1968: the year of revolt on the streets and campuses of Europe and America, and even of distant Australia, reminiscent of 1848, the year of revolutions in Europe and also in distant Ceylon. It was the year in which Gustavo Gutiérrez first presented his ‘theology of liberation’; the year of Dorothee Sölle’s ‘political night prayer’ in Cologne cathedral; the year in which the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland came to a head and precipitated the Troubles. It was my first full year in Europe. When I began studying for a doctorate at the Faculty of Catholic Theology in the University of Münster in 1969, even in this stuffily conservative setting there were strikes, sit-ins, disruptions of lectures and demonstrations. It thus seemed to respond to the need of the hour when Johann Baptist Metz, the Professor of Fundamental Theology, proclaimed the necessity of a ‘political theology’ which would act as a critical corrective to the widespread tendency to treat religion as a private matter that had no business in politics and the public sphere. Now, over 40 years later, it is perhaps appropriate to take a new look at political theology and ask whether it has retained its relevance. I do this as the preface to an appreciation of Geraldine Smyth’s contribution to peacebuilding in the fraught religio-political situation of Northern Ireland.

1. Johann Baptist Metz: Memory and Liberation

Even at that time I felt the term ‘political theology’ was unfortunate. Metz himself remarks in passing that the term carries historical baggage (historisch belastet). He was doubtless referring to the legacy of Carl Schmitt, to whom we shall turn shortly. The current term ‘public theology’ seems more appropriate to what Metz was trying to achieve, but for better or for worse it was as ‘political’ that his theology became famous. Re-reading him now, I do not fall under the spell of his high-flown rhetoric as I did when listening to his riveting lectures, and I recall how difficult it was to translate his long sentences and piled-up adjectives into English when he occasionally asked me to do so, usually on the eve of his departure to lecture in America. There was something infectious about his invocation of Europe’s history of freedom, which rightfully belonged to the heritage of the Church if only it would pass through the Enlightenment instead of trying to discredit it from the outside.
Church could then become the institutionalisation of social criticism, which would be unprecedented in the light of her history of resistance to change and complicity in oppression. It would imply that she take on board non-theological data and learn to see her institutional structures not merely as bulwarks against a hostile world, but as ‘making possible a critical consciousness’. The corresponding theology would be anthropocentric, not cosmocentric on traditional lines, and radically eschatological, applying an ‘eschatological proviso’ to all the pretensions of human technology and social engineering – and to the Church itself. The result would go far beyond the venerable tradition of Catholic social teaching: it would not simply be the application of principles deduced from revelation to contingent social circumstances, but would be social at its core, because it would take seriously the social conditioning of all forms of church life and theological thought. This would result in an awareness of their historical ambivalence as expressions of the history of freedom which takes its rise in Jesus.

This, then, is Metz’s summary of the positive task of political theology:

it seeks to determine anew the relationship between religion and society, between Church and society’s public sphere, between eschatological faith and social practice – not pre-critically, with the intention of making both realities identical once again, but post-critically, in the sense of a ‘second reflection’.

Numerous lectures and newspaper articles in subsequent years were variations on this theme, making Metz – in reality the least political of men! – a public figure and attracting many doctoral students from Latin America. The context of his thinking, however, remained the profoundly conservative Federal Republic of (West) Germany, and some of his liveliest forays were published under the unequivocal title ‘Beyond Bourgeois Religion’. The collection of his most significant essays as ‘Faith in History and Society’ gives testimony to the power and originality of his central insights (his preferred medium was always the brilliant essay rather than the plodding systematic treatise). The Enlightenment centred around the Bürger, the bourgeois or middle-class citizen, as the ‘subject’ of the history of emancipation, but this was premised on society as a system of mercantile exchange, hence the creation of a ‘private sphere’ in which Christianity became trapped. The metaphysics which had sustained Christian thought since the Church Fathers no longer had a consensual basis, and religion had been criticised as ideology – as Marx said, the critique of religion is the
beginning of all critique – and rendered harmless. Traditional Christology is now seen to be ‘idealistic’; theologians must reassert the primacy of praxis.\textsuperscript{10} Kant’s critique of judgement gives us a lead, but his ethics is premised on the individual (sittlich rather than social): we now need the much bolder perspective of the liberating memory of suffering as the basis for a universal solidarity with history’s victims.\textsuperscript{11} Our God is a God of the living and the dead; we celebrate the dangerous and subversive memoria passionis, mortis et resurrectionis Jesu Christi.\textsuperscript{12} Hence the stirring slogan: a future out of the memory of suffering, an appropriation of the suffering of history’s forgotten ones without any attempt to repress guilt.

