HOLY LAND AND HOLY SEE

PAPAL POLICY ON PALESTINE DURING THE PONTIFICATES OF POPES PIUS X, BENEDICT XV AND PIUS XI FROM 1903 TO 1939

PhD Thesis
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1.1. THE INTRIGUING QUESTION

On 25 January 1904, the Feast of the Conversion of St Paul, the recently-elected Pope Pius X granted an Audience in the Vatican Palace to Dr Theodor Herzl, leader of the Zionist movement, and heard his plea for papal approval for the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine. Dr Herzl outlined to the Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church the full details of the Zionist project, providing assurances that the various Holy Places in Palestine would be “ex-territorialised” to ensure their security and protection, and sought the Pope’s endorsement and support, preferably through the issuing of a pro-Zionist encyclical. Pope Pius X gave an immediate response to Dr Herzl, vigorously stating that he was “not able” \(\text{non possumus}\) to accede to this request, though the Catholic Church would not oppose Jewish emigration to Palestine on humanitarian grounds. The Pope promised that the Catholic Church would have churches and priests ready in Palestine to receive the incoming Jewish immigrants into the Christian faith. Herzl left the Audience disappointed in his hopes of approval from the Holy See for the Zionist project. The intriguing question which this episode poses is:-
what was the Holy See’s subsequent response to being made aware of the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine? Did the Holy See take it seriously, and develop a policy and strategy for dealing with a proposal whose implementation would ultimately lead to the establishment of the State of Israel? Was the Holy See’s response shaped by anti-Semitism?

And all of these questions invite the initial question:-

just what was the Holy See’s policy regarding the Holy Land, Palestine, up to the time of this momentous Audience between Pius X and Dr Herzl in 1904? And did that policy subsequently change as the implementation of the Zionist project unfolded with vigour and determination through the pontificates of Popes Pius X, Benedict XV and Pius XI?

1.2. THE CLEAR HYPOTHESIS TO ANSWER IT

A review of the history of the Holy See’s approach to the Holy Land from the pontificate of Pope Urban II [1088-1099] to Pope Leo XIII [1878-1903] is explored in Appendix 1. This review shows that the overriding policy of the Holy See to the Holy Land was, from the promulgation of the first Crusade by Urban II at Clermont on 27 November 1095, the protection of the Christian Holy Places in the Holy Land and the safety of Christian pilgrims visiting those Holy Places. From the Seventeenth Century a secondary policy slowly developed within the Holy See, especially within its Propaganda Fide dicastery from 1622, of nurturing an indigenous Latin [and later Greek] Catholic population within Palestine. Following the failure and fall of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1187 the principal agent of the Holy See for the securing and protection of the Christian Holy Places in Palestine came to be the Franciscan Order, which arrived in Palestine in 1217. In 1847, following decades of disruption within the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa and the establishment in 1841 of a Protestant bishopric of Jerusalem jointly supported by the British and Prussian governments, the Holy See re-established a resident bishop in Jerusalem, the Latin Patriarch, with responsibility for the indigenous Latin Catholic population of Palestine, Transjordan and Cyprus. From the arrival of the first Latin Patriarch of
Jerusalem in early 1848 the two policies of the Holy See for Palestine, protection of the Holy Places and nurturing of the indigenous Latin and Greek Catholic population of Palestine, were administered respectively through the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa in Jerusalem and the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, with the Congregation of Propaganda Fide as the principal dicastery of the Holy See dealing with each of those entities. From 1862 the Congregatio de Propaganda Fide pro negotiis ritus orientalis, located within Propaganda Fide, would be given the role of overseeing the Oriental [non-Latin, often referred to as Greek] Catholic Churches, evolving in 1917 into the separate Congregation for the Eastern Churches [Pro Ecclesia Orientalis], adding an additional dicastery of the Roman Curia to the political and decision-making matrix.

My clear hypothesis is that Pope Pius X did not understand the significance of what Dr Herzl told him on 25 January 1904 about the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine; did not take it seriously; and did not develop an effective and meaningful response to dealing with the Zionist project. Rather, the policies of the Holy See remained what they had been for almost seven hundred years, the protection of the Christian Holy Places through the agency of the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa, and since the pontificate of Pope Pius IX, the nurturing of the indigenous Catholic population in Palestine largely through the agency of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem and the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in Rome but with the additional involvement from 1862 of the office for the Eastern Churches which dealt with Palestine’s Eastern or Greek Catholics. The Holy See did not foresee the Balfour Declaration, and never at any time openly opposed the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine though it did oppose the establishment of a separate Jewish state in Palestine. Its focus remained on the primary question of the Holy Places, and secondarily, the wellbeing and growth of the indigenous Catholic population of Palestine.

My primary hypothesis therefore is that:-
the Holy See adhered throughout the period in question to its two long-established policies towards the Holy Land of protecting the Christian Holy Places and nurturing the indigenous Catholic population, never adopting a different policy in response to the unfolding of events in Palestine from 1903 to 1939. My subordinate hypothesis is that the Holy See never opposed the Zionist project in any meaningful manner, and that its responses to the unfolding of the Zionist project for a Jewish national home were never driven by anti-Semitism, but rather were guided by its two long-established policy priorities for Palestine, the protection of the Holy Places and the care for and nurturing of the indigenous Catholic population.

