shape in the Middle Ages, it seems that one of the main aims of mass schooling can be traced to the time of the Reformation.

**Moral**

One of the principal aims of mass schooling has been the promotion of morality or good moral conduct. For example, the 2008 *Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians* – a national document that superseded the 1999 *Adelaide Declaration* and sets the direction for Australian schooling for the next decade – explicitly identifies in Goal 2 that Australian schools should “support all young Australians to ... act with moral and ethical integrity”.\textsuperscript{37} In the history of schooling for the poor, one of the earliest means for promoting moral behaviour was oral instruction in Christian catechism and doctrines.

The purpose of promoting moral conduct through schooling seems to have arisen as part of the wider, fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Protestant religious and political

\textsuperscript{36} Ramirez and Boli: 13.

\textsuperscript{37} MCEECDYA, 8-9.
movement that sought to challenge the Roman Catholic Church’s claim to have sole authority for interpreting the Bible and guiding the conduct of Christendom’s rulers and subjects. For example, the Augustinian friar, Martin Luther, considered the expansion of parish schooling to be crucial to the success of the Reformation. Luther urged rulers of Protestant territories on the European continent to establish schools that provided religious and catechistic instruction for parish youth.\textsuperscript{38} From the outset religious instruction in schools for the poor was intertwined with guidance in moral conduct.

Parish schooling was used by Protestants and Catholics in sixteenth-century Europe as a means to set young people on the Protestant or Catholic “path to holy living and salvation”.\textsuperscript{39} Parish schooling inculcated new recruits into the particular side of the controversy that the ruler or prince of a region happened to support. The initial emphasis on oral instruction such as memorising Christian creeds, prayers and hymns rather than the teaching of reading may have been due to ambivalence on the part of the sixteenth-century Protestant reformers “about the wisdom of placing Bibles in the hands of the laity”.\textsuperscript{40} Some Protestant reformers, rulers, social elites and ecclesiastical leaders objected to the growth of reading of the Bible in the vernacular because of concern about the possible impact that direct access to Scripture might have on the moral conduct of the common people.


\textsuperscript{39} Annette Joyce Patterson, Phillip Anton Cormack, and William Charles Green, ”The Child, the Text and the Teacher: Reading Primers and Reading Instruction,” \textit{Pedagogica Historica} 48, no. 2 (2012): 190.

\textsuperscript{40} Melton, 9.
Prior to the Reformation, the authority to explain how the Biblical stories and injunctions were relevant for the daily conduct of the average person had been restricted to a particular class within society, the clergy. If the laity assumed for themselves the task of Biblical commentary without guidance from the clergy then they could ‘misread’ the Bible or go against the clergy’s explanation and base their conduct on unorthodox interpretations of Scripture. From the standpoint of the day, the salvation of the individual in the afterlife was at stake. But also the direct access of the common people to the Bible was seen to have the potential to undermine social stability in this life through outbreak of disputes between neighbours over correct or ‘heretical’ interpretations. Political elites may also have feared that as a result of direct access to the Bible, the common people could interpret particular texts in a way that legitimated overthrowing their social superiors in the established order. Perhaps it was for that reason that the teaching of reading to the poor only became widespread much later on during the eighteenth-century in parish schools in Europe and in charity schools in England.

The emergence in England of reading instruction for poor children seems to have been largely due to the influence of an eighteenth-century German Protestant movement called Pietism, which vigorously promoted the reading of vernacular versions of the Christian Scriptures by the laity.\footnote{Ibid.} Pietism was an important influence in the formation of the Society for Promotion of Christian Knowledge, which was one of the main organisations behind the eighteenth-century Charity School movement. The \footnote{Ibid.}
teaching of reading in the charity schools constituted the first of what was to later become ‘the Three R’s’ or three basic elements in the curriculum for working class children: reading, ‘riting and ‘rithmetic. Reading was not taught for its own sake – at least not to poor children – but in order to read the Bible. The accompanying explanation of Scripture was intended to doctrinally influence the way that individuals reflected on their conduct and understood their own behaviour in relation to others.\(^42\)

The Three R’s, then, seem to have been an outgrowth of one original ‘R’ of religious instruction, which was intertwined from the outset with the formation of particular types of conduct.\(^43\) Memorisation of the catechism in English, Christian hymns and instruction in reading the Bible absorbed most of the charity school day.\(^44\) At that time, it was not common practice to teach reading and writing simultaneously, although some charity schools taught writing and arithmetic.\(^45\) Teaching poor children to read was considered controversial and opposed by those who thought the ability to read and write would cause the poor to become discontent with their lot in life and to disobey their social superiors. However, the Anglican and Dissenting sponsors of the charity schools argued that instructing the poor in the principles of the Protestant faith would safeguard the political status quo by producing good Protestants and immuring youth against Catholicism.\(^46\) These concerns of different social groups about how instructing the poor in religion and teaching them to read and write might serve to undermine or

\(^{42}\) Patterson, Cormack, and Green: 190.

\(^{43}\) Ibid.

\(^{44}\) Jones, 224.

\(^{45}\) Patterson, Cormack, and Green: 185.

\(^{46}\) Jones, 35.
bolster social stability, points to an overlap between the moral aim of schooling and another purpose: the political.

**Political**

Another principal aim of mass schooling has been concerned with promoting the unity of a political whole – or politically organised unit – and with fostering unity or harmonious relations between citizens. For example, the *Melbourne Declaration* explicitly identifies in its Preamble that Australian schools “play a vital role in promoting ... social cohesion” and also states in Goal 1 that Australian schools should contribute “to a socially cohesive society that respects and appreciates cultural, social and religious diversity”. Concern about the potentially socially disruptive effects that could result from giving the common people direct access to the Bible led some social elites after the Reformation to attempt to prevent the growth of reading and to limit religious instruction to oral lessons. In the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries, concern about maintaining social order grew in England in response to political and industrial upheavals and rapid population growth and urbanisation. This contributed to create a sense of urgency on the part of many in the face of social chaos and political danger.

The Sunday schools movement of the 1780s was the first attempt to provide a solution to the new set of problems faced by a rapidly changing society. The new schools built on the charity school curriculum of Bible and catechism in order to

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47 MCEEDYA, 4, 7.

48 Silver and Silver, 7.
respond to the unfolding Industrial Revolution.\textsuperscript{49} Child labour was not new but the large number of children engaged in industry in urban centres – and the sight of children wandering around in the cities after work hours on week-days and on Sunday afternoons – was a new phenomenon. Instruction only took place on Sundays because these schools were aimed at “the children who were either employed in industry during the week or were left to maraud in the streets”.\textsuperscript{50} As well as seeking to influence the way that individuals reflected on their conduct and understood their own behaviour in relation to others, religious instruction in the Sunday schools aimed to ‘gentle the masses’.

Sunday schools attracted some criticism as it was alleged that teaching working class children to read and write would give them ideas above their station. A prominent supporter of Sunday schools, Hannah More, defended them on the grounds that the object of instruction was not “to make them fanatics, but to train up the lower classes in habits of industry and piety”.\textsuperscript{51} This suggests that both proponents and opponents of Sunday schools implicitly agreed that the labouring poor should be taught to know their place, to obey their social superiors and to accept the status quo. As one English historian of education, Kenneth Charlton observes: “At the end of eighteenth-century the maintenance of a divinely ordered social hierarchy was the prime aim of educators such as Hannah More”.\textsuperscript{52} Religious instruction in Sunday schools thus served a political

\textsuperscript{49} Jones, 144.

\textsuperscript{50} Silver and Silver, 7.

\textsuperscript{51} Quoted by Chitty, 16.

aim of promoting civic virtue by encouraging the poor to resign themselves to their fate in this life. The threat of what would happen to them in the afterlife if they did not behave or keep to their allotted place provided a means for the organisers of the Sunday school to discipline and control potentially disruptive social elements of a burgeoning population in turbulent political times.

Inculcating compliant conduct that upheld the social order was also a chief aim of the monitory schools. Andrew Bell hoped his system would make “good scholars, good men, good subjects and good Christians”.\textsuperscript{53} Joseph Lancaster aspired “to train children in the practice of such moral habits as are conducive to their future welfare as virtuous men and useful members of society”.\textsuperscript{54} As with the charity and Sunday schools, instruction was based on the Bible but a radical and controversial innovation was introduced of teaching reading and writing simultaneously.\textsuperscript{55}

Working class children were taught in the religiously-sponsored elementary schools the three basic elements of reading, writing and arithmetic as well as some practical activities. But the three R’s were apparently subsumed to the twin purposes of inculcating the Christian principles of the rival National and British societies and maintaining social order. Hence, the moral aim of promoting good conduct can be read to have served the political aim of transforming the children of a potentially refractory social class into compliant citizens. The idea that the political aim of elementary

\textsuperscript{53} Quoted by Jones, 336.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Patterson, Cormack, and Green: 185.
schooling could also be harnessed to an economic aim of improving the competitiveness of the nation’s economy seems to have only gained currency in Britain during the 1860s when Germany and America first began to threaten British industrial supremacy.

**Economic**

Another principle aim of mass schooling has been economic. This has two aspects that are both reflected in the *Melbourne Declaration*. The first relates to the purpose of preparing young people for working life by equipping them with the skills they need to earn a living and support themselves as adult members of society. The second links schooling to the promotion of a nation’s economic growth, prosperity and competitiveness in a global economy. The *Melbourne Declaration* refers to the first aspect of the economic purpose of schooling in Goal 2, which stipulates that Australian schools should aim to produce “successful learners [who are] ... on a “pathway towards continued success in further education, training or employment” and “have the confidence and capability to pursue university or post-secondary vocational qualifications leading to rewarding and productive employment”. However, the second element of the economic aim of schooling appears to provide the overarching purpose of the *Melbourne Declaration*.

The first paragraph of the Preamble seems to foreground education for democracy by opening with the statement that, “As a nation Australia values the central role of education in building a democratic, equitable and just society”. However, the second paragraph immediately shifts the emphasis from democracy to the role that schooling plays in promoting the competitiveness of the nation’s economy: “In the 21st century

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56 MCEECDYA, 8, 9.
Australia’s capacity to provide a high quality of life for all will depend on the ability to compete in the global economy”. The paragraph that introduces the document’s two goals for young Australians also foregrounds this economic argument for schooling: “Improving educational outcomes for all young Australians is central to the nation’s social and economic prosperity ... Young Australians are therefore placed at the centre of the Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals”. The reasoning seems to be that young Australians are important chiefly because their economic activities will contribute to the nation’s prosperity and competitive standing in a global environment. This prioritisation by a national government of an economic argument for schooling is not new.

The principal argument that came to be central in the debate in England about the 1870 Forster Education Act was an economic argument for schooling, which claimed that “upon the speedy provision of elementary education depends our industrial prosperity”. Three sides can be distinguished in the debate about the purpose of education, which was stimulated by the Forster Education Act. Participants in the argument included “industrial trainers” who defined schooling in terms of training and disciplining the working classes in order to improve the skills of the British workforce, public educators who were strong proponents of democracy and “old humanists” who promoted an older conception of liberal education that pre-dates the emergence of

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57 Ibid., 4.
58 Ibid., 7.
59 W.E. Forster, quoted by Williams, The Long Revolution, 162.
democracy in the early modern era.\(^6\) The complexity of the argument about the purpose of education is suggested by the fact that the public educators were often in alliance with the industrial trainers, old humanists were commonly against public educators and industrial trainers, but that in certain respects, public educators drew on the arguments of the defenders of liberal education against the industrial trainers.\(^6\)

At the time of the Forster Education Act, the concerns of the industrial trainers predominated.\(^6\) This led to the definition of education “in terms of future adult work, with the parallel clause of teaching the required social character – habits of regularity, ‘self-discipline’, obedience, and trained effort”.\(^6\) A democratic argument for the expansion of schooling was made subservient to an economic argument. The influence of these three groups – the public educators, industrial trainers and liberal educators – continued to be felt in England during the twentieth-century.\(^6\)

It seems possible to discern in the Australian document, the *Melbourne Declaration*, the influence of the kind of argument for schooling that the industrial trainers promoted, which ties schooling primarily to the competitiveness of a nation’s economy within a now global interstate system. Yet we have seen that UNESCO’s document, the Delors Report, takes a contrasting position by arguing that ‘learning to live together’, the third pillar, should constitute an overarching purpose of education for democracy in

\(^{60}\) Ibid., 161-163.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 162.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., 163.

\(^{63}\) Ibid.

\(^{64}\) Ibid., 161-163.
a global era. The Delors Report can be interpreted as recommending that an economic argument for schooling ought to be made subservient to an educational aim of promoting democracy and world peace in a global environment.

This section has so far identified and examined several established aims of schooling: moral, political and economic. In order to take seriously an appeal that the Delors Report makes, "that all people with a sense of responsibility turn their attention to both the aims and means of education", it is now necessary to explore different conceptions of education, specifically, what it means to be an educated person.65

**Educational**

The concepts of ‘schooling’ and ‘education’ are often considered to have the same or similar meanings. This is reflected in the way that the phrases, ‘aims of schooling’ and ‘aims of education’ are often used synonymously. For example, the full title of the *Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians* refers to ‘educational goals’. But the document’s emphasis on the role of schooling in producing workers capable of improving Australia’s competitiveness in the global economy suggests that the *Melbourne Declaration* may be primarily concerned not with goals or aims of education but with aims of schooling, particularly a type of economic aim that ties schooling to the national economy.

The two phrases, ‘mass schooling’ and ‘mass education’ are commonly used interchangeably as synonyms. However, ‘schooling’ is not identical with ‘education’.66

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65 Delors, 14.

Aims of schooling seem to be distinct from aims of education but the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive and can overlap. This means that the enterprise that teachers in schools professionally engage in may not necessarily be educative.

Philosophers of education and cultural theorists initiated a conversation following World War II about the nature of education, which explored a distinction between being indoctrinated and being an educated kind of person. There was a perceived need at that historical juncture to create safeguards in Western democracies against the potential for mass populations to become amenable to totalitarian ideologies and authoritarian dictators. In a 1966 lecture entitled, ‘Education After Auschwitz’, given twenty-one years after the liberation of the German concentration-camp of that name, German-Jewish cultural theorist, Theodor W. Adorno, defined a new educational aim for a post-war era: “The premier demand upon all education is that Auschwitz not happen again”.  

An indoctrinated person

Adorno described Auschwitz as “the barbarism all education strives against”. He argued that it is chiefly the mentality, attitudes and traits of a certain type of person, “the manipulative character”, and the accumulation of vast numbers of people with such a character, that made Auschwitz possible. The characteristics of this kind of character are: a permanent compulsion to obey orders, the glorification of functions and a

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68 Ibid., 191, 198.
willingness to treat others as anonymous members of an amorphous mass. In order to guard against the repetition of Auschwitz, Adorno proposed that it is essential “to gain some clarity about the conditions under which the manipulative character arises, and then, by altering these conditions, to prevent as far as possible its possible emergence”. It is necessary to discover “how such a person develops”.

Adorno in an earlier lecture identified a connection between the task of ‘debarbarising humanity’ and the work of the school. He argued that, “the pathos of the school today, its moral import, is that in the midst of the status quo it alone has the ability, if it is conscious of it, to work directly against the debarbarisation of humanity”. An approach that draws on Adorno’s view of the task of the school and his conception of education could define an overarching aim of mass schooling as an educational one whereby schools seek to create a sort of environment that causes a kind of development in learners that makes them less likely to become a cruel type of character. However, the emphasis that Adorno places on the notion of personalities has been criticised for discounting contemporary social influences.

While Adorno attributed the willingness of a vast number of the German population to participate in the Nazi regime to the prevalence of a type of character, Polish-Jewish

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69 Ibid., 198.

70 Ibid., 199.

71 Ibid.

72 Adorno, "Taboos on the Teaching Vocation," 190.

sociologist, Zygmunt Bauman describes the monstrous activities of the Nazis as arising from “an ethics of obedience”. 74 On this reading, Adorno’s emphasis on personality suppresses the disturbing insight that “many gentle people may turn cruel if given a chance”. 75 Bauman proposes that the atrocities that ensued from Nazi rule were not due to the perverse delight that a group of sociopathic individuals took in committing heinous acts. Rather, what made Auschwitz possible was the belief of morally normal people that they were doing the right thing by obeying orders that an authority gave them to commit inhumane acts. If the Nazis considered that they were being good citizens by being obedient to authorities, then according to Bauman, the kind of person that is now to be feared is “the person who obeys the law more than the one who breaks it”. 76 Inhumanity is less a matter of personality features and more a matter of social relationships and the quality of environments.

Bauman identifies an environment in which a polarity exists due to a relationship of authority and subordination as one that promotes an ethics of obedience because it is “only when you have ... an authority who ... operates in a free field without countervailing pressures other than the victim’s protests that you get the purest response [of obedience] to authority”. 77 By contrast, an environment that can defend against “morally normal people engaging in morally abnormal actions” is one that creates resources or countervailing pressures to protect individuals from being exposed

74 Ibid., 151.

75 Ibid.

76 Dwight Macdonald, quoted by ibid., 151.

77 Ibid., 165.
to a single-minded source of authority.\textsuperscript{78} The promotion of pluralism and patterns of social interaction characterised by “the tumult of political and social discord” is considered by Bauman to be the best preventative measure against the recurrence of Auschwitz.\textsuperscript{79}

North American educational psychologist, William G. Perry, conducted research during the 1960s at Harvard University on the development of male undergraduates’ understanding of the nature of knowledge and how it is acquired, which led to the publication of Perry’s influential book, \textit{Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years}.\textsuperscript{80} The Perry scheme has been widely used as a developmental framework for educational practice and I am introducing it here as a guide rather than a blueprint for the present inquiry into the differences between the characteristics of an indoctrinated kind of person and an educated kind of person.\textsuperscript{81} The scheme identifies nine “positions” through which students typically progress over time.

A ‘position’ refers to a “point of outlook” or a perspective through which a person perceives themselves and the world.\textsuperscript{82} As the way students view themselves in relationship to what they believe knowledge to be changes, they progress through

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 166.

\textsuperscript{80} William G Perry, \textit{Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years} (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968).

\textsuperscript{81} Mary Field Belenky and others, \textit{Women’s Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice, and Mind} (New York: Basic Books, 1997; reprint, 1st), 10.

\textsuperscript{82} Perry, 48.
positions. However, a person can occupy several positions at the same time with respect to different subjects or aspects of experience. The nine positions can be roughly grouped into three successive levels of characteristics: basic dualism, multiplicity and commitment.

In the initial position of basic dualism, students view knowledge as received truth and assume that right answers exist for everything. Passive learners depend on authorities to hand down the truth because they assume that the right answers or correct knowledge are already known to authorities and that the role of authorities is to tell students the answers. The dualistic student sees the world in polarities of right-wrong, good-bad, we-they and black-white. Dualistic thinkers are confused by disagreement between authorities and diversity of opinions. Since this mindset perceives teachers to have all the ‘answers’, a dualistic student will reject her or his peers as a source of knowledge. Subsequently, as the learner becomes more aware that multiple interpretations and diverse opinions exist, faith in authorities and right answers can be shaken. The transition into multiplicity occurs when the learner concludes that, at least in some areas, no one knows the right answer yet.

In multiplicity, knowledge is simply a matter of opinion. Students tend to shift from a dependency on authorities and begin to think more independently. From this vantage point, teachers and advisors are no longer seen as authorities with the right answers but just as people with opinions. Consequently, peers begin to be recognised as legitimate sources of knowledge. Since it is assumed that ‘everyone is entitled to his or her own opinion’, students believe that their own opinion is as good as the teacher’s or anyone else’s. A multiplist thinker may be puzzled by how teachers can assign grades
because of her or his assumption that personal feelings or prejudice are the criteria for judgement. If everyone’s opinion is considered to be equally valid then a belief might arise that it is not possible to reach ultimate truth or to evaluate one person’s opinion as more valid than another’s. In response to teachers’ demands that students provide evidence and support for their conclusions, students begin to see that some opinions are more rigorous than others and recognise the need to support opinions. The transition into Perry’s third level, commitment, begins when the learner becomes able to see that a wide variety of different positions and understandings exist that are legitimately held.

In the position of commitment, students come to understand that knowledge is contextual and that what one ‘knows’ is constructed by the framework that one is using to understand something. The committed learner is not only aware of the existence and validity of different frameworks but is motivated to take a personal stance amongst multiple views. The responsible stance that such a learner takes is not fixed but relative to the different contexts that she or he finds her/himself in. Depending on context, she or he is able to navigate between theoretical understandings, take a responsible stance and to give an account of this to others whilst being sensitive and understanding of the fact that other people have different views that are also legitimate and will therefore disagree.

Intrinsic to the characteristic of responsibility or commitment that is distinctive to this level is an awareness of the need to explain or offer a justification for the stand one takes because a person in this position is mindful of the existence of a multiplicity of conflicting views that may also be legitimate. The existence of disagreements is not seen
by the committed learner as a matter of right-wrong or as indicating that all opinions are equally valid, but as an opportunity for engaged discussion and considered – even passionate – disagreement that can lead to the clarification of one’s own position or to adjusting or even changing one’s considered view. A key characteristic of this level is therefore a critical openness that arises from a willingness to engage with multiple views in order to invite critical scrutiny of one’s reasons from differing or opposing viewpoints and to thereby test one’s own position.

In Perry's scheme, an indoctrinated kind of person can be described as exhibiting the characteristics of someone occupying the basic dualistic stage of ‘black and white’ polarised thinking, where the individual is passive in relation to authorities. Since authorities are regarded in this level as having the right answers, individuals are likely to wait for authorities to tell them what to do. From the standpoint of such a perspective, persons who unquestioningly accept information and follow orders handed down from above will consider themselves to actually be doing the right thing and will believe that by being obedient they are 'being good'. It seems valuable to make a connection here between the idea that basic dualistic thinking is a characteristic of being an indoctrinated person and Bauman's notion of an ethics of obedience which seems to presuppose an idea of an indoctrinatory environment. Then it seems possible to describe the state of being an indoctrinated person as one that either actively promotes or has not yet been enabled to create resources to defend against the emergence of an environment of indoctrination in which a single-minded source of authority may operate in a free field as a consequence of the exclusion or stifling of plurality.
Building on Perry’s scheme, North American developmental theorist, Mary Belenky and her colleagues qualified the basic dualistic position and added a characteristic, “silence”, that is considered to be valuable for this present discussion of the traits of an indoctrinated person. Belenky et al used the category of ‘silence’ to describe the women in their study whose thinking can be described as dualistic, ‘black and white’. Like Perry’s basic dualistic student, the silent women see the world in polarities of right-wrong, good-bad, win-lose. Their relationship to external authorities is one of passivity, subduedness, subordination and dependence for direction. For them, “to hear is to obey”. This state of being silent is characterised by Belenky et al as an inability to speak out to challenge authorities because this kind of person is disposed to look to authorities for direction and to comply unthinkingly. Belenky et al map the progression that the silent women ought to have: from silence to critical dialogue with multiple perspectives. Drawing on Perry, Adorno, Bauman and Belenky et al, it seems possible to describe an indoctrinated kind of person as one who occupies with respect to different subjects or aspects of experience a basic dualistic position of silence. Such a person has not yet been enabled to create moral resources that can defend against the emergence of ‘vicious’ social arrangements in which exposure to a single-minded source of authority promotes an ethics of obedience that can lead to morally normal people engaging in morally abnormal actions.

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83 Belenky and others, 15, 23-34.
84 Ibid., 30.
85 Ibid., 28.
86 Bauman, 165.
The foregoing discussion has identified some key characteristics of what it might mean to be an indoctrinated kind of person and also described several theorists’ accounts of what the movement out of an indoctrinated mindset entails. I turn now to explore some different answers that have been given to the question, ‘what does it mean to be an educated person?’

An educated person

For Adorno, being educated meant being an autonomous kind of person. He drew a connection between a failure to become an autonomous person and a willingness to treat others as an amorphous mass, which is a disposition that he argued contributed to make Auschwitz possible.87 Those who are not autonomous “blindly slot themselves into the collective [and] make themselves into something like inert material, extinguish themselves as self-determined beings”.88 By contrast, being autonomous is described by Adorno in terms of an ability to critically reflect upon oneself, exercise independence of mind and be disposed to withstand societal pressure to blindly identify with a collective.89

English analytic philosopher of education, R. S. Peters, gave an account of his conception of what it means to be an educated person in his 1966 book, *Ethics and Education* and in an essay published several years later entitled, ‘Education and the
Educated Man’. North American feminist philosopher of education, Jane Roland Martin, observes that the concept of the educated person is the starting point of Peters’s philosophy of education. According to Peters, both the educated person and a person who does not count as being educated possess some kind of knowledge or understanding. The educated person possesses four characteristics that a person who is merely trained, skilled or socialised lacks.

First, the educated person has a conceptual scheme that raises their body of knowledge above the level of a collection of disjointed facts. This conceptual scheme implies “some understanding of principles for the organisation of facts” and some understanding of the “reason why” of things. Second, the educated person is not merely knowledgeable in the sense of being able to memorise and recite the dates of historical events; being educated involves being in some way affected or transformed by what one knows. Third, the educated person must care about the standards and procedures imminent in her or his field of interest and not merely unthinkingly adhere to them. Fourth, the educated person has cognitive perspective, which is a notion that one commentator describes as “not simply … a field of knowledge but … a wider

93 Ibid.
framework such that, for example, [the educated person’s] scientific knowledge coexists with historical and cultural understanding".94

Peters expanded the notion in his later essay, 'Education and the Educated Man' by specifying that the educated person could pursue practical as well as theoretical activities provided that she or he delighted in such things for their own sake and so long as there were standards imminent within the activity that she or he was sensitive to. He also specified that the educated person is one who possesses knowledge and understanding in depth and breadth. A kind of education capable of realising such a conception of the educated person would involve the acquisition of conceptual schemes and a process of widening cognitive perspective through growth of knowledge and understanding. As Martin points out, Peters’s educated person would need to receive an education similar to the model of liberal education proposed by English analytic philosopher of education, Paul H. Hirst.95

Hirst’s conception of a liberal education argued for the existence of seven ‘forms of knowledge’ and for their centrality in realising the ideal of a liberally educated person.96 Consequently, the kind of knowledge that both Hirst’s and Peters’s ideal of an educated person possessed is highly theoretical. Education requires an initiation into the ‘breadth’ of the forms of knowledge, which is understood to develop the mind and enable the person being educated to reflect analytically and critically. The widening of


95 Martin: 98-99.

cognitive perspective through initiation into the seven forms of knowledge was understood to promote the growth of critical power, which was considered necessary to develop the rational autonomy of learners.

The idea that the educated person is one who is rationally autonomous seems to follow from Peters’s and Hirst’s emphasis on the need to initiate learners into forms of knowledge so that learners can acquire those characteristics that Peters identified as peculiar to the educated person and as lacking in a person who is merely trained, skilled or socialised. Peters and Hirst understood autonomy to involve the making of rationally informed choices. Autonomy has often been described in terms of a man making choices according to a code of principles which are his own. Different thinkers in the tradition of analytic philosophy of education have held the view that the development of autonomy requires the compulsory initiation of learners into various fields and forms of knowledge that provide frameworks for informed choice. Autonomy, or the aim of enabling a learner to become a rationally autonomous person, is considered by some to have become one of the central aims in modern education and has been appealed to as a

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Jane Roland Martin argued that Hirst’s theory of a liberal education was incomplete and needed to be supplemented. Hirst’s theory is deficient in three ways, according to Martin. First, it decided the goals of education based upon a theory of knowledge rather than beginning by clarifying the aim or purpose of a liberal education.101 Putting curriculum content before educational goals led Hirst into what Martin termed the epistemological fallacy and it reinforced an assumption that the content of the curriculum should be confined to propositional knowledge, which Martin considered a serious deficiency. Second, Hirst’s theory created an ivory tower kind of person “who can reason yet has no desire to solve real problems in the real world; a person who understands science but does not worry about the uses to which it is put”.102 Third, it created untenable dualisms by separating mind from body, thought from action and reason from feelings, which produced a kind of person “who can reach flawless moral conclusions” but lacks empathy because she or he “feels no care or concern for others”.103


102 Martin, “The Ideal of the Educated Person,” 104.

103 Ibid.
Martin’s reconceptualisation of liberal education emphasised concern for the development of a person and not just a mind, the development of emotion, feelings and sensitivity to other persons rather than just standards of theoretical or practical pursuits and a commitment to moral action.\textsuperscript{104} While Martin’s critique focused on received liberal notions of the educated person and curriculum theory, other writers have challenged a perceived tendency within liberal education to promote rational autonomy as the sole principle of education without making sufficient room for authenticity.

The idea that the educated person is not merely rationally autonomous but has also been enabled to exercise \textit{authentic} choice beyond rationality – in the sense of criteria provided by an academic curriculum based on the forms of knowledge – has been proposed by certain thinkers who argue that education should promote rational autonomy \textit{and} authenticity.\textsuperscript{105} Advocates of authenticity disagree with the explanation that educational philosophers in the ‘rationalist’ analytic tradition have given of what it means to describe a person’s values, beliefs or principles as her or his “own”.\textsuperscript{106} The idea of ‘own’ that is considered problematic can be found in the following description of autonomy by English analytic philosopher, Robert Dearden:

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{104} Martin, "Needed: A New Paradigm for Liberal Education," 180-181.
    \item \textsuperscript{106} Bonnett, "Authenticity, Autonomy and Compulsory Curriculum," 110.
\end{itemize}}
A person is autonomous, then, to the degree that what he thinks and does in important areas of his life cannot be explained without reference to his own activity of mind. That is to say, the explanation of why he thinks and acts as he does in these areas must include a reference to his own choices, deliberations, decisions, reflections, judgements,plannings or reasonings.107

Some have objected to what they take Dearden to mean here, which is that an autonomous person’s activities of mind need to be based on, or are an expression of, independent criteria gained through familiarity with a broad range of curriculum subjects.108 Their concern is that this implies that a thought can be said to be a person’s ‘own’ if, once having had it, that person then evaluates it according to rational, impersonal criteria.

One of the key points of divergence between supporters of rational autonomy and supporters of authenticity is “the meaning and significance of this idea of ‘ownership’ of one’s beliefs, thoughts, and choices”.109 For advocates of authenticity, initiation into a curriculum that aims to develop rational autonomy alone leaves out matters relating to “personal significance”.110 Consequently, it does not make provision for learners to gain an awareness of the values, beliefs and meanings by which they are necessarily already

109 Ibid.
interpreting the world – prior to their entering the institution of mass schooling – or provide learners with opportunities to take “ownership” of those values and beliefs.111

R. S. Peters’s account of the characteristics of the educated person includes authenticity by specifying that it is not sufficient to unthinkingly adhere to the standards and procedures imminent in one’s discipline but one must actively care for them. However, Peters’s ‘rationalist’ approach subordinates authenticity to standards of rationality and implies that the educated person need only gain an authentic relation to rational standards.112 An approach that does not reduce authenticity to a mere functionary of standards of rationality but explores its meaning more fully can be found in the work of German ‘existentialist’ philosopher, Martin Heidegger. Of particular relevance for the present discussion of what it means to be an educated person are Heidegger’s notions of ‘Eigentlichkeit’ (a word he coined in German to mean ‘authenticity’), ‘Dasein’ and ‘aletheia’, which I will now briefly examine.

Being authentic, on Heidegger’s account, involves being enabled to choose how one relates to one’s own beliefs and to actualise possibilities with an awareness that personal responsibility for the stand one takes on one’s own being rests with oneself alone. Eigentlichkeit is derived from ‘eigen’, which is a German adjective for ‘own’ that is used in such contexts as ‘going my own way’, ‘having a mind of one’s own’ or ‘having a room of one’s own’, which can mean possession. Also, ‘eigentlich’ means ‘real’ or ‘proper’, and ‘-keit’ is a suffix that can be added to adjectives to create nouns. Taken


together, Heidegger formed the contrasting pair of nouns, ‘Eigentlichkeit’ and ‘Uneigentlichkeit’, which mean ‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity’. Inauthenticity and authenticity are terms Heidegger uses to describe different modes or conditions in which a particular entity, ‘Dasein’, can exist. Consequently, he contrasts inauthentic and authentic Dasein, which are not necessarily two separate entities but can refer to the same entity that is perhaps on different occasions ‘being inauthentic’ or ‘being authentic’.

‘Dasein’ is a term Heidegger uses to designate both the human being and the type of being that humans have or the basic structure of human being. It derives from ‘dasein’, a German verb that variously means ‘existence’, ‘to exist’, ‘to be there, to be here’ or ‘presence’. ‘Sein’ means ‘to be’ or ‘being’ and ‘da’ often means ‘there’ or, sometimes, ‘here’ (but not too far from the speaker). Heidegger at times emphasises the root, ‘sein’ of ‘Dasein’ to mean ‘being there’ or ‘being here’. The way Dasein is in the world differs from the way other entities are in the world because according to Heidegger, “the essence of Dasein lies in its existence”. Unlike other entities in the world, Dasein is not just one thing occupying space alongside other things. While the being of animals and things is a matter of indifference to them since they lack self-awareness, Dasein for Heidegger is the entity for which, in its being, that way of being is an issue or concern.

115 Ibid., 42.
Consequently, a certain kind of freedom distinguishes the being of Dasein from the being of other entities.

This self-awareness that is characteristic and unique to Dasein alone among entities is suggested by that fact that only Dasein needs to be addressed with a personal pronoun, 'I' or 'you'. Other entities are not appropriately addressed as 'I' or 'you' and even though pet owners may address their pets as 'you', animals cannot identify themselves as 'I'. Another way to describe this difference between Dasein and other entities is that the being of Dasein is not wholly causally determined whereas the being of animals and things are wholly bound in with the causal world. On this account, the kind of freedom that is characteristic of distinctively human being stems from Dasein's self-awareness; Dasein is capable of being aware of its relationship to the world and therefore can take charge of its own being whereas un-self-aware entities cannot. This freedom of the way of being of Dasein is described in Heidegger's observation, “Dasein is its possibility”.

Dasein is not a substance with an essential nature. Rather, the potentiality or possibility of Dasein precedes its actuality. It is therefore appropriate to talk about the being of Dasein in terms of possibility rather than actuality since Dasein is the possibility of various ways of being and not a definite actual thing. For that reason, Heidegger identifies that only Dasein exists or has existence, the German verb for which is

116 Ibid., 191.
118 Heidegger, Being and Time, 42. (1967)
'existieren' and the noun, 'Existenz'. Heidegger at times hyphenated the latter, 'Ek-sistenz', to emphasise its derivation from Latin and Greek words, which have the meaning ‘to stand forth’ or ‘standing out from’. Only Dasein exists, then, in the sense that it is the only entity that can stand forth, or stand out from, its present conditions or circumstances in such a way that it creates what Heidegger described as ‘possibilities’ or ‘ways to be’.\(^{119}\) The distinctive freedom of the way of being of Dasein is due to the fact that only Dasein exists or can stand out from its present to create possibilities in this way. Integral to this sort of freedom of the distinctively human way of being is a particular notion of truth.

In place of the traditional Western emphasis on conceptualising truth as propositions or statements that accurately describe a state of affairs, Heidegger emphasised the Classical Greek notion of ‘aletheia’, which can be translated as ‘the state of not being hidden’ or ‘the state of being evident’. Aletheia comes from the word, Lēthē, which means concealment, hiding, forgetfulness, withdrawn and mysterious depths. Given its derivation from Lēthē, aletheia can be translated as unconcealedness, disclosing or unforgetfulness. Aletheia is an activity of relationship where something opens which was once closed and a movement of uncovering that simultaneously covers up other possibilities. For Heidegger, this term referred to an unhiddenness in relation to that which is hidden and a process whereby hidden things are “tak[en] out of their concealment”.\(^{120}\) Dasein's relation to aletheia is such that the being of Dasein is


\(^{120}\) Ibid., 202.
considered to be in truth which is understood as an activity of disclosing and covering up.

The personal freedom of Dasein can be said to consist in an activity of exercising choice between its own possibilities disclosed to it in truth as aletheia and in actualising a possibility whereby a particular way of being that previously did not exist is thereby brought into existence. Heidegger described this process of exercising personal freedom to choose and actualise as 'understanding', by which he meant "literally taking a stand on. We take a stand on our own being whenever we choose a particular possibility or project".\textsuperscript{121} Taking a stand on my own way of being by choosing a possibility from amongst disclosed possibilities defines who I am.

The choice to actualise one way of being, however, is always gained at the expense of other real possibilities that could have been taken up but were not acted upon.\textsuperscript{122} An awareness of the negation of the possibilities that are necessarily passed by is inherent to the notion of personal responsibility that this conception of personal freedom of choice demands. From this standpoint, one cannot fall back on abstract principles of rightness and wrongness provided by a system of ethics or by forms of knowledge in a broad compulsory curriculum to make one's choices for one. Moreover, one is not choosing to do 'this' or 'that' but, rather, one is deciding the kind of being that one is becoming. Taking personal responsibility for the stance that one takes on one's being


\textsuperscript{122} Bonnett, Children's Thinking: Promoting Understanding in the Primary School, 191.
entails learning to cope with the awareness that there are no guarantees that one has made the ‘right’ decision about one’s being or personal identity.

Inauthenticity seems to be conceived by Heidegger as the normal condition of most human beings for most of the time, which cannot be avoided. By contrast, authentic Dasein is one that exercises personal freedom to choose between its own disclosed possibilities and takes personal responsibility for actualising one way of being in the consciousness that doing so negates other real possibilities. This sheds some light on the disagreement between advocates of rational autonomy and advocates of authenticity about what it means to describe a person’s values as her or his own and the significance of the idea of ownership of one’s beliefs, thoughts and choices. Advocates of authenticity argue that an ability to exercise rationally informed choice based on independent criteria gained from public forms of knowledge is necessary but not sufficient for a person to count as autonomous “in the deep sense”. What it might mean to be an educated person, then, could involve being enabled to exercise authentic choice in addition to rationally informed choice. In other words, being authentic as well as being rationally autonomous could be hallmarks of being an educated person.

A possible connection between a conception of liberal education as initiation into public forms of knowledge which aims to promote rational autonomy alone and the formation of a kind of person that is disengaged from the political has recently been

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123 Ibid.
pointed out by Martin: “Liberal education, as it has traditionally been understood, tends to form observers or spectators of democracy rather than active participants in it”. She proposes that a preoccupation with cognitive formation alone at the expense of developing emotion, feelings and sensitivity towards other people and the world undermines the formation of democratic citizens. Such an education does not aim to enable learners “to care if people’s freedoms are denied them ... [or] feel society’s injustices, be moved to action by concerns for its future, or be able to translate the knowledge acquired into practice”. Martin can be read as suggesting that an important consideration which ought to be taken into account when evaluating the worthwhileness of a conception of education is whether the kind of person it produces is capable of promoting an environment of vigorous democratic participation.

Martin’s position seems to receive support from Charles Taylor’s argument in The Ethics of Authenticity that economic forces and over-bureaucratic state control have weakened what he terms “democratic initiative” in modern democratic societies. Also, the claim that education for rational autonomy alone may not enable learners to be more than mere observers of democracy seems to overlap significantly with John Dewey’s concern about approaches to teaching in schools that emphasise knowledge acquisition. He argued that knowledge-based teaching and curriculum reduces learners to passive ‘consumers’ of information and mere spectators rather than participants in a democratic way of life. In place of ‘knowledge’, Dewey proposed the notion of

126 Ibid.
127 Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, 112.
'warranted assertion'. Chapter Six of this thesis will explore Dewey's conception of democracy and valuation in relation to the idea that has been explored in this chapter that what it means to be an educated person could involve being able to make rationally informed choices and to exercise authentic choice.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has examined the origins of the institution of mass schooling in a particular Western democracy, England and Wales. It traced the successive transformations of the school from the eighteenth-century charity school through to the late-eighteenth-century Sunday school, the early nineteenth-century monitorial school and the late nineteenth-century board school in order to show how these institutional reforms were designed to address a variety of religious, social, political, industrial and economic upheavals and disturbances. Given that, historically, the institution of the school was not static but changed in response to circumstances, it seems to follow that in a democracy the enterprise of mass schooling ought to be democratically controlled by public deliberation about the challenges faced by the wider society in which schools are embedded rather than by political and economic elites alone.