This was most strikingly expressed in Metz’s confrontation with the Holocaust, in which the symbol of Auschwitz becomes the criterion for the credibility of any future theology.\textsuperscript{13} Just as Theodor W. Adorno claimed that poetry was impossible after Auschwitz, Metz insisted that theology can no longer be done with our backs turned to Auschwitz. Only story, not dialectic, can tap into this history of suffering to discover the wellsprings of identity and articulate ‘meaning’ without totalitarian claims.\textsuperscript{14} Metz was well aware that unless it broke through into this dimension, the Church was in danger of the cognitive isolation of a sect, irrespective of the number of its members.\textsuperscript{15} Metz’s students, such as Ludwig Rütti in an eschatologically orientated theology of mission, Tiemo Peters OP in the reappropriation of the political in Bonhoeffer, or Helmut Peukert in working through the implications of the human sciences, developed these ideas in a detail and consistency that were not Metz’s forte. But in later years Metz’s thinking expanded to imagine a ‘polycentric’ Christianity, whose fundamental message amid the plurality of cultures is compassion.\textsuperscript{16} Perhaps his most enduring legacy will be less the high-sounding theory of the Church’s political practice and social criticism, which is heavy with irony now in the light of subsequent financial and sexual abuse scandals, than his essays on ‘mysticism and politics’, the witness of the religious orders and the nature of discipleship. On any estimate he was a most stimulating presence, always a couple of years ahead of the theological game and ready to take on the leading intellectuals of his day on their own ground.

2. Carl Schmitt: Sovereignty and Sacrifice

In my view, nevertheless, it was his Tübingen Protestant colleague Jürgen Moltmann who grounded political theology more securely in scripture and the history of ideas, insisting that his theology of hope was correlative with the theology of the cross as the source of both
liberation and redemption. He traces the concept back to the *genus politikon* and *theologia civilis* of the Stoa, to reappear as *theologia politica* in the writings of Terrentius Varro. Augustine criticises this in his *De Civitate Dei* VI, 12, because it is in effect the religious ideology of the Roman state. For Moltmann Peterson’s theology of the Trinity was a critical corrective to the ‘monarchical’ monotheism inherited from the Middle Ages, because instead of rationalising state power it engaged with the crucified Christ as God’s protest against injustice. Peterson wrote in 1935 in reply to Carl Schmitt’s appropriation of the term ‘political theology’, in a book written in 1922 at a turning point in the political history of Europe, which has been controversial from that day to this. Schmitt was a Catholic jurist from north Germany who became disillusioned with democracy during the turbulent years of the Weimar Republic, foreseeing the end of democracy and legal government unless a radically different course were taken. He was convinced that Roman Catholicism was the foundation of European civilisation, transcending economic factors and in the figures of Pope, Emperor and Monk providing the matrices for the principle of representation.

On 1 May 1933, at the instigation of Heidegger, he joined the Nazi party and remained a member till 1945, protected by Göring. He died in 1985 and in 1970 he acknowledged Metz’s work. It is thus not surprising that 63 years went by before his seminal treatise was translated into English, but now that democracies are faltering all over the world and many are beginning to doubt the virtues of liberalism, Schmitt’s critique is having a new lease of life in political theory. In what follows I shall refer, not to Schmitt’s *Four Chapters* with their enigmatic references to forgotten thinkers of the Weimar era, but to Paul Kahn’s *Four New Chapters*, in which he attempts a contemporary reinterpretation of what is still valuable in Schmitt’s critique.