1.3. THE BACKGROUND CONTEXT OF THE HYPOTHESIS

Catholics until 1959 were accustomed to the prayer in the Good Friday liturgy “for the faithless [perfidious] Jews…. That they may be delivered from their darkness”. Pope John XXIII only required on 21 March 1959 that the word “faithless/perfidious” be removed from this prayer. The Catholic faithful during the period covered by this work were therefore accustomed to hearing Jews and the Jewish faith spoken of in negative terms, which undoubtedly must have impacted on the thinking of Catholics everywhere. Theodor Herzl in his Diaries [at 5] said that: “In Austria and Germany I constantly have to fear that someone will shout ‘Hep, Hep’ at my heels”, repeating a traditional anti-Semitic taunt. For Herzl the fear of anti-Semitism, and its manifestation in such episodes as the Dreyfus Affair in France, was the fuel which powered his development of the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine.

John Pollard, in his 2014 work The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism,¹ and David Kertzer, in his 2014 work The Pope and Mussolini,² each traverse in great and unarguable detail the persistent manifestations of anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism within the upper reaches of the Catholic Church in Italy and within the Vatican, not

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least within the Jesuits who were led through much of this period by a virulently anti-Semitic Pole, Wlodimir Ledochowski SJ. The journey of Pope Pius XI, in particular, away from this disturbing vice within the Catholic Church is one which has been continued by Pope John XXIII and subsequent Supreme Pontiffs.

On 28 October 1965 Pope Paul VI proclaimed the Declaration of the Second Vatican Council on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions, Nostra Aetate, which eloquently acknowledged the origins of the Christian faith and the Catholic Church within Judaism, its patriarchs and prophets; owned the debt due to the Jewish faith, the “Ancient Covenant”, and the origins of Jesus, Our Lady and the apostles “from the Jewish people”; and therefore declared that “the Jews should not be presented as rejected or accursed by God, as if this followed from the Holy Scriptures”. Flowing naturally from this, the 1970 edition of the Roman Missal has included the prayer for the Good Friday liturgy as follows: “Let us pray for the Jewish people, first to hear the word of God, that they may continue to grow in the love of his name and in faithfulness to his covenant ... that the people you first made your own may arrive at the fullness of redemption”.

Whilst I therefore conduct this research and write this work from a position which vehemently rejects all forms of anti-Semitism, the fact is that this work focuses on a period in which people, including Popes and politicians, were influenced by anti-Semitism in many different ways, leading to the eruption of the most violent and virulent phase of anti-Semitism in the policies and practices of the National Socialist regime in Germany from 1933 to 1945. The question necessarily arises, is anti-Zionism, or even failure to share enthusiasm for the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine, a manifestation of anti-Semitism? That is a highly pertinent question at the present time as the failure to resolve the issue of a viable Palestinian state and the ongoing encroachment of illegal Jewish settlements on the West Bank in Palestine continue to bedevil Middle Eastern politics. This work takes the firm position that to be anti-Zionist, or to lack enthusiasm for the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine, is not of itself to be anti-Semitic. Indeed, many ultra-Orthodox Jews living in Israel at the present time do not support the
Zionist project, just as many leading and influential Jews in Europe and the United States did not support it in the early Twentieth Century. It is anti-intellectual, and a defiance of the evidence, to couple the two together inexorably. This research and this work seek to adopt an impartial view which firmly differentiates between the two phenomena.

1.4. CLEARLY ARTICULATED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK THAT WILL BE USED TO GIVE SHAPE TO THE ARGUMENTS THAT SUPPORT THE STATED HYPOTHESIS

My preliminary hypothesis is that:-

the Holy See had two established policies in relation to the Holy Land, Palestine, at the outset of the Twentieth Century, firstly, to protect the Christian Holy Places and protect the Christians pilgrims who sought to visit them; and secondly, to nurture its own indigenous Catholic community within the Holy Land; and that, in the face of awareness of proposals for the implementation of the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine and a Jewish “Commonwealth” there, the Holy See never wavered from these two pre-existing policies, never opposed the Zionist project and never displayed anti-Semitism in the pursuit of its policies for the Holy Land, Palestine, during the period under review, the pontificates of Popes Pius X, Benedict XV and Pius XI.

The conceptual framework I propose for the exploration of this overall hypothesis requires, by way of introductory background, firstly, that I establish through secondary sources, as well as some primary sources from 1845 onwards, just what the policies of the Holy See were for the Holy Land at the outset of my period of review, the commencement of the pontificate of Pope Pius X in 1903. This is dealt with in Appendix 1. As part of this historical background I also propose to consider very briefly the origins and growth of Zionism and of the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine, highlighting its roots not simply amongst Jewish people but also amongst British Protestants whose support was vital to its ultimate success. This is dealt with in Appendix 2. The concluding component of the historical
background is a brief overview of the evolution of the policies of the principal powers [especially Britain, France and Italy] towards Palestine and the Zionist project in the period from 1900 to 1940. This is dealt with in Appendix 3.