The chapter explored the evolution of the moral, political and economic aims of mass schooling. In addition to serving the legitimate purpose of equipping learners with skills to earn a living and to support themselves as adult members of society, it seems the aims of schooling have also functioned as levers for influential social groups to ‘steer’ the direction in which a society is developing. This kind of control that political and economic elites exercise over citizenship formation in schools can be described as
'undemocratic' because only a privileged few are invited to participate in deliberation about what kind of citizen is considered desirable for schools to produce.

Finally, the chapter distinguished between aims of schooling and aims of education in order to pursue a line of inquiry into what it means to be an educated person, which served to bring to light a range of responses of educators and cultural theorists. A key value of an educational aim in a democracy seems to lie in its potential to contribute to promoting an environment of vigorous public deliberation about the challenges faced by the society in which schools are situated. This can provide a defence against the concentration of decision-making in the hands of a few about what kind of a global society is developing and what kind of person such a society is producing.

The next chapter brings a diverse range of perspectives of citizenship, democracy and education into conversation with each other which provides a literary portrayal of the kind of debate about citizenship that a democracy depends upon in order to flourish and which seems currently to be largely absent from the public forums of democracies.
Chapter Three – Inquiry into citizenship

The purpose of this chapter is to explore versions of citizenship and citizenship education which different perspectives have argued ought to be implemented in mass schooling in a democracy. This chapter provides a conceptual overview that serves the overall claim of the thesis that the enterprise of mass schooling ought to initiate non-religious and religious learners into a secular process of education that enculturates democratic citizens capable of building a democratic society that is inclusive of those with and without religious faith. The range of interpretations of citizenship reviewed in this chapter indicate that it is the kind of democratic society that is considered to be worth aiming for that ought to determine what kind of citizen is considered desirable. This, in turn, ought to define the sort of education that is implemented in mass schooling which shapes citizens for life in a particular kind of desired society.

The chapter consists of two main sections. The first section, 'Liberal communitarian debate', examines a debate that has been underway in political philosophy for the past three decades between a most influential interpretation of liberalism and its extra-liberal critics. This sets the context for the exploration in the second section, ‘Conceptions of citizenship’, of a variety of liberal conceptions of citizenship and one extra-liberal conception of citizenship, civic republicanism.

3.1 Liberal communitarian debate

Liberal political theory has come increasingly under fire since the 1980s from a disparate group of thinkers in America whose diverse critiques have been labelled as ‘communitarianism’. What is commonly referred to as the 'liberal communitarian
debate’ began largely in response to the publication in 1971 of John Rawls’s, *A Theory of Justice*, a landmark text that rejuvenated liberal political theory at a time when the utilitarian tradition had long dominated political philosophy in English-speaking countries.¹

**Priority of ‘the Right’ or ‘the Good’**

Communitarians variously argue that a certain kind of liberalism presupposes an inadequate view of the person and an inadequate view of the relationship between individuals and their communities, which results in an impoverished view of the role of the state.² A basic tenet of neutralist liberalism, according to Charles Taylor, is the view that “a liberal society must be neutral on questions of what constitutes a good life”.³ The debate between liberals and communitarians is often cast as an argument about the priority of ‘the Right’ and ‘the Good’. ‘The Right’ here refers to the liberal political-moral framework of basic rights and duties and ‘the Good’ stands for determinate conceptions of the good life.⁴ Neutralist liberals emphasise formal rules of justice and procedural principles as a precondition of individuals having the freedom to live according to their own ideal of the good life in a liberal society. Communitarians emphasise the good and

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argue that some conception of the proper end for the common life of a community necessarily precedes the establishment of principles and rules of justice.\textsuperscript{5}

Justifying a liberal democratic social order and form of government in terms of formal, procedural rules of justice is held by neutralist liberals to be necessary if people are to be able to live and work together with others despite differences of belief, and in a liberal democratic manner or spirit.\textsuperscript{6} For example, McLaughlin observes that “without significant common values, principles and procedures, societies would lack not only stability and coherence, but also the justice for their members to live together as free and equal democratic citizens”.\textsuperscript{7} From a neutralist liberal standpoint, a society structured by a Rawlsian liberal political-moral framework and regulated according to procedural principles of justice can only function when citizens have the mental equipment for ‘applying’ such principles in their everyday life. For that reason, it may be supposed that individuals need to be enabled to gain “critical distance” from the ethical norms of their own communities or cultures in order to critically appraise the norms that govern their own lives, to engage in reasoned dialogue with members of other communities and to critique political authority and hold government to account.\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{5} Nel Noddings, "On Community," Educational Theory 46, no. 3 (1996).


Autonomy, “disembedding ourselves from our rootedness” is considered by many neutralist liberals to be a precondition of both the capacity to reflect critically on the vision of the good life pursued by one's own community and an attitude of openness to those who are not members of our community. Neutralist and comprehensive liberals maintain that moral deliberation grounded in disengaged reason and the capacity of individuals to detach from their cultural heritage constitute “our only hope for peaceful co-existence ... in religiously and culturally diverse societies”. The ideal of an autonomous agent who can detach her/himself from her or his cultural heritage in order to make rational decisions on matters of justice and fairness in the public forums of a liberal democracy is a key source of disagreement between liberals and communitarians. For communitarians, concepts of justice are not rationally justifiable from an impartial point of “view from nowhere”. Rather, rules of justice are themselves considered to be products of traditions and may differ across cultures.

View of the person

Communitarians argue that the priority liberals place on formal rules of justice over understandings of the good life embodied in the practices of particular communities – on the Right prior to the Good – emphasises the individual over her or his community in

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9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.


a manner that presupposes an inadequate conception of the person. On this account, the neutralist liberal conception of a fully rational decision-maker who enters into a social contract after detaching her/himself from her or his cultural heritage by shedding or transcending particularistic allegiances bears little resemblance to real persons. Nor does such a conception of the person acknowledge that what counts as good evidence for reaching conclusions or rational decisions depends on which first principles a person takes rules of justice to be based upon, which may differ between individuals. 

Communitarians object to what they perceive to be a liberal fiction of the pre-social individual and to the underlying presuppositions of the contract-theory family of thought which describes how society comes into being after pre-political individuals consent to establish a compact.

The conception of a pre-social self and the notion that society has ‘origins’ is perceived by communitarians to give rise to a “desert island conception of individuality as prior to community”, which is held to promote a distorted view of human socialising that can potentially influence individuals to pay no heed to features of their upbringing.

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15 For a comparison of the classical Greek and contract-theory conceptions of human sociality and political community, see the subsection entitled, 'The concept of 'society' in Chapter One.
that ought to contribute to the moral development of persons. Communitarians argue that liberals underestimate the importance of the social matrix for the identity and integrity of the individual. If persons are not pre-social but are more accurately described as social and cultural entities, then it follows for communitarians that community is prior to the individual and therefore persons are unavoidably products of the cultural or communal traditions that nourish them. Communitarians therefore reject the liberal notion that the individual can be the fundamental interpreter of moral questions in isolation from the particular standards of rational argumentation peculiar to the community or culture to which she or he belongs.

The idea that the self is socially constituted and the argument that some conception of the good life shared by a historical community is logically prior to rules of justice, issues a significant challenge to the neutralist liberal justification of the nation-state as an impartial adjudicator between individual and group visions of what constitutes a good life. Specifically, the communitarian contention that both the self and rules of justice necessarily derive from the community in which they are situated can be seen to challenge the ‘proceduralist ethics’ that the view of liberal democracy as a minimal form of life entails. This potentially undercuts the received liberal belief that the relationships between citizens in liberal democracies characterised by religious, cultural, ethnic, racial and linguistic diversity ought to be regulated by procedural rules

17 Mulhall and Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 71, 199.
18 Noddings: 250.
19 For an account of the received neutralist liberal conception of democracy as a procedural rather than purposive form of life and the entailing notion of procedural ethics, see Hill, 13-32.
of justice that are founded on principles which are supposedly neutral between rival individual and cultural visions of the good life.

A non-neutralist state

Communitarians differ with respect to the kinds of objections they raise to the minimal, procedural understanding of the bonds between citizens in a liberal democracy. Some communitarian opposition is substantive in the sense that neutralist liberalism is argued to foster a type of self-absorbed and apolitical individualism. Such individualism can be perceived to work against a stable social order because it undermines the willingness of citizens to put some notion of the common good ahead of their own private interests. By contrast, Alasdair MacIntyre’s attack is methodological and conceptual rather than substantive. Chapter Five of this thesis examines MacIntyre’s argument that liberal culture lacks the conceptual resources required for moral discourse in democratic forums to count as rational. The differences between the kinds of objections to neutralist liberalism that communitarians raise may account in part for the differences between the constructive proposals that communitarians offer as an alternative to liberal conceptions of how citizens ought to go about interacting with each other.

Some communitarians argue that the doctrine of the neutralist state dissolves communal bonds of shared traditions, cultures and identities by promoting the belief that citizens are united to one another solely by the procedural or formal bonds that the

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20 Mulhall, "Liberalism, Morality and Rationality: MacIntyre, Rawls and Cavell," 207.

21 Ibid.
neutralist state constructs. A case for a non-neutralist state is made by some communitarians who oppose the ideal of a neutralist state and also hold that the rules of justice that regulate a political community should issue from the particularistic norms that the members of a community in a particular place and time share in common. A non-neutralist state is the bearer of a thick, substantive shared vision of the good life. Modern Anglo-American forms of communitarianism that make the case for a non-neutralist state have been described as “humane forms of nationalism”. Neutralist liberal objections to any kind of ‘marriage’ between community and public authority derive from a belief that interpreting the common bonds and ties between citizens in terms of shared cultural understanding, or a shared national past, depends on the construction of ‘outsiders’. Neutralist liberals argue that a communitarian conception of citizenship or group membership will usually tend to be exclusionary and to sanction privilege. ‘Insiders’ in a national community will ordinarily define themselves in terms of such clearly distinct categories as ‘they’ and ‘we’, which some ruling class or elite will usually prescribe in order to shore up a particular status quo. Not all communitarians support a non-neutralist state. For example, MacIntyre opposes communitarian

22 Strike: 134.

23 Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Sandel.


25 Strike: 136. English philosopher of education, Kenneth Strike, points out that fascism is a “virulent form” of the communitarian understanding of the state as an expression of “the nation, a people, a folk (Volk)” in Kenneth. A. Strike, "Schools as Communities: Four Metaphors, Three Models and a Dilemma or Two," Journal of Philosophy of Education 34, no. 4 (2000): 625.

26 Strike, "Schools as Communities: Four Metaphors, Three Models and a Dilemma or Two," 624.
conceptions of a non-neutralist state because he believes that a modern state that bears some substantive vision of the good life “generates totalitarian and other evils”.27

The foregoing section has provided an overview of the communitarian critique of neutralist liberal conceptions of democracy. This sets the context for the next section which explores a range of interpretations of citizenship and citizenship education which different perspectives have argued ought to be promoted in order to shape citizens for life in a kind of democracy that is considered to be worth aiming for.

3.2 Conceptions of citizenship

The contemporary prevalence of the idea of citizenship belies the fact that this concept only relatively recently regained currency in Western political theory. In 1978, Dutch liberal political theorist, Herman van Gunsteren, stated that “the concept of citizenship has gone out of fashion amongst political thinkers”.28 From the 1960s through to the 1980s, political discourse focussed not on citizenship but on rights, with democracy and justice as its norms. Political philosophers William Kymlicka and Wayne Norman observe: “Liberal theorists in the 1970s and 1980s focused almost exclusively on the justification of rights and of the institutions to secure these rights”.29 Through the influence of figures like English sociologist, T. H. Marshall, citizenship was held in the post-war era to be derivative of democracy and justice. It was supposed that to be a


28 Quoted by Kymlicka and Norman, 283.

29 Ibid., 297.
citizen was to have democratic rights and claims to justice.\textsuperscript{30} During this period, citizenship and/or civics studies were notably absent from mass schooling systems worldwide.

\textit{Neutralist liberalism}

Implicit in much post-World War II political theory, according to Kymlicka and Norman, was an “orthodox” conception that defined citizenship “almost entirely in terms of the possession of rights”.\textsuperscript{31} A ‘thin’ notion of citizenship as legal status depicts the individual as entitled to exercise a "basic package of rights and liberties".\textsuperscript{32} Such a conception seems linked to what liberal philosopher of education, Terence H. McLaughlin, describes as “minimal conceptions of civic virtue [that] stress such features of basic social morality as respect for the law and the formal processes of democracy”.\textsuperscript{33} ‘Minimal citizenship’ can be read as a requirement to refrain from interfering with the entitlement of other citizens to exercise their basic rights and liberties. This ‘thin’ notion of citizenship and ‘minimal’ conception of civic virtue corresponds to a liberal neutralist understanding of society according to which “political democracy [is] only a minimal form of life, procedural rather than purposive”.\textsuperscript{34}

A neutralist liberal doctrine of society defines political community as “the context or framework in which individuals are fellow citizens governed by the principles of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{31} Kymlicka and Norman, 285-6.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Steutel and Spiecker, 62.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Hill, 71.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
justice”. For neutralist liberal political theorists like John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, common values in a liberal democracy are principles or rules of justice that apply to all citizens and are held to be rationally justifiable from an impartial point of view without appeal to any individual’s own particular conception of the good. On this account, the liberal state should not take an official position on any conception of the good but ought to remain strictly neutral with respect to citizens’ conceptions of the good life. Neutralist liberals hold that the basic structure and institutions of society should be regulated by principles of justice. Shared identity or social cohesion between individual citizens is constructed by the liberal-political framework and consists of procedural or formal bonds. This excludes the promotion of ‘thicker’ ties, including ‘liberal civic virtues’. According to such a neutralist liberal conception of shared identity, ‘the common’ and ‘social cohesion’ are not based on a particular shared history and language but, rather, on rationally justifiable ties of citizenship secured by the neutralist state. From such a neutralist standpoint, any other doctrine of shared values or shared identity is seen to be in excess of a thin, minimal, procedural understanding of the bonds that a neutral state constructs between individual citizens in a liberal democracy.

‘Citizenship’ became something of a ‘buzzword’ in the 1990s for political philosophers and theorists. The resurgence of citizenship seems to have been due in part to increasing dissatisfaction with the ‘thin’ understanding of citizenship and, also,


to a growing sense that citizenship should not be considered as derivative of justice but ought to be regarded as a norm. Critics of neutralist liberalism and the entailing notion of citizenship began to question the sufficiency of this version of liberalism to ensure the stability of democracies.\textsuperscript{38} For example, the influential 1980s American sociological study, \textit{Habits of the Heart}, offered a communitarian critique of modern culture which argued that American democracy was in danger of “fall[ing] into the hands of despotism”.\textsuperscript{39} Democracy is endangered by a “reigning ideology of individualism” which \textit{Habits} attributes to the pervasiveness of the neutralist liberal belief that the bonds between citizens are merely procedural.\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Habits} rejects this neutralist conception of citizenship: “we have never been, and still are not, a collection of private individuals who, except for a conscious contract to create a minimal government, have nothing in common”.\textsuperscript{41} This position reflects a wider loss of confidence amongst political philosophers and theorists in the adequacy of a minimal conception of good citizen conduct – derived from neutralist liberal doctrines of justice and society – to ensure the well-being of democracies.

For Kymlicka, whom some describe as a ‘liberal cultural pluralist’, citizenship serves an integrative function and relates to questions of identity in the sense of expressing a person’s membership of a political community. The notion of citizenship provides a way to talk about rights \textit{and} obligations, belonging, responsibility, inclusion and political participation:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38}Tomasi, 56.
\item \textsuperscript{39}Bellah and others, 141, 184, 294.
\item \textsuperscript{40}Ibid., 141.
\item \textsuperscript{41}Ibid., 282.
\end{itemize}
There are a number of reasons for this renewed interest in citizenship in the 1990s. At the level of theory it is a natural evolution in political discourse because the concept of citizenship seems to integrate the demands of justice and community membership – the central concepts of political philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively... the health and stability of a modern democracy depends, not only on the justice of its ‘basic structure’ but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens.42

Kymlicka and Norman argued in 1995 that the promotion of citizenship is “an urgent aim of public policy”.43 Beyond the context of academic debate, at the level of the public policy of nation-states, certain Western governments began to promote citizenship education in schooling during the 1990s (for example, in the UK, Canada and Australia). Citizenship became a compulsory National Curriculum subject in England and Wales from 2002. In Australia, according to one commentator, “a regeneration of civics and citizenship education has been occurring ... since the publication of the Civics Expert Group report”.44 The Civics Expert Group report was commissioned in 1994 by the then Federal Labor Prime Minister, Paul Keating. The report argued that a coordinated national response was needed to provide relevant materials on citizenship education for students and professional development for teachers.

42 Kymlicka and Norman, 283-4.

43 Ibid., 300.

A national document was issued for Australian schooling in 1999, *The Adelaide Declaration of National Goals: Australia’s Common and Agreed National Goals for Schooling in the Twenty-first Century* that explicitly identified in Goal 1.4, that “when students leave school ... they should ... be active and informed citizens with an understanding and appreciation of Australia’s system of government and civic life”. In 2008, a national document that superseded the *Adelaide Declaration* and set the direction for Australian schooling for the next decade, called the *Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians*, explicitly identified in Goal 2, that Australian schooling should “support all young Australians to become ... active and informed citizens ... [who] are committed to national values of democracy, equity and justice, and participate in Australia’s civic life”. The *Melbourne Declaration* provided the basis for ACARA’s, *The Shape of the Australian Curriculum*, which is a document that at the time of writing this thesis is guiding the development of the new Australian Curriculum, which is assigning the study of ‘Civics and citizenship’ – alongside the study of history – to the overarching subject of ‘Humanities and Social Sciences’ (the most recent updated version of *The Shape of the Australian Curriculum* was produced in 2012). The issuing of these diverse national documents for Australian schooling, which emphasise the role of schooling in producing active citizens, can be taken to indicate that for over a decade now, attempts have been underway at the level of national public policy to ‘close’ the

46 MCEECDYA, 9.
“almost 30-year gap” in the teaching of civics and citizenship education in Australian schools, which the authors of CEG identified in 1994.48

A ‘thin’ reading of citizenship and the ‘minimal’ neutralist liberal-political framework that informs it have since the 1980s come increasingly under fire from diverse critics situated within liberalism as well as from communitarians situated outside the liberal tradition.49 The next section examines the ‘New Right’ critique of neutralist liberalism.

‘New Right’ liberalism

The emphasis placed on rights by the then orthodox, procedural conception of citizenship attracted particular censure during the 1980s from ‘New Right’ critics of the welfare state.50 Welfare capitalism was perceived by New Right critics to have “tipped the delicate balance between entitlement and duty too far towards the former”. 51 Welfare capitalism therefore fostered “passive” citizenship and a “dependent individualism” based on legal appeals for the protection and recognition of rights.52 According to New Right critics, an emphasis on rights belied the extent to which

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49 Kymlicka and Norman, 286.


52 Ibid.
fulfilling certain ‘obligations’ or ‘responsibilities’ can be understood to be a precondition for being accepted as a full member of society. English social policy critics, John H. Clarke and Janet E. Newman, identify two different strands of thinking in the New Right critique of the post-war orthodox notion of minimal citizenship and the entailing neutralist liberal view of society: “neo-liberal” and “neo-conservative” positions. Some insight into the differences between these two stances can be gained by considering their respective characterisations of the kind of character that minimal citizenship is perceived to foster.

Neo-liberal and neo-conservative critiques of the welfare state converge in the belief that welfare provision produces a type of character – the “scrounger” – that undermines the smooth operation of liberal democracies. Single mothers and ‘dole bludgers’ are identified as ‘scroungers’ by the New Right framework. A neo-liberal account portrays the scrounger as disinclined to undertake enterprising personal initiatives and attributes this to “the inevitable product of levels of welfare benefits that fail to provide incentives to work by not being set sufficiently below prevailing labour market wages”. In other words, the scrounger does not have sufficient reason to look for a job if unemployment benefits provide enough money for her or him to live on. Reducing welfare benefits can then be defended by neo-liberals as contributing to the autonomy...
of citizens by providing ‘incentives’ to look for paid employment, which ‘frees’ them from dependency on the welfare state to become self-reliant.\textsuperscript{56}

Neo-liberalism looks to the market “as a school of virtue”.\textsuperscript{57} Under the growing influence during the 1980s of New Right political parties in various Western democracies, the marketplace was promoted as an appropriate site for teaching people how to be ‘responsible citizens’, by cultivating the ‘virtues’ of initiative, self-reliance and self-sufficiency, virtues that were said to have been corroded by the minimal citizenship fostered by the welfare state.\textsuperscript{58} By contrast, the neo-conservative critique of the ‘scrounger’ type of character reflects different concerns that pertain to the corrosion of traditional morality and national culture. This latter focus stems from an underlying view of the nation that seems incompatible with the view of society that informs the neo-liberal outlook.

According to neo-conservatism, the expectation created by welfare provision that the state will provide has brought about a “collapse” of national culture and an erosion of traditional morality.\textsuperscript{59} On this account, the welfare state can be perceived to corrode the social cohesion of the nation by encouraging citizens to rely on the state for support instead of on familial bonds and other “informal networks of voluntary associations” –


\textsuperscript{57} Kymlicka and Norman, 292.


\textsuperscript{59} Clarke and Newman, 15.
including churches and other religious organisations – which can be argued to be ‘withering away’ as a result.\textsuperscript{60} Clarke and Newman observe that “in addition to pursuing neo-liberal economic and social policies, the New Right in both Britain and the USA has also been profoundly influenced by neo-conservative obsessions with restoring the traditional family”.\textsuperscript{61} For neo-conservatives, then, the traditional family is perceived to be undermined by the emphasis that minimal citizenship places on rights.

Neo-conservatives link the ‘disintegration’ of the family to what they perceive as growing moral disorder in liberal democracies. The portrayal of the family as being ‘in crisis’ and therefore in need of ‘saving’ comes to occupy a central place within a broader neo-conservative project to ‘save’ the national culture and to ‘restore’ moral order through public policy reform. In this framework, the figure of the teenage, single-mother appears as an ‘arch-scrounger’ whose sexual fecklessness is seen to be supported by state welfare.\textsuperscript{62} Child benefits give no ‘incentive’ to a female single-parent to either get married – and presumably be supported by a husband rather than by the state – or to use contraception. Social welfare payments can be perceived to actually ‘reward’ an unmarried mother for remaining single and for having illegitimate children. Support garnered from conservative religious groups for the neo-conservative critique of minimal citizenship seems to revolve largely around the loaded notion of ‘family values’.

\textsuperscript{60} Bowring: 96.

\textsuperscript{61} Clarke and Newman, 28.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 15.
Moral Majority, an American ‘Religious Right’ interfaith ‘pressure group’, was formed in the late 1970s with the aim of encouraging conservative Protestants, Catholics and Jews to elect to office politicians and political parties that supported policies that promoted what Moral Majority identified as family values. For American religious conservatives during the 1980s, the notions of traditional morality and family values seem to have been treated as synonymous with the idea of ‘Christian values’ or ‘religious values’. American postliberal theologian, Stanley Hauerwas, whose position I will examine in Chapter Five, offers what he describes as “a radical Christian critique” of Moral Majority’s approach which Hauerwas claims harnesses a notion of ‘Christian values’ to the project of restoring the traditional family, traditional morality and a national ‘Christian’ American culture. Hauerwas argues that “the view of some Christians that the greatest virtue of Christianity is the bulwark it supposedly provides for some form of defence of the family … seems to me to be nothing short of idolatrous”. Hauerwas can therefore be understood to be a religious thinker who challenges the assumption of neo-conservatives and of some conservative religious groups that religion ought to legitimate traditional morality and restore national values or culture. It might be that conservative religious support in America for the New Right agenda for public welfare reform may initially have stemmed from identification with

63 Williams, "Jerry Falwell's Sunbelt Politics: The Regional Origins of the Moral Majority," 139.


the neo-conservative strand of thinking about the family and traditional morality in the New Right alliance. However, certain religious conservatives seem also to have come to support a neo-liberal stance in addition to a neo-conservative position.66

Neo-conservative objections to the ‘scrounger’ character that is supposedly produced by the welfare state conception of minimal citizenship presuppose a romantic view of the nation. As I examined in Chapter One, a romantic conception of the nation holds that a person is a member of a political community by virtue of shared features such as a particular common language, a common ethnic inheritance and a common past, “bound to one another by ties of blood and history”.67 By contrast, the neo-liberal strand of thinking in the New Right alliance does not draw on the view that society is grounded in a ‘thick’ or substantive common good of ethnic-linguistic nationhood. Like neutralist liberalism, neo-liberalism is informed by the belief that society ought to be regulated by a liberal-political framework of basic rights and duties. Neo-liberals object to the neutralist liberal belief that society should be regulated by principles of justice that are neutral between different views of the good life. Such appeal by political authority to principles of justice is argued to constitute interference on the part of the state with the free play of individual effort, merit and preference.68 Neo-liberals argue that the private sphere ought to be protected from state interference; the basic institutions of society ought to be organised not in light of principles of justice but according to the aggregate


outcome of choices made by autonomous individuals engaged in the pursuit of their own private benefit. People are regarded as consumers rather than producers and to live well is to make personal choices. It can be seen, therefore, that even though neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism both vilify the type of character that the welfare state produces, their separate critiques of the scrounger are motivated by fundamentally incompatible views of society and citizenship. This suggests that the New Right alliance between neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism is inherently unstable.⁶⁹

A New Right account of traits of good citizenship ordinarily lays emphasis on personal lifestyle decisions that the individual makes in isolation from others in the context of the nation-state. For example, good citizenship qualities may include the self-discipline required to eat good food in moderation, a disposition to exercise regularly so as not to become obese, to refrain from binge-drinking, smoking or illicit drug-taking and generally avoiding behaviour that might lead to ill-health, because this would place an unnecessary drain on the health system and on the outlay of taxpayers. Good citizenship might also entail a disposition to avoid dependence on the state by assuming responsibility to care for the young and the elderly in one’s family without resort to public social security systems, refraining from discriminatory conduct in the workplace and not borrowing money beyond one’s means. Usually, the importance of citizens being enabled to evaluate the decisions and public policy of government is not emphasised by New Right thinkers, and for this reason, educators, political theorists

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⁶⁹ Clarke and Newman, 124.
and political philosophers such as Kymlicka and Norman regard the New Right program “as an assault on the very principle of citizenship.”

**Liberal virtue theory**

North American political philosopher, Amy Gutmann, and North American political theorists, Stephen Macedo and William A. Galston advance a ‘virtue liberal’ conception of citizenship. Liberal virtue theorists identify a liberal democratic society as a context that calls for the cultivation of civic virtue or virtues of liberal citizenship. They argue that a ‘thin’, ‘minimal’, procedural notion of citizenship emphasises rights that are owed to the individual at the expense of developing the sort of qualities and dispositions that citizens need to exhibit if a society is to count as a democracy in more than name alone. On this latter account, the education system can be interpreted as a site where basic virtues of liberal citizenship should be developed. The disposition to question

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70 Kymlicka and Norman, 288.


For an overview of Gutmann’s, Macedo’s and Galston’s notions of citizenship education and a comparison with other liberal and non-liberal approaches, see Kymlicka and Norman, 298.

72 Kymlicka and Norman, 297.

political authority and the willingness to engage in public discussion about political concerns are two virtues that form the most distinctive component of the different variants of liberal virtue theory. It is believed that such civic virtues are necessary for a liberal democratic society to be in good order. For example, North American liberal philosopher of education, Eamonn Callan, argues that “free and equal citizenship is ... about the kind of people we become and the kind of people we encourage or allow our children to become”. Here, an attempt is made to link substantive qualities of character and virtue with the general features and requirements of democracy and citizenship, not directly with the moral life as a whole, thereby forestalling neutralist liberal educators’ concern about the imposition of undue value influence.

Liberal virtue theorists challenge in different ways the neutralist liberal belief that the ‘health’ of a liberal democratic society does not depend on its citizens being “especially virtuous”. According to Canadian ‘liberal cultural pluralist’, William Kymlicka, “It has become clear that some level of civic virtue and public spiritedness is required”. Virtue liberals are critical of minimal citizenship because they believe that the exclusive emphasis that neutralist liberalism places on rights renders the concept of civic virtue unintelligible. In response to perceived inadequacies in the orthodox

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conception of citizenship, virtue liberals argue that the health of liberal democracies depends not on rights alone but also on whether or not citizens exhibit certain democratic qualities and dispositions. They seek to delineate notions of civic virtue that embody “a much fuller sense of the forms of civic agency and moral environment required by a liberal democratic society”.79 Virtue liberals describe a liberal democratic society as a context that calls for the cultivation of basic virtues of liberal citizenship. On this view, schools are regarded as a crucial site for developing democratic qualities of character. Specifically, a key aim of common schools is argued to be to enable learners to become the kind of ‘active’ rather than ‘passive’ citizens that are needed if a democratic society is to resist drifting into a form of ‘democratic despotism’.

Kymlicka argues that liberalism is consistent with, and requires an accommodation of, cultural membership because he holds that group identity provides the context of choice for individuals. For that reason his position is sometimes referred to as a ‘cultural pluralist’. While Kymlicka is concerned with developing arguments regarding group-differentiated rights for national minorities living in liberal democracies, like the Quebecois in Canada, the next chapter will explore how certain liberal philosophers of education draw on Kymlicka’s cultural pluralist approach to make a liberal case for separate faith schooling. A point of commonality between his ‘differentiated rights’ account of citizenship, on the one hand, and virtue liberal approaches, on the other, is that Kymlicka emphasises the importance of developing virtues of liberal citizenship.

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In a liberal democracy, according to Kymlicka, the concept of ‘citizenship’ is not restricted to rights but also involves “the qualities and attitudes of its citizens”.\textsuperscript{80} Without citizens who possess certain qualities, dispositions, virtues and loyalties “that are intimately bound up with the practice of democratic citizenship”, liberal democracies become difficult to govern, even unstable.\textsuperscript{81} Kymlicka counts the disposition to critique political authority and to hold government to account as political virtues that both religious persons and non-religious persons need to be able to exercise. His cultural pluralist version of liberal virtue theory can be perceived to be more accommodating of religious, cultural and ethnic groups than some other virtue liberal approaches because Kymlicka locates the initial setting for the development of liberal virtues in cultural group membership. He does not include personal autonomy as a precondition of democratic citizenship, which means that he does not specify that religious believers in a liberal democracy ought to be disposed to critically reflect on the intrinsic value of their religious conceptions of the good life. A possible reason for why Kymlicka only appeals to critical thinking as a political skill, and does not endorse personal autonomy as a virtue of liberal citizenship, is because one of the main criticisms levelled at neutralist liberalism since the 1980s has been that it implicitly privileges autonomous ways of life.\textsuperscript{82} William A. Galston and Stephen Macedo also promote virtue liberal approaches that aim to accommodate the desire of religious,

\textsuperscript{80} Kymlicka, “Education for Citizenship,” 80.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 79, 80.

cultural and ethnic groups to preserve and maintain the distinctiveness of their ways of life within a liberal democracy.

Described variously as ‘political liberals’ and ‘diversity liberals’, Galston and Macedo interpret liberalism as essentially about support for a society that is inclusive of diverse ways of life, including those that are non-liberal. Both argue that liberal democracies require citizens to develop a particular set of virtues of liberal citizenship. Galston defends a more minimalist catalogue of liberal virtues than Kymlicka and Macedo because he believes that it is only defensible for the state to promote tolerance but not mutual respect as an aim of citizenship education. He argues that accounts of civic education that excessively promote critical reflectiveness undermine the sort of moral identity and moral commitment underlying many religious groups. For that reason Galston supports the legal decision made in the 1972 case, Wisconsin v. Yoder, by the United States Supreme Court, which found in favour of the right of Amish parents to remove their children from compulsory schooling in the state of Wisconsin at the age of fourteen, which was two years before the normal minimal age of sixteen for leaving school. Wisconsin v. Yoder is a test case that liberal educators, theorists and political philosophers often cite because it illustrates the conflict between the principle of social

83 Tomasi, 60.

84 Galston, "Two Concepts of Liberalism."

diversity and the value of civic education, and demonstrates the limits of liberalism in accommodating the diversity of religious groups.86

The Amish group argued that high school attendance after the age of fourteen was contrary to their religion and that exposure of their children to external influences beyond that age would destroy their way of life. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that placing the Amish children under compulsory schooling beyond 8th grade would violate the Amish parents’ fundamental right to freedom of religion. Unlike Galston, Macedo does not support the early removal of Amish children from compulsory schooling because he defends a version of liberal social diversity that depends on teaching children to respect people who are not members of their own group or culture. The civic aim of developing respect as a basic political virtue requires that common schools expose children to different ways of life over an extended period of time. From this standpoint, too early removal from compulsory schooling may disable Amish children from exercising respect towards those who are different from themselves, which can be perceived to undermine the health of the wider liberal democracy that ‘hosts’ the Amish community. Although Macedo does not advocate that personal autonomy be promoted as an aim of civic education, he also objects to the Amish exemption on the grounds that

early withdrawal can impede the capacity of Amish teenagers to make informed
decisions about how they wish to lead their own lives.87

Even though the ruling runs counter to Kymlicka’s belief that children should be
required to have at least the later stages of their education take place in common
schooling, Kymlicka accepts the Amish exemption because of the exceptional nature of
the Amish community, namely, the fact that the Amish voluntarily isolate themselves
from the larger society and do not attempt to influence public policy.88 However,
Kymlicka does not think the ‘Amish exemption’ should be extended to other religious
groups, like fundamentalist Christians in America and Muslims in Britain.89 In Australia,
for example, a cultural pluralist perspective would oppose the exemption of children of
a religious group like The Exclusive Brethren on the grounds that this group
participates in national politics through donations to parties whose policies favour a
particular conception of the family.90 Given that such groups participate in the wider
society and do seek to influence public policy, the case can be made from a cultural
pluralist standpoint that the children of fundamentalist Christians and Muslims should
be obliged to attend common schooling at some point in the educational process.91

87 Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy (Cambridge, Mass:
89 Ibid., 90.
90 Quentin McDermott, "Four Corners: The Brethren Express," Australian Broadcasting Corporation (12
91 Kymlicka, "Education for Citizenship," 90.
The approach advanced by Amy Gutmann differs from the variants of liberal virtue theory discussed so far. In contrast to liberal cultural pluralists and diversity liberals, Gutmann explicitly endorses the ideal of personal autonomy as a central educational aim in a liberal democracy. She argues that liberal support for social diversity and the free exercise of religion should not 'trump' democratic citizenship. Specifically, she identifies critical thinking about the intrinsic value of ways of life as a central liberal-democratic virtue, which is “necessary for a flourishing liberal democracy”. For that reason, Gutmann rejects the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on *Wisconsin v. Yoder* on the grounds that exemption from the mandatory schooling requirement denies Amish children the education necessary for exercising full citizenship and for developing the capacity for critical reflection needed to choose between diverse ways of life that lie beyond their parents' religious, cultural or ethnic group.

Like other virtue liberals, Gutmann argues for a substantial role for common schools in promoting the virtues of liberal citizenship. On this particular account, a key task of compulsory schooling is to initiate learners into the ‘thick’ liberal virtue of personal autonomy, a process that Gutmann describes as liberal democratic “conscious social reproduction”. Gutmann’s argument that the central goal of common schooling is to produce democratic character draws on a version of liberalism that can be described variously as ‘ethical liberalism’, ‘liberal perfectionism’ or ‘comprehensive liberalism’. From the standpoint of neutralist liberalism and its entailing notion of minimal

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92 Gutmann, *Democratic Education*, 79.

93 Gutmann, “Civic Education and Social Diversity,” 570.

94 Gutmann, *Democratic Education*. 
citizenship, Gutmann’s claim that the state should promote a comprehensive liberal ideal of democratic character centred on autonomy or individuality, can be perceived to interfere beyond the rationally defensible minimum for a just society. Such a ‘thick’ account of liberal virtues can be seen from the perspective of liberal cultural pluralists and diversity liberals also to run the risk of closing down or stifling the range of possible worthwhile views of the good life that a liberal society ought to support.95 The promotion by a liberal democratic state of an ethical liberal notion of democratic character through the vehicle of compulsory schooling is perceived by non-comprehensive liberals to work against an overall aim of a liberal democracy: to be as inclusive as possible of social diversity.

Civil society theory

Like the critics of minimal citizenship that I have discussed so far, the work of civil society theorists can be understood to spring from a sense that the orthodox conception of citizenship is not adequate on its own to ensure the health of liberal democracies. North American political theorist, Michael Walzer, North American professor of Law, Mary Ann Glendon, and North American political scientist, Robert D. Putnam, perceive a decline in “everyday cooperation and civic friendship” in democracies:

The associational life in the ‘advanced’ capitalist and social democratic societies seems at risk. ... Familial solidarity, mutual assistance, political like-mindedness – all these are less certain and less substantial than they once were.96

95 Macedo, "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God V. John Rawls?.”
96 Walzer, 154.
Walzer claims that as a consequence of the emphasis on rights, which follows from the
neutralist liberal tenet that the basic structure and institutions of society should be
regulated by principles of justice, “we have neglected the networks through which
civility is produced and reproduced”.97

Referred to sometimes as ‘civic-liberal theorists’, civil society theorists focus on the
extent to which citizens participate in ‘voluntary associations’, which is a category that
defines mosques, synagogues, churches, families, unions, ethnic associations,
cooperatives, neighbourhood associations, women’s support groups, charities, choral
societies, and netball teams as ‘mediating institutions’ between the individual and a
potentially “overbearing state”.98 The best setting for the development of civic virtue,
according to civil society theorists, is in the voluntary organisations or voluntary
associations of civil society in the context of the nation-state.99 For that reason, Glendon
describes civil society as the “seedbed of civic virtue”.100 Also, Putnam asserts that the
political health of a society can be measured by the number and vitality of its civil
society groups.101 On Walzer’s account, “there is much to be said for the neo-

97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., 170.
99 M. A Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: Free Press, 1991);
Robert D Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1993); Walzer.
100 Glendon, 109.
Schuster, 2000).
conservative argument that in the modern world we need to recapture the density of associational life and relearn the activities and understandings that go with it.\textsuperscript{102}

For civil society theorists, voluntary associations are contexts in which people can be properly formed in the virtues of mutual obligation, and “meaningful attachments” between individuals can be fostered.\textsuperscript{103} Rights need to be supplemented by the forms of civility practiced in voluntary associations. Dwindling participation in voluntary associations is argued to be intrinsically related to the perceived state of “disorder” in contemporary life in liberal democratic societies.\textsuperscript{104} The task of motivating individuals to contribute actively to the liberal democratic enterprise is seen then to hinge on reinvigorating voluntary associations. This account of ‘active citizenship’ is informed by the belief that robust private associations are necessary to develop the ‘social capital’ on which democracy depends.\textsuperscript{105}

The civil society argument that government should allocate public funding to “underwrite and subsidise the most desirable associational activities” for the purpose of cultivating civic virtue runs counter to the neutralist liberal tenet that the state should remain impartial on the question of which conceptions of the good life are pursued in voluntary associations.\textsuperscript{106} Kymlicka raises an objection that justifying state aid for

\textsuperscript{102} Walzer, 173.