For Kahn, the idea that the religious is simply evaporating from Western civilisation, leaving a residue of the purely secular, is wrong-headed and ignorant of the origins of European institutions in Christian forebears. For Schmitt there is something theological about the very notion of the nation-state and the concept of popular sovereignty on which it is based. This connotes an originating act of will and the imperative of sacrifice. In the liberal theory of thinkers such as Rawls, however, the state’s prerogative of violence is not accounted for, and the possibility of war is not present. We realise that the sovereignty of the nation-state is the stumbling block of all well-meaning schemes to establish international structures and enforce international law. If the sovereign is the people, who speaks for them? If there is continuity between the modern nation-state and the theological tradition, and if this no longer consists in
the church’s dominance of politics, what forms does it take and how are we to estimate its influence? The church may have been defeated, but the secular never won: the search for meaning continually disturbs the efficiencies of law and commerce.²⁶ ‘To confront Schmitt is, accordingly, to confront the most fundamental issue in theorizing the character and meaning of the modern state’, namely ‘that the state creates and maintains its own sacred space and history’.²⁷ Rather than ascribing the origin of the state to the social contract, Schmitt contends that it is popular sovereignty that enables the social contract in the first place. Claims of national political identity trump first principles; indeed, reason and the people themselves are ritualised and sacralised in order to legitimate sacrifice, the wellspring of revolution and war alike.²⁸ Far from religion’s having been made private, as liberal theory assumes, the supposedly secular state draws deeply on the experience of faith: ‘The political formation of the experience of the sacred is the subject of political theology’.²⁹

The opening line of Schmitt’s first chapter on sovereignty, ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’, amounts to a ‘dialectical negation of liberal political theory’.³⁰ The underlying – markedly juridical – thesis is that the exception cannot become the norm, and that in dealing with the exception one is not simply applying the norm but making a decision beyond its scope, which redefines the rule and establishes the law, as in the judgement of a constitutional court.³¹ As becomes apparent in cases such as Ireland, Israel, Poland and many others, the identity of the state is tantamount to its existence and is not a matter for adjudication.³² The function of the norm is to allow us to identify the exception and contextualise the act of sovereign will: ‘no exception, no sovereignty’.³³ Revolutions issue in law; norms are not grounded in a transcendental norm, as Kant postulated, but in a decision that amounts to an act of faith. Superseding the is/ought dichotomy, ‘it is the decision for the norm’.³⁴ The state must continually will itself into being. At the root of this vision is freedom: ‘But for the exception, we might be well ordered but not free’.³⁵ We are left with conundrums: the king may become a tyrant, the law may be legally suspended, an entity like the EU is legal but not sovereign. An international legal order has no point of sovereignty, and contingencies such as the defeat of the whole polity or the presence of a nuclear threat are not covered by law.³⁶ In dealing with sovereignty we are dealing not with the formal, the rational framework, but with the existential, the free act of will which brings these into being: existence before essence.

Schmitt was radically opposed to Kant’s account of norms. Form determines nothing; what matters is judgement, the free act of will, which, in the end, ‘emanates from nothingness’.³⁷
Both the normative status of jurisprudence and the empirical status of sociology are transcended by this free act.\textsuperscript{38} With regard to the question whence comes the ‘ought’ of normative law, ‘law exists at the intersection of the is and the ought’, neither on the one side nor the other, for ‘our experience is always that of facts already ordered by norms’. ‘Both [is and ought] are abstractions from experience, which is always of meanings already operating in the world’.\textsuperscript{39} The decision is not explained by a norm; ‘no norm can establish the authority of its own application’.\textsuperscript{40} We are left with the question, which has its parallels in theology: who embodies the whole?, and with Foucault’s caution: ‘unanimity points to power, not to an essential truth’, a question echoed by Moltmann’s warnings about assuming political theology to mean ‘merely the forerunner of the intended affirmative political theology of a coming harmonious world society’.\textsuperscript{41} Kahn’s conclusion: ‘Neither reason nor power alone will do the work of the political’.\textsuperscript{42}

In Kahn’s opinion Schmitt falls victim to what he otherwise criticises as ‘caricature’, i.e. reductionism, in claiming that every political order corresponds to a metaphysical world view, but he is right – and opposed to Weber – in postulating neither norms nor causes (e.g. ideologies or Marx’s material conditions) as the origin of law, affirming the judicial decision itself as a statement of the law rather than the mere application of an already existing principle.\textsuperscript{43} He captures the interplay between social practices and ideas: ‘A practice .. is not the end of discourse but is itself a form of discourse. A practice always expresses a symbolic content; it stands to ideas in the same way that a proposition does’.\textsuperscript{44} Thought, action and faith are always in a kind of interplay.\textsuperscript{45} ‘Linking the subject to the object in a proposition is the paradigm of the free act’.\textsuperscript{46} In the sociology of concepts one must attend to both genealogy and architecture: concepts carry remnants of former meanings into new structures, the prime example being sovereignty itself. ‘They carry these resonances as part of the larger system of thought in which they have been embedded. Because a concept draws its strength from the entire social imaginary, the resonances it carries are felt before they are understood’.\textsuperscript{47} Popular sovereignty, in formulations such as ‘we the people’, has been sacralised, as if it formerly belonged to a different culture.