Having considered the historical background through secondary sources in the first three appendices, I propose to analyse the policies and actions of each of the three Popes of my period of research, Pius X [1903-1914], Benedict XV [1914-1922] and Pius XI [1922-1939], towards the Holy Land. This should enable me to ascertain whether the Holy See during any of their pontificates veered from the two established papal policies for the Holy Land or whether they abandoned or varied those policies, or developed new policies in addition to the initial two policies for responding to the Zionist project for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine and the establishment of British rule in Palestine through General Allenby’s occupation in 1917 and the subsequent implementation of the League of Nations Mandate to Great Britain to administer Palestine and implement the Balfour Declaration’s promise of a Jewish national home in Palestine. In pursuing this substantive original research, in three separate chapters on each of the three pontificates, I will give consideration to the extent to which the actions and policies of the Holy See towards the Holy Land, Palestine, displayed characteristics of anti-Zionism or anti-Semitism. The Conclusion will draw together the results of this review, testing my hypothesis against the available primary evidence.

1.5. METHODOLOGY

My research methodology is quite simple and straightforward. I have spent two years in 2011-2013 traversing the available materials in the archives of the Holy See in Rome, of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem and of the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem, of the French Foreign Office in Paris and of the United Kingdom Government in Kew in order to ascertain what material there is relating to the Holy See and Palestine for the period 1903-1939, covering the pontificates of Popes Pius X, Benedict XV and Pius XI. With the benefit of the material I have researched I have then given my consideration to the questions, what was the policy of the Holy See towards Palestine at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, and how did that policy
evolve, if at all, in the light of the unfolding of the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine during the subject period? It is therefore a Source-based methodology, considering the available archival and published material, evaluating it and drawing conclusions from the sources.
CHAPTER 2: POPE PIUS X AND THE HOLY LAND

2.1. PAPAL POLICY ON THE HOLY LAND AND THE ISSUE OF CATHOLIC ANTI-SEMITISM AT THE OUTSET OF THE PONTIFICE OF POPE PIUS X IN 1903

The Holy See had in place two specific policies with respect to the Holy Land at the outset of the pontificate of Pope Pius X in 1903. John Pollard, in The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism, has described these as its “two major concerns in Palestine: the administration of the Holy Places and the future of the Christian, especially Catholic, minority”. At Appendix 1 hereof I explore the development and evolution of these two major policies and their consequent strategies from the time of Pope Urban II [1088-1099] and the first Crusade [1095-1099] through to the re-establishment in 1847-1848 by Pope Pius IX [1846-1878] of a resident Latin Patriarch in Jerusalem to oversee the indigenous Latin Catholic community in Palestine and to pursue missionary outreach. By the end of the pontificate of Pope Leo XIII in 1903 the evidence supports my conclusion that: “the concerns of the Holy See in relation to Palestine were twofold, the protection of the Holy Places, in relation to which its chosen instrument was the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa; and the nurturing and dissemination of the Catholic faith in Palestine amongst its indigenous peoples, in relation to which its chosen instrument was the resident Latin Patriarch in Jerusalem, assisted by the generous contributions received from the Order of the Holy Sepulchre”.2

In pursuit of these two policies throughout the pontificates of Pius X, Benedict XV and Pius XI from 1903 to 1939 the Holy See would have to confront the rapid growth of Zionism and the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine as well as the reality of endemic Catholic anti-Semitism within the broader reaches of the Catholic Church. The origins of Zionism and the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine are outlined in modest detail in Appendix 2 hereof. The term

1 Pollard, The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism, at 88.
2 Appendix 1.
“Zionism” was first used publicly only in the early 1890’s. Its true founder as a potent political and social movement was Dr Theodor Herzl [1860-1904], who recorded after the first Zionist Congress in Basle in August 1897 that: “at Basle I founded the Jewish state .... and certainly in fifty years everyone will perceive it”.3 That he would be proven right to within a year was not something which any political or religious leader of his own day would have believed possible. The substance of this thesis is really a recording of the Holy See’s responses towards the Holy Land in the period in which Zionism emerged as an ultimately unstoppable force and reality that, against every odd, transformed the face of Palestine.

The question necessarily arises, to what extent would the Holy See’s responses to the rise of Zionism reflect an ancient strand of anti-Semitism within the broader Catholic Church? John Pollard, David Kertzer and Frank J. Coppa have all recently set out in great detail the strands of anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism which infected the upper reaches of the Catholic Church in the period under review.4 There is no doubt that there was a strong strand of anti-Semitism amongst some Catholics in this period, which Pollard has neatly traversed and summarized in 2014.5 Yet Pollard himself points out that “the official papal attitude was complex, ambivalent, even confusing in this period”, noting the sympathetic conduct of Benedict XV and Pius XI respectively towards the Zionist project and against anti-Semitic violence.6 The distinguished Italo-Israeli diplomat and historian Sergio I. Minerbi, in The Vatican and Zionism: Conflict in the Holy Land 1895-1925,7 persistently conflates the two attitudes of anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. He relies heavily on views expressed by the Jesuit journal, Civiltà Cattolica, as though these views necessarily reflected those of the Holy See. This thesis seeks to understand the truth of what the Holy See did