\textsuperscript{104} Walzer, 173.

\textsuperscript{105} Strike, "Schools as Communities: Four Metaphors, Three Models and a Dilemma or Two," 626-7.

\textsuperscript{106} Walzer, 172.
voluntary associations on the grounds that such mediating institutions cultivate the “civility” needed to reinvigorate democratic participation may “unintentionally license wholesale intervention in them”. 107 Another danger posed to democracy itself by the civil society proposal is that the eventual dependency of mosques, synagogues, churches, families and other so-called ‘voluntary associations’ on state funding could stifle the willingness of individuals associated with these agencies to hold government to account and to question public policy. Consequently, such institutions could be reduced to mere handmaidens of the social status quo, which would diminish the resources needed in a democratic society to defend against the potential growth of ‘democratic despotism’ which could result if critical scrutiny of dominant groups in a democracy stultifies.

**Classical civic republicanism**

Despite the differences that I have enumerated between the accounts of citizenship offered by neutralist liberals, neo-liberals, neo-conservatives, liberal cultural pluralists, diversity liberals, comprehensive liberals and civil society theorists, there is an underlying family resemblance between these various approaches to citizenship. This likeness derives from the fact that they draw on modern conceptions of society, the state, the individual, freedom and the spheres of public and private. Yet this prevailing paradigm that interprets politics and citizenship as a means to being free is a relative newcomer on the historical scene. It supplanted an older classical Greek tradition of democracy, in which the participation of citizens in political life is itself understood to be the way of being free.

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The classical civic republican notion of the citizen and politics draws on conceptions of society, the state, the individual, freedom, justice and the spheres of public and private, which differ greatly from the prevailing ‘instrumental’ framework for democratic citizenship. A key divergence between these different views can be traced to the introduction at the start of the modern era of the idea that society has ‘origins’ in an original, pre-political ‘state of nature’ (I discussed the seventeenth-century tradition of contract-theory in Chapter One). The contract-theory family of thought informs the modern view of freedom as pre-political and the corresponding belief that the individual was originally in an abstract condition in which the individual was free to consent to the society she or he might join and to its politics. On this modern account, the notion of ‘society’ is reserved for the wider community. In this scheme, the institutions of marriage and the family are conceived of as ‘voluntary associations’ that mediate between the individual and the mechanism of the state.¹⁰⁸

By contrast, the classical conception of society and human socialising did not view marriage and the family as voluntary associations within the setting of society at large. Rather, Aristotle’s notion of koinōnia defines marriage and the family as ‘societies’ or types of communities and partnerships in their own right. In this scheme, humans are not considered to be originally ‘free’ to consent to join a voluntary association because the natural state of the human person is one of living from the outset in koinōnia. Aristotle’s anthropology of man as kata phusin zoon politikon – by nature a political animal – precludes the notion of an original pre-political condition prior to the establishment of a social compact. From a classical civic republican standpoint, political

¹⁰⁸ Grosby: 194.
freedom and responsibility in a liberal democracy atrophies because politics ceases to be viewed as the affair of citizens who emerge from private life in order to participate in the pursuit of non-self-interested goals in the *polis*.

Whereas in his work, *Politics*, Aristotle defines the citizen as one who both rules and is ruled, the defining characteristic of liberal democratic citizenship is the capacity to be represented by another, whose purpose in governing is to ensure non-interference in the freedom of the individual. The expectation is that the role of government is not to provide a public forum in which individuals might pursue non-self-interested goals with others. Rather, the purpose of a liberal state is to protect the private property of private owners and to preserve the freedom of the private sphere by maintaining the stability, safety and prosperity of the social order. The concept of justice that corresponds to the modern view of politics is a formal principle that defines the scope and limits of state coercion for regulating basic social institutions, which provide the venue for individuals to pursue their own private conceptions of the good life. By contrast, according to a classical civic republican perspective, a *polis* could only be said to be ‘just’ if the citizens within it were enabled to realise freedom through engaging in the activity of ruling and being ruled in turn.

Following World War II, Hannah Arendt drew on the Aristotelian scheme that interprets the concept of the ‘state’ as ‘political community’ or *polis* rather than as an apparatus of government, in her account of the political community as the setting in which a good life can develop. For Arendt, who had studied before the war with German

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philosopher, Martin Heidegger, at the University of Marburg, the *polis* is a metaphor that does not simply refer to the political institutions of the 5th century B.C.E Greek city-state. Rather, it is a sphere of human action, which, “properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be”.

Arendt distinguishes between genuinely human action and other kinds of activity engaged in by humans, and identifies the former with communication and deliberation about ends among fellow citizens in the public sphere. From such a non-instrumental standpoint, a person is not considered to be free until she or he participates in the political process; the practice of democratic citizenship is understood to have intrinsic value for participants themselves. Whereas for Aristotle, the pursuit of *eudaimonia* or the highest good of the *polis* by citizens ensured that “the state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only”, Arendt asserts that the modern state exists “for the sake of life and nothing else”.

For critics of neutralist liberalism and the minimal understanding of citizenship, the robust form of participatory democracy that a classical civic republican account of democratic citizenship promotes, can seem appealing. However, the belief that freedom consists in political engagement and the idea that politics is a matter of joint

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111 Quoted by Tomasi, 62.

deliberation about ends in the public sphere, is quite likely to, initially, seem utterly foreign and perhaps, also, overly demanding to the average adult now living in a Western democracy. Kymlicka and Norman note the “modern indifference to political participation” and suggest that people “no longer seek gratification in politics because our personal and social life is so much richer than the Greeks”\(^\text{113}\). Yet it seems worthwhile to point out that the presuppositions about political life that currently prevail emerged in the social and intellectual history of the modern West. It could, however, have been otherwise. Given that it was not inevitable, it ceases to be self-evident that current presuppositions – and indifference or disengagement from the political – should be left unquestioned or unchallenged.

**Nationalism**

The final account of citizenship that I will discuss presupposes a romantic conception of the nation, which proponents of neutralist liberalism and entailing conceptions of minimal citizenship have sought particularly to oppose in the post-war era\(^\text{114}\). As I described earlier on in this chapter in the subsection, 'New Right liberalism', a romantic conception of society defines the nation as a unique socio-cultural communal totality. A person is understood to be a member of the nation by virtue of such shared cultural features as a common language, ethnic inheritance or a shared history. During the period between the two world wars, Nazi Germany and fascist Italy grounded political authority in a substantive common good of ethnic-linguistic nationhood.


\(^{114}\) Lockwood O'Donovan, 291.
In contrast to minimal interpretations of citizenship and citizenship education, Kymlicka points out:

The aim of citizenship education, in the past, was to promote an unreflective patriotism, one that glorifies the past history and current political system of the country, and which vilifies opponents of that political system, whether they are internal dissidents or external enemies. This sort of civic education, needless to say, promoted passivity and deference rather than a critical attitude towards political authority or a broad-mindedness towards cultural differences.115

Writing during the inter-war period, English philosopher of logical positivism, Bertrand Russell, argued that the mass schooling systems of nation-states fostered nationalist sentiment that helped to bring about World War I.116 Public education intensifies nationalism, according to Russell, who claimed that “the increasing share of the State in the education and care of children has dangers so grave as to outweigh its undoubted advantages”.117 In an essay in which Jean Bethke Elshtain expresses reservations about the deployment by the authors of Habits of the Heart of “strong notions” of ‘community’, ‘the public good’, and ‘the common good’, Elshtain argues that “the national identity that we assume, or yearn for, is historically inseparable from war. The nation-state, including our own, rests on mounds of bodies”.118 According to Elshtain, such ideals are

117 Ibid., 218-219.
“inseparable historically from war and preparation for war”. The promotion of nationalistic sentiments by nation-states through mass schooling systems can be traced to the nineteenth-century.

The very first systems of mass schooling established by early modern states fostered ‘national’ values. These served as a vehicle through which membership of the nation came to be experienced as “shared sentiments, mores, spiritual capacities, and historical memories”. This national idea dominated Europe in the nineteenth century largely as a result of the efforts of elites who promoted nationalistic sentiments through “the increasing influence of the state over education, by means of which a common history and common myths of origin were told”. Consequently, in the post-war era, “liberal minimalism” came to be valued as a safeguard to protect democracies against the dangers of authoritarian regimes.


Ibid., 52.


Lockwood O'Donovan, 278.


Oliver O'Donovan, Common Objects of Love: Moral Reflection and the Shaping of Community - the 2001 Stob Lectures (Grand Rapids, Michigan)

... footnote cont’d on next page
Advocates of minimal liberal citizenship sought to defend against the promotion by nation-states of substantive notions of the common good, which could facilitate the subordination of the individual to the interests of totalitarian regimes. The promotion by a national government of a set of ‘basic’ or ‘core’ national values is seen from the standpoint of liberal minimalism to exceed the procedural bonds of citizenship that a neutralist state ought to secure. A key concern, from a neutralist liberal standpoint, is that excessive allegiance or ‘extremist’ devotion to one’s country, religion, ideology or culture can potentially impede one’s capacity to engage in rational criticism of the norms, values and beliefs of one’s own nation, religion, ideology or cultural group.  

Also, nationalistic sentiment is thought to undermine the ability to detach oneself from one’s particularistic allegiances, which some liberals regard as a precondition for being able to get along with others who are not members of one’s own cultural, religious or ethnic group. Advocating a particularistic set of national values is perceived to remove a safeguard against the potential for populations in democratic societies to acquiesce to authoritarian and totalitarian ideologies. However, an incongruity can arise for liberals as a result of the fact that a liberal social order depends on the willingness of patriotic individuals to fight for it. As MacIntyre observes, “good soldiers may not be liberals and must indeed in their actions embody a good deal at least of the morality of patriotism”.

A disposition to detach oneself from one’s particularistic allegiances can work against a willingness to give one’s life in war for one’s country or fellow


125 MacIntyre, "Is Patriotism a Virtue?," 227.
countrymen, which is an essential disposition for anyone who serves in the defence forces or the military.

Nationalism is most characteristically an ideology of the right because its understanding of membership is ascriptive; it requires no political choices and no activity beyond ritual membership.\textsuperscript{126} From a nationalistic perspective, “to live well is to participate with other men and women in remembering, cultivating, and passing on a national heritage”.\textsuperscript{127} The terms ‘patriotic’ and ‘nationalistic’ are often used as synonyms to describe a person’s strong regard for her or his own country or sense of loyalty to the particular culture or ethnic group to which she belongs. Patriotism, according to Alasdair MacIntyre, describes “a perfectly proper devotion to one’s own nation”.\textsuperscript{128} Nationalism, on civil society theorist, Michael Walzer’s account, is a “free-floating intensity” that can “in time of trouble … readily be turned against other nations, particularly against internal others: minorities, aliens, strangers”.\textsuperscript{129} English novelist, essayist and journalist, George Orwell, stressed the importance of distinguishing nationalism from patriotism in a 1945 essay, \textit{Notes on Nationalism}, in which Orwell developed subjects that he later expanded upon in his classic dystopian novel, published in 1949, \textit{Nineteen Eighty-Four}:

\textit{Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism}. Both words are normally used in so vague a way that any definition is liable to be challenged, but one must

\textsuperscript{126} Walzer, 161.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 160.

\textsuperscript{128} MacIntyre, “Is Patriotism a Virtue?,” 212.

\textsuperscript{129} Walzer, 161.
draw a distinction between them, since two different and even opposing ideas are involved (original emphasis).\footnote{130}{George Orwell, "Notes on Nationalism," in As I Please, 1943-1945: The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, ed. Ian Angus and Sonia Orwell (London: Secker & Warburg, 1968; reprint, 3rd).}

Orwell defines patriotism as "devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people".\footnote{131}{Ibid.} Orwell uses the term, 'nationalism', to stand for an outlook that he perceived to be influencing the thinking and actions of many of his contemporaries: "power-hunger tempered by self-deception".\footnote{132}{Ibid.} According to Orwell, "the abiding purpose" of a person in whom such a self-deluding desire for power over others has been allowed to take hold "is to secure more prestige, not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality (original emphasis)".\footnote{133}{Ibid.} For Orwell, the 'unit' that is the object of passionate nationalistic feeling need not necessarily be limited to the common meaning of loyalty to a country but can include such movements and tendencies "as Communism, political Catholicism, Zionism, Antisemitism, Trotskyism and Pacifism".\footnote{134}{Ibid.}

It seems that one way to describe nationalism is as an improper or overly excessive devotion to a nation, culture, religion, ideology, or ethnic or racial group, which is motivated by a 'self-deceiving hunger' to acquire power through force, especially
military coercion. Power, that is, not so much for oneself but, rather, for a unit larger than oneself that one consciously puts oneself into the service of. A 'nationalistic' kind of person, then, derives a sense of security – and even superiority – from belonging to this larger unit and feels obliged as a result to defend it. 'Nationalism' seems similar to the notion of 'fundamentalism', which is a term used to describe someone who is fanatically or dogmatically devoted to a particular set of religious or philosophical beliefs. By the same token, a person who is fanatical in her or his belief in the superiority of her or his own nation or cultural group is said to be 'nationalistic'. It seems that 'nationalism' and 'fundamentalism' are both forms of 'extremism' or 'extremist' attachment; it is possible to talk of 'religious extremism' and 'nationalist extremism'. The issue of religio-cultural fundamentalism or extremism has in recent years come to be closely associated with the concept of 'terrorism', particularly since the 11th September 2001 when members of the global militant Islamist group, al-Qaeda, hijacked several passenger planes and flew them into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has given a conceptual review of different interpretations of citizenship and citizenship education which serves to show that the kind of democratic society that is considered to be worth pursuing and the corresponding notion of education are not static but in a constant state of flux and changes in response to shifting circumstances. The question of what kind of a democracy, citizen and education is considered to be worth aiming for, and therefore what kind of citizen the enterprise of mass schooling ought to educate for life in a democracy, should always be open for review and revision. This necessitates the establishment of environments that will support vigorous public debate about what kind of democracy, citizen and education ought to be aimed at. The
institution of mass schooling is a potential site in which such an environment of
democratic deliberation could be fostered. However, this chapter has shown that
historically, mass schooling has tended ordinarily to promote environments that
produce a kind of person that is not capable of participating in such public debate. The
next chapter explores a recent policy called the *National Framework for Values
Education in Australian Schools* (2005) which was developed by the national
government of a Western democracy, Australia, in order to investigate what kind of
environment this measure seeks to promote in Australian state and faith schools.
Chapter Four – The National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools

The purpose of this chapter is to explore several key philosophical and theoretical debates that shed light on an Australian values education initiative called the *National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools* (2005) which was instigated by the Australian Federal Government in 2002 and implemented in selected Australian state and faith schools from 2003-2009. The Australian values education initiative provides an example of an established, long-running policy that can be understood to have set a benchmark in the Australian context for how teachers ought to teach values in state and faith schools. It seems likely that future initiatives for promoting values in schools in the Australian context and perhaps even internationally will refer to the *National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools* as a resource or template for school-based practice. Since the overall aim of this thesis is to investigate whether there is an approach to education which can be interpreted as secular – in the sense of inclusive of those with and without religious faith – that can enable non-religious and religious learners to engage with values in Australian state and faith schools, it seems highly valuable to now investigate the philosophical and theoretical debates in which the *National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools* can be understood to be embedded.

4.1 The context of Australian schooling

The *Values Education Study* was launched by Brendan Nelson, the then Federal Minister for Education of the Federal Coalition Government on 19 July 2002. Australian state and
territory education ministers supported the study at a meeting of the Ministerial Council for Employment Education Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA), which is a body that provides a forum for common decisions regarding Australian schooling in which the commonwealth government contributes to the articulation of national goals for schooling.\(^1\) The stated aim of the *Values Education Study* (hereinafter *VES*) was to investigate and promote values education in schools nationally, with an emphasis on building character and cultivating the personal, social and civic virtues necessary for an active, engaged citizenry.

The year-long study was undertaken with a view to making recommendations on a set of Principles and a Framework for improving values education in Australian schools. The findings of the study were published in 2003 (hereinafter *VES Report 2003*) and provided the basis for the production of the *National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools* (hereinafter *NFVEAS*), which was distributed to all state and faith schools nationwide in June 2005.\(^2\) After the commissioning of *VES* in 2002, further values education projects implementing *NFVEAS* received funding from the Federal Government from 2002 until 2009.\(^3\) In 2004, the Federal Government allocated $29.7 million over a period of four years to the values education initiative, which continued to receive federal funding despite the Federal Coalition Government’s loss to Labor in the

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\(^1\) In 2009, this council merged with another body and was renamed, the Ministerial Council for Education, Early Childhood Development and Youth Affairs, which I will refer to hereafter as MCEECDYA.

\(^2\) DEEWR, *Giving Voice to the Impacts of Values Education: The Final Report - October 2010* (Carlton South, Vic: Education Services Australia, 2010), 120.

\(^3\) DEST, 4.
2007 Australian general election. The initiative secured further funding from the Federal Labor Government for an additional year beyond the original scheduled timeframe, which can be taken to indicate that there was bi-partisan political support for the Australian values education initiative.

**NFVEAS** consists of a thirteen-page document that lists the following set of “common values” for Australian schooling:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>Care and Compassion:</strong> Care for self and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>Doing Your Best:</strong> Seek to accomplish something worthy and admirable, try hard, pursue excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>Fair Go:</strong> Pursue and protect the common good where all people are treated fairly for a just society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>Freedom:</strong> Enjoy all the rights and privileges of Australian citizenship, free from unnecessary interference or control, and stand up for the rights of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td><strong>Honesty and Trustworthiness:</strong> Be honest, sincere and seek the truth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td><strong>Integrity:</strong> Act in accordance with principles of moral and ethical conduct, ensure consistency between words and deeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>Respect:</strong> Treat others with consideration and regard, respect another person’s point of view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td><strong>Responsibility:</strong> Be accountable for one’s own actions, resolve differences in constructive, non-violent and peaceful ways, contribute to society and to civil life, take care of the environment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4 In Australian politics, the Coalition or the Liberal/National Coalition refers to a partnership between two conservative parties, the Liberal Party of Australia and the National Party of Australia. The Coalition’s main rival for government at the Federal and state levels is the Australian Labor Party.

5 DEEWR, 120.
Although it is possible to count a total of thirteen “values” in all, the document specifically identifies “nine values for Australian schooling”. It seems that the authors of NFVEAS regard ‘care and compassion’ as synonyms for one value, ‘honesty and trustworthiness’ as synonyms for another value and ‘understanding, tolerance and inclusion’ as synonyms for the final value. No theoretical account is given in the document or in the accompanying literature to explain why these separate concepts are treated as though they are indistinct from each other. What the document refers to as ‘values’ are, in fact, qualities and traits that have been reified into behaviouristic observations.

Brendan Nelson gave some insight into the reasons that informed his decision to allocate federal funding towards a study of how values are taught in Australian schools in an article for the Melbourne newspaper, The Age. Entitled ‘Schools Must Teach Values’, the article was published a month after the state, territory and federal education ministers endorsed VES at the MCEETYA meeting:

“Schools Must Teach Values”, the article was published a month after the state, territory and federal education ministers endorsed VES at the MCEETYA meeting:

What needs encouragement and formalisation in our schools is the teaching of values and the building of character. Why shouldn't we identify and acknowledge

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6 Due to copyright restrictions, I am not able to reproduce a copy of NFVEAS as appendix material. However, NFVEAS is readily available for viewing on the internet and can be downloaded from: http://www.valueseducation.edu.au/verve/_resources/Framework_PDF_version_for_the_web.pdf

7 DEST, 4.

8 Webster, “Does the Australian National Framework for Values Education Stifle an Education for World Peace?”, 471.
the values we implicitly communicate, and ask whether we want these values taught? Every Australian child needs to have an understanding of values as part of their schooling. Schools can support our democratic way of life by helping students to be active and informed citizens ... We should not be surprised if a values-free education produces values-free adults.⁹

In this extract, Nelson claims that Australian schooling ought to enable learners to develop an understanding of values through values education, draws a connection between teaching values in schools and “the building of character” and between teaching values in schools and active citizenship. ‘Character’ is usually associated with the notion of morality, which can be linked to religion. ‘Character’ can also be associated with the idea of ‘national character or identity’. This chapter will explore different philosophical and theoretical debates that the Australian values education initiative can be understood to have been embedded in: state schools versus faith schools, ‘history and culture wars’ over Australian national character, citizenship and moral education.

**The Australian system of schooling**

In Australia, the states and territories are responsible for education. According to the Australian founding constitution, state schools (also known as government or public schools) are overseen by state bureaucracies. Governance of the Catholic education system differs from the state systems in that there are dual accountabilities to the Catholic education commissions of the individual states as well as to the state education department. Independent schools are operated and accountable at the individual school site, being free to develop their own policies, practices and procedures for student

⁹ Nelson.
welfare, uniform, enrolment, curriculum and expected standards of behaviour. In practice, the Federal Government plays a significant role in education because funding from both Federal and State Governments is increasingly made contingent upon agreements to implement their policies and programs.\(^{10}\) State ministers are deemed responsible for the oversight of all schools (government and non-government) in their state, and make decisions for all sectors in forums such as MCEECDYA (the body formerly called MCEETYA).\(^{11}\)

In 2012, according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, there were 9,427 schools in Australia.\(^ {12}\) Of these, 6,697 (71\%) were government schools and 2,730 (29\%) were non-government schools. As I mentioned earlier, in Australia, government schools are also called state schools or public schools (from here onwards I will refer to government schools as state schools but I will also make use of the common distinction that is drawn between ‘the government sector’ and ‘the non-government sector’ in the Australian system of mass schooling). State schools are state-funded although parents are sometimes asked to pay a voluntary contribution fee.


\(^{11}\) This account of the Australian educational infrastructure draws on the book chapter by Pascoe, "Values Education and Lifelong Learning: Policy Challenge - Values Education in Australia’s Government and Non-Government Schools."

In the non-government sector, the Catholic schools system is the largest with 1,713 (18.2%). Independent schools make up the remaining with 1,017 (10.8%). Christian denominations that operate within the independent school sector include Anglicanism and Lutheranism along with a number of other churches, which consist mainly of Protestant grammar schools; also, there are Seventh-day Adventist schools, Jewish and Islamic schools and philosophically-based schools such as Montessori and Steiner.

Parents for the most part pay sizeable fees in the independent sector. However, the ten years prior to the production of NFVEAS was marked by the growth in the independent school sector of small, often “robustly religious” Christian schools.\textsuperscript{13} According to one Australian journalist for The Age newspaper, Michael Bachelard, the growth in “small, intensely religious low-fee schools” was a consequence of school policies introduced by the Federal Coalition Government from 1996 onwards, which provided generous funding and lighter regulation.\textsuperscript{14} On Bachelard’s account, parents are attracted to the new faith schools by “the combination of strong religious values and low fees”.\textsuperscript{15}

The National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools was distributed to state schools and faith schools nationwide. Many faith schools secured federal funding to implement the nine values. Several Catholic ‘clusters’ of schools successfully applied for federal grants and implemented NFVEAS during the Good Practice Schools Project

\textsuperscript{13} In a 2008 newspaper article, Australian journalist for The Age, Michael Bachelard, observed: “In the 10 years to 2006, 339 new private schools opened in Australia, 65 of them in Victoria. Many were new Catholic schools, but a large number were also robustly religious colleges”. See Michael Bachelard, “At the Crossroads?,” The Age, 25 February 2008.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
Stages 1 & 2. A 'Melbourne Interfaith and Intercultural Cluster' where two Catholic schools, a Jewish school, an Islamic school and a state school worked together to develop a project inspired by NFVEAS took part in Good Practice Schools Project Stage 2. The participation of faith schools in the Australian values education initiative can be taken to point to an underlying assumption on the part of the authors and managers of NFVEAS that ‘national values’ can provide a common framework within which the issue of the differences between faith schools and state schools is somehow resolved or becomes less problematic. However, such an assumption may fail to give due recognition to, on the one hand, the diverse, heterogeneous makeup of Australian society and, on the other hand, the ongoing controversy in Australia and abroad regarding the justification for faith schools in democratic societies. The next section explores different positions on the debate about faith schools and state or ‘common’ schools in a democracy.

Values education and faith schools

It is possible to take the view that faith schools teach values that should not be taught in state schools and that state schools should not teach values that are taught in faith schools. For example, English philosopher of education, Terence H. McLaughlin, points out that some liberal theorists argue that state schools should “stop short of the sort of substantial religious formation that might take place in a religious school”.\textsuperscript{16} As I mentioned in an earlier chapter, faith schools can be understood to fall under the category of ’separate schooling’ which also includes schools that are ‘separate’ for

\textsuperscript{16} McLaughlin, "Liberalism, Education and the Common School," 246.
cultural or linguistic reasons.\textsuperscript{17} In contrast to the notion of a ‘separate school’, ‘common schools’ are not religiously or culturally-based.\textsuperscript{18}

McLaughlin describes a “common school” as one in which “all students are educated together regardless of differentiating characteristics such as religious and cultural background ... such a school lacks a mandate to offer a specific form of moral influence which goes beyond that acceptable to society in general”.\textsuperscript{19} State schools in Australia can be described as ‘common schools’ although the term is not in widespread usage in Australia. Part of the value of the ‘common school’ can be seen to lie in its being a miniature version of the heterogeneous society at large, with individuals from different cultures co-existing within the same institution. Supporters of the ‘common school’ argue that it is through daily exposure to diverse cultures which such a school makes possible that students and their teachers can best learn to appreciate that there are

\textsuperscript{17} For an account of the concept of ‘the separate school’ from an English analytic philosophy of education standpoint, see McLaughlin, "The Ethics of Separate Schools." For a philosophical inquiry into the controversy in the UK over state funding for separate faith schools, see J. Mark Halstead and Terence H McLaughlin, "Are Faith Schools Divisive?,” in \textit{Faith Schools: Consensus or Conflict?}, ed. Roy Gardner, Jo Cairns, and Denis Lawton (Abingdon, Oxon: RoutledgeFalmer, 2005).


diverse ways of seeing the world, which may differ, conflict or even clash with their own current beliefs and understandings. The environment of a common school is held to provide opportunities for students to learn to respond well to pluralism:

With respect to diversity, the common school may play a major role in fostering respect and understanding. A mixed environment, in which pupils confront opposing views face-to-face with those who hold them, and not merely from abstract or hypothetical sources, has much to recommend it, as does a context in which pupils associate and study together regardless of ethnic or cultural difference.20

English philosopher of education, Graham Haydon, neatly summarises this position: “the citizens of a plural society are more likely to live harmoniously together if they have shared a common schooling together”.21 Supporters of common schooling are likely to take the view that students whose entire schooling takes place in separate schools – especially separate faith schools – are given less opportunity to develop a tolerant attitude towards other ways of life and therefore are likely to be ill-equipped to live well with diversity in a democracy.

Liberal educators emphasise the need to promote commonality as well as diversity in schooling. Consequently, an acknowledged role of the ‘common school’ is to foster unity in a democratic society: “It is likely that the common school will be well placed to foster

20 McLaughlin, “Liberalism, Education and the Common School,” 240, 244.

21 Haydon, 152.
the shared values and sensibility needed for a stable and just democratic political and civic order, and to combat the various forces which threaten this, including social divisiveness, credal isolation and prejudice in its various forms.”

However, some liberal supporters of separate schooling argue that the means employed by common schooling to achieve the objective of unifying a diverse population through an emphasis on ‘procedural values’ may exclude and even repress or stifle the distinctive perspectives or voices of religious, cultural and ethnic minority groups. For example, McLaughlin observes, “Some members of cultural minority groups feel that a de facto secularist interpretation of moral issues is being imposed on their children.”

According to McLaughlin, such groups believe that the common school is not living up to its own principles and ought to be more inclusive of a wider range of moral perspectives on prominent issues. Haydon observes that in England some religious believers and members of cultural minority groups in England seem reluctant to send their children to state schools and that this could be due to a feeling on the part of minority religious, ethnic or cultural groups that their voice is being marginalised or even excluded in advance in the context of common schooling.

Clearly, public opinion in the West is divided over the question of the presence of separate faith schools in a democracy and the related issue of whether common schools are truly inclusive of religious worldviews. In a pluralist democratic society that is

22 McLaughlin, “Liberalism, Education and the Common School,” 244.


25 Haydon, 161; Walford, Educational Politics: Pressure Groups and Faith-Based Schools.
multifaith, multiracial and ethnically and culturally diverse, a case can be made against separate faith schooling, particularly when it is based on the ethnic, cultural, racial or religious identities of students. Articles in the domestic and foreign media over the past three decades have suggested that faith schools do not teach the values required for a cohesive liberal democratic society and should therefore be abolished. Some critics perceive faith schools as ‘divisive’. The concern here might be that faith schools and environments – including communities and families – that nurture religious outlooks weaken the ties of commonality in a democracy by emphasising particularities of belief about which there exists widespread disagreement.

In the Australian context, a journalist for a Melbourne newspaper reported that a senior education advisor in 2008 to the then Federal Education Minister, Julia Gillard, expressed the view that the significant increase in small, highly religious, independent schools over the past decade threatened to divide Australian society: “These people often form a narrowly focused school that is aimed at cementing the faith it’s based on ... If we continue as we are, I think we’ll just become more and more isolated sub-groups


27 Erroneously attributed to Professor Barry McGaw (private conversation with author).
in our community”. Despite such objections to separate faith schooling, the national
governments of Australia and the UK provided significant state-funding for separate
faith schools from the mid-1990s through to the latter part of the 2000s. This
governmental stance was usually justified through appeal to the argument that separate
schooling supplies parental choice. In England, during the early to mid-2000s, state-
maintained faith schools were encouraged by both government and religious
organisations to be ‘distinctive’ from common schools.

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28 Quoted by Bachelard, "Faith School Boom 'Creates Division'." The same article also reported Australian
psychologist and educator, Louise Samway's, opinion that separate faith schools are 'balkanising' the
community: "If we don’t have agreed values that everyone can understand and respect ... it leads to a
whole lot of disparate sub-groups that are suspicious of each other”.

For an account of the growth of independent evangelical Christian schools in the UK, see Walford,

*Educational Politics: Pressure Groups and Faith-Based Schools*; Natasha Walter, "Divine and Rule," *The

29 In Australia, the then Prime Minister, John Howard claimed in 1997 that "it was this Government’s
schools policy in 1996 ... which really opened up choice for parents by facilitating the huge expansion in
low-fee independent schools". Quoted by Bachelard, "At the Crossroads?.”

Faith schools were a central plank in the UK’s New Labour Government’s education reforms, which
were also designed to increase parental choice. For example, after coming to power in 1997, New Labour
approved the first Muslim maintained – that is, government-financed – primary schools. In 2001, New
Labour published a white paper, *Schools – Achieving Success*, that proposed a large increase in the number
of schools run by religious organisations.

of Australia, Canberra, 2 & 3 May 2005* (Canberra: Department of Education, Science and Training, 2005),
11.
Another liberal objection to faith schools which differs from the concern that faith schools undermine social unity in a democracy centres on the issue of whether faith schools can promote the educational aim of rational autonomy. Haydon observes that liberals are “often uneasy about the existence of schools that are committed to a non-secular education ... they may be worried that such schools will inculcate in pupils views that the pupils would not have chosen for themselves”.\textsuperscript{31} From a perspective of education for autonomy, faith schools can be perceived to be incompatible with the enterprise of education in a liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{32} Yet within liberalism there is room for disagreement on religious schooling and religious upbringing of children. Certain liberal educational and political theorists question whether parents have a right to bring up their children in particular religions. The difference between liberal perspectives on this issue seems to usually depend on whether a theorist places an emphasis on the autonomy of the child or on ‘the right’ of the parent.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{31} Haydon, 152.


A case can also be made in a liberal democracy in support of separate faith schools that initiate learners into substantial religious beliefs. McLaughlin, who argues that the idea of the common school has much to commend it, offers a liberal justification for separate faith schools which appeals to the right of religious parents to send children to schools that instil the religious faith of their parents. Another English liberal philosopher of education, J. Mark Halstead, critiques the educational aim of autonomy and defends the request of Muslims in England and Wales for a separate school system that restricts the development of autonomy. In making a liberal case for separate faith schooling, McLaughlin and Halstead, draw on political theorist, William Kymlicka, whose work I referred to in my discussion of liberal virtue theory in Chapter Three.

34 McLaughlin, "The Ethics of Separate Schools." That McLaughlin himself is an example of a person with religious beliefs (Catholicism in McLaughlin's case) who is also a liberal, is reflected in his work in the discipline of philosophy of education, which is sympathetic to the desire of certain religious communities to preserve and maintain their distinctiveness through separate faith schooling.

35 McLaughlin, "Parental Rights and the Religious Upbringing of Children."


Kymlicka develops a 'cultural pluralist' version of liberalism that does not seem wholly neutral in that it seeks to accommodate cultural and religious plurality by not including personal autonomy as pre-condition of democratic citizenship, see Kymlicka, "Education for Citizenship," 91.
Kymlicka holds that liberalism is consistent with, and requires an accommodation of, cultural membership.\textsuperscript{38} From such a liberal ’cultural pluralist’ perspective, religious and cultural minorities might legitimately seek to use the enterprise of schooling to maintain their distinctive cultures. It is perceived that separate schooling may do better than common schooling at providing an initial environment “for developing the capacity for in-depth engagement with a particular cultural tradition, and for loyalty and commitment to particular projects and relationships”\textsuperscript{39} However, as I mentioned in Chapter Three, Kymlicka argues that schooling in separate faith or cultural schools – where learners are taught alongside others who share their background – ought to be limited to the earlier stages of education. According to this approach, at some point in the educational process learners ought to be obliged to move into common schooling so that qualities and attitudes of liberal citizenship can be developed upon the ‘foundation’ of the particular religious or cultural virtues, which are understood to have been fostered by learners’ early schooling in separate schools.\textsuperscript{40}

In practice, some kinds of faith schools in the non-government sector in Australia may not appear particularly ’distinctive’ in comparison to common or state schools. As we have seen, in Australia, Catholic schools and schools of other Christian denominations are all part of the non-government sector. Non-Catholic faith schools are classed as ‘independent schools’ and, as mentioned above, philosophically-based schools like Montessori and Steiner, also fall under this category. However, it is not clear


\textsuperscript{39} Kymlicka, ”Education for Citizenship,” 90.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 89-90.
that the category of ‘separate faith school’ is applicable to either Australian Catholic schools or grammar schools in the independent sector that are loosely affiliated with Protestant denominations, which are high fee-paying and often referred to in everyday conversation as ‘private schools’. In Australia, the kind of faith school that does appear to fall under the category of ‘separate faith school’ is the new, small, low-fee independent “robustly religious” school that seems to have been the main target of the Melbourne newspaper article’s criticism mentioned above.

The new separate evangelical Christian faith schools that have been recently established in Australia seem distinctive in comparison to both state schools and the older Catholic and Protestant-affiliated schools. They tend to promote a conservative outlook that is significantly different to liberal worldviews, and to uphold literalist interpretations of Scripture that differ significantly from the kinds of attitudes towards the Bible that shape other Christian communities. They not only tend to exclude liberal influences as corrupting but also to view with suspicion Christian worldviews that do not share their hermeneutical method. It would be possible to draw on a liberal

41 Examples from Australia that spring to mind include prestigious schools like Wesley College in Melbourne, which is affiliated with the Wesleyan church, and The King’s School in Parramatta, NSW, which is affiliated with the Anglican church.

42 Bachelard, "Faith School Boom 'Creates Division'."

43 In some of these new Christian schools, evolution is not taught and creationism may be taught instead. Bachelard observes: “The details vary but in Christian schools, creationism is almost universal, and is taught not in religious education but in science … In a number of Christian schools, such as Chairo in Drouin, the science teachers talks about evolution and then moves on to suggest that the hand of God was the real creative force. The grade four class at Heatherton Christian College last year studied ‘dinosaurs from a biblical perspective’”, see Bachelard, "At the Crossroads?."
cultural pluralist perspective to make a case in support of such separate religious schools on the basis that such a religious setting may provide particularistic virtues unavailable within a state school. However, it seems unlikely that supporters of such schools would accept the cultural pluralist tenet that at some point in their schooling, children should be obliged to attend common schools. Conservative evangelical Christian advocates of separate faith schooling would probably prefer to keep learners permanently separate from the ‘corrupting’ influences of the rest of society. It also seems unlikely that supporters of such schools would be willing to implement NFVEAS because they would regard the nine ‘common values’ as issuing from a source external to Scripture and therefore as either extraneous, or as directly opposed to, orthodox ‘Bible-based’ teaching. Moreover, it seems doubtful that such religious groups would be willing to implement a secular process of education that enables religious learners to engage with values in public forums.

Debate about faith schools and the question of whether common schools promote social unity in a manner that is inclusive of religious worldviews was not discussed by Brendan Nelson when he launched the Australian values initiative. Instead, it was Australian common schools that came under criticism from Federal Coalition Government ministers for failing to teach values when the Good Practice Schools Project Stage 1 (GPSPS1) was launched in 2004.\(^44\) The then Prime Minister, John Howard, sparked a public debate when he observed that state schools were ‘too values-neutral’ and suggested that this alleged values vacuum was a contributing factor to the

\(^44\) Federal funding was allocated to ‘clusters’ of schools in the Good Practice Schools Project Stages 1 & 2 to implement NFVEAS.
perceived “drift” from state schools to independent schools (both the new small, low-fee independent religious schools and expensive fee-paying ‘private schools’ fall under the category of independent schools). According to Prime Minister Howard, “government schools have become too politically correct and too values-neutral”.45 From the perspective of a proponent of common schooling who believes that such an institution plays a significant role in striking a balance in a liberal democracy between cohesion and social diversity, Howard’s criticism of Australian state schools as being values-neutral would seem problematic.

An advocate of the common school might argue that Australian state schools are environments that necessarily already aim to develop liberal qualities and dispositions like ‘respect’ and ‘understanding, tolerance and inclusion’ – the very capacities and dispositions that NFVEAS groups under ‘value 7’ and ‘value 9’. This point was made by the editor of the New South Wales’ broadsheet, the Sydney Morning Herald, in an editorial written the day after Howard described state schools as ‘values-neutral’:

“Many parents choose government schools precisely because of the virtues they see in the values given primacy there – tolerance, fairness and inclusiveness – in contrast with narrower, religion-based values imparted in many private schools”.46 Advocates of common schooling who regard state schools as values-laden environments that foster qualities and attitudes needed for life in a liberal democracy would most likely perceive the values education approach that NFVEAS promotes to be redundant.


Debate about the social unity of the Australian nation was widespread at the time VES was initiated. Much media attention was given to debate about Australian history and citizenship, particularly on the problem of defining what values are distinctly Australian. One observer commented, “The values education initiative has been distracted by a number of factors – the debate on the adequacy of values teaching in government schools, the mandatory nature of implementation, and more recently, national debates on Australian values”. The national debates on Australian values pertain to the ‘culture wars’ which centred on disagreement about what historical narrative(s) ought to shape people’s understanding of Australia’s past. The next section explores the Australian ‘culture and history wars’ which were part of the context that led to the development of the Australian values education initiative.

**Values education and Australian ‘culture and history wars’**

A central issue in the culture wars is the question of what it means to be a member of one’s nation. Different responses to this question stimulate disagreement between advocates of different historical narratives and between proponents of differing accounts of citizenship. In Australia, a proliferation of media stories suggesting that there were culture wars going on to ‘define Australia’ seemed to draw their inspiration from the American model of culture wars. In America, the metaphor of ‘culture wars’ gained widespread usage during the 1990s following the publication of sociologist,

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James Davison Hunter’s 1991 book, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*.\(^4^9\) Hunter argued that a dramatic re-alignment and polarisation had transformed American politics and culture. This metaphor is used to support the claim that political conflict is based on sets of conflicting values. The term frequently implies a conflict between values considered as ‘traditional’ or ‘conservative’ and those considered ‘progressive’ or ‘liberal’. The issue of Australian history gained prominence in public debate from the time the Federal Coalition Government came to power in 1996 under the leadership of John Howard.