Schmitt, in maintaining that metaphysics determines the politics of an era, failed to account for the diversity, contingency and \textit{bricolage} that characterise pluralism, but he was astute in seeing that ‘every metaphysics will be linked phenomenologically to a political theory’: metaphysics is historicised as the rhetorical practice that drives politics.\textsuperscript{48} Democracy with its
presupposition of individualism is thus not deduced from some natural order or the image of
God: ‘We are democratic first and then look for metaphysical analogies to support our
political practices and beliefs’.\textsuperscript{49} There is no longer any such thing as a ‘general tenor of
thought of the epoch’; we are in ‘a “postepochal” age’.\textsuperscript{50} ‘The real work of political theology,
then, is done in giving a theoretical expression to those understandings that already inform a
community’s self-understanding’.\textsuperscript{51} Confronted by an existential threat, such as the rise of
fascism or the proliferation of terrorism, popular sovereignty has recourse to the call to
sacrifice, not to legal obligations arising from the social contract; but ‘[l]iberal theory .. fails
even to see the problem’ that this poses. ‘A politics that is complete in itself, that wants only
to realize its own truth, touches on the sacred’,\textsuperscript{52} the implication being that when its identity
and its very existence are threatened, it defends this truth to the last drop of blood as a sacred
duty.

We are ominously close to the rationales of such organisations as the IRA and the Islamic
State, yet the basic thrust of Schmitt’s thinking gives us pause. Liberalism, as formulated by
Rawls or Habermas, implies perpetual discourse and is therefore always demanding reform,
failing to realise that compromise, not agreement, is at the heart of the political: action,
especially under the threat of violence, thrusts itself ahead of yet more discussion, the
stimulus of diversity, and the prospect of arriving at the ‘same’ truth.\textsuperscript{53} Here leaders have to
envison violence as sacrifice, which is the product of imagination and faith, not reason. Is
this, in the end, to be ‘authentic’? And is the authentic necessarily just?\textsuperscript{54} ‘Liberalism fails to
comprehend the nature of the political, because it is committed to an ideal of agreement, first
on the rules and then on their application’.\textsuperscript{55} Let us repeat that sentence, substituting the focus
of our chief concern: Ecumenism fails to comprehend the nature of the ecclesiological,
because it is committed to an ideal of agreement, first on doctrines and then on their
application. Sobering! Perhaps we have been too much attracted to Habermas’s privileging of
discourse, the everlasting conversation that never issues in a decision, waiting for the
convergence that would signal unanimity but unable to imagine fundamental, irresolvable
disagreement. Again, ‘[t]hat which liberal theory fails to grasp is exactly that which we need a
political theology to understand: the sources and character of meaning beyond reason’.\textsuperscript{56} The
free thought and the free act are linked by judgement, and ‘[p]olitical authenticity .. is that
experience of the unity of being and meaning that marks the presence of the sacred’.\textsuperscript{57} Is it
because of this that, ‘[i]ronically, political theologians, just by virtue of their religious faith,
may have a particularly difficult time adopting a political-theological perspective’?\textsuperscript{58} The
question may be directed to Metz, who tended to brush aside Schmitt’s thought as ‘decisionistic’, yet there are resonances here with Metz’s own theme of the primacy of *praxis*, narrative and memory.

Schmitt himself, Kahn concludes, overwhelmed by circumstances in the Weimar chaos, chose authenticity over justice. His powerful leading idea, reminiscent of Girard, that sacrifice is ‘the appearance of the sacred as a historical phenomenon’, admonishes us denizens of the classroom that the call to decision, to respond to the exception rather than conform to the norm, can come to anyone at any time. To embrace the exception is to realise in our own lives ‘an ultimate meaning’. Yet is this, can this be, the guiding idea behind all politics? Robbins believes Schmitt to be ‘fundamentally undemocratic’, indeed ‘antidemocratic’. The answer to democracy’s present difficulties, he believes, is more democracy, not less, and certainly not Schmitt’s preference for dictatorship and the suspension of law. In a postsecular, postmodern context political theology can once again come into its own as the political theory of radical democracy, overcoming the ‘great separation’ of politics and religion in a public sphere that is now global and pluralist. Democracy is not simply liberalism; its fundamental thrust is towards justice for the left-out and marginalised, and it is thus fully consonant with a theology of liberation. There is scope for the reconception of theology and indeed of religion itself as a new global order struggles to emerge amidst violent conflict and apparently irreconcilable ethnic, cultural and religious differences.