5 Pollard, The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism, at 280-281.
6 Pollard, The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism, at 276-282 and 472-473.
and said in relation to the Holy Land and to distinguish the Holy See’s actions and words from those of other Catholic organizations which did not form part of the Holy See itself, for example the Jesuits. This has required me to consider the words and actions, or lack of action, of the Popes, their Secretaries of State, the heads of Roman Curial dicasteries, and papal nuncios and other diplomats engaged in the work of the Holy See during the period from 1903 to 1939. It is in this regard that I now approach the accession to the pontificate of Pius X and his brief encounter with the founder of modern Zionism, Dr Theodor Herzl.

2.2. POPE PIUS X’S ELECTION AS BISHOP OF ROME IN 1903

Following the death of Pope Leo XIII [1810-1903] on 20 July 1903 Cardinal Giuseppe Sarto, Patriarch of Venice, was elected bishop of Rome and Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church on 4 August 1903. Cardinal Patriarch Sarto had been identified before his departure from Venice as being papabile, but was only elected as bishop of Rome after Cardinal Puzyna of Cracow exercised the right of veto on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian King-Emperor Franz-Josef against Cardinal Rampolla, the Secretary of State to Pope Leo XIII. Despite his tearful reluctance, Cardinal Giuseppe Sarto was crowned as Pope Pius X in St Peter’s Basilica on 9 August 1903 and placed the Secretariat of State in the hands of Monsignor Raphael Merry del Val, the young secretary of the Conclave. Whilst Pius X was acclaimed for his possession of the virtues of meekness and humbleness of heart, he was also renowned for his “inflexible firmness”, allowing the cross of Christ to be his sole policy and guide. One of the first actions of Pius X after his election was to commission the painter Berthold Dominik Lippay, to paint his portrait. It seems certain that Pope Pius X had known Berthold Lippay during his years as Cardinal Patriarch of Venice. As Pius X had known Lippay well in Venice it seems most likely that he knew Lippay was a

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9 Chiron, 126-127, 135.
11 *Et Cetera, The Tablet*, 12 September 1903, at 22, reported that Pope Pius X had given sittings to an Irish artist called Thaddeus and the Hungarian [sic] artist, Berthold Lippay. See Appendix 5 for Count Berthold Lippay’s biographical details.
12 Lowenthal, 417.
convert to Catholicism from Judaism. When he had been Supreme Pontiff for only six months Pope Pius X granted an Audience to another man of inflexible firmness, Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, the broker for that Audience being Count Berthold Dominik Lippay, the Pope’s favourite portrait painter.

Three weeks before this, on 4 October 1903, Pope Pius X issued his first encyclical, *E Supremi Apostolatus*, in which the program of his pontificate was set out: *Instaurare omnia in Christo*, to restore all things in Christ. In 18 October 1903 the new Pope formally appointed Monsignor Raphael Merry del Val as Secretary of State, nominating him a Cardinal at the Consistory on 9 November 1903. In November of 1903 Pope Pius X wrote a “draft plan for the reorganization of the Sacred Roman Congregations”, the Curia; and in February 1904 the Pope issued a draft motu proprio to the Roman Cardinals entitled *De Ecclesia legibus in novum corpus redigendis* to commence the process of codification and reform of the Canon Law of the Catholic Church. It was in the midst of this positive whirlwind of ecclesial reform that Theodor Herzl travelled towards Rome in hope of an Audience with the new Supreme Pontiff, seeking to persuade him to give papal endorsement to the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine.

### 2.3. The 1904 Encounter Between Pope Pius X and Dr Herzl

Herzl’s Diaries show that the Zionist leader reached Venice in January of 1904 without having any arrangement to meet with either Pope Pius X or Cardinal Merry del Val, the new Secretary of State of the Holy See. In the event that he could procure such a meeting, Herzl intended to offer the new Pope, as an olive branch, that in any Jewish state in Palestine the Holy Places would be “ex-territorial”, that is, under international control. His first efforts to procure a papal audience through the good offices of Count von Goluchowski had been unsuccessful but Herzl set off

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14 Chiron, 135-137.
15 Chiron, 157-158, 149-151. The Pio-Benedictine Code of Canon Law was promulgated in 1917.
16 Minerbi, 98 and 220, fn 19.
for Italy in mid-January of 1904, arriving in Venice on 18 January. There he encountered the newly ennobled Count Berthold Lippay in the Bauer Bierhaus.\textsuperscript{17} Lippay recognized Herzl and approached him, immediately offering to use his connections in the Vatican to procure an Audience for Herzl with the new Pope.\textsuperscript{18}

Upon arriving in Rome on 21 January 1904 Herzl found Count Lippay awaiting him, in order to confirm that Herzl’s “audience with the Pope was assured”.\textsuperscript{19} Herzl made clear that his sole objective for this encounter was to persuade Pope Pius X to issue “an encyclical that he has no objection to Zionism, provided the Holy Places are exterritorialized”.\textsuperscript{20}