Prime Minister Howard gave a lecture after coming to office in which he argued that “the balance sheet of Australian history” had come to be misrepresented:

The ‘black armband’ view of our history reflects a belief that most Australian history since 1788 has been little more than a disgraceful story of imperialism, exploitation, racism, sexism and other forms of discrimination ... I believe that the balance sheet of our history is one of heroic achievement and that we have achieved much more as a nation of which we can be proud than of which we should be ashamed.\(^5^0\)

The term, ‘black armband’, was first used by Australian historian, Geoffrey Blainey, and by referring to it Prime Minister Howard indicated that he was taking a particular


stance in relation to a dispute known as the “history wars” over opposing historical interpretations of the period in which Europeans arrived in Australia. The dispute was perceived to be between, on the one hand, ‘conservative’ historians such as Geoffrey Blainey and Keith Windschuttle who portrayed the initial ‘settlement’ of Australia in a positive light and, on the other hand, ‘progressive’ accounts that depict the ‘invasion’ of Australia and its deleterious effect on the indigenous peoples as represented by Robert Manne and Lyndall Ryan. Media and political interest in the dispute between ‘settlement’ and ‘invasion’ camps meant that the debate ceased to be merely an academic exercise and gained the potential to impact public policy.

The issue of the role that the teaching of history in Australian schools plays in forming citizens and shaping the nation’s future came to be widely debated in the media mid-way through the Coalition’s final term in federal office. This was sparked by a series of public statements that Federal Coalition ministers made to the press about the way schools were teaching history. Prime Minister Howard in his 2006 Australia Day speech, Howard called for a “root and branch renewal of the teaching of Australian history in our schools”:


Too often, Australian history ... is taught without any sense of structured narrative, replaced by a fragmented stew of ‘themes’ and ‘issues’ ... Part of preparing young Australians to be informed and active citizens is to teach them the central currents of our nation’s development.53

In response to this speech, the then Coalition Federal Minister for Education, Julie Bishop, organised a national summit on the way history is taught in schools which was held in Canberra on August 17th 2006. Prime Minister Howard said in his address to the history summit that the Federal Coalition Government wanted to bring about “a renaissance” of interest in Australian history and he identified “the disciplined teaching and understanding of history in Australian schools” as the vehicle through which this purpose could be achieved.54 Over the course of the Federal Coalition Government’s decade in power, emphasis shifted in schools from multicultural education to the promotion of civics and citizenship, which was moved from the school curriculum subject of SOSE (Studies of Society and Environment) to the history lesson.55 Some insight into the possible rationale behind the Coalition Government-guided shift from multiculturalism to civics and citizenship in Australian schools can be gained from the following extract from Prime Minister Howard’s 2006 Australia Day speech:

We’ve drawn back from being too obsessed with diversity to a point where Australians are now better able to appreciate the enduring values of the national character that we proudly celebrate and preserve ... In the end, young people are at risk of being disinherit from their community if that community lacks the courage and confidence to teach its history.56

The dual emphasis that Prime Minister Howard places here on the idea of “the national character” and the teaching of Australian history in schools seems to prioritise the unification of the national ‘community’ over recognition of social diversity. Australian citizenship is interpreted as common bonds or ties that have to do with a shared history, a shared national past and the ‘same’ cultural heritage, which is a focus that apparently gives a considerably lower profile to diversity and difference. Prime Minister Howard seems to imply in his Australia Day speech that a main purpose of compulsory schooling is citizenship education that initiates learners into those received beliefs, values, norms and practices of ‘the Australian culture’, which have been identified as orthodox by a particular national government. The emphasis on particularistic, cultural attachments that informs this view of citizenship seems in keeping with the romantic view of the nation as a unique, socio-cultural communal totality, which I discussed in Chapter Three in relation to ‘neo-conservative’ and ‘nationalistic’ approaches to citizenship. The next section explores different conceptions of citizenship and citizenship education that national governments of Australia have promoted over the past three decades. It will also discuss various public statements made by senior ministers of the Howard-led Federal Coalition government in order to shed light on the

56 Howard, "Prime Minister's Speech."
particular conception of citizenship favoured by the authors and supporters of the
Australian values education initiative.

Values education and citizenship

The Australian values education initiative is closely tied to Federal Government-
sponsored citizenship education initiatives such as Discovering Democracy (1997-2004)
Prime Minister, Paul Keating, commissioned CEG on the state of civics and citizenship
education in Australia and Discovering Democracy grew out of the findings of CEG. Susan
Pascoe, a former Chief Director of the Catholic Education Commission of Victoria who
was involved in CEG, Discovering Democracy and VES, describes VES as “complementing”
the Discovering Democracy project. VES Report 2003 specifically notes that the
implementation of NFVEAS in schools was “linked closely” to Discovering Democracy.
Several of the nine values for Australian schooling listed by NFVEAS are explicitly or
implicitly citizenship values, for example, value 3, Fair Go, value 4, Freedom, value 7,
Respect and value 9, Understanding, Tolerance and Inclusion. These citizenship values
are listed alongside moral values, for example, value 5, Honesty and Trustworthiness and
value 6, Integrity.

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57 Civics Expert Group, Whereas the People ... Civics and Citizenship Education (Canberra: Australian

58 Pascoe, "Values Education and Lifelong Learning: Policy Challenge - Values Education in Australia's

59 Vic Zbar and others, Values Education Study Final Report (Melbourne: Curriculum Corporation, 2003),
31.
The relationship between values education and citizenship education is complex. VES Report 2003’s literature review observes: “Citizenship education is also related to values education, as it involves a consideration of values and values-laden concepts, but it has a much narrower domain”.\(^{60}\) Civics lessons during the Keating-led, Federal Labor Government’s time in power in the early to mid-90s, were informed by a procedural account of citizenship as legal status, which details one’s rights and obligations under the law irrespective of one’s particular cultural background. Civics education concentrated on imparting knowledge about formal aspects of citizenship. For example, classroom activities might include examining the democratic process, memorising the structure of the Australian bicameral parliamentary system or committing to memory a person’s rights under the law. Learners are taught about democratic ‘procedural values’ and no attempt is made to actively ‘inculcate values’ or to shape their character. Civics was taught in Australian schools as part of the curricular subject, SOSE – not as part of the history syllabus – and emphasised the content or formal knowledge of governance and public decisions.

The 1994 CEG report that Prime Minister Keating commissioned was informed by the assumption that “citizenship is not about shared identity or (assimilation to) core values, but about a formal knowledge and understanding of, and participation in political settlements”.\(^{61}\) This report found an “almost 30-year gap” in “the systematic

\(^{60}\) Ibid., 171.

teaching of civics and citizenship education in Australia”. On Prime Minister Keating’s account, citizenship need not make any reference to historical narratives. Regarding civics education, Prime Minister Keating said in a 1995 speech, that, “properly taught, [civics] is no more political than maths or English or woodwork”. This can be understood to imply that knowledge of ‘civic values’ and the institutions they sustain can be separated from ‘cultural values’. During his time in office, Prime Minister Keating promoted a ‘differentiated identity politics’ policy of multiculturalism, which could accommodate a ‘procedural’ approach to civics education because the latter leaves cultural identity out of count. Later on during the Howard-led, Federal Coalition Government’s decade in power, civics and citizenship was moved from the school curriculum subject of SOSE (Studies of Society and Environment) to the history lesson.

Australian journalist, Waleed Aly, argued that the Coalition Government’s decade in power had been marked by growing nationalistic sentiment on the part of the general population in an article published by The Age newspaper following Federal Labor’s win in the November 2007 general election. Aly claimed that this excessive patriotism had been deliberately “nurtured” by the Australian national government. While Aly’s position might seem quite extreme, it seems to be the case that at the time of VES’s inception and following the publication of NFVEAS, several senior ministers in the


63 Quoted by Walter and MacLeod, eds., The Citizen's Bargain: A Documentary History of Australian Views since 1890, 268.

64 Ibid., 231.

Federal Coalition Government gave speeches that seemed to signal a deliberate shift away from a liberal framework of minimal citizenship towards an emphasis on a particularistic, cultural conception of citizenship.

Prime Minister Howard and the then Federal Minister for Education, Brendan Nelson, announced in June 2004 a new federal education package that made funding contingent upon the fulfilment by government, independent and Catholic schools of several conditions. In addition to the demand that “every school must have a functioning flagpole, [and] fly the Australian flag”, schools were also required to “display the values framework in a prominent place in the school, as a condition of funding”. The “values framework” here in question refers specifically to the National Framework forValues Education in Australian Schools which was published and distributed to all Australian schools in June 2005 in the form of a thirteen-page booklet and a poster. The image of John Simpson Kirkpatrick, the famous Simpson who, with his donkey, survived forty days at Gallipoli in World War I was superimposed on the front cover of NFVEAS and the accompanying poster which list the nine values for Australian schooling. At the 2005 National Values Education Forum held in Canberra on the 2nd May, Brendan Nelson explained the reasoning behind his decision to use the icon of Simpson. He argued that the image of Simpson helping a wounded soldier symbolised “everything that we should strive to be as a nation” and that it demonstrated for children that “our fundamental value is that we will place the interest and welfare of other human beings ahead of our

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66 Clark: 107.
own”. Nelson elaborated further on his understanding of the significance of the image of Simpson five months later shortly after the 7th July 2005 London Tube bombings:

> I’ve superimposed Simpson and his donkey [on the cover NFVEAS] as an example of what’s at the heart of our national sense of emerging identity ... [The story of] Simpson, which is part myth and part truth, is about an unarmed man with a donkey who, over some forty days, rescued a number of injured and wounded men. He was unarmed and he represents everything that’s at the heart of what it means to be an Australian. Simpson was a man who was prepared to put the interests and welfare of other human beings ahead of his own ... if we lose sight of what Simpson and his donkey represents, then we will lose our direction as a country.

The 7th July 2005 London Tube bombings raised concern in certain quarters about the possible threat posed from ‘within’ Western democracies by networks of ‘home-grown terrorism’.

Prime Minister Howard held a two-hour ‘anti-terror’ summit with thirteen Australian Muslim leaders on 24th August 2005. On the day of the summit, the then Treasurer, Peter Costello, said in an interview that “people thinking of coming to Australia who [do] not like Australian values and prefer a society that practice[s] sharia law should go elsewhere”. Prime Minister Howard identified his main reasons for holding the meeting as “a concern that a small section of the Islamic community of this country could be a source of terrorism”, and the consequent need to secure the cooperation of

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67 Shane Green and Chee Chee Leung, "War Icon Seen as Outdated, Blokey," *The Age*, 02 May 2005.


the Australian Islamic community in reporting any potentially hostile terrorist cells. The Muslim leaders agreed to a number of principles including that terrorism in the name of Islam is a perversion of the faith and that all Australians should respect the democratic institutions and practices of the country where they live. In the meeting, the issue of fostering tolerance in Muslim faith schools was discussed, the possibility was raised of introducing into Muslim faith schools a requirement that teachers and students “denounce” and “repudiate” terrorism and the issue was raised of teaching Muslim students Australian traditions and culture.

Brendan Nelson made a public statement on the day after the ‘anti-terror’ summit in which he said that Muslim schools ought to instil the Australian way of life in Muslim students by teaching them the story about Simpson and his donkey. Nelson seemed to imply in this statement that if any teachers or students in Australian schools were not willing to teach the nine Australian values or to learn about Simpson then they would not be welcome in Australia:

70 John Howard, "Joint Press Conference of the Prime Minister John Howard and Dr Ameer Ali, President, Australian Federation of Islamic Councils," (23 August 2005).
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=(Id:media/pressrel/wk2h6);rec=0;


72 Howard, "Joint Press Conference of the Prime Minister John Howard and Dr Ameer Ali, President, Australian Federation of Islamic Councils".

73 Hawley, "Brendan Nelson Addresses Islamic Schools on Australian Values".
If you want to be an Australian, if you want to raise your children in Australia, we fully expect those children to be taught and to accept Australian values and beliefs. We want them to understand our history and our culture, the extent to which we believe in mateship and giving another person a fair go, and basically if people don’t want to support and accept and adopt and teach Australian values then, they should clear off.⁷⁴

Nelson’s repeated use in this statement of the first-person plural personal pronoun, ‘we’, in contrast to the third-person plural personal pronoun, ‘they’, the notion of ‘Australian values’ seems to be reduced to a criterion for determining inclusion or exclusion from membership of the Australian nation-state.

An exclusionary impetus can also be detected in a speech that Peter Costello made to the Sydney Institute on the 23rd February 2006, entitled, ‘Worth promoting, worth defending: citizenship, what it means and how to nurture it’.⁷⁵ Costello focussed on the need for migrants, particularly Muslims, who wish to take up Australian citizenship, to truly commit to fulfilling “the demanding requirements of citizenship”. An article in The Age newspaper characterised the spirit of the address in its title: ‘Our values or go

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Hawley, "Teach Australian Values or 'Clear Off', Says Nelson".

Costello stated: “Before becoming an Australian you will be asked to subscribe to certain values. If you have strong objections to those values don’t come to Australia”. In the same speech, Costello stated that “if a person wants to live under Sharia law, [Arabia and Iran] are countries where they might feel at ease. But not Australia”. This can be interpreted to imply that abiding by Sharia law is incompatible with being a citizen of Australia.

The conception of citizenship that emerges from the public statements made by senior ministers of the national government that initiated the Australian values initiative seems to emphasise cultural membership of the Australian nation. Here, the meaning of citizenship is equated with ‘being Australian’ or national identity and national character is defined by first categorising those who qualify as ‘outsiders’ in order to determine “who is the same as us, and why”. A particularistic conception of citizenship can be utilised by national governments as an instrument for identifying ‘outsiders’ and ‘enemies within’ nation-states, which can foster a perception that the population should be on the alert for ‘un-Australian’ behaviour. This represents a shift away from the emphasis that minimal citizenship places on rights towards a focus on national values, norms and mores, which frames citizenship in terms of accepting or assimilating to a supposedly monolithic Australian national culture. For many liberal perspectives this poses a danger of stifling social diversity in a liberal democracy.

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Public comments made by senior ministers in the national government that initiated the Australian values initiative bring to mind a social order in which patrolling the cultural borders of citizenship is of central concern. Such statements do not convey a sense of an underlying vision of a society that is inclusive of difference. Taken on their own, the nine values of NFVEAS seem general and abstract. But the superimposition upon NFVEAS of the image of Simpson – a white Australian war hero and an icon of self-sacrifice in a global military conflict in which the greater good of the nation was at stake – can be understood to give a particularistic meaning or ‘slant’ to the nine values. This illustrates the way that associating common values with a historical narrative or national myth can facilitate the use of citizenship as an exclusionary tool. An approach that names cultural values as substantive and ties citizenship to historical narratives of a nation’s past seems to be rooted in a process that post-colonialist literary theorist, Edward Said, described as ‘Othering’.\(^78\) Othering denotes a disposition to divide human reality into such clearly distinct categories as ‘they’ and ‘we’, and to view those who are different from oneself as posing a threat to one’s own way of life.

This section inquired into the vision of society and social unity that was publicly promoted by the national government that initiated the Australian values education initiative. The next section examines how attitudes towards teaching morality and values in Australian schools have changed profoundly over the past four decades and provides an overview of different theories of moral education in order to situate the particular approach that the Australian values education initiative promotes.

Values education and morality

In the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries, moral education comprised a distinct part of the curriculum in several Australian states. For example, in 1885 the subject ‘morals and manners’ was added to the Victorian curriculum and in 1905 ‘civics and morals’ was introduced into the Queensland syllabus. By the mid-twentieth-century, however, the explicit teaching of moral education in state schools was no longer regarded as appropriate. Australian philosopher of education David Aspin attributes the absence of values and morals from Australian state school curricula to the dominance from the 1950s to around the early 1980s “of empiricism and positivism as leading philosophies in Australian education institutions”. From the early 1990s, Australian government at both federal and state level began to place more emphasis on the social and moral/ethical outcomes of schooling.

The previous section described how the Federal Labor Government under Paul Keating and the Federal Coalition Government under John Howard both provided funding for citizenship education initiatives in schools. At around the same time, in the early 1990s, references to values began to surface in educational policy and curriculum documents at both the federal and state level. The earliest instance of this occurring in a document of national significance can be traced to The Adelaide Declaration of National Goals: Australia's Common and Agreed National Goals for Schooling in the Twenty-first century (hereinafter AD). AD updated an earlier national statement, the 1989 Hobart Declaration, which was concerned with the promotion of skills and competencies in

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79 Zbar and others, 185.

particular areas of curriculum endeavour in Australian schools. The 1989 document
mentioned values briefly, including one goal to develop “knowledge, skills, attitudes and
values which will enable students to participate as active and informed citizens in our
democratic Australian society within an international context”.\footnote{The full text of the Hobart Declaration is available at http://www.mceetya.edu.au/mceecdya/hobart_declaration,11577.html} In 1999, \textit{AD} superseded the \textit{Hobart Declaration} and provided an updated framework for developing
national collaboration for the improvement of Australian schooling.\footnote{\textit{AD} was superseded in 2008 by the \textit{Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians}. This provided the blueprint for \textit{The Shape of the Australian Curriculum}, the ACARA document that is
guiding the development underway at the time of writing of the new Australian Curriculum.}

According to Aspin, “what cannot be doubted is that, from the publication of \textit{[AD]},
values have been publicly acknowledged to form a critical part of Australian education undertakings in the years of compulsory schooling”.\footnote{Aspin, Chapman, and Klenowski, "Changing Cultures and Schools in Australia," 131.} In \textit{AD}, there is an explicit emphasis on values, which according to Aspin, “has now been established, accepted and promulgated as an important element in all policies and initiatives devoted to the advancement and enhancement of education”.\footnote{Ibid.} The various state departments of education have incorporated values statements into recent curriculum documents. Generally these statements are dispersed throughout the various key learning areas rather than within a program specifically designed to teach values.\footnote{For an overview of the State and Territory curriculum frameworks and values statements, see Zbar and others, 185-195.} It should be noted
that values promoted in policy or curriculum documents are not necessarily taken up by schools and translated into practice. The references to values in AD are underdetermined, which allows for widely differing interpretations and modes of implementation. AD is a ‘framework’, a format that is directive in nature rather than exhaustively descriptive. The potential for values controversy is not raised in AD, which sets out to emphasise common goals for schooling in a pluralist, secular, democratic society rather than to draw attention to the difficulties involved in shaping the values of students in such a context. No explanation is given of the philosophical, ethical or educational assumptions that inform AD’s references to values.

Over the past four decades in Western democracies, interest has shifted from approaches to moral education in state schools that centre on analysis of moral dilemmas towards approaches that give prominence to character formation. In some ways, this represents a return to a prior consensus on the role of moral education in schools, which prevailed in the West during the early part of the twentieth-century. For example, in North America, prior to World War II, a traditional method of direct moral education in both state schools and religiously-sponsored schools was usually provided through the inclusion of religious education and character education (state schools are normally called ‘public schools’ in America but for the sake of consistency I will use the term ‘state schools’). The inclusion of character education and religious education in state schools was not widely regarded as controversial. For example, an influential

86 Ibid., 187.

1928-1930 report, *Studies in the Nature of Character*, by North American psychologists, Hugh Hartshorne and Mark A. May was commissioned in 1922 by an organisation called the Religious Education Association to examine the impact of character education and religious education in both state and religious schools on the morality of learners.\(^{88}\) This can be taken to indicate that moral education was promoted in state schools through the teaching of religion and character.\(^{89}\)

Two rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court in the early 1960s rendered unconstitutional all state laws that required public schools to hold prayers or devotional Bible readings.\(^{90}\) In 1962, the practice of reading a brief, nondenominational prayer at the start of the school day in state schools was found to violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment, and in 1963, the recitation of the Lord's Prayer and the reading of verses from the Bible as part of the opening school day ritual were also found to breach the establishment clause.\(^{91}\) These decisions rejected long-standing assumptions about the appropriateness of utilising religious education in state schools for the direct moral formation of learners. While participation in such religious practices as prayer and Bible reading – which can be understood to fall under the category of ‘religious instruction’ – was thereby legally excluded from state schools, the U.S. Supreme Court deemed


\(^{89}\) Leming, 32.


‘religious studies’ that involve the acquisition of knowledge about religions acceptable.\textsuperscript{92} The publication in 1966 of the highly influential work,\textit{Values and Teaching,} by North American educational psychologists, Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin and Sidney Simon, also signalled a shift away from traditional approaches to moral education in state schools towards the adoption of methods that aimed to deliberately refrain from influencing the moral formation of students.\textsuperscript{93}

Raths, Harmin and Simon’s theory and technique of ‘values clarification’ dominated the field of moral or values education in state schools in America for the next two decades.\textsuperscript{94} Values clarification is a rational decision-making model that involves a seven-step valuing process, which tries to assist students in clarifying their current values rather than to directly influence their moral actions and attitudes. The authors of values clarification believed that, “if we occasionally focus students’ attention on issues in their lives, and if we stimulate students to consider their choices, their prizings, and their actions, then the students will change behaviour, demonstrating more purposeful, proud, positive, and enthusiastic behaviour patterns”.\textsuperscript{95} In this scheme, the teacher’s task was to be a facilitator of the valuing process, which meant that teachers were urged to withhold their own opinions for fear of influencing students. Also, teachers were not expected to see themselves as ‘role-models’ or to regard themselves as responsible for

\textsuperscript{92} Russell and Richardson, "Religious Values and Public Education in the United States," 16.

\textsuperscript{93} Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney Simon, \textit{Values and Teaching} (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1966).

\textsuperscript{94} Leming, 36.

\textsuperscript{95} Raths, Harmin, and Simon, 248.
setting an example of particular moral qualities or traits of character. From the late 1960s onwards, an alternative approach to moral education in state schools was based on North American psychologist, Lawrence Kohlberg’s, theory of stages of moral reasoning.

The significance of Kohlberg’s influence on moral education is characterised by English philosopher of education, David Carr, as follows: “It is beyond serious dispute that post-war reflection upon and research into moral education and development has been well nigh dominated by an extensive and ambitious research programme influenced and initiated by the modern cognitive developmental theorist Lawrence Kohlberg”. This approach to moral education in the classroom was first developed in 1969 as part of doctoral research that demonstrated how Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental theory of moral development could be applied to the practice of moral education. Discussion of moral dilemmas or problematic situations was informed by the hypothesis that “if children were systematically exposed to moral conflict accompanied by the presentation of moral reasoning one stage above their own, they would be attracted to that reasoning and attempt to adopt it for their own”. As with the values clarification method, the teacher’s role in the cognitive developmental approach to moral education was not to directly influence students or to ‘model’ particular qualities and traits of character. For that reason, Kohlberg dismissed the

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96 Leming, 36.


98 Leming, 38.

99 Ibid., 39.
older, traditional approach to character formation in schools as the “bag of virtues”
approach to moral development. In Kohlberg’s scheme, teachers seek to facilitate
each student’s ability to exercise critical reasoning, to assist the student in resolving
quandaries or issues of moral conflict and to ensure that the environment in which the
discussion of moral quandaries takes place contains the conditions essential for stage
growth in moral reasoning. According to Carr, the perspective underlying this
account of moral education is an “essentially liberal conception of the nature of moral
life and values”.

Powerful scholarly critique contributed to the decline of values clarification, which
was found to promote an inherently relativistic moral perspective, epitomised by the
belief “that everyone’s values resulting from the clarification process must be treated as
acceptable”. By 1992, values clarification had fallen so far out of favour with teachers
that North American, educational psychologist, Howard Kirschenbaum, observed that
“some administrators today would rather be accused of having asbestos in their ceilings
than of using values clarification in their classrooms”. The eclipse of values
clarification might have also been due in part to “the emerging conservative political

100 Quoted by Carr: 356.
101 Leming, 38-40.
102 Carr: 353. Of the varieties of liberalism that are possible, which I discussed in the previous section, it
seems likely that cognitive developmentalism is informed by neutralist liberalism rather than
perfectionist liberalism, given that the liberalism of neutrality was most influential in the west at the time
when Kohlberg undertook his research and developed his cognitive developmental theory.
103 Leming, 38.
104 Ibid.
climate” in America during the 1980s.\textsuperscript{105} In the late 1970s, a major criticism of the cognitive developmental approach to moral education was articulated by Kohlberg himself, partly as a response to concerns expressed by parents and school personnel that the development of cognitive problem-solving skills did not seem to have an effect on student conduct. In 1978, Kohlberg noted, “I realize now that the psychologists’ abstraction of moral cognition … is not a sufficient guide to the moral educator who deals with the moral concrete in the school world … the educator must be a socializer”.\textsuperscript{106} This, along with other factors, led Kohlberg to shift his focus as a moral educator to the moral atmosphere of the school, which gave rise to his notion of “the just community”.\textsuperscript{107} One sympathetic critic of Kohlberg, English analytic philosopher of education, Richard S. Peters, argued that Kohlberg neglected the moral significance of the acquisition of certain qualities of character.\textsuperscript{108} Some critics of Kohlberg appear to have supposed that his theory of moral development simply requires counterbalancing by recognising, for example, the significance for the moral life of qualities of character.\textsuperscript{109} However, Carr makes the case that Kohlberg’s later emphasis on the social

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.


aspects of moral growth and commitment to the notion of the community of justice cannot be reconciled with his earlier emphasis on individual cognitive processing.\textsuperscript{110}

Another influential conception of moral education, which developed partly as a response to perceived shortcomings in Kohlberg’s account, is the ethics of care perspective advanced by North American feminist thinkers, moral psychologist, Carol Gilligan, and philosopher of education, Nel Noddings. In her influential book, \textit{In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development}, published in 1982, Gilligan pointed out that only white, middle-class males took part in the research interviews that formed the basis of Kohlberg’s theory of cognitive moral development. Gilligan suggested that his findings were biased against females.\textsuperscript{111} According to her feminist critique, Kohlberg’s account seriously neglects and underestimates the moral significance of qualities of care and concern for others grounded in the affective dimension of moral life.\textsuperscript{112} Drawing on interviews she conducted with females, Gilligan argued the somewhat controversial claim that Kohlberg ignored the ‘female element’ of care in a moral life and that there are gender-based differences in moral reasoning: men reason by appeal to principles of justice, women by appeal to ideas of care and


\textsuperscript{111} Carol Gilligan, \textit{In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development} (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).

affiliation. She made the case that a morality of care can serve in the place of the morality of justice and rights. Gilligan’s critique can be qualified to state that the Kohlbergian approach ignored the role of care and emotions in the moral lives of both men and women. Educational approaches influenced by Gilligan’s work have aimed to foster empathy and care for others on the part of students in the context of schools. Perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of these issues may be found in Nel Noddings’s book, *The Challenge to Care in Schools*.  

Noddings defines education from the standpoint of her ‘care’ perspective as “a constellation of encounters, both planned and unplanned, that promote growth through the acquisition of knowledge, skills, understanding and appreciation”. She views the home as the primary educator and argues that public education policy should be reoriented in light of childrearing practices that develop in some families: “schools should, as far as possible, use the sort of methods found in the best homes to educate [children]”. Noddings identifies “a gap” at the heart of teacher education, which she

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113 For an account that questions Gilligan’s claim that there are gender-based differences in moral reasoning, see Nussbaum: 194-195.


117 Ibid., 289.
fears is failing to enable teachers to become aware of “the great questions of life”\textsuperscript{118}. Moral education in schools, on Noddings’s account, has to do with enabling learners to feel the importance of acknowledging and addressing existential questions in order to promote “growth”. The kind of self-image that teachers develop in education schools and in professional development is of great significance for such a ‘care’ conception of moral education. For school environments to be most conducive to promoting growth on the part of learners, it seems teachers need to be enabled to understand themselves not as ‘classroom managers’ or ‘technicians’ delivering a pre-determined content, but as co-participants with learners in an educational enterprise that gives prominence to questioning rather than to unthinking acceptance of ready-made answers.

Interest in traditional approaches to moral education in schools revived in America during the 1980s, which has been attributed in part to the publication of books that called for state schools to develop ‘character’ and ‘virtue’, many of which became ‘best-sellers’\textsuperscript{119}. ‘Character education’ focuses on character formation and is often described


as calling for a return to the educational principles and teaching methods of the
nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries.\textsuperscript{120} According to Noddings, character
education was "eclipsed" by cognitive developmentalism in the latter half of the
twentieth-century.\textsuperscript{121} By the late 1990s, however, the impact of values clarification and
Kohlberg's stages of moral development had "largely dissipated".\textsuperscript{122} Noddings observed
in 1996 that "in moral education, a renewed emphasis on character education and
community has begun to displace the Kohlbergian focus on moral reasoning and
principles of universal justice".\textsuperscript{123} In contrast to cognitive developmentalism, traditional
coloracter education normally assigns a limited role to developing reasoning on the part
of the student.\textsuperscript{124}

Character education aims to directly impart particular traits and qualities of
coloracter to learners and places particular emphasis on monitoring the behaviour of
children as evidence for the success of this approach.\textsuperscript{125} Prominent proponents of
coloracter education in America include William Bennett, Marva Collins, William
Kilpatrick and Thomas Lickona. These authors commonly recommend that teachers

\textsuperscript{120} McLaughlin and Halstead, "Education in Character and Virtue," 139.

\textsuperscript{121} Noddings, "On Community," 245.

\textsuperscript{122} Robert. J. Nash, \textit{Answering the "Virtuecrats": A Moral Conversation on Character Education}, ed. Jonas. F.
Soltis, Advances in Contemporary Educational Thought Series (New York & London: Teachers College
Press, 1997), 12.

\textsuperscript{123} Noddings, "On Community," 245.

\textsuperscript{124} McLaughlin and Halstead, "Education in Character and Virtue," 137.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., 140.
model traits of character as a means of directly influencing the behaviour of students.\textsuperscript{126} Story-telling is often seen as central to character education approaches, where the teacher relates narratives that describe a figure whose actions or life represents the best values or virtues of a particular ‘community’, which might be a group or class within the larger society. It is hoped that learners will be inspired to emulate the good qualities of the heroine or hero and be moved to reject those of her or his traits that are identified as undesirable by the story.\textsuperscript{127}

Character education is somewhat heterogeneous as a ‘movement’, lacking grounding in a philosophical perspective or a common core of practice, and adopting an eclectic approach to many matters.\textsuperscript{128} According to English liberal philosophers of education, McLaughlin and Halstead, “‘character education’ is clearly no single thing and is capable of being interpreted in a number of ways”.\textsuperscript{129} Approaches to character education can vary depending on the degree to which provision is made for open discussion and debate. They also differ according to the rationale provided for the particular programs, the kinds of qualities of character and virtue seen as apt for development and the level of philosophical sophistication of the accounts given for the relationship between qualities.\textsuperscript{130} For example, groups that cite moral failure on the part of young people or

\textsuperscript{126} Noddings, "Character Education and Community," 2.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{128} For an account of the ‘revival’ of character education in America since the 1980s and an overview of the history of character education in America during the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, see Nash, 16-52.

\textsuperscript{129} McLaughlin and Halstead, "Education in Character and Virtue," 139.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
cultural decline as reasons for why schools should teach values are often seen “as part of the neo-conservative social and cultural agenda and linked to the call to traditional values and teaching methods”. At some stage and to differing extents, character education usually involves a postponement of critical reasoning whereby children are directly initiated into particular attitudes and dispositions.

The Australian values education initiative can be interpreted as promoting a character education approach to teaching values in schools. NFVEAS' architects regard schools as a crucial site for developing qualities of character considered desirable by influential groups in society. The purpose of the National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools is to directly influence the actions and attitudes of learners. For example, one of the 'guiding principles' for the Australian values framework stipulates that “education is as much about building character as it is about equipping students with specific skills”. This constitutes a significant change of direction for Australian state schools, which have long advocated a “liberal silence” on values and left moral formation to parents and to religious institutions, including faith schools. Many teachers who participated in implementing NFVEAS expressed their ambivalence about forsaking old obligations to be neutral even though they

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131 Ibid., 138.

132 Ibid., 142.

133 DEST, National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools, 5.

acknowledged that “schools are environments of values”. The new emphasis on character formation and ethical outcomes that NFVEAS represents can be understood to reflect the broader changes that have taken place on the international stage with regards to moral education.

A distinguishing feature of character education approaches is that they often cite social or moral decline in society as a rationale for implementing programs in schools. Brendan Nelson cited student violence in state schools and incidents of parents abusing umpires at children’s sporting events as ‘evidence’ that a values deficit existed in Australian society which he argued the Australian values education initiative would address. In fact, the kind of rationale that Nelson gave for the Australian values education initiative has been identified as typical of a neo-conservative approach that calls for a return to traditional values and teaching methods. Another distinctive feature of character education approaches is that they usually do not provide a philosophical justification for the qualities that programs promote. The Australian values education initiative bases its claim to legitimacy solely on appeals to the Adelaide Declaration and to its endorsement by state, territory and federal education ministers under the auspices of MCEECDA. It lacks grounding in philosophical or theoretical inquiry into the nature of education and values. An awareness of the lack of theoretical foundations for NFVEAS was articulated at the 2005 and 2006 National Values Education Forums.

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136 Nelson.

137 DEST, National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools, 1.

Proponents of character education normally recommend that teachers model traits of character and tell stories about a hero or heroine whose qualities it is hoped learners will emulate. Nelson stated that teachers would be expected to exhibit the nine Australian values in their behaviour: “[NFVEAS] will require ... that teachers in their ongoing professional learning and also in the way they behave in the classroom on a day to day basis meet and reflect the values being taught in the school in terms of responsibility, respect, caring and compassion, which we’ve set out in the national framework”.139 The reports of the schools that implemented NFVEAS contain many references that explicitly describe teachers “as role models”, stress the importance of “role modelling”, “living the values of the school” and the need for “the values to be explicitly taught and modelled to students”140 One school report stated that teachers need to “walk our talk”, meaning that teachers should model the nine values.141 The emphasis that Nelson placed on the image of Simpson and his donkey can be understood as a technique of story-telling which is central to character education. In some ways, Nelson took on the role of a ‘character educator’ by telling the Australian nation the story of Simpson in order to represent the best values or virtues that he considered desirable for the majority of Australians to emulate. This section has


140 Zbar and others, 69, 107,112, 111, 26.

141 Ibid., 50.
identified the particular approach to teaching values in schools that informs the
*National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools*. The next section gives a
brief overview of the constituent parts of the Australian values education initiative and
the several phases of its development.

**Values education in Australian schooling (2002-2009)**

In September 2002, Brendan Nelson, the then Federal Minister for Education of the
Federal Coalition Government, launched the *Values Education Study*. The values
education initiative was national in scope and developed in stages as a series of projects,
which received federal funding until 2009. The national values project was managed by
the then Curriculum Corporation, a Melbourne-based, not-for-profit company ‘owned’
by all State, Territory and Commonwealth Ministers of Education.\(^{142}\) Several different
components make up VES: the 2002 *Values Education Study* (the findings of which were
published in *VES Report 2003*), the *National Framework for Values Education in
Australian Schools* (2005), the *Good Practice Schools Project Stages 1 & 2* (2005-2008)

**Values Education Study (2002-2003)**

The 2002 *Values Education Study* was a year-long project designed to demonstrate
current practice in values education, to provide an informed basis for promoting
improved values education in Australian schools and to draft a set of principles and a
national framework for improved values education in Australian schools.\(^{143}\) The inquiry
was a qualitative investigation with three interrelated components. First, ‘action

\(^{142}\) DEEWR, 2.

\(^{143}\) Zbar and others, 21.
research’ or evidence-based research in 69 schools that secured federal funding for 50 projects in all, second, a literature review that was carried out by Australian historian of education, Carole Hooper,144 and third, an online survey to determine parent, teacher and student views on the values the community expects Australian schools to foster.145 The grants for research began at $7,000 per school and school ‘clusters’, which refers to a group of schools working together, were provided with between $14,000 to $21,000. Successful applicants included primary and secondary schools from government and non-government sectors in urban, rural and remote areas, with some schools working in clusters and others on their own. The data gathered by the 50 evidence-based school research projects informed the development of a draft national framework for values education and also provided case studies that are intended to illustrate how other schools can go about instilling values.146

The National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools (2005)

NFVEAS emerged from consultation around the draft version outlined in VES Report 2003 and was endorsed by MCEETYA. This thirteen-page document consists of a context; an underpinning vision for all Australian schools to provide values education in a planned and systematic way as a central aspect of their work; a set of nine values for Australian schooling, based on the 1999 ‘Adelaide Declaration’, a national document endorsed by MCEECDYA that provided a framework for developing national collaboration for the improvement of Australian; guiding principles to support schools

144 Ibid., 168-212.
145 Ibid., 213-240.
146 DEST, Values Education in Action: Case Studies from 12 Values Education Schools, for the National Values Education Forum, Melbourne April 2004 (Carlton South, Vic: Curriculum Corporation, 2004), 2.
in implementing values education; and key elements and approaches providing
guidance to schools in implementing values education.\textsuperscript{147} NFVEAS was distributed to all
schools nationwide in June 2005. At the 2007 \textit{National Values Education Forum} held in
Melbourne, a DEEWR representative described the framework as intended as ‘a guide’
for developing school values through discussion in the school community at the local
level.\textsuperscript{148}

Curriculum Corporation oversaw the channelling of federal funding towards various
‘branches’ of the values education initiative, including the development of values
education curriculum and professional learning resources, which consisted of a ‘Values
for Australian Schooling Kit’, and a website with additional resources such as links to
articles, a newsletter, a diary of activities and a portal for schools involved in the Good
Practice projects.\textsuperscript{149} The primary and secondary school kits were distributed to all
schools in June 2006 and contained the 13-page values framework document and
poster, a booklet to guide action (the primary kit varied slightly from the secondary kit),
a DVD to support professional development and provide examples of case studies of
good practice (from \textit{VES Report 2003}) and a booklet to guide the conduct of school

\textsuperscript{147} DEEWR, \textit{National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools}, 1.

\textsuperscript{148} Quoted by DEEWR, \textit{Values Education in Practice: Making Connections, National Values Education Forum
Report, Melbourne Exhibition Centre, Victoria, 3 & 4 May 2007} (Canberra: Department of Education,
Science and Training, 2007), 11.

\textsuperscript{149} The DEEWR webpage, ‘Values education for Australian schooling’ can be viewed at
http://www.valueseducation.edu.au/values/
values education forums. Funding also went towards annual National Values Education Forums from 2004-2009.

Government, independent and Catholic schools were invited in 2004 to apply in clusters or groups for grants to take part in the Good Practice Schools Project Stage 1 (GPSPS1), which ran from May 2005 to April 2006. Grants varied from $45,000 to $100,000, depending on the number of schools in the cluster. In total 26 clusters took part, which involved 166 schools and approximately 70,000 students. The principal aim of the project was to identify “good practices” that “effectively” applied the nine values of NFVEAS. Grants were “made available to enable schools to adapt the national framework to their own context and then report back on what they had learned”.

**Good Practice Schools Project Stage 1 (2005-2006)**

Stage 1 of the values enterprise was “designed as a school-driven, ground-up approach to exploring values education practice in local schooling contexts”. Work centred on evidence-based research that aimed to gather data for developing – in light of the criteria prescribed by NFVEAS – approaches to values education that were specifically

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151 DEST, *National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools*, 1, 2, 5, 6, 8.