### 3. Geraldine Smyth: Forgiveness and Reconciliation

Those Christians who wrestled with the theological rationales which sought to legitimate the conflict in Northern Ireland and tried to replace them with strategies to resolve it, with whom I was privileged to be associated for over 20 years, were in fact grappling with issues raised by both Metz and Schmitt, though this was rarely acknowledged. If this was ‘political theology’, it was in a sense quite different from what Metz intended. The usual heading for these efforts was ‘faith and politics’, and where ecumenists’ thinking delved deeper than theological stereotypes it was the theories of René Girard (of which I was sceptical) rather than those of Schmitt that were influential. In a paper read to the Irish Theological Association I ventured the term ‘political ecumenism’, suggesting that the outcome of the ‘reconciliation of memories’ articulated by my colleague Alan Falconer could be a ‘reconciliation of structures’ in which the churches’ willingness to implement ecumenical
reforms would give credibility to their advocacy of peace in the political sphere. In subsequent years it became clear to me how immensely difficult any ecumenical initiative that brought about real change would be in the Irish context, with its history of churches clinging to their identities in the throes of political conflict. When Gerry O’Hanlon SJ proposed in 1997 that in the prevailing situation of violence and danger of death the Catholic Church could make a gesture of reconciliation by offering Eucharistic hospitality to Protestants, in accord with canon law, the suggestion was dismissed out of hand. This was intended as an invitation to the (Anglican) Church of Ireland and Protestants generally to dissociate themselves from the Orange Order and its provocative parades. It is about as close as we came to reciprocal actions that would have had a political impact, though there were many less confronting ecumenical initiatives.

Under the heading ‘faith and politics’ there was in fact a lot of what could legitimately be called ‘political theology’, though it was more subdued than Metz’s clarion calls for the church to institutionalise social criticism and more restrained than Schmitt’s abandonment of liberal principles and the rule of law. The eponymous inter-church group produced paper after paper pinpointing the neuralgic centres of pain and conflict. If ever there was a society ruled by what Schmitt called ‘the exception’, it was Northern Ireland at that time. The bastions of law and the moral norm were constantly battered by violent acts specifically designed to break them down. Neither political liberalism nor Christian ecumenism seemed capable of withstanding these attacks, yet in the course of time, to a limited extent at least, both have prevailed over anarchic militancy – on both ‘sides’. The gradual reconciliation at the ‘street level’ of divided communities, which I am convinced helped to make possible the Belfast Agreement in 1998, drew on deep and hidden wells of spiritual resilience, made visible from time to time in acts of forgiveness and reconciliation initiatives. It is no exaggeration to say than in many cases people undertook such actions at the risk of their lives. The phrase coined by Rev. Gordon Gray, the Presbyterian minister of Lisburn in the Unionist heartland – on the spur of the moment, he told me, during a meeting at the World Council of Churches – was never more true than on these occasions: ‘divided churches cost lives’.

Forgiveness, as the irreplaceable but difficult precondition of reconciliation, was a central theme, though more often at the individual than the institutional level. There was much discussion of whether repentance was the precondition of forgiveness, or whether the act of forgiveness transcends the demand for repentance. The repentance of institutions, as Donald
Shriver remarks in his study of German-Polish and American-Japanese reconciliation, is rare in politics, yet this ‘complex dialectic of forgiving and forgetting’ is ‘the political form of the forgiveness of sins’. Geraldine Smyth goes at length into the paradox of forgiveness as ‘gift and call to reconciliation’, noting that in the New Testament ‘reconciliation is the context and matrix of forgiveness’, though ‘forgiveness can neither be merited nor demanded’. In a situation as closed in on itself as that of Northern Ireland, ‘one cannot tell the story of suffering without re-opening a well of loss’, which is why ‘the public dialogical context is critical to the healing process’. Forgiveness, far from being some kind of cop-out or soft option, is the key to theology’s being prophetic in such a public context; and coming to terms with the shared memory of suffering is the key to bringing about forgiveness. Smyth and her student and friend, the Presbyterian minister Lesley Carroll, develop this theme in full awareness that the South African Kairos theologians pitted prophecy and ecumenism against one another, dismissing reconciliation as falling short of the necessary condemnation of state-sponsored violence. Paradoxically, this stance is reminiscent of Schmitt’s option for the sovereign act, and in the Northern Irish context, they insist, ‘reconciliation itself was a prophetic act’, and ‘[t]here is no innate dualism between reconciling and prophetic gestures’. They make use of the Priest, Prophet and Sage paradigms deployed by Terence McCaughey to reassess the role of the political in societies riven by conflict and violence. These three ‘primordial models of the divine imagination’ are complementary, and the wisdom of the Sage must temper both the sacralised authority of the Priest and the necessary challenge of the Prophet.