On 22 January 1904 Count Lippay escorted Herzl to the Vatican Palace, driving up to the Bronze Doors where he was saluted and acknowledged by the Swiss Guards. Lippay then accompanied Herzl into the presence of the Secretary of State, Cardinal Merry del Val, in the Borgia Apartments.\textsuperscript{21} Herzl asked Merry del Val for “the good will of the Holy See for our cause”, to which the Secretary of State replied that:-

\begin{quote}
I do not rightly see how we can take the initiative in this. So long as the Jews deny the divinity of Christ, we certainly cannot side with them. Not that we have any ill will toward them. On the contrary, the Church has always protected them. They are for us the indispensable witnesses of what took place in the days when God dwelt on earth. But they persist in denying the divinity of Christ. How then, short of abandoning our own highest principles, can we agree to their regaining possession of the Holy Land?\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

When Herzl proffered the position that the Holy Places would be “exterritorialised” the Secretary of State responded that “it is virtually impossible to think of them as

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\textsuperscript{17} Lowenthal, Martin, Ed./transl., The Diaries of Theodor Herzl, (New York: The Dial Press, 1956), 417; Minerbi, ibid, 98. The date of 18 January flows from Herzl’s diary entry two days later, on 20 January.
\textsuperscript{18} Lowenthal, 417.
\textsuperscript{19} Lowenthal, 418.
\textsuperscript{20} Lowenthal, 419.
\textsuperscript{21} Lowenthal, 420.
\textsuperscript{22} Lowenthal, 421.
\end{flushleft}
set apart, one from the other, in such terms”. Merry del Val declared that “the College of Cardinals has never considered this question”, although “the existence of such a movement is well known through the press”, but that “the College as such could not take official cognizance of the matter unless an exposition of the case were submitted to it”. He concluded that he saw “no possibility of our assuming the initiative”. The Secretary of State did undertake “to ask the Pope to grant me an audience”.

It is essential to understand from the evidence surrounding this encounter that the Holy See had never, up to that point, given any consideration to the Zionist question and that it was the Secretary of State’s considered opinion that the Holy See could take no initiative with regard to the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine. Herzl, who also met with King Victor Emmanuel III while in Rome, clearly attached greater significance to the position of the Supreme Pontiff and placed his hope in the possibility of an audience with Pope Pius X.

True to his word, Cardinal Merry del Val did arrange for Herzl to have a private audience with Pope Pius X on Monday, 25 January 1904, the Feast of the Conversion of St Paul, the invitation being addressed to “Il Dott. Teodoro Herzl”, requiring him to be dressed “in white tie and tails”, to be present at 11.15am and to enter by the “Cortile di San Damaso, Scala Nobile e Sala Clementina”.

Herzl’s vivid description of this audience appears to be the only account of this historic event, since the Secret Vatican Archives disclose no record relating to it. Count Lippay escorted Herzl to the Apostolic Palace and past the Swiss Guards, into the presence of the Pope. According to Herzl the Pope was affable but firm, stating, in response to Herzl’s outline of his request, that:

23 Lowenthal, 421-422 quoting Herzl’s diary entry for 23 January 1904.
24 Lowenthal, 421-422.
26 Lowenthal, 427-430.
27 Lowenthal, 427. Lippay did not enter the presence of the Pope with Herzl, but joined them later.
We are unable to favour this movement [of Zionism]. We cannot prevent the Jews from going to Jerusalem – but we could never sanction it. The ground of Jerusalem, if it were not always sacred, has been sanctified by the life of Jesus Christ. As the head of the Church I cannot answer you otherwise. The Jews have not recognized our Lord, therefore we cannot recognize the Jewish people .... I know, it is disagreeable to see the Turks in possession of our Holy Places. We simply have to put up with it. But to sanction the Jewish wish to occupy these sites, that we cannot do.  

When Herzl declared that “we are not asking for Jerusalem, but for Palestine – for only the secular land” the Pope responded that “We cannot be in favour of it”, declaring his “friendly relations with Jews” in social intercourse and philanthropy, and predicting that:-

Either the Jews will retain their ancient faith and continue to await the Messiah whom we believe has already appeared – in which case they are denying the divinity of Jesus and we cannot assist them. Or else they will go there with no religion whatever, and then we can have nothing at all to do with them. The Jewish faith was the foundation of our own, but it has been superceded by the teachings of Christ, and we cannot admit that it still enjoys any validity. The Jews who should have been the first to acknowledge Jesus Christ have not done so to this day.

Herzl acknowledged that: “His reply had an element of grandeur in its simplicity”. The Pope concluded that “if you come to Palestine and settle your people there, we will be ready with churches and priests to baptize all of you”. Whilst the Supreme Pontiff told Lippay that: “I am glad you brought me the Signor Commander [Herzl]”,

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28 Lowenthal, 427-430, at 428.
29 Lowenthal, 427-430, at 429.
30 Lowenthal, 429.
31 Lowenthal, 427-430, at 430.
Pius X concluded the audience by reiterating the words: “Non possumus”/ “We cannot”.  