153 DEEWR, *At the Heart of What We Do: Values Education at the Centre of Schooling, the Final Report of the Values Education Good Practice Schools Project - Stage 2* (Carlton South, Vic: Curriculum Corporation, 2008), 7.
‘tailored’ to the school clusters’ own particular contexts. A University Associates Network (UAN) was established to help schools, so that each cluster had a UAN advisor ("a supportive, critical friend and mentor"); educational academics at the University of Newcastle and the Australian Catholic University led and coordinated UAN, which drew its 24 members from the faculties of education of 17 Australian universities.

**GPSPS1** clusters drew on data accumulated through school values projects and other sources and this material informed the 2006 report, *Implementing the National Framework for Values in Education in Australian Schools*, (hereinafter **GPSPS1 Report**). **GPSPS1 Report** made recommendations to Australian schools about ten suggested principles of good practice and made inferences about "good practice implementation of the National Framework". **GPSPS1 Report** outlined indicators of 'educational impacts' on many aspects of the schools life and recommended that the next round of school values projects aim to confirm or modify these findings. These impacts were observed in student learning, student behaviours, teacher professional practice, relationships in school and school culture change.

**Good Practice Schools Project Stage 2 (2006-2008)**

The Federal Coalition Government’s loss to Labor in the November 2007 general election did not affect the timetabling or funding for the Australian values education

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155 Ibid., 1.

156 Ibid.
initiative, which had originally been scheduled for completion in mid-2008. In 2008, the new Federal Education Minister, Julia Gillard, committed a further $5.9 million towards another year and a third round of school values projects, which indicates that there was bi-partisan support for the values education enterprise (the amount of funding allocated to the values education initiative by the previous Coalition government over a four year period worked out to $7.425 million per year). The second round, the Good Practice Schools Project Stage 2 (GPSPS2), ran from October 2006 to April 2008. 25 school clusters took part, comprising 143 schools which were supported by 21 UAN academics from 16 universities around Australia. Grants ranged from $45,000 to $100,000 each, depending on the number of schools in a cluster. Stage 2 “was conceived of largely as an extension of Stage 1”, according to the 2008 report, *At the Heart of What We Do: Values Education at the Centre of Schooling* (hereinafter *GPSPS2 Report*).159

The timeframe of *GPSPS2* ran for 20 months, approximately double the project time available to *GPSPS1*. Three new criteria for selecting schools clusters were added to round 2: projects that had a particular focus on exploring values education in intercultural and global contexts, projects that focused on integrating values education in teaching programs in and across key learning areas, and projects that aimed to use

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158 DEEWR, *At the Heart of What We Do: Values Education at the Centre of Schooling, the Final Report of the Values Education Good Practice Schools Project - Stage 2*, 17.

159 DEST, *Implementing the National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools: Report of the Values Education Good Practice Schools Project - Stage 1*, 16.

160 DEEWR, *At the Heart of What We Do: Values Education at the Centre of Schooling, the Final Report of the Values Education Good Practice Schools Project - Stage 2*, 16.
explicit classroom practices that developed student social skills and fostered student resilience.\textsuperscript{161} The second round of school values projects set out to “build on the lessons from stage 1”.\textsuperscript{162} Curriculum Corporation’s chief objective was to oversee the development of “evidence-based accounts of good practice” with a view to “distilling” the “key indicators of good practice”.\textsuperscript{163}

**Values in Action Schools Project (2008-2009)**

The third and final round of the schools values projects, the Values in Action Schools Project (VASP), ran from December 2008 to November 2009. According to the final report of round 3, *Giving Voice to the Impacts of Values Education* (hereinafter *VASP Report*), the Federal Labor Government committed over $5.9 million to VASP in 2008.\textsuperscript{164} According to *VASP Report*, “DEEWR wanted to fund another round of values education schools projects to explore more deeply the evidence of impacts in schools where ‘values are in action’ throughout school activity”.\textsuperscript{165} 15 school clusters (of 3 to 10 schools) took part, comprising 86 schools, approximately 2,500 teachers and almost 40,000 students, who were supported by 21 UAN academics from 11 universities around Australia.\textsuperscript{166} Grants for school values project were between $30,000 and $54,000. The

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{163} DEEWR, *At the Heart of What We Do: Values Education at the Centre of Schooling, the Final Report of the Values Education Good Practice Schools Project - Stage 2*, 17, 23.

\textsuperscript{164} DEEWR, *Giving Voice to the Impacts of Values Education: The Final Report - October 2010*, 120.

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 14.

principle aim of the third round was to “build on the work of Stages 1 and Stages 2 of the VEGPSP, and to explore additional evidence of impacts that result from effective values education practice”.\textsuperscript{167} The three stages of the schools values projects can be said to hang together in the following way: the objective of the first round was to make inferences about ten principles of good practice that applied NFVEAS effectively in schools, the second round set out to “confirm” and “validate many of the initial findings from Stage 1” and the final round aimed to explicitly identify attitudinal or behavioural outcomes of effective good practice in values education.\textsuperscript{168}

**Conclusion**

This chapter has brought to light key philosophical, political and educational controversies which the *National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools* can be interpreted as aiming to address. While this thesis finds the assertion of a chief architect of the Australian values education initiative, Brendan Nelson, that ‘every Australian child needs to have an understanding of values as part of their schooling’, to be very valuable, it is, however, by no means clear that the understanding of values and democracy which informs the Australian values initiative is one that can educate citizens capable of building a democratic society that is inclusive of those with and without religious faith.


\textsuperscript{168} DEEWR, *At the Heart of What We Do: Values Education at the Centre of Schooling, the Final Report of the Values Education Good Practice Schools Project - Stage 2*, 24.
In order to investigate if there is a way to build on the stated objective of the *National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools* to provide opportunities for every Australian child to gain an understanding of values as part of their schooling, the next chapter will explore the work of postliberal theologian, Stanley Hauerwas, which offers insight into a religious perspective that holds that the nation-state and prevailing interpretations of democracy as nation-state theory suppress religion to the private sphere. It seems necessary to engage with the concerns of such a religious perspective in order to be able to establish if there is a version of democracy and an understanding of values that is *not* open to Hauerwas’s critique and which therefore can be argued to be compatible with non-religious and religious worldviews and suitable for implementation in Australian state *and* faith schools.
Chapter Five – Inquiry into religion

The purpose of this chapter is to examine a particular religious perspective which claims that an influential version of democracy is incompatible with religious faith. North American postliberal theologian, Stanley Hauerwas, argues that religious persons are compelled to ‘democratically police’ their speech in the public forums of Western democracies. Inquiry into this religious perspective is of relevance to the overall claim of the thesis that non-religious and religious learners would benefit from being enabled to be the kind of democratic person that a globalised environment is creating a need for.

The enculturation of the kind of democratic person that this thesis is arguing would be valuable for a global age requires the development of an educative process that is secular in the sense of inclusive of those with and without religious faith. In order to make the case that education towards being democratic is compatible with non-religious and religious worldviews, it is necessary to investigate Hauerwas’s claim that neutralist liberal interpretations of democracy are exclusionary of religion. A secular, inclusive version of democracy into which non-religious and religious learners could be initiated in the context of state and faith schools would be one that can address the concerns of this religious perspective.

The chapter begins by examining two main influences on Hauerwas’s work, North American moral philosopher, Alasdair C. MacIntyre – particularly his critique of liberal culture and the alleged incoherence of public debate in Western democracies – and postliberal theology. This sets the context for an exploration of how MacIntyre’s diagnosis of democratic politics combines with a postliberal ‘cultural-linguistic’ model
of religion to inform Hauerwas's critique of the way the nation-state and neutralist liberalism relegate religion to the private sphere, which Hauerwas argues reduces religion to a mere prop for so-called traditional morality. Hauerwas’s postliberal conception of mission as witness seems to presuppose a marked scepticism about the possibility of dialogue between those situated ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ Christianity, which causes some critics to argue that Hauerwas’s constructive position may discourage religious believers from engaging in democratic participation. The chapter will close with an examination of various criticisms levelled against Hauerwas by other theologians and by a supporter of participatory democracy.

5.1 Stanley Hauerwas

The impact of Stanley Hauerwas’s work among Christian intellectuals and in seminaries and divinity schools in North America and Great Britain has been considerable for the past three decades. ¹ Hauerwas’s writings can be understood to offer resources for thinking about how Christians can recover a distinctive Christian identity in order to navigate the complexities of a ‘post-Christendom’ cultural environment whilst also contributing to the society in which Christians find themselves. An indication of how Hauerwas’s position is regarded by theologians sympathetic to his project is North American New Testament scholar, Stephen E. Fowl’s observation that MacIntyre’s diagnosis of modern culture supplemented by Hauerwas provides theologians “with a potent description for living faithfully in our present situation”.² However, others have

¹ Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 140.

² Fowl: 16.
accused Hauerwas of ‘sectarianism’ or cutting off Christians from participating in the world.³

In order to clarify the nature of Hauerwas’s claim that the public forums of democracies require religious persons to “police their convictions in the name of sustaining such [democratic] social orders” it seems valuable to now explore two important influences that inform Hauerwas’s postliberal theological outlook.⁴ First, I will give an account of Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of neutralist liberalism in After Virtue. I am only discussing those features of MacIntyre’s work that are relevant for my discussion of Hauerwas’s critique of the way that conceptions of democracy as a theory of the nation-state require religious persons to remain silent on matters of central importance to them in public forums.⁵ For that reason I will give an account of MacIntyre’s argument that moral debate in the public forums of modern democracies is incoherent because modern culture produces an emotivist kind of person that is not capable of participating in rational political discussion. I will not examine the teleological framework of practices, virtues, narrative and tradition that MacIntyre develops in After Virtue, which he argues can supply the missing element needed for meaningful moral discourse to be sustained in a supposedly fragmented modern culture.


⁵ Ibid., 91-106.
A second significant influence on Hauerwas’s thought that I will discuss is the postliberal theology of the Yale Divinity School that is identified with the work of North American theologian, George Lindbeck and others. My primary concern is to describe those sources that inform Hauerwas’s scepticism about the possibility of dialogue between those ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ Christianity and also his claim that democratic politics requires religious believers to remain silent in public forums about their most cherished purposes. Given that these particular aspects of Hauerwas’s work draw mainly on postliberal theology and on MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism, a third key influence on Hauerwas that I will not discuss – because I do not believe it is essential to the present inquiry – is North American Mennonite pacifist theologian, John Howard Yoder’s conception of the church as a community of discipleship committed to non-violence in a violent world.

Alasdair MacIntyre

MacIntyre opens *After Virtue* with striking imagery of a scientific discourse in ruins. He introduces the main thesis of the book by asking the reader to imagine a world in which “the natural sciences were to suffer the effects of a catastrophe” and yet the current practitioners of science continue to use scientific terms that are only “fragments” of a once coherent conceptual scheme, which “now lack those contexts from which their significance derived”.⁶ In this culture, “nobody, or almost nobody, realises that what they are doing is not natural science in any proper sense at all”.⁷ This picture of

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⁷ Ibid., 1.
catastrophe and confusion sets the scene for MacIntyre to raise a “disquieting suggestion” that “in the actual world which we inhabit the language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder as the language of natural science in the imaginary world which I described”. At the conclusion of *After Virtue*, MacIntyre argues that there are some parallels between “our own age in Europe and North America and the epoch in which the Roman Empire declined into the Dark Ages”, which recalls the imagery of a scientific discourse in ruins. By a ‘new dark ages’ it seems MacIntyre means that in our modern culture most people continue to use moral terms that have been severed from the contexts or sources that originally gave those ‘fragments’ significance. Although we may think we are speaking and acting morally in the public forums of democracies nonetheless our speech and conduct cannot be said to count as moral in any proper sense.

What seems to trouble MacIntyre most about modern culture is the absence of the sort of agreement in public debate that is needed to identify what questions are important to address. He gives three examples of modern ethical debates about just war, abortion and economic justice. These particular debates exemplify three characteristics that MacIntyre claims are “typical” of contemporary moral argument and disagreement in general. First, they are “interminable”, by which MacIntyre does not just mean they seem endless or have yet to be resolved. Rather, public debate is

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8 Ibid., 2.
9 Ibid., 263.
10 Ibid., 6-7.
11 Ibid., 8.
12 Ibid.
interminable because the rival initial premises of liberal moral agents are incommensurable, which makes such arguments impossible to resolve. Second, disputants appeal to criteria in a manner that implies the belief that such standards are impersonal and not just expressions of their personal preferences. Third, since participants in public debate believe the principles of justice or rights to which they appeal are universal they ordinarily tend not to inquire into the diversity and heterogeneity of moral sources that originally gave such ‘fragments’ quite different meanings from those in current usage. MacIntyre accounts for the irresolvability of public moral debates in terms of his main thesis that contemporary moral discourse is not rational but incoherent because the moral terms currently in use are ‘ruins’ left over from once coherent moral languages.

MacIntyre argues that the arbitrary nature of public discussion is concealed from participants by certain features of the language they use. Contemporary moral disagreement has a paradoxical air, according to MacIntyre, because it exemplifies a clash between arbitrary personal wills but the language in which moral argumentation takes place invokes impersonal standards that can supposedly rationally adjudicate disputes between rival perspectives. While those who engage in moral conflict may aspire to rational argument, their rival first principles preclude reasoned exchange and the ‘fragmented’ nature of moral discourse disguises the irrationality of their arguments from them. For MacIntyre, the key to understanding this paradox is to be found in the explanation of moral discourse that the moral philosophy of emotivism offers.

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13 Ibid., 8-11.

14 Ibid., 9.
Emotivism is the doctrine that “all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character (original emphasis)”\textsuperscript{15} On this account, moral judgements are designed to express personal feelings and attitudes, which are neither true nor false, and also to influence the hearer’s attitudes so that they accord with those of the speaker; expressions that invoke impersonal criteria are simply a tool for effectively bending others to our own will. According to MacIntyre, emotivism accurately accounts for the way moral expressions are used in contemporary moral discourse. People now appeal to impersonal reasons to express their personal feelings and attitudes but moral expressions were not always used in this way. In past historical periods, moral language could lay claim to real objectivity.

An emotivist self, on MacIntyre’s account, “is an integral part of one distinctive type of social order, that which we in the so-called advanced countries presently inhabit”.\textsuperscript{16} Modern culture makes available only two alternative modes of social life, a bureaucratic one and an individualistic one.\textsuperscript{17} This division encourages individuals to regard each other as competitors for scarce resources such as, for example, jobs and government funding, which can distract citizens from examining and calling into question the aims of corporate and governmental bureaucracies and institutions. Reasoned discourse is not possible between emotivist selves who ordinarily use moral terminology to express

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 11-12.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 34.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 35.
their personal desires. Such selves regard public forums, “not as places of debate ... but as places where bargaining between individuals, each with their own preferences, are conducted”.18 MacIntyre traces the emergence of the emotivist self and the corresponding decline of public debate to developments that took place at a particular juncture in the intellectual history of the West.

MacIntyre traces the reason for why modern culture lacks the kind of agreement that is needed to sustain meaningful moral debate in the public arena to the inheritance by eighteenth-century Enlightenment moral philosophers from their predecessors of moral vocabularies that had been severed from an overarching framework that gives a point to ethical rules and precepts. Whereas the received moral tradition in the Renaissance consisted of three elements, the proponents of the various European Enlightenments inherited from their predecessors an incomplete framework comprised of only two elements. The three elements of the classical and medieval teleological scheme involved a conception of “human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be” or “human nature in its untutored state”, a conception of “human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realised-its-telos” and “the conception of the precepts of rational ethics”.19

In the three-fold scheme, the point of moral rules and precepts – how a person ‘ought’ to act – is to educate or enhance a person’s emotions and desires in order to enable her to move or progress from an untutored state – how a person ‘is’ – towards becoming the kind of person she could be if she realised her proper end or telos.


19 MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 53.
According to MacIntyre, “each of the three elements of the scheme ... requires reference to the other two if its status and function are to be intelligible”. The ‘ought’ of moral rules and principles “had been expressly designed to be discrepant with” the ‘is’ of untutored human nature so that the inability to derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’ was intelligible within the older scheme. However, “the joint effect of the secular rejection of both Protestant and Catholic theology and the scientific rejection of Aristotelianism was to eliminate any notion of man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos”.

The quest for abstract first principles from which to derive general rules of justice led to the production of a number of rival ethical systems such as Kantianism, utilitarianism and Humeanism that each offer distinct conceptions of rationality. MacIntyre argues that the inability of modern philosophers over the course of the past three centuries to reach agreement on the correct principles and the interminability of such debates casts doubts on the original Enlightenment premise that principles of the kind being sought really exist. The incoherence of modern moral discourse is due to the enormous

20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 55.
22 Ibid., 54.
23 Some critics of MacIntyre point out that simply because debate about first principles is ongoing does not signify that no outcome can be reached and that the task should therefore be abandoned: “MacIntyre may be impatient and unrealistic in insisting that if philosophy has not yet resolved the matter, then we ought [to] consider it beyond resolution and move on ... Nevertheless, we should recognize that MacIntyre has an important point in reminding us that it is difficult to defend the rationality of trusting any such conception until it has been tested by many and over time (original emphasis)”. J. L. A Garcia, "Modern(Ist) Moral Philosophy and Macintyrean Critique," in Alasdair MacIntyre, ed. Mark C Murphy(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 106.
variety of candidates within liberalism that each claim to provide a rational foundation for the moral ‘ought’ that every rational person would have reason to accept and which each offer evidence that demonstrates its competitors are mistaken. In the forum of public debate, the rival premises on which participants base their arguments about just war, abortion or economic justice are incommensurable: “we possess no rational way of weighing the claims of one [set of principles] against another”.24 There can be no reasoned discourse between proponents of rival premises. MacIntyre’s pessimistic conclusion about the role of modern politics and democracy in responding to the moral and political challenges of modern culture seems to derive partly from his account of the lack of agreement on first principles among liberal moral agents.

MacIntyre set himself a task in After Virtue of addressing the question of what sort of conditions could make it possible to participate in rational moral debate ‘in dark times’. MacIntyre’s critique of the perceived ills of modern culture, and the conclusion he reaches about the steps that would need to be taken in order for it to even be possible under the conditions of modernity for public moral debate to be rational, has been perceived by some of MacIntyre’s critics to be excessively bleak.25 At the end of After

24 MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 8.

25 For a selection of critical perspectives on MacIntyre’s work from contributors covering a broad spectrum of disciplines – such as moral philosophy, political philosophy, and ancient and medieval political thought – which also includes a response from MacIntyre to his critics, see John Horton and Susan Mendus, eds., After Macintyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair Macintyre (Notre Dame, Indiana: Polity Press/University of Notre Dame, 1994). In particular, the introductory essay by Susan Mendus and John Horton to this collection of essays provides an overview of the range of issues debated by the contributors. See, John Horton and Susan Mendus, "Alasdair Macintyre: After Virtue and After," in ... footnote cont’d on next page
MacIntyre proposes the need for “the construction of local forms of community” in which to seek refuge from the incoherence of moral discourse and in order to protect “civility and the intellectual moral life” from “the barbarians” that have “already been governing us for some time”.  

Postliberal theology

According to Northern Irish theologian, Alister McGrath, “the emergence of postliberalism is widely regarded as one of the most important aspects of Western theology since 1980”. There is significant overlap between postliberal theological themes and the concerns of Alasdair MacIntyre. For example, McGrath notes that within postliberal theology “particular appreciation can be discerned for the style of approach associated with the philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre … which places an emphasis on the relation between narrative, community, and the moral life”. While initially this theological movement had its origins in North America and was associated with Yale Divinity School, since the early 1980s “postliberal trends have become well established within North American and British academic theology”. Postliberal theologian, William Placher, contrasts the kind of theology taught at Yale to an approach he describes as “generic theology”. According to the latter, “what is distinctively Christian –

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Ibid.
or Buddhist or Jewish – is peripheral to theology’s real concerns”.\textsuperscript{30} Many of the religious studies departments in America promote a generic approach that defines ‘religion’ as “a universal phenomenon whose themes and symbols manifest the experience of the sacred in different but related ways in different cultures”.\textsuperscript{31} By contrast, at Yale, where Hauerwas completed his doctoral studies during the mid-1970s, an emphasis was placed “on the study of particular religious traditions, each in its own historical or cultural context. Students studied Christianity or Judaism or Buddhism but not ‘religion’”.\textsuperscript{32}

McGrath defines postliberalism as a movement that “rejects both the traditional Enlightenment appeal to a ‘universal rationality’ and the liberal assumption of an immediate religious experience common to all humanity”.\textsuperscript{33} The ‘liberalism’ to which the prefix, ‘post’, is affixed therefore does not imply a particular political complexion. Rather, it refers to the philosophical tradition of Enlightenment liberalism. Placher offers the following of survey of postliberal theology’s “interrelated characteristics”:

(1) It is non-foundationalist ... postliberal theologians ... believe that experience always comes already interpreted ... Therefore I cannot evaluate my beliefs by checking them against some primordial, uninterpreted experience. (2) It does not engage in systematic apologetics. Postliberal theologians will make ad hoc connections with the philosophy or art or miscellaneous experience of the cultures around them, but they do not believe that any non-Christian framework,


\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 343-344.

\textsuperscript{33} McGrath, 92.
philosophical, or cultural, sets the context in which Christian claims must be defended. (3) It attends to the differences among religions, rather than focusing on the things they have in common or trying to argue that they are all saying the same thing. (4) It emphasises the scriptural stories or narratives by which Christians identify God and the Christian community and come to understand their own lives (original emphasis).34

These characteristics identified by McGrath and Placher are of particular value for understanding the influence on Hauerwas’s thought of a key figure of ‘Yale postliberalism’, North American theologian, George Lindbeck.

George Lindbeck challenged traditional theology’s construal of mission in terms of systematic apologetics which tries to persuade or argue for Christian faith on the basis of some neutral ground of reason. Lindbeck was sceptical about any attempt to argue people into faith on the basis of reason; also he eschewed any attempt to find some neutral vantage point from which the claims of competing cultures could be assessed to the benefit of Christianity. Instead, Lindbeck advocated an approach to theology that was “intratextual” because he was interested in the way that theology can be a worldview. In contrast to the attempt of liberal theologians to find analogies and points of contact in human experience outside the Christian story, by recovering ‘historical kernels’ or looking for moral lessons, on Lindbeck’s account, a Christian believer comes to read the world in terms of the Christian story:

Intratextual theology redescribes reality within the scriptural framework rather than translating Scripture into extrascriptural categories. It is the

34 Placher, ”Postliberal Theology,” 344.
text, so to speak, which absorbs the world, rather than the world the

text.\textsuperscript{35}

The world of the biblical narratives “supplies the interpretive framework within

which believers seek to live their lives and understand reality”.\textsuperscript{36} In his landmark


Postliberal Age}, Lindbeck examined what such an intratextual approach implies

about the role of doctrines and provided a typology of conceptions of religion.

Lindbeck takes the view in \textit{The Nature of Doctrine} that the function of
doctrines is not to make assertions about ontological reality. Rather, it is to act as
the linguistic rules of a grammar that governs the way Christians should talk and
experience the world. The idea that Christian doctrine is like a language
informed Lindbeck’s promotion of what he described as a “cultural-linguistic
approach”, which he contrasted to approaches that he denoted as “experiential-
expressivist” and “propositionalist”.\textsuperscript{37} A propositionalist approach to a definition
of religion “emphasises the cognitive aspects of religion and stresses the ways in
which church doctrines function as informative propositions or truth-claims
about objective realities”; the experiential-expressivist reading “interprets
doctrines as noninformative and nondiscursive symbols of inner feelings,
attitudes or existential orientations”; a cultural-linguistic model interprets

\textsuperscript{35} George. A. Lindbeck, \textit{The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age} (Phildalephia:
Westminster Press, 1984), 118.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 117.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 16-18.
doctrines as “communally authoritative rules of discourse, attitude, and action”.\(^{38}\) Lindbeck is particularly critical of the claim of experiential-expressivism that religious language seeks to articulate some underlying common experience that all religious people share: “Religions are seen as multiple suppliers of different forms of a single commodity needed for transcendent self-expression and self-realisation”.\(^{39}\) This challenged the claims of pluralists like John Hick and Paul Knitter who argued in the early 1980s that religions have a common core and are, in Placher’s words, “at some deep level saying the same thing”.\(^{40}\)

The view that doctrines are more like a cultural-linguistic system in which a community of believers live than propositional assertions about the nature of reality or a manifestation of a single phenomenon called ‘religion’ seems indebted to the thought of Austrian-English philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein. In his later work, Wittgenstein investigated the role of language in constituting the world and argued that it is only through language that we have any contact with the world; all our connection with the world is construed and modified and shaped by language. Lindbeck makes the following key mention of Wittgenstein in *The Nature of Doctrine*, which can be taken to indicate that Lindbeck’s idea that a religion is a cultural-linguistic is influenced by Wittgenstein’s understanding of language as constitutive of human experience of the world:

\(^{38}\) Ibid.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 22.

\(^{40}\) Placher, "Postliberal Theology," 353.
Just as a language (or “language game,” to use Wittgenstein’s phrase) is correlated with a form of life, and just as a culture has both cognitive and behavioural dimensions, so it is also the case of a religious tradition. Its doctrines, cosmic stories or myths, and ethical directives are integrally related to the rituals it practices, the sentiments or experiences it evokes, the actions it recommends, and the institutional forms it develops. All this is involved in comparing a religion to a cultural-linguistic system.\textsuperscript{41}

It seems to follow from Lindbeck’s idea that doctrinal systems are like languages that the speech of Christians, for example, may really only be intelligible to those within the Christian community who can ‘speak Christian’. What words mean ‘inside’ a way of life shaped by Christian doctrine is different to what they mean ‘outside’: “we cannot have the kind of experience Christians or Buddhists or Muslims have without having the linguistic framework to structure and articulate that experience”.\textsuperscript{42} According to McGrath, the cultural-linguistic approach “denies that there is some universal unmediated human experience that exists apart from human language and culture. Rather it stresses that the heart of religion lies in living within a specific historical religious tradition ... this tradition rests upon an historically mediated set of ideas, for which the narrative is an especially suitable means of transmission”\textsuperscript{43}.

\textsuperscript{41} Lindbeck, 33.

\textsuperscript{42} Placher, "Postliberal Theology," 348.

\textsuperscript{43} McGrath, 92.
linguistic understanding of religion has implications for how religious persons think about conducting themselves in a world in which it is supposed that people who are situated 'outside' religion may be unable to easily understand the 'languages' of Christianity, Buddhism and Islam spoken 'inside' the church, temple or mosque.

Lindbeck argues that becoming religious requires a person to become skilled in the language or symbol system of that religion. Part of the task of the cultural-linguistic or postliberal theologian, then, is to teach Christians how to talk so that they might live as Christians. ‘Being religious’ (for example, ‘being Christian’) and ‘religious identity’ (for example, ‘Christian identity’) involves becoming fluent through practicing ‘speaking’ Christian, Buddhism or Islam. Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic understanding of religion comes together with a postliberal dissatisfaction with systematic apologetics – which tries to argue for Christian faith on the basis of some neutral ground of reason – to produce a postliberal conception of Christian mission. If the doctrines of Christianity or Islam or Judaism are like a language and therefore are really only intelligible to those who ‘speak’ it then it may not be possible to argue or persuade a person of the factual truth of religious conviction on the basis of supposedly universal reason. However, it might be possible to convince someone about the value of a particular faith by demonstrating it in the living of a particular kind of life.

44 Lindbeck, 131.
While Lindbeck laid a doctrinal foundation for postliberalism, Hauerwas’s contribution can be understood to be the development of the implications of the postliberal outlook for religious ‘social ethics’. I will discuss next how Hauerwas draws on MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism and on a postliberal theological understanding of Christian mission to make the case that Christians best serve the wider society in which they find themselves by recovering their Christian distinctiveness in order to live lives that exhibit uniquely Christian virtues and thereby display the truth of Christian conviction.

*Religion in public*

This section examines, first, Hauerwas’s critique of the way the nation-state relegates religion to the private sphere and the way an influential interpretation of democracy as nation-state theory requires religious persons to remain silent in public forums about their most cherished convictions. Second, I provide an overview of Hauerwas’s constructive position which describes Christianity as an alternative political community that witnesses to the truth of Christian conviction and can also serve society by visibly dissenting from the dominant power structures of the social order in which the church finds itself.45 Third, I outline several key concerns that have been raised by critics situated both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ Christianity in response to Hauerwas’s postliberal conception of Christian mission as witness.

*Critique*

Hauerwas's critique of the nation-state and liberal theory builds on MacIntyre's analysis of the incoherence of moral debate in modern democracies. According to MacIntyre, the parameters for moral debate in public forums require that participants make appeal to universal principles or norms and leave out particularistic convictions which not every rational person would have reason to accept. These parameters are informed by an assumption that there is a common morality or set of moral rules based on principles which any reasonable person can appeal to during the course of public debate. However, MacIntyre points out that as yet no agreement has been reached between ethical theorists as to which first principles provide a basis for morality. The Enlightenment quest for universally acceptable principles has failed or, at least, not yet succeeded and on MacIntyre's account there seems little reason to suppose that it will attain its goal. Consequently, participants in the public forums of modern democracies argue from rival first principles with the outcome that debate is not coherent and democratic politics is reduced to 'civil war carried on by other means'. Hauerwas accepts MacIntyre's pessimistic diagnoses of the incoherence of moral debate and his characterisation of modern politics as manipulative in order to draw out certain implications for the situation in which Christianity finds itself operating under the conditions of modern culture. The implications that Hauerwas draws apply not only to Christianity but holds too for the other historical world religions.

Hauerwas argues that since the Enlightenment search was instigated for principles that every rational person would have reason to accept the nation-state has justified constraining the church to the sphere of the private through
appeal to the existence of a putative common morality based on universal reason. In light of MacIntyre’s claim that the lack of agreement on first principles amongst ethical theorists points to the Enlightenment project having failed, Hauerwas argues that religious believers ought to resist the characterisation of the church, synagogue, mosque and temple as ‘voluntary associations’ that mediate between the individual and the nation-state. Seen from the standpoint of the nation-state, religious institutions appear in the public realm on par with intermediate institutions, social networks, lifestyle and civil society associations that cater for individuals with similar interests. According to Hauerwas, “the church is not simply a ‘voluntary association’ that may be of some use to the wider polity, but rather is that community constituted by practices by which all other politics are to be judged”. Christian believers should not permit the church to be constrained to the private in this way because Hauerwas holds that Christianity is public in all its deeds and occupies the public sphere by its very nature. In an essay entitled, ‘Sex in Public: How Adventurous Christians are Doing It’, Hauerwas argues that marriage within the church is a public declaration of sexual activity. He observes that Christians “have failed to see that any discussion of sex must begin within an understanding of how sexual ethics is rooted in a community’s basic political commitments”. That many Christians continue to fail to grasp that the Christian practice of sex in marriage is not private but political can be understood to stem from Christianity having allowed

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itself to be made captive to liberal political arrangements and from the church having accepted its relegation by the nation-state to the private.

According to Hauerwas, the requirement that religious persons leave their religious convictions behind when they participate in moral debate in democratic forums “renders our convictions as Christians puerile”.\textsuperscript{48} In the public arena, “Christians police their own convictions” to ensure that they base their appeals during public debate on principles that are accessible to any rational person.\textsuperscript{49} The criteria by which religious persons are compelled to ‘democratically police’ what they say in public forums are general principles that any reasonable person would accept. The particularities of religious conviction in the public realm are, therefore, always “subordinated to the lowest-common denominator set of rules that can be affirmed by all citizens”.\textsuperscript{50} On Hauerwas’s account, “everyone gets to participate in the democratic exchange on his or her own terms, except for Christians themselves”.\textsuperscript{51} Had the Enlightenment quest arrived at a conclusive outcome and succeeded in identifying first principles upon which all agree then the demand that a neutralist liberal interpretation of democracy places on religious persons to ‘bracket out’ their particularistic religious convictions might be defensible.

\textsuperscript{48} Hauerwas, “The Democratic Policing of Christianity,” 105.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{50} Hauerwas, \textit{A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic}, 130.

\textsuperscript{51} Hauerwas, “The Democratic Policing of Christianity,” 93.
In light of MacIntyre’s diagnosis of a lack of rationality in public debate, religious believers can be understood to sanitise their convictions in order to be granted entrance to participation in public forums which, however, lack the constraints necessary for coherent moral discourse to occur. In exchange for remaining silent about their most cherished convictions, religious persons are permitted to engage not in considered moral argument but in what MacIntyre describes as merely a clash between arbitrary wills. Drawing on a postliberal cultural-linguistic model of religion, Hauerwas argues that when religious persons endeavour to base their appeals during public debate on principles accessible to any rational person they are allowing an extra-religious definition of the world to set the agenda for their participation in the world. This strategy for engaging with the wider society in which religious believers are situated involves Christians in an unfaithful compromise of their religious calling or mission to embody a distinctively religious viewpoint that Hauerwas claims can point to a truth “that the world cannot on its own terms know”.

Hauerwas argues that stifling the distinctive points of view of religious believers in the public arena has an effect of reducing particularistic convictions to a mere set of beliefs to be relegated to the private sphere. Sanitising religious

convictions in this way undermines possibilities for a believer to come to understand that such convictions have the power to shape the kind of person that she or he becomes. According to Hauerwas, “the very characterisation of Christianity as a system of beliefs ... robs Christians of the resources necessary to reclaim for ourselves why we believe being Christian has to do with the power that moves the sun and the stars”.

Religious faith becomes a matter of mere personal taste, an interest or hobby to be pursued in church, which is viewed as a voluntary association that likeminded people ‘join’ in order to pursue the same interests. From a cultural-linguistic perspective, pursuing a strategy for involvement in the world whereby religious believers subordinate their distinctively religious convictions to supposedly neutral principles extraneous to religious thinking about the world makes believers complicit in a process that represses their own religious identity.

‘Being Christian’ for Hauerwas is less a compartmentalisable private interest and more like a way of life in which a person is initiated over time into the art of ‘speaking Christian’: “To be a Christian from a cultural-linguistic point of view is not like learning another language, but rather is to learn another language”.

From the standpoint of this understanding of religious faith, a person is not born with an ability to ‘speak Christian’ just because their parents are religious.

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Rather, in order to understand what those who have already begun to learn to 'speak Christian' are saying, a person first needs to undergo 'training': "To speak well, to talk right, requires that our bodies be habituated by the language of the faith". The kind of training that religious believers receive when they comply with 'democratically policing' their convictions in public forums can be understood to undermine their ability to speak the language of faith. As a result of becoming habituated to the practice of remaining silent about distinctively Christian viewpoints in the public arena, Christian believers “lose the critical skills formed by the gospel to know when we have voluntarily qualified our loyalty to God in the name of the state". The loss of critical skills and diminishment of Christian identity that ensues from participating in democratic forums also results in the distortion of the moral life 'inside' the Christian community.

An assumption that informs the neutralist liberal democratic practice of 'bracketing out' particularistic religious convictions is the belief that what has been excluded from the public realm ought to be discussed in the sphere of the private. A possible outcome of this process is that non-religious and religious persons may come to regard religious faith as wholly subjective or as a matter personal preference. It also tacitly commits Christian believers to a view of the church as a voluntary association, which causes Christians to lose sight of the

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public nature of Christian practices such as marriage. From the standpoint of a
cultural-linguistic conception of religion, democratic processes that exclude
religious conviction from the public realm are informed by a reductionist
account of religion which abstracts religious claims from their cultural locale in
specific historical religious traditions so that what is left is a set of philosophical
or ethical teachings. For Hauerwas, the church is not reducible to the status of a
voluntary association but, rather, “Christianity names an ongoing argument
across centuries of a tradition”. 59 Here, Hauerwas’s notion of moral traditions
draws on MacIntyre’s conception in After Virtue of “historically extended, socially
embodied argument[s]”. 60

If Christian believers acquiesce to a view of the church as a voluntary
association and an understanding of Christian conviction as mere belief then
they cut themselves off from participating in the church conceived of as “the
lively argument, extended over centuries and occasioned by the stories of God’s
calling of Israel and of the life and death of Jesus Christ, to which we are invited
to contribute by learning to live faithful to those stories”. 61 Without persons
capable of articulating and contributing distinctively Christian viewpoints the
Christian way of life stultifies because it lacks resources necessary to sustain the
conversation. To the extent that neutralist liberal democratic practices diminish
the capacity of religious believers to openly express their particularistic religious

59 Hauerwas, "The Pathos of the University: The Case of Stanley Fish," 90.
60 MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 222.
61 Stanley Hauerwas, "The Gesture of a Truthful Story," in Christian Existence Today: Essays on Church,
convictions, such a version of democracy can be understood to lead to the stifling or silencing of the ‘extended, socially embodied arguments’ which constitute the church, synagogue, mosque or temple. Hauerwas’s critique of the impact that the nation-state’s and neutralist liberalism’s relegation of the church and religious conviction to the private sphere has on, first, the moral life of the Christian community and, second, the ability of Christians to criticise the social status quo leads him to formulate a particular constructive position.

In order for Christians to become people capable of sustaining the ‘argument’ that constitutes the church, believers need to be enabled to break out of their ‘captivity’ to an understanding of the church as a voluntary association and an idea of religious faith as a private or merely personal system of beliefs. According to Hauerwas, this requires the recovery on the part of Christians of an understanding of Christianity as “an alternative polis, a countercultural structure called church”.62 I will now examine this notion of Christianity as a polis, which is the standpoint from which Hauerwas develops a particular conception of mission as witness.

**Witness**

Hauerwas’s conception of the church as a polis seems quite like the sort of community that MacIntyre argued at the end of *After Virtue* needs to be constructed to ensure the survival of “civility and the intellectual moral life” during “the new dark ages which are

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already upon us”. For Hauerwas, the church is essentially a community of peaceable virtue because he reads the gospel narratives as pacifist. The influence of MacIntyre’s diagnosis of modern culture as emotivist and his analysis of democratic politics as manipulative combines with the cultural-linguistic idea that religious faith “resemble[s] a language correlative to a way of life” to shape Hauerwas’s conception of Christianity as an alternative political community in which religious believers can participate in coherent moral discourse away from the ‘contagion’ of modern culture and democratic politics. In a co-authored book published in 1989 entitled, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony, Hauerwas expressed a postliberal dissatisfaction with traditional theology’s emphasis on systematic apologetics and argued that Christians in the West ought to acknowledge that Western societies are not ‘Christian’.

The image of the church as ‘a colony’ and of Christians as ‘resident aliens’ is meant to emphasise the difference between Christianity and its surrounding culture but Hauerwas warns Christians not to assume that their religious calling is to seek ‘to restore Christendom’ by, for example, campaigning for prayer in state schools. Addressing American Christians in particular, Hauerwas argues that the demise of Christendom “is not a death to lament. It is an opportunity to celebrate”. Hauerwas’s

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63 MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 263.

64 Gustafson, “The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on Theology, the Church and the University,” 88; Stanley Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); Stout, *Democracy and Tradition*, 144.

65 Hauerwas, “Carving Stone or Learning to Speak Christian,” 118.


67 Ibid., 18.
eschewal of apologetics as an approach for how Christian believers ought to interact with those ‘outside’ Christianity – or the ‘Christian colony’ – leads him to develop a “radical” conception of mission that he argues “puts me at odds with the social strategy of many Christians, both liberal and conservative, in America”.68 He distinguishes his understanding of mission from both the approach of the New Christian Right which seeks to ‘rechristianise America’ and the approach of the ‘mainline’ Protestant churches that, for example participated with Martin Luther King Jr in the 1960s Civil Rights movement:

... there is not much difference between Jerry [Falwell’s] ethical agenda and that of the American Protestant mainline. Whether they think of themselves as liberal or conservative, as ethically and politically left or right, American Christians have fallen into the bad habit of acting as if the church really does not matter as we go about trying to live like Christians.69

Both the New Christian Right and the Protestant mainline assume that the social agenda of the church is to motivate Christians to get involved in politics: “[it is supposed that] we Christians can, like every other pressure group in this society, push for the legislative embodiment of our point of view”.70 For Hauerwas, a main problem with such an approach is that it encourages religious believers to go about devising ‘Christian’ positions on issues like euthanasia, asylum-seekers, abortion or same-sex

69 Hauerwas and Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony, 69.
70 Ibid., 70.
marriage in a manner that limits the thinking of Christians to the parameters set by the wider modern culture. This can be understood to allow terms extraneous to Christian experience and thinking about the world to set the agenda for how Christians understand politics and the political. Hauerwas emphasises the importance of a recovery of the church as an alternative political community or polis because he wants American Christians to cultivate the virtue of acting as if the church really does matter for how they go about trying to live like Christians.  