In the light of all this the case could be made that, in situations like Northern Ireland, Schmitt’s ‘exception’ is not so much the violence and the extraordinarily repressive measures undertaken to combat it, but the suffering, remembering which is the first and most fundamental theological act. Here Metz’s memoria passionis is immediately apposite, and with it his advocacy of compassion as the programmatic Christian ministry in a divided world. He develops the powerful idea of the ‘authority of the suffering’ as the basis of an ethical universalism and an ‘anamnestic solidarity’ with the oppressed; but these can only develop ‘on the basis of a fundamental consensus between peoples and cultures that has to be continually regained and that is constantly being threatened’. In this context he makes a passing reference to Buddhism as a model of compassion, though incongruously he dismisses the more usual German equivalents Mitleid and Empathie as insufficiently social and political, giving the impression that Buddhism has even less to offer. Our examination of the...
work done in Northern Ireland, especially the unfailingly subtle and empathetic explorations of Geraldine Smyth, has shown that this is a false dichotomy. If theology in such a setting really is theology, there will be no need to strain after effect and call it ‘political’.

2 Metz, *Theologie der Welt*, 100.
4 See Johann Baptist Metz, *Christliche Anthropozentrik. Über die Denkform des Thomas von Aquin*, München, Kösel, 1962, the brilliant reinterpretation of St Thomas’s thought as the harbinger of modernity rather than a static medieval construct, which, endorsed by his teacher Karl Rahner, became the foundation of his career.
5 Metz, *Theologie der Welt*, 106.
7 Metz, *Theologie der Welt*, 103.
10 Metz, *Glaube*, 49.
14 In *Glaube*, 147, n. 21, Metz points out the relevance of this insight for a future theology of religions, a rare hint that he was aware of this challenge.


Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 17.

Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 10.


Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 18, 19.


See Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 34-35.

See Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 43.

Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 46.


Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 53, see 52.

See Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 54-55, 60-61.

Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 64, see 62-64.

Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 70.

Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 75, see 67.

Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 84, see 81. This is what is missing in Rawls’s scheme of things, where will is reduced to reason, 79.

Moltmann, ‘Theologische Kritik’, 18; he calls into question ‘the universality of a coming religion of humanity’, 31, and concludes: ‘A future world religion for a humanity on the way to being united is not to be acquired so cheaply’, 35. See Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 86, 88.

Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 89.

See Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 95, 98-99, 115.

Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 99, see 93.

See Kahn, *Four Chapters*, 100.

Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 104.

Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 104.


Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 117.

Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 118, 120.

Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 120.

Kahn, *Four New Chapters*, 121-122.
Garret FitzGerald once said in conversation that what he loved about politics was that every day one was forced to make moral judgments based on one’s ethical commitments. Yet he stood out from his contemporaries as a man who submitted political judgments to rational analysis and acted on principle.

Robbins, Radical Democracy, 13, 4.

Robbins, Radical Democracy, 108, see 115.

See Robbins, Radical Democracy, 133-134, 138, 175.


An Interchurch Group on Faith and Politics, Breaking Down the Ennity: Faith and Politics in the Northern Ireland Conflict, Belfast, 1993, gathers together some of the more important papers on topics such as unemployment, the peace process, remembering the past and funerals. Others treated the early release of political prisoners (1995), parity of esteem (1997), the misinterpretation of ‘justification’ as ‘self-righteous collective superiority’ (1999), guiding traditions through the transition from sectarianism (2001). Each sentence of each paper had to be carefully weighed to make sure it did not exacerbate the very divisions it was meant to heal – something entirely outside the range of Metz’s class-conscious rhetoric.

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73 See McCaughey, Memory and Redemption, chapters 11 and 12.
74 Smyth and Carroll, ‘The Wisdom’, where they note the special contribution of women, who ‘bear witness that such “maternal” dedication is not without its political impact and, in transcending normal politics, contributes to the transformation of political systems’, 161.
76 Metz, ‘In Memory’, 182, see182-184.