At first glance the encounter between Theodor Herzl and Pope Pius X may seem to have been a dead end, something that led nowhere. In fact this was far from the case, as subsequent history would show. Herzl’s successors in the Zionist movement would continue to seek the support of the Holy See for the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine. In 1917 Nathan Sokolow would obtain that support from Pope Benedict XV. Within months of that event the British Government had released the Balfour Declaration in favour of a Jewish national home in Palestine, General Allenby had captured Jerusalem from the Ottoman Empire, and history has flowed inexorably, but not inevitably, towards the realisation of Herzl’s vision of a Jewish nation in Palestine. On 14 May 1948 the State of Israel declared its independence. In accordance with Theodor Herzl’s last wishes his remains were taken from Vienna and on 16 August 1949 were interred on a ridge facing Jerusalem, now named Mount Herzl. Herzl had finally accomplished his mission.

The encounter between Pope Pius X and Theodor Herzl, facilitated through the intervention of Count Lippay, revealed two things, firstly, that the Holy See had never up to that moment given any consideration to the question of Zionism and the possibility of a Jewish national home being established in Palestine; and secondly, that Pope Pius X was personally and deeply opposed to such a project. The records of the Holy See reveal no immediate reaction flowing from the encounter between its Supreme Pontiff and the leader of Zionism. One must wait for some time before one can detect actual outcomes that might reflect what the Holy See’s reaction really was, bearing strongly in mind Pope Pius X’s promise that: “if you come to Palestine and settle your people there, we will be ready with churches and priests to baptize all of you”. 

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32 Lowenthal, 430.  
33 Lowenthal, 440.  
34 Lowenthal, 430.
Several months after this encounter, on 1 April 1904 in the German publication Die Welt, Cardinal Merry del Val further articulated the Holy See’s position:

How can we deliver up the country of our Redeemer to a people of a different faith? .... Yet the Church would do nothing to impede the Zionists’ effort to obtain ‘a home in Palestine secured by public law ...’ For that is quite another matter ... If the Jews believe that they can ease their lot in the land of their fathers, that is a humanitarian question in our view. The foundation of the Holy See is apostolic: it will never oppose an undertaking that alleviates human misery.\(^{35}\)

These responses of both Pius X and Merry del Val to the Zionist case argued by Herzl are remarkable for what they do and do not say. Andrej Kreutz has pointed out that:

During the first Vatican encounters with the Zionist movement and the Theodor Herzl visit to the Vatican in January 1904, neither Pope Pius X nor the Cardinal Secretary of State, Merry del Val, mentioned the indigenous Arabs of Palestine ... The Vatican’s negative stand towards Zionism was at that time caused mainly by its anxiety over the Christian Holy Places and their fate under Jewish rule.\(^{36}\)

What appears from this material is that the Pius X had no hostility towards the Jews, and would not oppose the emigration of Jews to Palestine on humanitarian grounds, but that he did not consider the Zionist project for a Jewish nation in Palestine favourably.\(^{37}\) The Secret Vatican Archives are utterly silent in the subsequent years of Pope Pius X’s pontificate regarding the question of the Zionist project. Within a


\(^{37}\) Frank J. Coppa, at 118, addresses Pius X’s alleged “anti-Judaism”, pointing out that Pope’s “long and close relations with Jewish individuals and even some Jewish causes before and after he became Pope”, and notes an obituary in Il Vessillo Israelatico which praised Pius X as the only European sovereign to have protested against anti-Semitic pogroms in Prussia.
very short period of the meeting on 25 January 1904 the Supreme Pontiff and his Secretary of State were consumed by the great struggle with France over the relationship between Church and State, which led to the termination of diplomatic relations between the Holy See and France on 30 July 1904, and to the subsequent separation of Church and State in France. It appeared, on the surface at least, as though the Zionist question had simply disappeared from papal consciousness.

2.4. THE SEARCH FOR A SAINT FOR JERUSALEM - POPE PIUS X Chooses a Latin Patriarch

The encounter between Pope Pius X and Theodor Herzl on 25 January 1904 should have left the Supreme Pontiff with no doubt of the seriousness of intent of those who were promoting the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine. Yet there is no evidence that the Pope took any concrete action regarding Palestine in the immediate aftermath of that historic meeting. Only a year later, when the Latin see of Jerusalem suddenly fell vacant, can we begin very slowly to discern some faint signs of a strategy by Pius X for Palestine.

Following the death of the incumbent Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Monsignor Luigi Piavi, on 24 January 1905 a struggle broke out between Rome and Jerusalem, and between the Jerusalem Concathedral Canons and the Franciscans of the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa, over the appointment of a successor to the office of Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. The relationship between the successive Franciscan Custodes of the Terra Santa and the Latin Patriarchs of Jerusalem since 1848 had been difficult. On the one hand, the Franciscan Custody jealously and zealously guarded the territory and roles it had won for itself over many centuries, not least with regard to the Christian Holy Places. On the other hand, the Latin Patriarchs attempted to assert their responsibilities for the overall wellbeing of the Latin Catholic Church in Palestine and the missionary efforts of the Latin Church there.