Central to Hauerwas’s notion of Christianity as a polis is his sense of the importance of moral discourse within the Christian community: “Tradition, as we use the term here, is a complex, lively argument about what happened in Jesus that has been carried on, across the generations, by a concrete body of people called the church”. Initiation into vigorous debate within the polis provides Christians with training in the language of religious faith which develops critical skills for understanding politics and the political in terms drawn from the resources of the Christian tradition rather than from extra-Christian sources: “The church gives us the interpretive skills, a truthful understanding whereby we first see the world for what it is”. Hauerwas’s claim that participation on the part of religious believers in coherent moral discourse is a political task is meant to challenge the nation-state’s relegation of the church to the private realm. It also aims to persuade Christians that they do not have to devise ‘Christian’ positions on issues and lobby for government support in order to be politically active.

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72 Hauerwas and Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony, 72.

73 Ibid., 38.
Hauerwas argues that being Christian in the sense of becoming capable of sustaining the ‘extended, socially embodied argument’ that constitutes the church is an inherently political activity. This leads him to make a central theological claim that for the church to simply be the church is a way of engaging the world: “the political task of Christians is to be the church rather than to transform the world”.74 Placher offers the following explanation: “For Hauerwas, the witness the church can provide of a different sort of life, grounded on different presuppositions, is precisely the most useful contribution it can make to the wider society, because it is the one contribution [the church] can uniquely make”.75 In order to be the embodiment of a communal sign, “a signal to the world that Christ ha[s] made possible a way of life together unlike anything the world ha[s] seen”, Hauerwas argues that the church must become a visibly distinctive society.76 Consequently, the ‘political’ challenge for Christians ceases to be a question of lobbying for the restoration of prayer in state schools or protesting against legislation that allows the offshore processing and indefinite detention of asylum-seekers. Rather, a primary political challenge is to reform the attitudes of Christian believers towards Christianity so that they give up an understanding of the church as a voluntary association and an idea of religious faith as a private or merely personal system of beliefs. This would make it possible for the Christian way of life to become what Hauerwas describes as “a contrast model”.77

74 Ibid.

75 Placher, "Preaching the Gospel in Academy and Society," 17.

76 Hauerwas and Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony, 132.

77 Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic, 50, 84.
Hauerwas argues that systematic apologetics underpinned by what he terms a “theology of translation” are factors that have contributed to Christians losing sight of their calling to be “the visible, political enactment of our language of God”. 78

Apologetics takes the primary task of theology to be an intellectual one of making Christianity – which treats as authoritative ancient Scriptures imbued with ‘pre-scientific’ or pre-modern worldviews – credible to the inhabitants of the modern era. Apologetics has been, on Hauerwas’s account, the project of theology since the Enlightenment and is informed by the belief that “Christian thought must be translated in order to become intelligible to modern people”. 79 One of its earliest proponents was the early nineteenth-century German theologian and philosopher, Friedrich Schleiermacher, who set out to make faith credible to Christianity’s ‘cultured despisers’. 80 In Resident Aliens, Hauerwas observes: “The theology of translation assumes that there is some kernel of real Christianity, some abstract essence that can be preserved even while changing some of the old Near Eastern labels (original emphasis)”. 81

Hauerwas associates the theology of translation with liberal theology which he argues regarded the particularities of Christian faith as impediments for the credibility of modern people that obscured Christianity’s real substance. 82 The attempt to interpret religious texts in a way that renders them more palatable to a modern person by first

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78 Hauerwas and Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony, 21, 171.

79 Ibid., 20.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid., 21.

82 Ibid., 25.
identifying analogies and points of contact in human experience assumes that the task of the theologian “is to read those texts into contemporary experience, which breathes intelligibility into them”. Such a project of making faith credible to the modern world begins by identifying what a modern person holds to be credible – for example, noble ideals, moral lessons, natural explanations for miracles – and removes or ignores parts of the religious text that do not conform to the pattern.

Lindbeck and Hauerwas describe the liberal theological approach as experiential-expressivist and reject its underlying assumption that religious texts, beliefs and practices ought to be revised by reference to an extraneous experiential standard: “Modern interpreters of the faith have tended to let the modern world determine the questions and therefore limit the answers”. According to Hauerwas, “modern theological attempts at translation ... distorted the gospel and transformed it into something it never claimed to be – ideas abstracted from Jesus”. Hauerwas argues that liberal theology’s conception of the task of theology to be primarily an apologetic one of translating Scripture into modern categories persuaded Christians that faith is reducible to an abstract essence, eternal truths or a set of rules that list moral ‘oughts’ which are intelligible to any rational person. Consequently, Christians came to mistakenly believe that the church has a social ethic because they lacked the critical skills and theological resources necessary to recognise that the church is a social ethic.

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84 Hauerwas and Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony, 19.
85 Ibid., 21.
The contention that “the church does not have a social ethic but rather is a social ethic (original emphasis)” seems to be integrally related to Hauerwas’s central claim that the main political task of Christians in a post-Christendom context is not to push for the legislative embodiment of ‘Christian’ positions on issues like abortion but, rather, to form a visible, distinctive community of faith that “confronts the world with a political alternative the world would not otherwise know”.87 Here, a brief explanation of what Hauerwas means by ‘social ethic’ seems necessary. In America, ‘social ethics’ is an academic discipline that grew out of a late nineteenth-century progressive Christian movement called ‘the Social Gospel’ that responded to ‘social’ issues of extreme poverty, industrialisation and urbanisation. The Social Gospellers were progressive Christians who believed that Christianity had a social responsibility to transform society and who sought to convert the church into an instrument of social betterment.88 Mid-twentieth-century North American theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, inherited the social gospel and refashioned social ethics into a version of Christian Realism which Hauerwas accepted early on in his theological training but later came to vehemently oppose. Hauerwas’s dictum, ‘the church does not have a social ethic but rather is a social ethic’ can be understood to pose a challenge to a key assumption of the mainstream disciplinary tradition of social ethics that the social mission of the church is to directly transform the social structures of American society.89 According to Hauerwas, the mission of the church is to be itself: “The church does not have a social ethic but is a social ethic, then,


insofar as it is a community that can be clearly distinguished from the world”. The primary purpose of the church is not to try to shape the wider society in which it is situated but, rather, to be the church: “The first task of the church is to exhibit in our common life the kind of community possible when trust, and not fear, rules our lives”.

What Hauerwas means by denying that the church has a social ethic seems to be rooted in his rejection of liberal theology's apologetic approach to interpreting the Bible. He holds that Christians should not approach Scripture as though it were a repository of universal principles or ideals that any reasonable modern person would accept and then seek to apply these principles and precepts within the Christian community, or to regulate the social structures of the wider society in terms of such principles. For Hauerwas, the theology of translation that informs an apologetic approach distracts Christians from their primary political task. He holds that the kind of vigorous moral discourse which sustains Christianity as a socially embodied argument is also necessary for creating theological resources to guard against the church passively accommodating to the nation-state or acquiescing to vicious patterns of social interaction: “unless the church and Christians are trained first to understand their community’s language, they will lack the resources to notice times when the language of the state is not their own”. In *Resident Aliens*, Hauerwas discusses the situation that the churches faced in Nazi Germany and suggests that the capitulation of German

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Christians before Nazism may have been due to the enervation of an understanding of the church as a political entity.\textsuperscript{93}

Hauerwas argues that an apologetic approach which seeks to make faith credible to the modern world may actually render Christianity incapable of providing a valuable service to the world in the form of resisting tyranny and taking a stand against oppressive social orders: “It was the theological liberals, those who had spent their theological careers translating the faith into terms that could be understood by modern people and used in the creation of modern civilisation, who were unable to say no [to Hitler]”.\textsuperscript{94} He observes that German theologian, Karl Barth “was horrified that his church lacked the theological resources to stand against Hitler” and that this led Barth to reject liberal theology.\textsuperscript{95} Hauerwas also sees the inadequacy of liberal theology in the failure of Christians to protest or speak out against certain actions carried out by the Allies during World War II such as the routine bombing by the English of German cities in 1942 following the bombing of London by the Germans. The dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was, on Hauerwas's account, “the sign of our moral incapacitation, an open admission that we had lost the will and the resources to resist vast evil”.\textsuperscript{96} For Hauerwas, the failure of the churches on both sides that fought in the war indicates the accommodation of Christians to the status quo in the world rather than to the gospel: “… in leaning over to speak to the modern world, we had fallen in.

\textsuperscript{93}Hauerwas and Willimon, \textit{Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony}, 24-29, 43-44.
\textsuperscript{94}Ibid., 25.
\textsuperscript{95}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{96}Ibid., 27.
was something worth resisting”. A key challenge for Hauerwas in an era after Auschwitz, Hiroshima and Nagasaki is how to ensure that Christianity does not again become ‘accommodationist’:

Nazi Germany was a devastating test for the church. Here the church was quite willing to “serve the world”. The capitulation of the church before Nazism, the theological incapacity of the church to see things clearly and to call them by their proper names, sends a chill down the spine of today’s church.

In order to guard against the churches again becoming so incapacitated that they are unable to see things clearly or to see that there are some things worth resisting, Hauerwas distinguishes between serving the world ‘on the world’s terms’ and serving the world on terms that draw from resources created by the ‘extended, socially embodied argument’ which constitutes the Christian tradition.

Some insight into Hauerwas’s conception of the church’s social task can be gained from a critique he offered in response to the influential 1980s American sociological study, Habits of the Heart. The authors of Habits argued that democracy and community in America are being eroded from within and that there is a predominance of an individualistic utilitarian attitude towards religion. Habits’ constructive proposal ascribed a central role to religion in their project for reviving democracy and restoring a sense of national purpose in America. While Hauerwas agrees with Habits’ diagnosis of

97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., 43.
the dangers of a therapeutic culture in which religion is valued only as a useful device for attaining individualistic satisfactions, however, Hauerwas also discerns hints of what he describes as “a functional account of religion” in Habits.\textsuperscript{99} According to Hauerwas, Habits’ proposal that biblical traditions could provide an alternative to the destructiveness of utilitarian individualism implies that “the church is good because it produces good results for the wider society (my emphasis)”.\textsuperscript{100} Hauerwas expresses concern that the study overlooks the danger that religion – and Christianity in particular – will be reduced to a socially useful tool for the nation-state. Also, Habits does not address the possibility that taking biblical traditions seriously may require Christian believers at times to dissent from the American body politic rather than to foster it.

A concern that seems to characterise Hauerwas’s critical response to Habits is that Christian believers might seek to produce tangible results that demonstrate the social relevance of their faith in the hope that it will cause people to turn to Christianity and also halt the decline of the churches’ membership. A danger, from Hauerwas’s perspective, is that believers may confuse their priorities and come to think that they worship God in order to be useful to society rather than for the sake of seeking “to be faithful to God irrespective of whether such faithfulness works out well for the American public ethos”.\textsuperscript{101} In Resident Aliens, Hauerwas observes: “the church does not exist to ask what needs doing to keep the world running smoothly and then to motivate our people to go do it. The church is not to be judged by how useful we are as ‘a

\textsuperscript{99}Hauerwas, ”A Christian Critique of Christian America,” 259.

\textsuperscript{100}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{101}Ibid.
supportive institution”. On Hauerwas’s account, this does not mean that he is advising religious believers to withdraw from the wider society but, rather, that he is recommending that Christians ought to cease allowing an extra-Christian definition of the world to set the terms for how religious believers participate in the world.

Hauerwas argues that if believers focus on the worship of God as its own end and not as a means to attaining individualistic or social results then they might acquire habits of thinking and acting that make them capable of finding something “distinctive to say as Christians about the challenges facing this society”. Hauerwas’s conception of Christianity as a way of life that is not socially utilitarian underpins his assertion that “the most important political service the church does for any society is to be a community capable of developing people of virtue”. He argues that Christians in America should not focus on sustaining the national culture or a so-called traditional morality. The church is not a prop or “service club” for sustaining “a generally Christian culture”. Instead, believers should concentrate on becoming the kind of persons capable of sustaining Christianity as a socially embodied tradition. Then they might acquire the critical skills necessary for articulating a distinctively Christian point of view about the nature of the challenges that face contemporary American society.

What Hauerwas means by his assertion that ‘the church is a social ethic’ and the related claim that ‘the church serves the world by being the church’ seems to be rooted in his eschewal of the liberal theological strategy of apologetics and his apparent preference for a cultural-linguistic approach to interpreting the Bible and a cultural-linguistic understanding of the task of theology. According to a cultural-linguistic model of religion, the relationship between religious ways of life and religious texts is such that religious believers come to ‘read’ or incorporate the world into their Scripture. Modern ‘experience’ is viewed as “in need of subordination-to and interpretation-in-light-of religious texts and traditions”.107 Consequently, the theological task “is not merely the interpretive matter of translating Jesus into modern categories but rather to translate the world to him”,108 It follows for Hauerwas that the biggest challenge facing Christian theology “is not translation but enactment”.109

Hauerwas reads liberal theologians as having understood themselves to be ‘witnessing’ to the gospel by distilling or extracting ‘historical kernels’ or moral lessons from Scripture in order to make Christianity appear credible to its ‘cultured despisers’. By contrast, Hauerwas argues that the “most credible form of witness ... is the actual creation of a living, breathing, visible community of faith”.110 By giving up a theology of translation and coming to understand Christianity as an alternative political community that shapes a particular kind of person, it becomes possible for believers to participate

107 Quirk: 82.
109 Ibid., 171.
110 Ibid., 47.
in creating theological resources that sustain ‘a historically extended, socially embodied argument’ and which can also enable members of the church to discern when they are accommodating to an unjust social order.

On Hauerwas’s account, a visible, distinctive community of faith witnesses by standing “in sharp contrast to the world”.\textsuperscript{111} He holds that the church serves the world by showing it something that it is not:

The only way for the world to know that it is being redeemed is for the church to point to the Redeemer by being a redeemed people. The way for the world to know that it is being redeemed, that it is broken and fallen, is for the church to enable the world to strike hard against something which is an alternative to what the world offers.\textsuperscript{112}

Hauerwas seems to mean that Christianity ought to seek to influence the world through ‘gestures’ rather than by trying to argue or persuade a person of the factual truth of Christian conviction on the basis of supposedly universal reason.\textsuperscript{113} From a cultural-linguistic perspective, it might be possible to convince someone about the value of Christianity by demonstrating it in the living of a particular kind of life. The ‘argument’ for Christianity then ceases to be a verbal one and becomes a kind of ‘enacted parable’, which is a form of display of Christian virtues. For Hauerwas and Lindbeck, mission

\textsuperscript{111} Hauerwas, “The Gesture of a Truthful Story,” 103.

\textsuperscript{112} Hauerwas and Willimon, \textit{Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony}, 94.

\textsuperscript{113} Hauerwas, “The Gesture of a Truthful Story,” 106.
requires the existence of the kind of people who are capable of living the ‘grammar’ of Christian thinking so skilfully that the truth of Christianity becomes clear in their living of it. Hauerwas’s conception of mission therefore emphasises ‘embodied’ witness rather than argument that appeals to principles that are supposedly acceptable to any reasonable person.

I will now examine several key objections that have been raised against Hauerwas’s view that the mission of the church is to simply be the church rather than to try to shape the society around it. This gives insight into how Hauerwas’s particular conception of witness is perceived to be controversial within Christian circles and has sparked intra-Christian debate about how Christianity ought to relate to the wider society in which it is situated in the twenty-first century. It also sheds light on how Hauerwas’s position is regarded by a perspective that supports a participatory version of democracy.

Criticism

A main criticism levelled against Hauerwas from ‘inside’ the Christian tradition is the charge of sectarianism. Another significant criticism raised by critics situated ‘outside’ Christianity is the concern that Hauerwas’s constructive position discourages Christian believers from engaging in democratic participation in the public realm. Several of the key sectarian-related concerns about Hauerwas’s position are dealt with in a seminal article entitled, ‘The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on Theology, the Church and the University’, by North American theologian and social ethicist, James Gustafson, who is a
former teacher of Hauerwas's. The term, ‘sectarianism’, describes a position that usually entails:

the impossibility of any rational dialogue with those outside the “sect”, on the grounds that their epistemically and morally central convictions are corrupt and diametrically opposed to those of “insiders”. Attempts at forging a consensus would, then, be not merely futile but dangerous, since arguing the point on “their” terms would only serve to undermine “ours”. Sectarians are then faced with the options of either proclaiming their confession to “the world” and having it fall upon deaf ears, or articulating only among themselves the truth to which they bear witness.

According to Gustafson, the particular juncture in which Christians in the West find themselves at the end of the twentieth-century is giving rise to “a sectarian temptation” that ought to be resisted. The inexorable fact of religious pluralism can create a sense that Christianity is “a beleaguered religion” and consequently “it is understandably tempting ... to seek a position, theologically and ethically, that at least enables Christians to assert, ‘Here I stand, I can do no other’”. Sectarianism in theology and ethics becomes a seductive temptation, on Gustafson’s account, because:

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114 Gustafson, "The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on Theology, the Church and the University."

115 Quirk: 81.

116 Gustafson, "The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on Theology, the Church and the University," 83.

117 Ibid., 84.
Religiously and theologically it provides Christians with a clear distinctiveness from others in beliefs; morally it provides distinctiveness in behaviour. It ensures a clear identity which frees persons from ambiguity and uncertainty, but it isolates Christians from taking seriously the wider world of science and culture and limits the participation of Christians in the ambiguities of moral and social life in the patterns of independence in the world.\footnote{118}

Gustafson identifies Hauerwas’s position with Lindbeck’s work on Christian doctrine, which Gustafson associates with thinkers that he refers to as “Wittgensteinian fideists”.\footnote{119} The latter sort of position holds that there are various language games, that the language of science and the language of religion are totally incommensurable and the “language of religion is therefore exempt from critical assessment from any scientific perspective; it is free from criticism from all perspectives other than its own”.\footnote{120} Such an approach holds that “to become religious is to learn a language, and to learn to use that language properly”, which is a view that Gustafson observes also informs Lindbeck’s conception of doctrine.\footnote{121} A cultural-linguistic view of theology holds that the task of doctrine is “to maintain a distinctive language or culture, and to socialise persons (perhaps in an almost behaviouristic psychological sense) into a particular form of life”.\footnote{122} Gustafson observes: “It is difficult to see how one can make

\footnotetext[118]{118}{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[119]{119}{Ibid., 85.}
\footnotetext[120]{120}{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[121]{121}{Ibid., 85, 86.}
\footnotetext[122]{122}{Ibid., 86.}
any critique of the tradition, internal or external”. The idea that Christianity is a cultural-linguistic community is a temptation that ought to be resisted, according to Gustafson, because “it legitimates a withdrawal of Christianity from its larger cultural environs at least to the extent that the truth or adequacy of Christianity is not subjected to critical scrutiny by other disciplines, other forces in the culture”. Here, Gustafson articulates a key sectarian-related concern which is that Hauerwas's conception of witness as a form of display of the truth of Christian conviction offers little or no means to criticise the performance of the Christian community or the behaviour of Christian believers.

Hauerwas’s assertion that ‘the church is a social ethic’ and that the church provides a ‘contrast model’ that “confronts the world with a political alternative the world would not otherwise know” can be interpreted to mean that in order to get to know Christianity a person need only look at the distinctive, visible Christian community. Yet this could be seen to be a very depressing suggestion as it may be that Christians do not look much different from non-Christians and may often even look much worse, which Hauerwas acknowledges. More importantly, however, it is possible for a Christian believer who is situated ‘inside’ the Christian community to ask if learning about Christianity involves something more than looking at the way different churches actually live. Martin Luther said, ‘Ecclesia semper reformanda est’: ‘the church is always 

123 Ibid.
124 Ibid., 93.
126 Hauerwas and Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony, 171.
to be reformed'. As Gustafson points out, this raises the problem of how a Christian community can gain a critical purchase on their practices, and on the way they are conducting the moral discourse which sustains a tradition, if the only way to know Christianity is by looking at the church. In *Resident Aliens*, Hauerwas quotes approvingly from ‘The Barmen Declaration’ – a document that the confessing church in Germany issued in 1934 in protest against Hitler’s accommodationist German church: “Jesus Christ, as he is attested for us in Holy Scripture, is the one Word of God which we have to hear and which we have to trust and obey in life and in death”.127 This extract appeals to the Word of God as that which exercises critical judgement on the church. However, it can seem at times from the emphasis that Hauerwas places on looking at the visible community of faith that little weight is being given to the role of the Word in critiquing, reforming and revealing to Christian believers how they *should* be, which might be quite different to how Christian believers are *already* being.

In an article responding to Gustafson’s critique, Hauerwas observes that “God’s kingdom is wider than the church”.128 However, Hauerwas has been charged with promoting a position that sees God at work only in the church.129 According to one critic, the influence of the cultural-linguistic model of religion on Hauerwas’s thinking need not lead him to rule out the possibility of entering into dialogue with ‘the world’. Yet, “Hauerwas gives every indication that such dialogue is fruitless, because of

127 Ibid., 44.


liberalism in particular and the coercive nature of secular politics in general”. It seems that the influence of MacIntyre’s diagnosis of modern culture as emotivist and his analysis of democratic politics as ‘civil war carried on by other means’ combines with a cultural-linguistic understanding of religion in a manner that leads Hauerwas towards a position of extreme scepticism about the possibility of dialogue between those ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ Christianity. But as another critic points out, “Surely it is possible to say both that theological language/community is distinctive and carries social implications, and that Christians can learn from and inform ‘secular’ society (original emphasis)”.

Again, a key issue is that of how the Christian community can receive external critique of its current practices, beliefs and discourse.

Another sectarian-related concern that Gustafson raises in response to Hauerwas’s position that ‘the main social task of the church is to be the church’ is that Hauerwas is perceived to provide little guidance for how Christians ought to carry out their roles outside the church. Christian believers work as judges, police-officers, politicians and teachers in state schools, which require them to make decisions in the public sphere: “Christians do (and ought to) participate in their professions, their political communities and other aspects of the social order. Their moral lives are not confined to some Christian community”. They have to decide how to participate in such roles: “either Christians are put into positions of intense inner conflict or they must withdraw

130 Quirk: 83.
132 Placher, “Preaching the Gospel in Academy and Society,” 17.
133 Gustafson, “The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on Theology, the Church and the University,” 91.
from participation in any structures which would presumably compromise their fidelity to Jesus”.\textsuperscript{134} This leads to another concern that Hauerwas’s conception of witness encourages Christians to leave the burden of responsibility for decision-making in professional and public life for non-Christians to shoulder.\textsuperscript{135} Finally, Gustafson argues that while a conception of Christianity as a cultural-linguistic community aims “to provide a critical religious vision of reality” it will end up becoming a defensive effort “to sustain the historical identity of the Christian tradition virtually for its own sake”.\textsuperscript{136} Christianity is then in danger of becoming a ‘tribe’ with a strong sense of identity that is chiefly concerned with sustaining a sense of its own difference from other ‘tribes’ rather than with challenging the social status quo. This would be perceived to be a perversion of the mission of church by many within Christianity who understood that the Christian community has been brought into existence for a primary aim of serving society at large and not simply for the sake of perpetuating itself.\textsuperscript{137}

From a position situated ‘outside’ the intra-Christian debate about Hauerwas’s alleged sectarian tendencies, North American scholar of religion and proponent of participatory democracy, Jeffrey Stout, argues that Hauerwas’s and MacIntyre’s separate critiques of modern culture and liberalism can be taken to imply that “modern democracy … is something that brings about the demise of tradition”.\textsuperscript{138} Both tend to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 90, 89.
\item \textsuperscript{137} Fowl: 15.
\item \textsuperscript{138} Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 119.
\end{itemize}
undermine identification with liberal democracy. According to Stout, Hauerwas not only agrees with MacIntyre's pessimistic analysis of democratic politics but "outbid[s] MacIntyre in a rhetoric of excess". Stout reads Hauerwas's MacIntyrean anti-liberal stance as leading him to regard the social practice of democratic questioning as a contagion of modernity that undermines the ability of the Christian community to sustain its tradition. According to Stout, "No theologian has done more to inflame Christian resentment of secular political culture". It seems Hauerwas's work can be interpreted to imply that living a virtuous life in the 'Christian colony' precludes commitment to participation in political debate in the public forums of a democracy.

Stout asserts that in the present era of global capitalism, corporate domination of civic life and theocratic terrorism it would be disastrous if religious persons were to interpret Hauerwas in a way that causes them to disengage from the political just when democratic participation is becoming most vitally important. The idea that the church offers a contrast model to its surroundings whereby the sinfulness of the world supposedly serves as a foil for the virtue of the Christian community strikes Stout as both dubious and prideful. Stout interprets Hauerwas as contributing to a lessening of concern about justice on the part of Christian believers: "Many of Hauerwas's readers probably liked being told that they should care more about being the church than about

139 Ibid.
140 Ibid., 118.
141 Ibid., 152.
142 Ibid., 140.
143 Ibid., 7.
144 Ibid., 84.
doing justice to the underclass”. In response to Stout’s critique, Hauerwas has suggested that it was not his intention to convince Christians in America to give up on democracy but, rather, to persuade them that being Christian is inherently political. Also, he stated that his aim has been to convince Christians not to disengage from democracy but to give up an idea that the mission of the church is to transform the wider society and to sustain traditional morality and a national culture. Perhaps partly in response to Stout’s challenge, Hauerwas collaborated in 2007 with a radical democrat thinker, North American Romand Coles, on a book which was entitled, Christianity, Democracy and the Radical Ordinary: Conversations Between a Radical Democrat and a Christian. This can be taken to indicate a new willingness on Hauerwas’s part to participate in conversations about how Christianity and democracy may become allies in defending against disengagement from the political in a global era.

The two main criticisms levelled against Hauerwas of, on the one hand, sectarianism and, on the other, disengagement from democracy seem to be integrally related to each other and, also, to what I see to be a key concern of Hauerwas to guard against Christian believers becoming accommodationist in their relation to wider society. It may be that Hauerwas’s animus against acquiescence on the part of Christians to the social status quo – which seems to me to be a very valuable concern – leads him to assert a position that is perceived by some to make him vulnerable to accusations of influencing

145 Ibid., 158.
146 Springs and others: 425, 427.
147 Ibid., 444.
Christian believers to disengage from the world, from democracy and from democratic participation in/with the world.

Might it be possible for Christian believers to learn what it means to be Christian by looking not just at the Christian community but also at the society in which the Christian community is always necessarily situated? Moreover, might there be a need for Christians not just to look at the wider society but to also listen to those ‘beyond’ the church and to ask them for critique? One critic of Hauerwas has observed that Hauerwas’s extreme scepticism about the possibility of dialogue may be due to his acceptance of MacIntyre’s claim that “modern politics itself expresses in its institutional forms a systematic rejection of [the] tradition [of the virtues]”. It seems possible to take on board MacIntyre’s criticism of the quality of moral debate in public forums without having to agree with his pessimistic view that modern politics and democracy can play no role in responding to the challenges that a globalised era is posing. Rather, one may seek ways to improve and revivify public deliberation in democracies. It seems to me that it would be possible to build on Hauerwas’s work without accepting MacIntyre’s reduction of democratic politics to ‘civil war carried on by other means’ in a way that develops the possibility that Christian believers could come to hear the Word of God through a form of dialogue that is open to learning from those ‘outside’ the Christian community.

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**Conclusion**

This chapter examined the claim of a postliberal theologian that the nation-state and prevailing conceptions of democracy suppress religion to the private sphere which undermines the religious ways of life of Christians and other historical world religions and cuts religious believers off from the theological resources they need to be able to stand against dominant power structures and oppressive social regimes. If religious groups and persons accept that Hauerwas's claim is true of all interpretations of democracy then this could influence the religious to 'opt out' of the kind of educative process that this thesis is arguing it would be valuable to introduce into non-religious and religious contexts of schooling. If non-religious persons do not acknowledge that Hauerwas's claim may be true of some interpretations of democracy then they may promote versions of democracy in state schools and public forums that silence the voice of the religious. This thesis is arguing that both kinds of response would be problematic because they prevent religious and non-religious learners from being initiated into a process that could shape the kind of educated person that can contribute to making a global age a bit less secularist and a bit more secular. Although conceptions of democracy as nation-state theory may be open to Hauerwas's charge, other versions of democracy may be more inclusive. The next chapter examines a particular interpretation of democracy as a personal way of life at the heart of which is an understanding of 'values' as an activity of valuation in order to investigate whether this conception of democracy and values is compatible with religious faith.
Chapter Six – Inquiry into democracy towards a secular global age

The purpose of this chapter is to examine a particular interpretation of democracy and a related understanding of values in order to address a main concern of the religious perspective examined in Chapter Five that democratic societies prevent religious persons from expressing their most cherished convictions in public. This serves the overall claim of the thesis that a globalised environment is creating a need for state and faith schools to educate non-religious and religious learners towards being democratic.

In order to make the case that non-religious persons and religious persons would benefit from being enabled to be a democratic kind of person, it is necessary to identify an interpretation of democracy that is not exclusionary of religious faith and which can therefore be understood to be compatible with religious faith as well as non-religious worldviews. This thesis argues that a conception of democracy as a personal way of life is inclusive of religious faith. Furthermore, this version of democracy can be understood to enhance the ability of religious persons to maintain the distinctiveness of their religious ways of life whilst at the same time participating in the wider global society in which religions are necessarily situated, and it can also strengthen the capacity of religious believers to defend against the reduction of religions to mere handmaidens in service to the interests of nation-states, which were two main concerns of the religious perspective examined in Chapter Five.
6.1 John Dewey

The work of North American philosopher and educator, John Dewey, has already been encountered in this thesis in the section on ‘democracy’ in Chapter One. There I touched on Dewey’s and Hannah Arendt’s separate proposals that a robust form of participatory democracy and citizenship is necessary to combat the general public’s perceived disengagement from the political in democratic societies. Both Dewey and Arendt were concerned that prevailing instrumental versions of democracy and citizenship promoted a conception of freedom as ‘freedom from politics’ that exacerbated modern indifference to political participation. Both thinkers argued that such widespread indifference to political affairs had contributed to the amenability of the populations of European nations between the two world wars to fascist dictators and totalitarian regimes. This thesis takes on board Dewey’s and Arendt’s shared concern about the public’s disengagement from the political and for that reason this chapter will not inquire further into the various instrumental versions of democracy reviewed in Chapter Three, such as neutralist liberalism, neo-liberalism, neo-conservatism, liberal cultural pluralism, diversity liberalism, comprehensive liberalism or civil society theory.

Both Arendt and Dewey sought to defend against the modern eclipse of public life by retrieving, in Arendt’s case, a non-instrumental classical civic republican account of democratic citizenship and by developing, in Dewey’s case, an experimentalist account of democracy as a form of social inquiry. However, whereas Arendt wrote very little on education, Dewey wrote extensively on education and on the relationship between
education and democracy. Given that this is a thesis about education, I am choosing to inquire in this chapter into Dewey’s conception of participatory democracy rather than into Arendt’s.

Dewey was against the notion that there is another supernatural realm beyond the natural. His understanding that we live in just the one realm that consists of the natural environment can be described as a ‘non-supernaturalist’ understanding of reality. Since Dewey did not believe in a supernatural realm or personal immortality, which are ideas that many religious persons and groups place varying levels of importance on, some religious persons might legitimately question whether a process of education that draws on Dewey’s work would be compatible with faith schools. Before I explore Dewey’s theory of evaluation, I therefore ought to consider whether Dewey’s position on personal immortality and supernaturalism renders his conception of democracy as a personal way of life incompatible with religious worldviews.

Dewey’s relinquishment of belief in personal immortality could be taken to mean that he is against religious faith because it can be argued that religious faith must involve some form of belief in an afterlife. Against this it can be pointed out that in the Old Testament there is little or no belief in an afterlife. For example, German-Jewish social psychologist, philosopher and democratic socialist, Erich Fromm, observes: “The Jews admitted the fact of death realistically and were able to reconcile themselves with the

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2 Rockefeller, 488.
idea of the destruction of individual life by the vision of a state of happiness and justice ultimately to be reached by mankind in this world”.3 Buddhism does not uphold belief in personal immortality or a notion of an afterlife. And first-century Jewish historian, Josephus, records that the group called the Sadducees who are mentioned several times in the New Testament as having been active during Jesus’s lifetime, denied the immortality of the soul and did not believe that there are rewards or penalties after death.4 The point I am making is that even though Dewey relinquished belief in personal immortality and in the existence of a supernatural realm, it does not necessarily follow that his work – including his theory of valuation, inquiry and democracy – is incompatible with religious faith.5

Dewey’s main criticism of belief in the soul’s existence after death in another supernatural realm is that it has “the morally and socially injurious consequence of putting preoccupations with another world in place of active interest in this one”.6 This


5 For an account that argues that in Dewey’s philosophy there “appears to be no room for God”, that Dewey’s “conclusions appear anti-religious”, and that he used religious language to promote an anti-religious agenda, see Eliyahu Rosenow, "The Teacher as Prophet of the True God: Dewey’s Religious Faith and Its Problems," Journal of Philosophy of Education 31, no. 3 (1997): 427, 430. For a response that argues that although Dewey did challenge some traditional religions that promote a dualistic, two realm division between the natural and the supernatural he was not anti-religious but held religious views that are significantly different to traditional religious views, see Webster, "Dewey’s Democracy as the Kingdom of God on Earth."

6 Rockefeller, 489.
suggests his animus may not be so much aimed at religious faith but against religious believers whose expectation of receiving rewards in heaven serves to rationalise a quietist withdrawal from the responsibility to respond to the needs and social evils encountered in this lifetime. According to Dewey, “Men have never fully used the powers they possess to advance the good in life, because they have waited upon some power external to themselves and to nature to do the work they are responsible for doing”. Fear of punishment or hope of rewards in heaven as inducements for good behaviour in this life also work against Dewey’s conception of inquiry, which requires attentiveness to the possibilities inherent in immediate lived experiences rather than the application of absolute values to concrete situations.

A major problem with un-nuanced accounts of an afterlife from a Deweyan perspective of democracy would be that such accounts can cover over the significance for the individual of the fact that one day she or he will certainly die. Facing up to the inevitability of death can bring an awareness of the narrowness and superficiality of our accustomed ‘common-sense’ way of interpreting and evaluating the world. For example, Fromm argues that “the awareness of death and suffering” can become “one of the strongest incentives for life, the basis for human solidarity, and an experience without which joy and enthusiasm lack intensity and depth”. It can offer opportunities for developing our own unique understanding of things rather than conforming to what ‘they say’ and to the social status quo.

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8 Fromm, 212.
Genuinely engaging with the finality of mortality is not necessarily incompatible with belief in an afterlife. But certain versions of belief in personal immortality and an afterlife can prevent some religious believers from thinking genuinely about their own unique existence and from facing up to their personal responsibility for all that they do. For example, Fromm observes: “Christianity has made death seem unreal and tried to comfort the unhappy individual by promises of a life after death”.9 If some forms of belief in life after death can make death seem unreal, then there may be a risk that the experiences a believer has in this life can become flattened and lacking in depth. However, non-religious persons could also become overly absorbed in everyday routine such that their thinking about death may be limited to idle speculation about how or when it might happen. My point is that commitment to a materialist worldview that rejects as a matter of principle the idea of an afterlife does not guarantee that an unbeliever is more likely than those who believe in an afterlife to genuinely engage with her or his own mortality.

With respect to Dewey’s critique of some traditional religions, I think it is possible to be critical of certain religious worldviews that posit an idea of God as a supernatural being who exists ‘up there’ or ‘out there’ in a supernatural realm beyond the natural realm, and seeks ‘a personal relationship’ with humans, without thereby necessarily ceasing to qualify as a religious person. For example, Christian believers like Paul Tillich and Dietrich Bonhoeffer are among those who have questioned a conventional approach to religion that “has made God a heavenly, completely perfect person who resides above

9 Ibid.
Bonhoeffer talked of the need to interpret God in a “non-religious sense” and asked: “How do we speak of God without religion ... How do we speak ... in secular fashion of God?” I think it is possible to read Dewey as a critic of conceptions of religion that were prevalent in his day, which he perceived to be inadequate because he found them to be authoritarian or absolutist.

Dewey can be understood to offer resources for religious persons in our own time who might be interested in developing ways of speaking ‘without religion’ about God with a view to overcoming some of the divisions that now stand in the way of cooperation between non-religious and religious persons of diverse faiths in our increasingly interconnected world. Even though Dewey rejected the notion of a supernatural realm and personal immortality, this does not mean that his work is incompatible with the religious worldviews of individuals who profess faith in a realm beyond the natural and in an afterlife. On the contrary, Dewey’s theory of valuation that drives his notion of inquiry, which is at the heart of his interpretation of democracy as a personal way of life, seeks to enable religious and non-religious persons to speak out openly to each other in public about their purposes. Therefore Dewey’s work can be argued to be highly valuable for both religious and non-religious contexts of schooling. I now turn to examine Dewey’s theory of valuation in light of the argument investigated in Chapter Two that the educated person is capable of exercising authentic choice as well as making rationally informed choices.

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10 Tillich quoted by Robinson, 39.

Theory of valuation

Some important overlaps can be identified between Dewey's and Martin Heidegger's thinking including, for example, their mutual dissatisfaction with traditional accounts of knowledge. While Heidegger recovered the Classical Greek concept of aletheia because he rejected the correspondence theory of truth in the traditional account of knowledge, Dewey preferred the idea of 'warranted assertions' to the notion of knowledge because he wanted to focus on the activity of inquiry itself rather than on 'knowledge' that is the outcome or conclusion of inquiry. Dewey argued that a "static, cold-storage ideal of knowledge is inimical to educative development. It not only lets occasions for thinking go unused, but it swamps thinking".12 By the same token, Heidegger was against what he termed 'answers': "The answer disposes of the question. By the answer, we rid ourselves of the question".13 For Heidegger, the possession of knowledge in the form of answers stifles thinking with the consequence that Dasein stops being authentic.

Heidegger's rejection of 'answers' and Dewey's of 'knowledge' centres on their mutual dissatisfaction with a kind of unthinking, unquestioning way of being that 'consumes' answers and knowledge. To recall the Perry scheme introduced in Chapter Two, a kind of person that both Dewey and Heidegger held to be problematic is one that has 'answers' and 'knowledge' with respect to certain subjects or areas of life and therefore lacks a critical openness to the existence of multiple perspectives that are different from her or his own. Such an inauthentic individuality can also be said to lack a sense of responsibility to offer a justification to others for her or his stance because such a

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person considers her/himself to already have ‘answers’ or ‘knowledge’, which precludes a perception of a need to offer a justification or engage in discussion and debate in order to invite criticism from differing points of view. I take it that these points of commonality between Heidegger and Dewey that I have identified are sufficient to warrant now drawing Dewey’s theory of valuation into a discussion about the educated person as an authentic type of individuality.

In formulating an empirical theory of moral valuation, Dewey sought a middle ground between what he identified as two unsatisfactory approaches to a theory of morals.\(^{14}\) On the one hand, the various forms of absolutism that some theologians and philosophical idealists supported out of “a desire to preserve the objective nature of value judgements”.\(^{15}\) Such approaches presuppose that it is not possible to transform a morally problematic situation without recourse to some external criteria of right or wrong that may take the form of transcendent and immutable values. On the other hand, the subjectivism of empiricists, including logical positivists who argue that beliefs about value are subjective in character and, consequently, do not make room for the question of whether something that is desired can also be judged to be desirable. Dewey also found inadequate the tenet of traditional ethical theory that the correct way to discover what is desirable depends on the capacity “to freely set aside customs in order to discern moral laws or rules derived from one or more foundational principle”.\(^{16}\) In response to the existing accounts of values as ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’, Dewey saw an

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\(^{14}\) Rockefeller, 408.

\(^{15}\) Ibid.

urgent need for the formulation of a theory that justifies belief in the objective character of moral value judgements.\textsuperscript{17}

Dewey’s most extended piece of writing on the subject of valuation was a monograph published in the second volume of the positivist, Otto Neurath’s, \textit{International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science}. This essay was therefore primarily addressed to positivist philosophers. Dewey particularly took aim in it at the emotive theory of values that A.J. Ayer and the Vienna Circle proposed some years earlier, which presupposed a radical separation of value (ought) language from factual (is) language. While emotivism connected values with concrete experiences involving desires and satisfactions, this theory “separated private feelings from interactive social contexts, and then ... identified all interests and desires with these internal and disconnected feelings”.\textsuperscript{18} Interests and desires appeared to the emotivists to be “mere eruptions of morally charged yet ultimately arbitrary and subjective felt preferences”.\textsuperscript{19} This system offered no real answer for how value statements have meaning. Hence to emotivists it was a moot question whether it was possible to distinguish between immediate goods and goods approved by critical reflection. Against the emotivists, Dewey asserted that a basic distinction between “what is desired and what is desirable” must be made by an empirical theory of objective moral value judgement.\textsuperscript{20} He argued that words like ‘good’, ‘right’ and ‘virtuous’ in statements of value could have more than a strictly emotivist use. His theory of valuation connected values – which he conceived of as ideational

\textsuperscript{17} Rockefeller, 408.

\textsuperscript{18} Fesmire, 789.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.

goals perceived in imagination – with concrete experiences involving desires and
satisfactions. However, Dewey did not identify, as emotivism did, interests and desires
with private, subjective felt preferences separated from interactive social contexts.
Against the emotivists, Dewey’s theory defended belief in the objective nature of value
judgements without seeking recourse, as absolutism did, to transcendent and
immutable criteria of right and wrong that supposedly derive from a realm or source
external to the problematic situation itself.

Dewey used the term ‘to value’ in two ways in order to distinguish between value as
that which is empirically desired and value as that which is desirable or worth desiring.
In the first place, we prize things and activities. Therefore Dewey designated that the
term ‘to value’ refers to attitudes of prizing, appreciating, liking, esteeming and
cherishing that arise as immediate, pre-reflective ‘valuings’ or direct enjoyments of
goods: “Valuing is the direct, spontaneous, and pre-cognitive operation where we
appreciate something by its immediate quality before it is subject to reflection (original
emphasis)”\(^{21}\). A question can arise of whether things that we prize ought to be so prized.
Dewey’s second meaning for the term ‘to value’ designated reflective acts of judgement
such as appraisal, approval, estimating, criticism, evaluating, assessing and valuation.
Such acts of judgement require intellectual inquiry into causes and effects: “once the
value of something is reflectively considered it is being considered in light of its
relations, that is, in its connections as a means or as a sign ... the reflective process of

\(^{21}\text{Gregory F Pappas, John Dewey’s Ethics: Democracy as Experience (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008), 104.}\)
arriving at this kind of judgement of value is called *valuation* (original emphasis)”.  

This distinction between valuing and valuation, non-cognitive desires and critical judgements about what ought to be desired, informs Dewey’s proposal that objective moral judgements are derivatives of criticised desires, goals or ends-in-view that have been tested in actions.

Valuation can be described as a process of appraisal leading to objective judgements about what can be considered to be worth desiring in which the hypothesis being tested is the question of whether immediate valuings and non-cognitive desires are real as opposed to apparent goods of a situation. The basic problem of valuation “is judging whether what is good in immediate experience has consequences for later experience that warrant accepting the immediate good as a true good”. For Dewey, the judgement that a course of action is the good of this particular situation must be conceived as a working hypothesis, which ought to be kept open to further testing in order to assess if the actual result accords with the goal and meets the demands of the situation. Valuation involves a kind of judgement concerned with estimating ideational goals that are not in existence and with bringing particular goals into existence by actualising them: “ideals are first perceived in imagination before being poetically called into existence”. Once actualised, what was formerly perceived in the imagination becomes observable as an outcome that can be critically appraised.

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22 Ibid., 104-105.

23 Rockefeller, 408.

24 Ibid., 407.

Valuing or the immediate, pre-cognitive enjoyment of goods can take the form of impulses towards or away from objects. Also, routine habit that is unmediated by reflection can be a species of valuing. Valuing in the form of impulse or routine habit is not valuation because mere impulse is not desire, which arises when an unexpected difficulty is encountered that, for example, disrupts a routine, habitual way of doing things. According to Dewey, “desires only arise when ‘there is something the matter’, when there is some ‘trouble’ in an existing situation.”

Although valuing is distinct from valuation they are phases of a continuing process in which the initial valuing experience functions as initial data that is regulative of subsequent reflection. Valuation emerges from valuing when desire arises in response to needs or conflicts presented by a problematic situation: “valuation takes place only when there is something the matter; when there is some trouble to be done away with, some need, lack or privation to be made good, some conflict of tendencies to be resolved by means of changing existing conditions.” Desire is therefore a key element in a problematic value situation – which can be described as an experience in need of reconstruction – and in the process of valuation.

For Dewey, desire is what distinguishes humans from other entities. The emphasis Dewey placed on the significance of need, desire and satisfaction in motivating human actions has been described as similar to the way classical Greek philosophers

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27 Pappas, 107.
approached moral problems. Dewey’s theory of valuation aims to enable individuals to transform problematic situations in a way that satisfies desires that arise in response to needful, doubtful situations. A course of action can be judged to be the ‘good’ of a particular situation if it addresses the need, lack or privation that gave the rise to the desire. Such an understanding of the ‘good’ of a situation presupposes Dewey’s wider project to replace the conception of ends-in-themselves with a continuum of ends-means. A common objection to Dewey’s position is that it focuses on means at the expense of identifying an ultimate end outside of practice towards which acts ought to aim. Dewey’s rejection of the idea of an ‘external’ criterion for evaluating practical action as means can appear ‘Humean’ in that it could be taken to reduce practical reason to an instrument for satisfying impulses. However, Dewey’s distinction between immediate valuing and critical valuation, and his notion of a kind of end that is neither immediately given by impulse nor external to practice but which emerges through situational reflection, indicates that he did not consider practical judgement to be a mere ‘slave of the passions’. Rather, Dewey assigned practical reason a task of ‘improving’ or reconstituting immediate impulse or valuing in terms of the perceived need, lack or privation in a particular, concrete situation.

Impulse is distinct from desire and yet desire starts with an impulse because the emergence of desire occurs when an impulse or pre-cognitive valuing is thwarted or blocked: “obstruction of the immediate execution of an impulse converts it into a

29 Rockefeller, 408.

desire". According to Dewey, the process of valuation occurs when there is an emergence of desire, which presupposes a transformation of impulse and habit:

... if and when desire and an end-in-view intervene between the occurrence of a vital impulse or a habitual tendency and the execution of an activity, then the impulse or tendency is to some degree modified and transformed ... the occurrence of a desire related to an end-in-view is a transformation of a prior impulse or routine habit. It is only in such cases that valuation occurs (original emphasis).

A desire is specific to a particular problematic situation and can be understood to be a 'want' for a course of action or end that will cause the desire to cease. Closely related to the notion of desire is the idea of 'interest', which "represents not just a desire but a set of interrelated desires". Dewey describes both desire and interest as "modes of action". Desires involve projections of practical 'ends' that Dewey terms 'ends-in-view', which are also a kind of 'purpose': "neither impulse nor desire is itself a purpose. A purpose is an end-view". A difference between impulsive activity and 'desirous' activity can be said to be that the latter is purposeful whereas the former lacks a


33 Ibid., 239.

34 Ibid., 238.

purposeful orientation: “vital impulses and acquired habits often operate without the intervention of an end-in-view or purpose”.\textsuperscript{36}

In contrast to impulse or immediate valuations, desire can generate a type of purpose or end that is ‘in view’ within a particular context. Although desire and corresponding ends-in-view are not separable, an end-in-view can be understood to be a distinct element in a problematic value situation. It is not an ultimate end that is external to the situation. Rather, the end-in-view is ‘situational’ in the sense that it is intrinsically related to the perceived lack or privation in a concrete, unique set of circumstances and it “is part of the resolution of any problematic value situation”.\textsuperscript{37} An end-in-view is an imagined goal, object, objective, hypothetical ideal or “idea for action” that has not been brought into existence.\textsuperscript{38} It is an imagined course of action which it is hoped will transform a problematic situation.

An important feature of an end-in-view is that its projection of a course of action anticipates and estimates possible outcomes that will follow acting upon it.\textsuperscript{39} Such goals of action give meaning to present activity by defining it in terms of imagined outcomes. Actualising a particular end-in-view then brings into existence a different kind of end that is distinguishable from ends-in-view, that is, ends as actual results of purposeful activity or consequences.\textsuperscript{40} One way to describe the relationship between these distinct

\textsuperscript{36} Dewey, "Theory of Valuation," 221.

\textsuperscript{37} McDonald, 99.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 112.

\textsuperscript{39} Dewey, \textit{Experience and Education}, 69.

\textsuperscript{40} McDonald, 93.
types of ends is that ends-in-view are “possibilities” since they do not exist yet but are under consideration as to whether they ought to be brought into existence. A consequence is an ‘actuality’ that follows from acting upon a possibility that a person has judged *ought* to be brought into existence.\(^{41}\)

Within a problematic value situation, an end-in-view functions as a means for bringing about activity to transform the situation. At the same time, it is also an end because in order to initiate activity to reconstruct the situation, an end-in-view or purpose must first be constituted or “formed in terms of these operative conditions”.\(^{42}\) In contrast to the older notion of an ultimate end or external criterion outside of practice, this kind of end is intrinsically related to means.\(^{43}\) After the process of valuation is ‘triggered’ by the conversion of valuing or impulse into a desire following the obstruction or disruption of a habit, the formation of ends-in-view or purposes constitute a significant phase of valuation:

The formation of purposes is ... a rather complex intellectual operation. It involves (1) observation of surrounding conditions; (2) knowledge of what has happened in similar situations in the past, a knowledge obtained partly by recollection and partly from the information, advice and warning of those who

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\(^{41}\) Garrison, 22.


\(^{43}\) McDonald, 112.
have had a wider experience; and (3) judgement which puts together what is observed and what is recalled to see what they signify.\textsuperscript{44}

The original desire and the immediate valuing from which the desire emerged offer the initial data out of which an end-in-view can be constituted by the operation of intelligence. Forming a purpose translates valuing and desire "into a plan and method of action based upon foresight of the consequences of acting under given observed conditions in a certain way".\textsuperscript{45} North American scholar of religion, Steven C. Rockefeller, observes, "Ideals that are framed apart from the study of the problems ... of concrete situations are dreams ... useless as instruments in directing practical affairs".\textsuperscript{46} A plan of action is a hypothesis or working end for further activity. Multiple guides for action can be constituted by intelligence in seeking to transform a problematic situation. While competing possibilities that anticipate different consequences are a product of the process of valuation, ends-in-view or possibilities can also themselves be described as 'valuations'.

Another phase of the process of valuation involves the appraisal or testing of valuations where competing ends-in-view are evaluated as better or worse guides for action.\textsuperscript{47} Evaluation is a critical activity that is distinct from valuation in the sense of the formation of purposes whilst at the same time being part of the continuous process of valuation. Valuation can therefore be understood to encompass valuing and evaluation.

\textsuperscript{44}Dewey, \textit{Experience and Education}, 69.

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{46}Rockefeller, 410.

\textsuperscript{47}McDonald, 113.
For Dewey, it is the task of moral wisdom to discriminate between valuations or ends-in-view and to judge which anticipated consequences of actions can contribute to human and social flourishing. As mentioned above, ends-in-view differ from ends in the sense of consequences. Ends-in-view are ideational “goals prior to their being brought about” whereas consequences are observable “objectives that have actually been brought about”. Consequences are another important element in the problematic value situation. Ends-in-view are related to consequences in that the worth or value of an end-in-view is grounded in the consequence that follows acting upon it. A role of the critical activity of evaluation is to test competing ends-in-view once they are formed in order to determine which course of action to pursue. This deliberation between possibilities issues in a choice to actualise one possibility.

After an end-in-view has been actualised it continues to be a working hypothesis that must be kept open for further review and testing in the light of actual consequences, foreseen and unforeseen. Evaluation of the outcome involves a comparison between the actual consequence and the foreseen consequence: “Observation of results obtained, of actual consequences in their agreement and difference from ends anticipated or held in view, thus provides the conditions by which desires and interests (and hence valuations) are matured and tested (original emphasis)”. If the outcome matches the

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48 Rockefeller, 409.

49 McDonald, 93.

50 Ibid., 115.

end-in-view and transforms the problematic situation in a way that satisfies the original desire then the end-in-view may be evaluated as good.\textsuperscript{52}

The process of valuation can be described as an “intelligent activity” in the sense that it affords reflective intelligence a crucial role in improving impulse and routine habit.\textsuperscript{53} Intelligence is an instrument for the formation of ends-in-view: “the formation of purposes and the organisation of means to execute them are the work of intelligence”.\textsuperscript{54} Intelligence also anticipates probable consequences of action and deliberates between possibilities prior to actualising an end-in-view.\textsuperscript{55} Dewey clearly identifies the connection between the process of valuation and intelligence: “there is present an intellectual factor – a factor of inquiry – whenever there is valuation”.\textsuperscript{56} He also describes the relationship between intelligence and desires as one in which intelligence gives a point or end to desire whereas desire provides the momentum for action: “The intellectual anticipation, the idea of consequences, must blend with desire and impulse to acquire moving force. It then gives direction to what otherwise is blind, while desire gives ideas impetus and momentum”.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{52} McDonald, 94.

\textsuperscript{53} Dewey, \textit{Experience and Education}, 69.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 68.

\textsuperscript{55} McDonald, 114.

\textsuperscript{56} Dewey, “Theory of Valuation,” 221.

\textsuperscript{57} Dewey, \textit{Experience and Education}, 69-70.
Dewey considered that any problematic value situation furnishes within itself materials for its own reconstruction. His theory of valuation offers individuals a way to approach the task of constituting regulative ideals in terms of the peculiarities of a particular concrete situation in order to move beyond or transform the initial disturbance. It seems to have been motivated in part by his understanding of why philosophy came about in human society and his related conception of how the task of philosophy ought to be conceived of in modern societies. According to Dewey, philosophy owes its origins to the fact that the problematic nature of existence in an ‘unfinished world’ caused humans to face emotional and social disturbances in their lives that they tried to address with a consequence that humans became philosophical: “philosophy originated not out of intellectual material, but out of social and emotional material”. In light of his account of philosophy’s origins in the efforts of humans to transform the problematic situations in which they found themselves, Dewey denounced what he saw as traditional philosophies’ tendency to separate knowledge and action, theory and practice. He argued that philosophy should help to forge connections between intellectual abilities and practical choices; his theory of valuation can be understood in light of this aspiration.

Dewey argued that “we live not in a settled and finished world, but in one which is going on”. This world “is not finished and ... has not consistently made up its mind

**Footnotes:**

58 Pappas, 112.


60 Rockefeller, 406.

Consequently, Dewey understood the nature of existence in such a world to be risky, precarious, hazardous and perilous. Dewey’s conception of the world, and the nature of existence in it, is intrinsically related to his conception of democracy as a personal way of life that is rooted in thinking or inquiry, which he understood to be a natural event that arises in response to the problematic situations that such a world occasions. Another factor informing Dewey’s theory of valuation may have been his understanding of the nature of human freedom in an uncertain existence. Dewey’s belief that “we live not in a settled and finished world, but in one which is going on” seems to be intrinsically linked to his conception of the freedom of human beings to shape the future. According to Dewey, “Contingency is a necessary although not, in a mathematical phrase, a sufficient condition of freedom”. Rockefeller describes Dewey’s conception of human freedom in an ‘unfinished’ world as follows: “Freedom, in his mind, means precisely the power to choose between alternative possibilities and to realise chosen objectives”. Because for Dewey the world is ‘unfinished’ and ‘open’ rather than ‘finished’ and ‘closed’, he contends that the outcomes of contingent situations can be influenced by the power of human choice.

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63 Rockefeller, 387.
64 Ibid.
67 Rockefeller, 386.
Dewey’s conception of human freedom as the ability to direct and regulate experience and to influence the outcome of contingent situations by the power of human choice may have informed his theory of valuation, which seeks to enable individuals to exercise this kind of judgement to choose between alternative possibilities and to realise chosen objectives. Dewey’s understanding of freedom seems consistent with a Heideggerian notion of authenticity, particularly, the idea that an authentic person is capable of exercising personal freedom to choose between disclosed possibilities. It seems a valuable contribution that Dewey’s theory of valuation can bring to the idea of the educated person centres on his notion of consequences. Specifically, the role of intelligence in projecting probable consequences of ends-in-view in order to anticipate how actualising different courses of action might contribute to the good of the individual and the good of a democratic society.

The role of intelligence in constructing ends-in-view, anticipating probable consequences of actualising possibilities and in evaluating purposes in light of actual outcomes to determine whether an end-in-view is ‘workable’ involve a process that Dewey described as ‘inquiry’. According to Rockefeller, “Dewey’s instrumentalist theory of inquiry and knowledge provides the foundation of his theory of valuation”.68 In order to further explore the notion of the educated person as someone who is capable of engaging in valuation of purposes in public forums it seems valuable to now examine Dewey’s notion of inquiry leading to warranted assertions.

68 Ibid., 407.
Inquiry

Dewey’s belief that our lives should be guided by inquiry seems to follow from his understanding of human freedom in an ‘unfinished’ world that is risky and problematic. A Deweyan approach of inquiry emphasises the importance of attentiveness to immediate lived experiences – including, for example, the impulses, routine habits and needs of learners in each concrete and unique classroom situation. Dewey gives a different account of knowledge from traditional epistemology where knowledge is understood to be the correct representation of the reality ‘behind’ the realm of appearances and he challenges the two-realm division between the thinking mind and actual reality. For Dewey, thinking arises in the context of problems, the experience of doubt or uncertainty in the immediate situation in which one finds oneself in everyday life. Conflicts and tensions that arise within our pre-reflective experiences yield practical problems, which evoke thinking or inquiry into those problems in order to clarify and address them.69

Since for Dewey we live in a world that is not static but constantly changing, he considers there to be no objective values or eternal truths that we can fall back upon to apply to practical activities. Consequently, there is a need for inquiry that explores possibilities in each concrete situation in order to exercise thought to determine just what the good is. A Deweyan approach of experimental inquiry would be against a Platonic belief in the existence of absolute standards that have a reality independent of human action. Deweyan inquiry might be described as relativistic in the sense that the

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supreme value in a particular concrete situation is understood to vary “according to individual need and capacity and the situation”.\textsuperscript{70} According to Rockefeller, “[Dewey] is not a relativist, if by that is meant one who believes that moral values are merely a matter of subjective liking”.\textsuperscript{71}

Inquiry or social inquiry can lead to a process of knowing which for Dewey is an enterprise rooted in problems faced by people in particular contexts. Dewey replaces the traditional idea of knowledge as that which accurately describes the reality behind appearances with the notion of warranted assertion. This is arrived at through inquiry that demonstrates the connection between anticipated consequences or ends-in-view and actual consequences of an activity: “the consequences of action must be carefully and discriminately observed. Activity that is not checked by observation of what follows from it may be temporarily enjoyed. But intellectually it leads nowhere”.\textsuperscript{72} If the original problem that catalysed a particular process of inquiry is overcome then the end-in-view or purpose that guided the activity towards re-establishing a harmonious situation acquires the status of a warranted assertion, which should be kept open to further review and examination.

Dewey thinks our lives should be guided by a type of inquiry that searches for clarification of conflicts and tensions that arise in a temporal existence, which is unstable and uncertain. Inquiry that engages others in a process of experimenting with

\textsuperscript{70} Rockefeller, 418.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 410.

\textsuperscript{72} Dewey, \textit{Experience and Education}, 87.
addressing problems creates moral resources that inquirers can draw upon in order to make experience more meaningful. Consequently, the type of person that learners can become through a Deweyan approach of inquiry would not be a spectator who passively observes at a distance but an engaged participant in the process of valuation which involves inquiry. An inquirer recognises the need to identify problems for her/himself and to anticipate consequences or outcomes with a view to directing present activity towards the goal of resolving the problematic situation which evokes inquiry. Consequently, in contrast to a spectator, an inquirer can exercise personal responsibility for directing her or his activity by thought.

This section has thus far given a brief account of Dewey’s eschewal of the traditional notion of knowledge in favour of the idea of warranted assertions arrived at through a process of inquiry into the connection between ends-in-view and actual consequences. It seems valuable to now clarify the relationship between the idea of inquiry leading to warranted assertion and the notion of the educated person as an authentic type of individuality that is capable of engaging in valuation of purposes in public forums. This also necessitates a discussion of how Dewey’s application of the ‘scientific method’ to moral judgements in the theory of valuation might inform the idea of the educated person. I mentioned at the end of the previous section that a valuable contribution that Dewey’s theory of valuation can bring to the idea of the educated person as an authentic type of individuality centres on his notion of consequences. Dewey indicates the interdependence of valuation, intelligence and inquiry in the following observation: “there is present an intellectual factor – a factor of inquiry – whenever there is
valuation”. Consequently, the notion of intelligence must be central to the idea of the educated person since it is the role of intelligence to undertake inquiry into the particular circumstances that give rise to what is perceived as a problematic or doubtful situation. Such inquiry furnishes material for constructing ends-in-view which necessarily entails projecting probable consequences.

It seems that while ‘valuation’ describes an overall process, ‘inquiry’ refers to a particular aspect of the larger process, namely, reflection on consequences – both anticipated and actual – and ‘intelligence’ is the intellectual faculty that is exercised during inquiry into consequences. ‘Warranted assertion’ belongs to a later stage of the overall process of valuation and seems to be connected to inquiry insofar as a warranted assertion results from reflection on or evaluation of the actual consequences that ensue from actualising a particular end-in-view. For example, an actualised end-in-view is judged to be a warranted assertion if the original doubtful situation that triggered inquiry is held to have been sufficiently clarified. A Deweyan authentic type of individuality, then, can be described as being capable of exercising intelligence as part of a process of inquiry into consequences that constructs ends-in-view. Between an initial phase of valuation involving the construction of ends-in-view and projection of consequences and the later phase of reflection on actual consequences, an ‘interim’ phase of valuation entails a process of deliberation issuing in a choice between competing ends-in-views to actualise a particular end-in-view in preference to others. Another distinguishing feature of a Deweyan authentic type of individuality pertains to

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how such a person approaches the task of choosing which possible course of action to bring into existence.

Dewey proposed that a scientific model ought to inform the way individuals deliberate between ends-in-view because he believed that while science had developed modern methods, thinking about ethics is still pre-modern. Ever since the Ancient Greeks, according to Dewey, ethical theory “has been singularly hypnotized by the notion that its business is to discover some final end or good or some ultimate and supreme law”.  

Plato and Aristotle responded to a social crisis of a breakdown of customs by formulating ethical theories that in Dewey’s view substituted for traditional morality – which was thought to be fixed – a view of a fixed and eternal good or idea of justice. Before the advent of the modern scientific view of the world, moral philosophy and associated plans of conduct took for granted an image of the universe as a fixed world with correspondingly fixed ultimate ends or laws. But the world of modern science is “an open world, a world varying indefinitely without the possibility of assignable limit in its internal make-up”, and Dewey argues that ethics ought to reflect this image of an open world. This causes Dewey to make the bold proposal that the modern world ought to give up the idea of a fixed and eternal end and “advance to a belief in a plurality of changing, moving, individualised goods and ends”. Also, instead of the idea of a fixed law, “a belief that principles, criteria, laws are intellectual

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74 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 92.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 31.
77 Ibid., 93.
instruments for analysing individual or unique situations” ought to be adopted.\textsuperscript{78} Dewey argued in his monograph, \textit{Theory of Valuation}:

If the notion of some objects as ends-in-themselves were abandoned, not merely in words but in all practical implications, human beings would for the first time in history be in a position to frame ends-in-view and form desires on the basis of empirically grounded propositions of the temporal relations of events to one another.\textsuperscript{79}

Dewey’s theory of valuation can be understood to replace the idea of a fixed law with the idea of ends-in-view or values or ideals which are instruments for addressing a problematic situation. In place of the idea of a fixed \textit{telos}, the ‘good’ of a situation is an actualised end-in-view that addresses the original problem and has therefore been judged retrospectively to count as a warranted assertion, but which remains always open for further review and revision.

Dewey argued that the methods of inquiry employed by scientists ought to serve as a model for philosophy and ethical deliberation:

Knowing for the experimental sciences, means a certain kind of intelligently conducted doing; it ceases to be contemplative and becomes in a true sense, practical. Now this implies that philosophy, unless it is to undergo a complete

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{79} Dewey, "Theory of Valuation," 229.
break with the authorised spirit of science, must also alter its nature. It must assume a practical nature; it must become operative and experimental.  

The practitioner of valuation can then be likened to a scientific experimenter and the process of valuation can be understood to be analogous to experimentation guided by hypothesis. A scientist is part of a scientific community in which the results of experiments are made public along with the inquiry that produced the results so that other scientists can repeat them. Dewey observes: “An inquirer in a given special field appeals to the experiences of the community of his fellow workers for confirmation and correction of his results”. By the same token, a Deweyan authentic type of individuality is part of a ‘scientific’ community in which the process of deliberation between which course of action to pursue is based on a scientific model of giving an account of ends-in-view along with the inquiry that led to their formation and asking others to do the same inquiry in order to test the ends-in-view. A valuable contribution that Dewey’s idea of scientific inquiry can bring to the idea of the educated person is that a Deweyan authentic type of individuality is capable of exercising choice to actualise an end-in-view or value that is informed by experimentation and evaluation of projected consequences in a community of practitioners of valuation.

What it means to be an educated person according to a scientific experimental model is to begin with “situations having value-quality” rather than with a conception of value

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81 Ibid.

as something independent.\textsuperscript{83} Dewey observed, “[s]peaking literally, there are no such things as values” (original emphasis).\textsuperscript{84} Whereas in most modern thought, according to Dewey, ‘values’ are held to be “an arbitrary creation of private mental operations guided by personal desire”, Dewey understood them to be “projections of possible consequences; they are ends-in-view”.\textsuperscript{85} Reification of values into an independent entity can be understood to be a feature of both an approach that assumes morality comes from a source outside human nature and an approach that assumes morality is something internal that originates in human beings and not in problematic situations.\textsuperscript{86} Neither approach regards a value as an instrument that intelligence constructs for transforming a doubtful situation. For Dewey, a reified understanding of values as entities or objects can lead to a passive acceptance of traditional moral values and a mistaken belief that such received ideals ought to be applied in the present because they are traditional. This overlooks their original provenance as instruments for transforming a set of past circumstances that necessarily differ from the particularities of the present concrete situation.


\textsuperscript{85} Quoted by Garrison, 22.

\textsuperscript{86} Pappas, 82.
The reification of ends-in-view into values as entities cut off from lived experience seems to be part of what Dewey perceived to be a broader “reification of morality into something that is separate from ordinary experience”. Both a view of morality as objective because it is supposed that immutable criteria of right and wrong can be sourced from another realm and a view of morality as subjective due to being based on arbitrary preferences place morality out of the reach of intelligence: “it diverts intelligence from the concrete situations where moral demands are encountered”. A reified conception of values as entities distracts intelligence from undertaking inquiry to transform the doubtful concrete situations that arise when routine habit or customary morality is disrupted. Failure to exercise intelligence produces a kind of person that evades personal responsibility for reshaping customary habits and traditional morality.

The diversion of intelligence from the task of inquiry leads to a split between the intellectual and the emotional in human relations and activities, which according to Dewey produces a strain so intolerable “that human beings are willing to pay almost any price for the semblance of even its temporary annihilation”. Dewey suggested that the anxiety caused by the split between “ideas that have scientific warrant and uncontrolled emotions that dominate practice (original emphasis)” was likely to have been a contributing factor to the conditions that made the populations of European

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87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
nations vulnerable between the two world wars to “the rise of dictatorships”.\textsuperscript{91} It seems possible that the apparently voracious appetite that exists in the Western world for mass entertainment, mass technologies and consumer goods might also stem in part from the lack of integration between “emotions and ideas, desires and appraisals” that results from the blockage of intelligent inquiry.\textsuperscript{92} For Dewey the challenge, then, was to establish cultural conditions that support activity in which emotion and ideas could be integrated. His promotion of a scientific model for testing values or ideals in light of anticipated and actual consequences derived from a belief that the practice of valuation could produce a kind of person in whom “head and heart work together”.\textsuperscript{93}

A scientific model of valuation is at the heart of Dewey’s conception of democratic participation. He observed, “[t]he experimental method is the only one compatible with the democratic way of life, as we understand it”.\textsuperscript{94} Therefore a Deweyan authentic type of individuality that is capable of valuation can be described as a democratic kind of person. I will now explore Dewey’s understanding of democracy.

\textit{Democracy}

Dewey’s notion of democracy as “a name for a life of free and enriching communion” differs significantly from popular understandings of democracy, which usually conceive

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 65.
\end{itemize}
democratic societies as those that enjoy a certain form of government. The idea of democracy for Dewey involves far more than a theory of political organization. Dewey emphasised the importance of democratic individuals because he felt that free elections and free markets are not sufficient but that only individual persons who are “democratic in thought and action” can ensure that a society is democratic. Dewey rejects the older theory of the democratic state that “each individual is of himself equipped with the intelligence needed, under the operation of self-interest, to engage in political affairs”. In other words, human beings are not by nature democratic. To understand a Deweyan idea of democracy it is helpful to consider the connected ideas of community and communication in relation to his experimental method of inquiry.

For Dewey, the dispositions and attitudes of a democratic person whereby an individual can be said to think and act democratically can only take shape in a democratic personal way of life, which, in turn, can only be fostered within the context of community. Being a member of a community is not a given: “We are born organic beings associated with others, but we are not born members of a community”. Rather, community can only come into being under certain conditions. Not all forms of joint or associated activity create communal life: “no amount of aggregated collective action of itself constitutes community”. Only communicative practices give rise to community in which democratic qualities can grow. An activity is communicative if it generates a

96 Rockefeller, 440.
98 Ibid., 154.
99 Ibid., 151.
“social consciousness”.\footnote{Ibid., 153.} This occurs when a perception of the consequences of combined action gives rise to a shared desire to sustain that activity in order to achieve those ends: “But ‘we’ and ‘our’ exist only when the consequences of combined action are perceived and become an object of desire and effort”.\footnote{Ibid., 151.}

Communication or communicative practice seems to be linked to the notion of inquiry via Dewey’s emphasis on the importance of reasoning about consequences. Dewey argues that a democratic personal way of life of “free and enriching communion” will “have its consummation when free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication”.\footnote{Ibid., 184.} This suggests that communication and inquiry are separate but mutually reinforcing and that both are integral to democracy. Dewey observes: “Communication of the results of social inquiry is the same thing as the formation of public opinion”.\footnote{Ibid., 177.} From this it seems that outcomes of inquiry ought to provide the material upon which members of a community deliberate.

Perhaps this means that warranted assertions arrived at through diverse inquiries into problematic situations ought to be communicated widely throughout society at large? General awareness of the various consequences that arise from combined activities can foster a shared commitment or common interest in sustaining the various
enterprises in order to achieve their multifarious ends. Only under these conditions can “an organised and articulate Public” come into being.\textsuperscript{104}

The formation of “a democratically organised public” is essential to the emergence of what Dewey terms “a Great Community” as distinct from “the Great Society”.\textsuperscript{105} According to Dewey, the process whereby tools were developed into machines during the industrial revolution inaugurated new commerce and technology, which created new social conditions that produced the Great Society: “the machine age in developing the Great Society has invaded and partially disintegrated the small communities of former times without generating a Great Community”.\textsuperscript{106} Moving from the Great Society to a Great Community depends on communication: “Till the Great Society is converted into a Great Community, the Public will remain in eclipse. Communication can alone create a great community. Our Babel is not one of tongues but of the signs and symbols without which shared experience is impossible”.\textsuperscript{107}

\textbf{‘Eclipse’ of the public}

Some of the powerful forces and distractions of modern life which undermine people’s interest in political affairs and contribute to the ‘eclipse’ of the public, according to Dewey, include the decline of leisure which used to be the basis for taking an active part in politics.\textsuperscript{108} For example, in England, prior to 1910, Members of Parliament were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 184.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 126.
\item \textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 142.
\item \textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 138.
\end{itemize}
unpaid, which meant that only gentlemen with income from their lands and estates had
time at their disposal to sit in Parliament. By contrast, today anyone, in theory,
irrespective of class background can pursue a career in politics and earn a salary.
However, this can give rise to a feeling that it is the 'job' of politicians to set the terms of
political debate and that the role of the electorate is a merely reactive one of registering
approval or disapproval of government policies in polls and elections. The orientation in
the West in Dewey’s and our own time towards the workplace arises from the necessity
for most to make a living, which usually tends to draw people’s attention away from
political concerns.

Another obstacle to communication of the results of inquiry are the new forms of
mass entertainment that people normally prefer to pursue or talk about when they are
not working. To Dewey’s list of technologies that divert attention from political life, “the
movie, radio, cheap reading matter and motor car,” we can now add the television, ipod,
internet, facebook, ‘self-help’ industry and cheap domestic and international air-
travel.109 North American media theorist and educator, Neil Postman, seems to make a
similar argument in Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show
Business about the way that contemporary technologies of mass media communication
transform complex and serious issues into forms of entertainment, which can lead to
the public’s disengagement from the political.110

109 Ibid., 139.

110 Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business (New York:
In the preface to his book, Postman distinguishes between George Orwell’s and Aldous Huxley’s dystopian visions of the future:

Contrary to common belief even among the educated, Huxley and Orwell did not prophesy the same thing. Orwell warns that we will be overcome by externally imposed oppression. But in Huxley’s vision, no Big Brother is required to deprive people of their autonomy, maturity and history. As he saw it, people will come to love their oppression, to adore the technologies that undo their capacities to think.\textsuperscript{111}

According to Postman, Americans should be wary of interpreting the apparent non-fulfillment of Orwell’s prophecy in \textit{Nineteen Eighty-Four} as a sign that liberal democracy is in good health. Although the American public may not be oppressed by state control, as Orwell anticipated, nonetheless on Postman’s account the public is oppressed in the sense that it is narcotised as a consequence of its addiction to amusement, which is a kind of tyranny that Huxley foretold in \textit{Brave New World}. Postman’s and Dewey’s objections to new forms of entertainment promoted by technology might come across to some as a Luddite dislike of technology or a Puritanical aversion to people enjoying themselves.

Yet Dewey’s concern is that the dual preoccupations of work and amusement crowd out altogether an awareness of political affairs: “In most circles it is hard work to sustain conversation on a political theme ... Let there be introduced the topic of the

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., vii.
mechanism and accomplishment of various makes of motor cars or the respective merits of actresses, and the dialogue goes on at a lively pace.” A key danger for Postman is that the public’s understanding of political affairs is being distorted by the way the media present serious ideas and issues in a disjointed fashion and in too rapid a succession. Readers or viewers are given little time to make sense of the individual events, which invites the public to become passive consumers of the images and easily digested sound bites that the media are continually bringing to our attention. This can work against a willingness on the part of members of the public to think deeply about the significance of the reported events or their long-term bearing on society as a whole.

Postman observes that television news has introduced a new phrase, ‘Now … this’:

... in television’s presentation of the “news of the day,” we may see the “Now … this” mode of discourse in its boldest and most embarrassing form. For there, we are presented not only with fragmented news but news without context, without consequences, without value, and therefore without essential seriousness; that is to say, news as pure entertainment.113

‘Now … this’ purports to connect the separate topics being reported but in practice this phrase signals a complete absence of connections between the disparate subjects:


113 Postman, 100.
We have become so accustomed to [television news’] discontinuities that we are no longer struck dumb, as any sane person would be, by a newscaster who having just reported that a nuclear war is inevitable goes on to say that he will be right back, after this word from Burger King; who says, in others words, “Now ... this.” One can hardly overestimate the damage that such juxtapositions do to our sense of the world as a serious place.\textsuperscript{114}

On Postman’s account, the public is being seduced by media constructions of political affairs and events into becoming passive spectators who are more amused or entertained by politics as spectacle or “vaudeville act” than they are willing or able to assume personal responsibility to participate in serious public conversation.\textsuperscript{115}

According to Dewey and Postman, people ought to be capable of discussing and engaging with serious issues of political concern as well as talking about work and leisure activities.

The constant movement of people from place to place in response to changing job opportunities, which is driven by the dynamism of the economy, also works against the formation of a democratic public: “the newer forces [of a technological age] have created mobile and fluctuating associational forms ... Nothing stays long put, not even the associations by which business and industry are carried on ... How can a public be organised, we may ask, when literally it does not stay in place?”\textsuperscript{116} In Dewey’s time, this

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 104-5.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 155-156.

\textsuperscript{116} Dewey, \textit{The Public and Its Problems}, 140.
mobility could be seen in the movement from rural areas in search of jobs in urban centres. Today, the emphasis on short-term contracts in an era of the ‘flexible corporation’ often obliges people to change occupation and to relocate across the country or the globe at regular intervals for work.

Dewey observes: “the Great Society created by steam and electricity may be a society, but it is no community”. By the same token, in our own time the international ‘information economy’ and job market may be creating a global society but it is not a global community, which would necessarily need to be inclusive of non-religious persons, religious believers and the nonhuman world of nature. It seems that individuals born in our time are inescapably participants in a global society but we are not born members of a global community and we are not by nature democratic. Yet the challenges we now face are global and require democratic global solutions.

If we are now living through a time in which a global society is emerging, there may be a need to develop the capacities for conducting international collaborative inquiry that can identify and experiment with finding solutions for the problematic global situations now facing us and those which will arise in the future. Such inquiry is only possible if there are individuals who are capable of engaging with significantly different others to think and act globally and in a democratic manner. It seems likely that the possibility of peaceable rather than antagonistic relations between persons who disagree fundamentally and the future of life on our planet depend on the existence of a type of democratic individuality. Yet, as Dewey and Postman point out, the demands of

117 Ibid., 98.
the workplace, technologies of mass entertainment and the mobility of global workers prevent the formation of a global democratic public that could convert the global society into a global community and foster a kind of democratic person that is capable of such inquiry.

If Dewey and Postman are right in their characterisation of contemporary culture as rife with distractions that undermine participation in serious public conversation, how might it be possible to take action to change this? In the West we have a system of compulsory mass schooling which is perhaps now the only vehicle in modern society that can offer similar experiences to individuals over a lengthy period of time through a compulsory curriculum. I am arguing that in addition to enabling learners to participate in an economically competitive global job market, we might do well to also use the resources offered by mass education to achieve the aim of bringing about a democratic kind of person for a democratic global public. Part of the importance of schooling might then include that it can offer a window of opportunity before the graduates of such systems enter the adult world, to educate a kind of democratic person who demonstrates a willingness and capacity to engage in the political.