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38 Chiron, 160-185 at 170-171.
39 Monsignor Luigi Piavi OFM [1833-1905], a Franciscan, was appointed Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem in 1889.
There were three specific ways in which friction was generated between the Franciscan Custody and the Latin Patriarchate. The first was with regard to its control of key Christian Holy Places and the conflict this often led to with other Christian denominations also involved in those sites, not least the Greek Orthodox and the Armenians. The second related to the assertion by the Franciscan Custody that it alone should rule on the historical veracity of the claims with regard to individual Holy Places, which brought it into conflict on occasion with other Catholic religious Orders who had been encouraged to enter Palestine as part of the missionary expansion of the Latin Patriarchate since 1848. The third related to the role of the Franciscan Custody as controller of particular Latin Catholic parishes in Palestine, for which it supplied personnel and other resources, and which frequently provoked conflict with successive Latin Patriarchs and their staff. In each of these three areas the issue of money, and specifically the revenue from pilgrims and costs associated with the Holy Places, was a source of ongoing tension between The Franciscan Custody and the Latin Patriarchate. The Franciscan Custody’s view appears to have been that it would be better for Latin Patriarchs to be drawn from the Franciscan Order, with past experience in the Franciscan Custody. Failing that, the view seems to have been that Latin Patriarchs should defer in all things to the opinions and interests of the Franciscan Custody. Latin Patriarch Piavi, a Franciscan Friar Minor, appears to have adopted a consistent policy of accommodating and placating the Franciscan Custody during his fifteen years in office.

Reflecting the historical rivalries between the Latin Patriarchate and the Franciscan Custody, the death of Monsignor Piavi led to a struggle over the appointment of the next Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. Nothing in that struggle betokens the least sense of awareness of the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine. Its preoccupations all reflected the territorial turf wars between the Franciscan Custody and the Latin Patriarchate, the rivalries in the Holy Places between the Franciscans and the Greek Orthodox and Armenians, and the historic role of France as Protector of the Latin Catholic Church within the Ottoman Empire versus the rising claims of Italy, and also Spain, to act in these areas. This latter issue connected with the greatest foreign policy issue of Pope Pius X’s pontificate, the rupture between the
Holy See and France which had been developing since the pontificate of Pope Leo XIII but which was formalised by the termination of diplomatic relations between France and the Holy See on 30 July 1904, and which was to preoccupy both Pope Pius X and his Secretary of State, Cardinal Merry del Val, until well into 1907. The affairs of Palestine, birthplace of the Catholic Church, paled into insignificance beside the loss of the “first daughter” of that Church. The French Government claimed that, in spite of this rupture in diplomatic relations between the French State and the Holy See, France continued to exercise its “protecting power” over the Catholic interests in the Ottoman Empire.

The death of Monsignor Piavi brought to a head the long-standing rivalries between the Franciscan Order and the secular clergy of the Latin Patriarchate over the question of whom the Holy See should appoint as the next Latin Patriarch. This rivalry was the major contributor to the long delay in appointment of Piavi’s successor in Jerusalem. The auxiliary bishop, Monsignor Luigi Piccardo, immediately called for the early appointment by Rome of a new Latin Patriarch. Shortly afterwards one of the Canons of the Holy Sepulchre, Guglielmo Barberis, wrote to Cardinal Gotti to express his views as to the decline in the well-being of the Latin Patriarchate since 1889, with the number of priests reduced from 46-48 to 34 or less by 1904. He suggested there was an oppressive and partisan atmosphere undermining the work of the Latin Patriarchate, the source of that discontent being understood by the concluding request from Barberis that Rome not send another Franciscan as the new Patriarch. Father Elia Sciha wrote to Cardinal Gotti complaining of the terrible state of the Latin Patriarchate under Piavi, in which those

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41 Wasserstein, 56.
42 Bishop Luigi Piccardo [1845-1917] was ordained as titular Bishop of Capharnaum in 1902, serving as Auxiliary Bishop in Jerusalem until his death in 1917.
who opposed the Latin Patriarch were persecuted, these serious disorders being the product of a Patriarch poorly disposed towards all of the works of the Patriarchate.\textsuperscript{45}

The force of the anti-Franciscan view within the Latin Patriarchate was highlighted when the Canons of the Holy Sepulchre submitted a petition to Pope Pius X seeking the appointment of Monsignor Piccardo as the new Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. Without naming names this petition conveyed a profound sense of dissatisfaction with the tenure of the late Monsignor Piavi and with the very concept of a Franciscan being appointed as Latin Patriarch, on the one hand noting that the mission work of the Patriarchate, once so flourishing, had been thrown into a state of torpor, its schools negligently directed and Latin Catholics defecting to other churches; and on the other noting the danger of having a Patriarch who would favour one religious congregation over the many others who worked in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{46}