If it is accepted that we are living through a time in which a global society is emerging, what sort of relation can be said to exist between, on the one hand, inquiry that seeks democratic global solutions for global problematic situations and, on the other hand, a process of valuation of purposes in public forums? I think both can be described as components of ‘free and open communication’, which Dewey identifies as
“the heart and strength of the democratic way of living”. Valuation of purposes that requires participants to give an account of how anticipated consequences of ends-in-view can contribute to the good of the individual and the good of the global society can be seen to be necessary for inquiry into global problems, which would mean that these two components could not be understood independently of one another.

Initiation into valuation of purposes in public forums can be understood to be a condition for freedom of expression of beliefs, discussion of the good life and free intellectual inquiry in which participants seek critical leverage on their warrants for action. It is hoped that the open expression of difference in which all voices are heard in public debate will provide a venue in which alternative points of view can participate in a free exchange of considered opinions and in a mutual testing of viewpoints. Dewey observes, “Without freedom of expression, not even methods of social inquiry can be developed”. It may be that initiation into valuation and inquiry into democratic global solutions for global problems together constitute a process that could educate a democratic person who is capable of bringing about a global democratic public. This could work towards converting the global society into a global community. If the capacity to engage in valuation of purposes in public forums can be argued to be necessary for becoming democratic in thought and action, and for becoming a kind of democratic person who can think and act globally, then it might make sense to assert that a willingness and ability to engage in valuation constitutes an important part of

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118 Rockefeller, 239.

what it means to be an educated person at the beginning of the twenty-first-century in an increasingly interconnected world.

Given the one hazardous and problematic realm of nature in which we live and the absence of absolute values that can direct our thinking and conduct, an education for a democratic personal way of life would be animated by the belief that our lives should be guided by inquiry. Such inquiry would engage diverse perspectives in a process of identifying problematic situations that are now necessarily global in reach, and in experimenting with solutions in order to re-establish a harmonious state of global affairs. In such an approach, the onus may fall upon each person to recognise that tensions or complexities within doubtful or problematic situations can provide an occasion for the construction of purposes and social inquiry that explores consequences for society of actualising different ends-in-view. On Dewey’s account, we begin to think when we perceive there is some difficulty to be overcome, a problem to be solved, or questions to be answered and we feel the need of transformation. Dewey observes: “problems are the stimulus for thinking ... growth depends upon the presence of difficulty to be overcome by the exercise of intelligence”. However, from such a standpoint of education for democracy, what normally passes for thinking in schools is not the sort of active thinking that occurs when tensions or difficulties in learners’ immediate lived experience of particular classroom situations are identified and made the subject of inquiry.

120 Dewey, *Experience and Education*, 79.
An emphasis that certain approaches to curriculum and teaching place on knowledge acquisition tends usually to foster passive consumption on the part of learners of what is regarded as the ‘correct’ knowledge or information. Here teaching will be identified with conveying of facts and learning with memorising data. Learners accumulate vast quantities of ‘correct’ answers to questions that have been pre-specified by those outside of the immediate learning situation. Such approaches to teaching and learning reward learners for their ability to recall and apply the conclusions of other people’s inquiries and leave out of count learners’ own questions and concerns. It seems relevant here to mention Erich Fromm’s discussion of the different quality that learning and knowing can have for persons in To Have or To Be, a work in which Fromm distinguishes between two fundamental modes of human experience or orientation towards the self and the world.\(^\text{121}\)

Briefly, Fromm describes the relationship a person who is in the ‘having mode of existence’ has to the world and to himself as “one of possessing and owning, one in which I want to make everybody and everything, including myself my property”.\(^\text{122}\) A person in the ‘being mode’ of existence “neither has anything nor craves to have something, but is joyous, employs one’s faculties productively, is oned to the world (original emphasis)”.\(^\text{123}\) The quality of learning and knowing that a person experiences, on Fromm’s account, varies depending on which mode of relatedness to the world an individual is in. In the having mode, which Fromm argues prevails under (post)

\(^{121}\) Erich Fromm, To Have or To Be? (New York, London: Continuum, 2003).

\(^{122}\) Ibid., 24.

\(^{123}\) Ibid., 18-19.
industrial capitalism, students “will listen to a lecture ... write down every word in their looseleaf notebooks – so that later on, they can memorise their notes and thus pass an examination ... each student has become the owner of a collection of statements made by somebody else”.\textsuperscript{124} By contrast, for students in the being mode the process of learning has an entirely different quality: “Instead of being passive receptacles of words and ideas, they listen, they \textit{hear}, and most important, they \textit{receive} and \textit{respond} in an active, productive way ... They do not simply acquire knowledge that they can take home and memorise (original emphasis)”.\textsuperscript{125} Learning in the being mode becomes a process of actively receiving, responding and questioning as opposed to memorising, acquiring, accumulating, possessing, consuming and storing knowledge or information.

The quality of knowing that a person in the having mode experiences also differs from the quality of knowing that a person in the being mode is actively striving after. Whereas in the mode of having a person’s attitude might be reflected in the expression, ‘I have knowledge’, the orientation of a person in the mode of being might be revealed in the expression, ‘I know’.\textsuperscript{126} According to Fromm, “Having knowledge is taking and keeping possession of available knowledge (information) ... Knowing does not mean to be in possession of the truth; it means to penetrate the surface and to strive critically and actively in order to approach truth more closely”,\textsuperscript{127} In the being mode, “optimum knowledge ... is to \textit{know more deeply}. In the having mode it is to \textit{have more knowledge}.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 28-29. \\
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., 29. \\
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 39. \\
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 39, 40.
Fromm claims that in (post) industrialist capitalist societies, “our education generally tries to train people to have knowledge as a possession” rather than educate persons who are capable of knowing more deeply. In the having mode, knowledge as a possession becomes a resource that one can use to secure advantages over others whom one comes to regard as competitors for scarce resources such as prestige, status, power and material things. The type of classroom exchanges that produce a kind of person who ‘has’ or ‘consumes’ knowledge as a possession are described by Brazilian educator and philosopher, Paulo Freire, as “banking education”.

A teacher in the role of ‘banker’, according to Freire, aims “to ‘fill’ the students by making deposits of information which the teacher considers to constitute true knowledge” while the role of the student is “to store the deposits”. In the banking model of education, “students are not called upon to know, but to memorise the contents narrated by the teacher”. On Freire’s account, treating students as empty receptacles usually “anaesthetises” and “attempts to maintain the submersion of consciousness (original emphasis)”.

As a consequence of anaesthetisation, students become lulled into a state of passivity that disposes them to be obedient, conformist and to become the sort of person who is easily manipulated and controlled. This conditions

128 Ibid., 41.
129 Ibid.
130 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Seaview, 1971), 68.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid., 68.
133 Ibid.
learners to remain silent in the sense of not speaking out about their immediate lived experience of particular learning situations. Such anaesthetisation of consciousness and silencing of learners’ voices constitute a barrier to the freedom of inquiry that is needed for learners to become confident to openly articulate their perceptions of tensions and uncertainties, which provide the stimulus for active thinking and questioning in the classroom. In contrast to a banker-teacher, Freire envisages that a teacher could become a “partner of the students”, a “student among students”.¹³⁴

Partner-teachers engage in a “problem-posing” model of education, which “affirms men as beings in the process of becoming – as unfinished, uncompleted being”.¹³⁵ Students would therefore not be treated by partner-teachers as depositories of information or passive consumers of knowledge but would be assisted to ‘wake up’ out of an anaesthetised state. To draw on Fromm’s language, one might say that partner-teachers invite learners to respond in the being mode of relatedness to the world so that teacher and learners might strive together to know more deeply and to question existing social arrangements. By contrast, when the voices of learners are silenced as a result of a knowledge-based curriculum that minimises or even ignores the present lived experience of learners, the sort of relationship that a teacher establishes between the learner and what is to be learnt “forbids much active participation by pupils in the development of what is taught”.¹³⁶ In Freire’s and Fromm’s terms, the banking model of education encourages learners to memorise, acquire and consume knowledge as a

¹³⁴ Ibid., 62.
¹³⁵ Ibid., 72.
¹³⁶ Dewey, Experience and Education, 19.
possession to be used to secure their own advantage against others in a Hobbesian competition or struggle for scarce resources. Without opportunities to participate in active thinking that can lead to knowing and constructing knowledge in the classroom, it seems likely that a learner will become a type of knower who has been anaesthetised to become a mere consumer of knowledge and traditional beliefs. A knowledge-based curriculum that emphasises the transference of the ‘correct’ answers leaves little room for engaging with doubtful or problematic situations, which can serve as a catalyst for learners to construct and evaluate different courses of action with multiple perspectives in public forums to address the problems that face them.

**Conclusion**

This chapter explored an interpretation of democracy as a personal way of life which does not require religious persons to ‘police’ their speech in public forums but, rather, seeks to enable non-religious and religious persons to speak out openly to each other about their purposes. Democracy as a personal way of life can therefore be understood to not be open to the objections raised by the religious perspective examined in Chapter Five. The chapter examined a conception of valuation which is at the heart of an interpretation of democracy as a personal way of life whereby individuals are enabled to exercise intelligence through inquiry in order to construct purposes and to evaluate anticipated and actual consequences of plans for action in the context of an experimental, ‘scientific’ community of practitioners of valuation. The latter conception of values as instruments for addressing concrete problematic situations was contrasted to the conception of values as reified entities, which can be understood to inform the *National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools* that Chapter Four investigated. The discussion of valuation resumed the inquiry begun in Chapter Two.
into what it means to be an educated person and further developed the argument that education ought to enable learners to act on the basis of authentic choice as well as to make rationally informed choices. In order to contribute to the ongoing debate about active citizenship which Chapter Three reviewed, this chapter explored the possibility that movement out of passive spectatorship of democracy towards speaking out to challenge authorities and the social status quo might depend upon enabling religious and non-religious learners to engage in valuation of their purposes with multiple perspectives in the context of state and faith schools. The next chapter aims to bring the various strands of the inquiry together in order to make the case to the non-religious and the religious that both would benefit if they sought to fundamentally change their attitudes towards each other. I will argue that one possible way to achieve this might be for both non-religious and religious persons to enter into a way of life that educates towards being a democratic kind of person.
Chapter Seven – Conclusion

This thesis began by examining the 2005 *National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools*, an educational policy that the Australian national government issued in response to the 1999 *Adelaide Declaration*. This latter document was the national response to UNESCO’s 1996 Delors Report, *Learning: the Treasure Within*. I acknowledged the importance in the context of a globalised environment of UNESCO’s project to realise world peace though a notion of democracy that is inclusive of all groups globally, and therefore especially as embracing of non-religious and religious groups together. I identified the challenge that this thesis seeks to address to be the disparity between the Delors Report’s vision of different groups participating together in a democratic spirit and the response of the Australian values framework. I concluded that the formulation and implementation of the Australian values framework for Australian schooling can be to taken to indicate that UNESCO’s project – which has already been widely acknowledged internationally as an aspiration that would be valuable for all countries to pursue – is not being actualised in the Australian context. Therefore this thesis set out to examine what factors might be influencing the Australian values education policy’s apparent failure to contribute to actualising UNESCO’s call to promote a particular notion of democracy necessary to pursue world peace. Specifically, this thesis examined why the Australian context, through the values framework, does not appear to be educating for a democratic inclusivity of religious groups as legitimate participants of values formation and indeed of political life in general. Consequently, the separate chapters of this thesis each undertook to address distinct dimensions that are formative of the Australian context in order to find out how
each might be understood in such a way that it can be made more valuable for engaging with UNESCO’s aspiration to realise a particular conception of democracy.

**Findings**

Chapter One explored the concept of the secular because even though it is taken for granted that Australia is a secular society, it is unclear what the secular means. The task of this chapter to add clarity to an understanding of the secular is important. If this chapter found the secular to be *intrinsically* exclusionary of the religious then the concept of the secular would not be one that could be utilised to actualise UNESCO’s aspiration to a democratic inclusivity that embraces non-religious and religious groups together. However, through Chapter One’s inquiry into the secular, this thesis has uncovered that an understanding of the meaning of the secular as inclusive of the non-religious and religious prevailed for many centuries in the West and an understanding of the secular as exclusionary of the religious has arisen only relatively recently. Therefore, through the findings of this chapter this thesis has established that the meaning of the secular is not intrinsically exclusive of the religious. This thesis has thereby established through the inquiry undertaken in Chapter One that the cause of the Australian values framework’s preference for realising a homogenous social unity through a process of imposing common values that narrows down pluralism – and thereby is exclusionary of religious groups – cannot be attributed to the secular nature of Australian society. Furthermore, through these findings this thesis has demonstrated that the secular is a concept that *can* be used to describe the inclusivity that is characteristic of the kind of democracy that the Delors Report argues is essential for realising world peace.
Chapter One also examined the concept of ‘a secular society’ and was able to uncover that an *intrinsic* connection appears to exist between the notion of ‘a secular society’ and the concept of ‘democracy’ via the concepts of ‘society’ and ‘the nation-state’. This work clarified a connection between the secular and democracy, which has been vague and ambiguous. Taken together the findings of this chapter demonstrate that the secular is not an obstacle to UNESCO’s project. Rather, this chapter established that the concept of the secular and the concept of democracy are intrinsically related. On the basis of this chapter’s findings, it is possible to define the term ‘secular’ as a description of a democratic attribute of inclusivity and also of an attribute of inclusiveness that is characteristic of a particular kind of democracy, which is embracing of plurality and supportive of peace between non-religious and religious groups. If this chapter had not investigated the meaning of ‘a secular society’, this connection between the concept of the secular and world peace via a particular kind of democracy would not have been brought to light. The work of the thesis in Chapter One has therefore uncovered a valuable connection between the secular, democracy and world peace that can be used to engage with UNESCO’s project of actualising world peace through a notion of democracy that is inclusive or ‘secular’.

Chapter Two examined how the history of the aims of mass schooling in Western society has contributed towards an understanding of citizenship. The task of this chapter was to find out whether or not aims of mass schooling have historically promoted a conception of citizenship that is democratic and, if so, whether such a democratic conception of citizenship is in keeping with UNESCO’s inclusive conception of democracy. This task was necessary in order to discover whether the promotion of citizenship through aims of mass schooling is a factor that is contributing to the failure
of the Australian values framework to actualise UNESCO’s project of pursuing world peace in the Australian context. This chapter demonstrated that elites have utilised aims of mass schooling to produce a kind of compliant, non-disruptive citizen that is socialised to obey authorities and to participate in the national economy. Therefore through the inquiry of Chapter Two this thesis has found out that the established tradition in the West of tying citizenship formation to aims of mass schooling is not supportive of a type of democracy which UNESCO argues is necessary to actualise world peace. Without the work of this chapter, it would not be clear that aims of mass schooling are utilised by elites to control citizen formation in schools in a way that works against the democratic ideal of the Delors Report. This work has therefore established that aims of mass schooling are a factor that is contributing to UNESCO’s project not being actualised in the Australian context. On the basis of the first set of findings established by Chapter Two alone, it might appear that UNESCO’s ideal of democracy cannot be pursued in schools. However, through Chapter Two it was also discovered that in addition to aims of mass schooling, schools can also promote educational aims, and the thesis thereby found that mass schooling can be turned to the service of the vision in the Delors Report.

Through the inquiry of Chapter Two this thesis has uncovered that the educational ideal of what it means to be an educated person can be utilised to link the institution of mass schooling to citizenship formation that promotes a kind of democracy that the Delors Report aspires to. Without this chapter’s inquiry into aims of mass schooling, clarity would be lacking in the public domain about how mass schooling in the Australian context can be reconceptualised as an educative enterprise that serves an expansive project such as UNESCO’s, which seeks to benefit all groups globally,
including vulnerable minorities, rather than just the interests of a few, powerful groups within nation-states. Taking together the findings of Chapters One and Two, the thesis has uncovered that certain implications for citizenship formation in the Australian system of mass schooling follow from Australia being a secular society.

Given that this thesis has established that the secular is by definition inclusive of those with and without religious faith, the promotion of aims of mass schooling in a secular context which narrow down pluralism, and thereby exclude the religious, contradicts the very nature of what it means to be secular. It follows that whether or not a secular society ceases to be secular or develops in a secular direction, which is inclusive of non-religious and religious groups, depends in part on the kind of citizen that the Australian system of schooling promotes. Citizenship formation depends, in turn, on the kind of education policies that the Australian government implements. Furthermore, if the term ‘secular’ describes a democratic attribute of inclusivity, which is in keeping with the inclusive kind of democracy that UNESCO upholds, then a lack of alignment in the Australian context with UNESCO’s project – which the Australian values framework is symptomatic of – not only constitutes a failure on the part of Australian society to contribute to realising world peace but also a failure to promote Australia’s own secularity.

The work of this thesis is bringing to light a possibility that the secular is not a given but is itself an aspiration to be achieved – or not – by a society, and that it can be actualised through participation in a certain kind of democracy such as that which the Delors Report advocates. Therefore it would be valuable for Australia to seek to align with UNESCO’s version of democracy not only to promote world peace but also to
ensure that what many consider to be most valuable about Australia – that it is a secular society – is not lost but is continually renewed. The work of this thesis has demonstrated that schools could contribute to the renewal of the secularity that Australians clearly value by promoting an educational aim of the educated person in addition to established aims of schooling. Without the inquiry undertaken by this thesis, the following insight would not have been brought to light: that initiating learners into a kind of inclusive democracy would serve not only to align Australian schooling with the vision of the Delors Report but also to promote the secular, understood as a democratic inclusivity of non-religious and religious groups. This thesis has demonstrated that in order for Australia to continue to be a genuinely secular society, it would be valuable for Australian citizens to be enabled to be democratic in a way that can also actualise UNESCO’s vision for attaining world peace. One way to achieve this would be to promote an educational aim that supports an inclusive kind of democracy in Australian schooling.

Australia is a society that is considered to not only be secular but also democratic. However, the lack of alignment between the Australian values framework and UNESCO’s version of democracy as inclusive of all groups globally, points to a disparity: if Australians were already democratic in the way that UNESCO aspires to, then a policy like the National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools would not have been produced in the Australian context. This apparent discrepancy between the kind democracy that is practiced in Australia and UNESCO’s ideal of democracy indicates that there might be more than just one way of understanding democracy. Consequently, the task of Chapter Three was to investigate whether or not there are different versions of democracy. This chapter’s inquiry brought to light a range of differing and conflicting
understandings of democracy. The chapter also uncovered relationships between democracy, citizenship and education whereby it is the kind of democratic society that is considered by a society as a whole to be worth promoting that determines what kind of citizen is desirable, and education is conceived as a process that shapes citizens for life in such a democratic society. Chapter Two's findings that elites have ‘steered’ citizenship formation in mass schooling in a manner that works against the actualisation of UNESCO's project serve as a foil to an understanding that defines education and citizenship in terms of what kind of democratic society is judged desirable by the whole community and not just a privileged few.

Chapter Three's inquiry produced a review or conceptual history of different versions of democracy on the basis of which this thesis has established that citizenship, and corresponding notions of democracy and education, are not fixed but continually are in flux and change in response to circumstance. The findings of this chapter's inquiry have also shed light on the nature of the secular understood as a democratic inclusivity. This chapter finds that democratic inclusivity consists in a continual extending of an invitation to very different non-religious and religious perspectives to participate in debate that seeks to challenge, test and revise received notions of citizenship, democracy and education. The inclusivity or secularity that is characteristic of UNESCO's kind of democracy is self-critical and dynamic in that it involves an invitation to diverse perspectives to reflect on the very nature of democracy itself in response to changing circumstances in order to ensure the ‘growth’ of democracy as opposed to its stagnation. Such debate would probably not be a staid affair but quite likely fraught and confronting as it would be a forum in which clashes between worldviews could be channelled away from war towards stimulating the growth of
democracy. On the basis of the findings of this chapter, this thesis argues that UNESCO’s project of actualising world peace through democracy would be better served by an *educative* approach to citizenship formation in mass schooling whereby the community as a whole and not just an elite few participate in debate about what kinds of citizens, democracy and education are valuable for educating in schools in light of changing circumstances.

The task of Chapter Four was to investigate the nature of the *National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools*. This was necessary in order to find out if this kind of policy for mass schooling is one that is able to actualise UNESCO’s project of pursuing world peace in the Australian context. It was established through this chapter that the Australian values education policy is embedded in key philosophical, political and educational debates about faith schools versus state schools, the Australian ‘culture and history wars’, Australian citizenship and moral education. It was important to bring these debates to light because the creators of the Australian values framework gave no account of the inherently controversial nature of the policy. Chapter Four has thereby uncovered areas of disagreement that future values education policymakers would need to openly acknowledge and give an account of to the public. Without the work of this chapter to bring to light the controversies that values education policy is embedded in, there would be a lack of clarity in the public realm about what kind of considerations the general public should expect framers of values education policy to give an open account of to the public.

Chapter Four has established that the Australian values framework promotes a conception of values as reified entities that learners are expected to simply accept. This
chapter has recognised that the Australian values framework promulgates a kind of democracy that inculcates a passive mindset that obediently accepts from authorities what they prescribe as common values. On the basis of the findings of Chapter Four, this thesis argues that the emphasis on passive acceptance of values that informs the Australian values education policy directly contradicts the emphasis in the Delors Report regarding the importance of individuals being able to freely choose values. For example, Australian schools were not able to freely choose whether or not they displayed the posters which list the nine values with the superimposed image of Simpson and his donkey because displaying the poster was made a condition of federal funding. Also, through the work of Chapter Four, this thesis finds that the Australian values education policy’s emphasis on compliance with nine common or ‘core’ values for Australian schooling promotes a homogenous social unity. This undermines the importance that UNESCO places on pluralism and on a social unity achieved through democratic participation of different perspectives in deliberating as to “what for and why we live together” (original emphasis).¹

Looking back to the findings of Chapters Two, which established that the utilisation by elites of aims of mass schooling to steer citizen formation in schools is a factor that is contributing to UNESCO’s project not being actualised in the Australian context, this thesis argues that the Australian values education policy is a continuation of the latter tradition. The decision process that led to the implementation of the Australian values framework, which produces a passive kind of citizen expected to unquestioningly accept values prescribed by authorities, was made by an elite few and was not open to all.

¹ Delors, 61.
Australian citizens. Prior to the work undertaken by Chapters Four and Two, there was a lack of clarity in the public domain about how the Australian values framework does not align with UNESCO's ideal of democracy. But the work of this thesis has clarified that the lack of alignment between UNESCO and the Australian values framework is due in part to the latter's being a continuation of a tradition whereby elites have dominated the influence of citizenship formation to be for the service of a few powerful groups, which undermines UNESCO's project. The work of this thesis has therefore improved our understanding of the problem of what factors are contributing to the lack of alignment between UNESCO and the Australian values framework in the Australian context.

Drawing on the findings (from Chapter Two) that the secular understood as a democratic inclusivity is fostered by the kind of democracy that UNESCO supports, and secondly the findings (from Chapter Four) that the conception of values which informs the Australian values framework does not align with the Delors Report's ideal of democracy, this thesis argues that the Australian values framework does not promote the secular which is inclusive of pluralism – especially religious groups. This thesis also goes further and argues that the Australian values education policy is not neutral but actively contributes towards making Australian society less secular, in the sense of less democratic inclusivity. It does so because the policy contradicts the kind of democracy that UNESCO advocates in which values are freely chosen and participation of diverse perspectives is encouraged. This thesis argues that in addition to blocking UNESCO's project of attaining world peace, the values education policy also stifles the secular, which is understood as a democratic inclusivity of difference. It fails to educate a kind of citizen capable of ensuring that Australia continues to be a secular society that is
inclusive of pluralism. Without the work of this thesis, there would be a lack of clarity in the public realm about the impact of the Australian values framework on the secular understood as inclusive of the non-religious and the religious. On the basis of Chapter Four’s findings that the Australian values education policy does not promote the secular, this thesis argues that within the kind of environment brought about by the passive character that simply accepts values, the meaning of secular ceases to be inclusive and becomes exclusionary of plurality, including religious faith.

The need for Chapter Five’s inquiry into a particular religious perspective followed from the findings of Chapter Four that the Australian values framework promotes an environment in which the meaning of secular loses a sense of inclusivity of plurality to the point where it becomes exclusionary of the religious. It was therefore necessary to examine how certain religious groups are positioned by the Australian values framework. The chapter also examined how such groups respond to those positionings, in order to find out if their responses to a policy like the Australian values framework are consistent with, or are undermining of, UNESCO’s ideal of democracy. There is currently a lack of understanding in the public domain about whether religious responses to such a policy contribute to or detract from UNESCO's project, which warranted this investigation. The work of Chapter Five established that from a particular religious standpoint, the conception of values as reified entities which informs the Australian values framework, promotes a reified conception of religion as a merely private enterprise that the nation-state – and the policymakers of the nation-state – sanitise in order to utilise religion as an instrument for the sake of the smooth running of the wider society. Through the inquiry undertaken in this particular chapter,
this thesis established that in response to a policy like the values framework, the religious viewpoint interprets the secular as intrinsically exclusionary of the religious.

This fifth chapter also found out that a religious viewpoint can perceive policies, like the values education framework, as positioning religious groups in a way to be controlled by the non-religious and forced to accommodate in a manner that denies what they cherish most. Furthermore, this chapter established that the response of a religious perspective to the sense of being contained, is to disengage from democratic practices that are interpreted as requiring silence about significantly important convictions. This finding is relevant to the overall investigation into why the Australian values framework is not actualising UNESCO's project of pursuing world peace because religious persons will disengage from participating in democratic practices if these are perceived to be demeaning and even manipulative. Through the work of this chapter, this thesis has established that the response of the religious groups does not contribute towards the sort of democracy that UNESCO aspires. Clarity has therefore been gained through this chapter's inquiry into a religious perspective that would not have been otherwise gained, about the impact that the response of religious persons to a policy like Australian values framework has on UNESCO's project of achieving world peace through a certain type of democracy.

A question is raised by the findings of Chapter Five, which creates a need for the inquiry into democracy undertaken by Chapter Six. Chapter Five found out that the response of the religious perspective to a policy like the Australian values framework is to interpret the secular as intrinsically exclusionary of the religious. Such a perspective of mistrust and suspicion towards the secular can then lead to a disengagement on the
part of this religious perspective from participation in democratic practices that are perceived to 'democratically police' the speech of religious persons in public forums. Such a religious perspective may assume that all versions of democracy silence the religious because they may interpret the secular as intrinsically exclusionary. However, a question that then arises from the standpoint of this thesis, which already established in Chapter One that the secular by definition ought to be inclusive of the religious, is whether there is an interpretation of democracy that can enhance the capacity of religious persons to maintain their distinctiveness whilst at the same time participating in the wider society in which religious ways of life are necessarily situated. The need for Chapter Six’s inquiry into a kind of democracy that is inclusive of the religious also arises from the Delors Report’s aspiration for a kind of democracy that is inclusive of all groups worldwide: UNESCO’s notion of democracy lacks detail because the report aimed to provide a starting point for dialogue and therefore its primary task was not to provide a worked-out account of its inclusive understanding of democracy. The task of investigating a particular, participatory interpretation of democracy is therefore necessary to offer clarification of the kind of democracy that seems more reflective of UNESCO’s role to be inclusive of all groups globally than the version of democracy that the religious perspective rejects as requiring religious persons to ‘democratically police’ their speech. Currently, there is a lack of understanding in the public realm as to whether there is a comprehensively, detailed conception of democracy that is inclusive of religious faith, which can be supportive of UNESCO’s role. Such an inquiry also serves the overall purpose of the thesis to identify whether there is a kind of democracy that is inclusive of religious faith that can be promoted by the Australian government through the Australian system of schooling, which can contribute to actualise UNESCO’s project to attain world peace.
Chapter Six’s inquiry into a particular version of democracy found out that an interpretation of democracy as a personal way of life offers a conception of values as an activity of valuation that involves the participation of diverse perspectives, including religious persons, in the formation of values or ends-in-view. Through the work of this chapter it was established that the conception of values and democracy which informs an interpretation of democracy as a personal way of life is more conducive to UNESCO’s role to be inclusive of all groups globally rather than a conception of democracy that requires citizens to passively accept values as reified entities which authorities prescribe. Chapter Four found the Australian values education policy to be informed by such a passive approach. Prior to the inquiries undertaken by Chapters Four and Six, there was a lack of clarity in the public domain about what particular conception of values is more suited to the Delors Report’s understanding that values are only meaningful if they are freely chosen through participation of diverse perspectives in formation of ends, and not only in the development of various means of attaining pre-specified ends. As a consequence of the findings of Chapters Four and Six, understanding has been improved that UNESCO’s aim to be inclusive of all groups globally in order to achieve world peace is more adequately actualised by a conception of values as an activity of valuation in which diverse perspectives participate in formation of values or ends-in-view, rather than a conception of values as reified entities prescribed by authorities that citizens are expected to passively accept.

This thesis argues that an interpretation of democracy as a personal way of life can address and alleviate the concerns of the religious perspective examined in Chapter Five. This argument draws upon the findings in Chapter Six that valuation, as an activity
of forming ends-in-view, necessarily invites a plurality of perspectives to participate, including religious perspectives. Since valuation is an activity of values formation in which all groups globally are invited to participate, it does not require religious persons to accept reified values in a manner that reduces faith to a private enterprise. It also does not require religious persons to ‘bracket out’ their most cherished convictions or ends when participating in public forums, which is the concern of the religious perspective. Chapter Six found out that the kind of environment that the activity of valuation or values formation promotes is one in which the meaning of secular ceases to be exclusionary of the religious. This contrasts, therefore, to the kind of environment that an understanding of values as reified entities – that underpins the Australian values framework – promotes in which the meaning of secular loses a sense of inclusivity of plurality to the point where it becomes exclusionary of the religious, which the findings of Chapter Four established. By comparison, a sense of the secular as a democratic inclusivity of plurality that is embracing of non-religious and religious worldviews together can be restored and sustained through the active participation of diverse perspectives in an activity of values formation. Through the inquiries carried out by Chapters Four, Five and Six, this research has recognised that there are different understandings of values and democracy, and that these determine whether the environment that is promoted is one in which the meaning of the secular is inclusive or exclusionary of plurality, together with religious perspectives. Through the work of this thesis, clarity has been gained about the relationship between the meaning of the secular – whether it is perceived by religious persons to be inclusive or exclusionary of the religious – and the kind of understanding of values and democracy that predominates at a particular time and in a particular environment, for example, the context of Australian society. Furthermore, this improves understanding of what kind of
democratic environment serves the overall purpose of the thesis to find out how UNESCO’s objective to attain world peace might be better actualised in the Australian context. On the basis of the findings of Chapters Four, Five and Six, this thesis argues that the kind of democratic environment that needs to be actively promoted in the Australian context – by, for example, policymakers – is one that enables religious persons to perceive the secular to be inclusive rather than exclusionary of the religious.

Through the task carried out by Chapter Six, this thesis argues that a conception of democracy as a personal way of life, or a democratic way of being, can enable a religious perspective, whose concerns Chapter Five examined, to engage with UNESCO’s aspiration for a kind of world in which all groups are able to participate. Through this inquiry undertaken in Chapters Five and Six, it was recognised that there is a lack of consensus about specifically what interpretation of democracy and values could be appealed to as a way to invite religious groups – that otherwise would disengage from democracy and the secular in response to polices like the Australia values framework – to engage with UNESCO’s project for world peace.

Chapter Six’s inquiry also builds on the findings of Chapter Two, which established that mass schooling can still be made valuable for engaging with UNESCO’s aspiration to realise a particular conception of democracy if, in addition to aims of mass schooling, Australian schools also promote an educational ideal of the educated person. Chapter Six developed further an idea that Chapter Two explored, that what it means to be an educated person is to be rationally autonomous and capable of exercising authentic choice between possibilities unconcealed in truth as aletheia. Through the inquiry in Chapter Six into the activity of valuation, this thesis argues that what it means to be an
educated person is to be an authentic type of individuality that is also democratic. The
democratic way of being of an educated person consists in the manner in which such a
democratic person deliberates between values or ends-in-view. This process of
deliberation involves giving an account to others of the inquiry that led to the
construction of particular ends-in-view in order to invite critical scrutiny of multiple
perspectives. The choice to actualise a particular end-in-view is arrived at through a
process of testing different ends-in-view through a kind of experimental inquiry in
collaboration with diverse perspectives. Through the findings of Chapters Two and Six,
this thesis argues that in order to enable UNESCO’s project to be better actualised in the
Australian context, it would be valuable for Australian schools to promote an
educational ideal of the democratic person that is rationally autonomous and capable of
exercising a democratic type of authentic choice.

Implications

This thesis began by accepting UNESCO’s call to imagine a world in which all groups are
able to harmoniously participate – not only the powerful and the wealthy but also the
uninfluential and the poor. The Delors Report is an invitation to all non-religious and
religious groups globally to participate in the formation of ends or values and not just to
develop means for achieving ends prescribed by powerful and dominant groups in a
globalised environment. That UNESCO’s call is very much in keeping with the ethos of
Australian society was recognised by the authors of the Adelaide Declaration. This thesis
has established that the main reason that UNESCO’s invitation should be acknowledged
as especially legitimate in the Australian context is because Australia is a secular society
and the secular is by definition inclusive of the non-religious and the religious. However,
in order for UNESCO’s ideal of participatory democracy not to remain just a vision it
needs to be actualised, which requires willing participants. But non-religious and religious groups in the Australian context are, by and large unwilling, to participate in the democratic formation of ends, which UNESCO argues is essential to realising world peace. I have argued that what seems most valuable about Australia is its secularity, which is understood as a democratic inclusivity of difference, particularly of the religious, and is more like an ideal to be achieved than a given. Both the non-religious and religious in their mutual suspicion and hostility towards each other have lost sight of the secular as an aspiration that requires continual renewal by non-religious and religious persons.

The non-religious

This thesis has argued that the Australian values framework has failed to promote a kind of democracy that is inclusive of religious groups and therefore has failed to take UNESCO’s invitation to religious groups. By laying down values or ends, the Australian policy bars religious persons from participating in the formation of ends. While concern about religious fundamentalism and terrorist extremism is understandable, UNESCO has offered guidelines that enable religious groups to have an active role in deciding what sorts of values non-religious and religious persons should aspire to within the framework of democracy and global peace. This approach does not privilege religion and it presents a safeguard against extreme takeover by religious fundamentalists, whereby religions are allowed to participate in the formation of ends and not excluded from this process.

Beyond that, I am arguing that the policy has failed not only by UNESCO’s standards but also by the standards of what it means to be a secular society. In addition to
blocking UNESCO's project of attaining world peace, the Australian values education policy also stifles the secular. If being secular is considered to be a significant part of what it means to be Australian, then, by failing to promote the secular, the Australian values education policy narrows down what many Australians consider to be most valuable about being Australian. In a sense, by becoming less secular, Australia is becoming less democratic in an inclusive sense. It seems ironic that a values education policy claiming to promote ‘Australian character’ as epitomised by an image of Simpson and his donkey, should undermine the heart of what it means to be an Australian democracy providing ‘a fair go’ for all. However, the emptying out of the secular from the Australian context is not solely due to Australian policies like the values education framework, but can also be attributed to the attitudes of non-religious persons towards religious persons. I am arguing that ‘secular’ is not a possession of the non-religious. Disbelief in God does not make a person secular. This thesis has established that the secular is a democratic attribute of inclusivity that characterises an environment, society or relationships, which can be achieved or lost depending on the attitudes, relationships and way of life that is pursued by the inhabitants of an environment. Contrary to common sense understandings of the secular, I interpret that a person can be secular to the extent that she or he contributes to promoting an environment that is characterised by a democratic inclusivity of pluralism, particularly of the religious. I am arguing that in order to cultivate the secular, the non-religious need religious persons to provide valuable diversity and therefore if UNESCO’s vision of world peace is considered to be an ideal worth actualising, it would be valuable if non-religious persons re-evaluated their attitudes towards religious persons and became more inviting, and more willing to actively seek out difference.
The religious

I am arguing that the attitudes of religious persons towards non-religious persons, the secular and democracy in the Australian context, can also contribute to the promotion of an environment that stifles the secular. I have argued that, on the one hand, the secular is by definition inclusive of the religious and, on the other hand, that the Australian values framework promotes an environment that stifles the secular. It follows that the Australian values framework stifles that quality which makes an environment inclusive of pluralism, particularly religious groups. In a social context from which the secular in the sense of a democratic inclusivity has been evacuated, religious groups whose concerns are similar to those of Stanley Hauerwas are legitimate. Such religious groups understand themselves as having no place or part to play in a society that calls itself secular and democratic.

When I first began my inquiry into the National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools, I was very attracted to the writings of Stanley Hauerwas. As a Christian in a predominantly non-religious milieu, I perceived a tacit, unspoken pressure to keep quiet about religion when participating in the wider society. Therefore, Hauerwas’s claim that the nation-state and liberalism suppress Christianity and religious belief to the private, and require religious persons to ‘democratically police’ their speech in public, really resonated with my own experience of what it is like to be a religious person in an allegedly secular society. Consequently, I regarded the secular and democracy as at best indifferent and at worst potentially hostile towards religious faith. It did not occur to me, then, that a secular society might be secular in name only and that it might be the evacuation of the secular from the society that I found myself in, which was promoting an environment that I found oppressive and demeaning. In a
sense I made the same mistake that many non-religious persons make by assuming that ‘secular’ is a possession of the non-religious. However, through the work of this thesis I am now arguing that the secular is more like an aspiration and an ideal to be achieved and that it can only be actualised by the democratic participation of non-religious and religious persons together in the formation of ends, which UNESCO recognises is necessary to attain world peace.

I have argued that the kind of environment promoted by the Australian values education policy is one that causes religious viewpoints to perceive the secular and democracy to be exclusionary of religion. While this perception that the secular is exclusionary of the religious is understandable, I am arguing that it is not the secular that is exclusionary. Rather, it is an environment in which the secular has been stifled or suppressed that is exclusionary of the religious. I am claiming that the problem therefore does not lie with the secular, but with an environment that is failing to renew the secular and is therefore not being secular enough. An environment that is exclusionary of the religious is one from which the secular has been evacuated. I am also arguing that the response of religious groups and religious persons to what they perceive to be hostility on the part of the secular – which can lead to a disengagement from democratic participation – contributes to further stifle or suppress the secular, which sustains an environment that is exclusionary of the religious. By rejecting the secular and democracy, religious persons are contributing to promote an environment that is exclusionary of the religious. In order to cease being exclusionary and to become inclusive of the religious, Australian society needs to be more secular. Therefore I am arguing that it would be valuable if religious groups and religious persons re-evaluated their attitude towards the secular, especially since the religious have a stake in
revitalising the secular because a secular environment is one that is by definition inclusive of the religious. This means that religious persons and religious groups in the context of Australia do have an essential part to play in a secular society of restoring the secular in its genuine meaning of a democratic inclusivity in order to better actualise UNESCO’s project for world peace.

**Australian policymakers**

The kind of policy that the Australian values framework represents may once have been appropriate in a different context and time – in, for example, a colonial era when territories were conquered through trade, and a colonial outlook aimed to establish people in a foreign land and to institute law and order. However, that approach is narrow and limiting and it is no longer appropriate in the globalised world we live in. There needs to be a shift in Australian policy – including the values framework, and in education – overall.

In order to work towards actualising UNESCO’s vision of attaining world peace through a kind of democracy that is inclusive of all groups globally, it would be valuable for future directions for policy in education to draw on the ideas that this thesis has been examining. These ideas need to play a greater role in policy formation and in the practices of schooling. Future research might include an examination of different directions that are taking place in policy and practices in order to inquire as to how it might be possible to invite a greater sense of plurality into schooling, to make schooling more democratic and more inclusive.
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