Within the Vatican’s Secretariat of State at this time there appears to have been substantial sympathy for the notion of appointing a Franciscan as Latin Patriarch. An internal Secretariat of State briefing note of 10 February 1905, entitled “exposition on the necessity of choosing a Franciscan as Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem”, noted that according to the last \textit{Relazione}, or Report, from Monsignor Piavi, there were 11,123 Catholics in Franciscan care in the Latin Patriarchate out of 14,700 Catholics in the whole diocese. There were more than 300 Franciscan friars minor working in the sanctuaries and parishes of the Holy Land. This briefing note concluded that, considering the special relationship between the Franciscans and the work of the Latin Patriarchate, if the next Patriarch was not a Franciscan it would result in grave detriment to the Catholic cause in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{47} The Franciscan Friars Minor in Rome themselves put the case to the Holy See for the appointment of a Franciscan as the next Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. This submission observed that since the death of Monsignor Piavi “many had set out to discredit the work of the Franciscans

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\textsuperscript{46} A. 17. Latin Patriarchate Archives GV-LB 2.4-3.6 Segretaria di Stato 1849-1921, letter from the Canons to Pope Pius X of 17 February 1905 [S/64]
\textsuperscript{47} D. 6. Segreteria di Stato Anno 1906 Rubrica 283 (Fasc. 8), Folio 12, Briefing note accompanying letter of 10 March 1906 from Father Fernandez to Cardinal Merry del Val.
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in the Holy Land” and that there was “a real campaign to prevent the appointment of a Franciscan as Patriarch”. It then pointed out that the Franciscans still held most of the sanctuaries and oversaw the parochial care of 12,000 out of 15,000 Latin Catholics in the Holy Land.⁴⁸

Pope Pius X clearly was giving some consideration to the question of whom to appoint as the next Latin Patriarch in the midst of the great crisis of the rupture between the Catholic Church and the French state which was at its peak in this period. Father Lagrange, the then Chancellor of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, had an Audience with Pope Pius X during 1905 and discussed with the Supreme Pontiff the vacancy in Jerusalem. The Pope summarized the situation as he then understood it, that “the Franciscans wish to have a Franciscan, whilst the Canons of the Holy Sepulchre demand to have a secular priest”.⁴⁹ Father Lagrange responded that “the Holy See in creating the Latin Patriarchate had intended to give a father to all the priests of the Holy Land, both regular and secular”, and that he could not understand why one would confer the mitre of Jerusalem on someone who was a religious, rather than secular, priest.⁵⁰ Father Lagrange went on to tell the Pope that a Carmelite nun at Bethlehem had predicted that the next Latin Patriarch would be a saint, to which Pope Pius X responded that he was going to look for just such a saint [je vais le chercher] for the Latin see of Jerusalem.⁵¹

This search for a saint for Jerusalem continued on through much of 1906. Several members of the Latin Catholic population of Jerusalem wrote to the Holy See in August 1906 to seek the appointment of a Latin Patriarch without delay, whether the incumbent Franciscan Custode or some other suitable person, in order to bring to an end the scandalous situation caused by the long vacancy.⁵² After a vacancy of almost

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⁴⁸ D. 6. Segreteria di Stato Anno 1906 Rubrica 283 (Fasc. 8), Folios 14-15, letter of 10 March 1906 from Father Mariano Fernandez OFM to Cardinal Merry del Val; at Folio 15 sets out five Franciscans suitable for the role of Latin Patriarch.
⁵⁰ A. 5. at 148.
⁵¹ A. 5. at 148.
⁵² D. 7. Segreteria di Stato Anno 1907 Rubrica 283 (Fasc. 5), Folio 90, letter of 5 August 1906 from Serafino Mattia and others to Cardinal Merry del Val; D. 7. Folio 92, letter of 25 October 1906 from Seafino Mattia and others to Cardinal Merry del Val.
two years, on 7 November 1906 Cardinal Gotti of Propaganda Fide, responsible for oversight of the Latin Patriarchate, had an Audience with Pope Pius X at which the Supreme Pontiff informed Gotti of his intention to appoint Monsignor Filipe Camassei, Archbishop of Naxos, as Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{53} Clearly, in the opinion of Pope Pius X, a saint had been found for Jerusalem.

\textbf{2.5. MONSIGNOR FILIPPO CAMASSEI, THE SAINT FOR JERUSALEM}

Monsignor Filippo Camassei [1848-1921] was born into the Roman nobility, was ordained as a priest for the diocese of Rome in 1872, obtained doctorates on theology, canon and civil law, and became Rector of Propaganda Fide’s Urbanian College in 1889. He had formed a friendship with Pope Pius X prior to the latter’s election as Pope in 1903 and was singled out for early episcopal appointment, becoming Archbishop of Naxos in the Aegean Islands on 18 March 1904.\textsuperscript{54} That Monsignor Camassei’s personal qualities were valued not simply by Pope Pius X but by others whom he encountered is strongly suggested by a letter of 1 January 1907 from Signor Ottone Calderavi of Naxos which observed that Monsignor Camassei was the prelate with all the necessary qualities to bring peace and harmony amongst the various competing interests he would encounter in the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{55}

A \textit{Relazione}, or Report, from the Latin Patriarchate in Jerusalem to Propaganda Fide of 14 April 1906 gives some idea of the actual dimensions of the Latin see of Jerusalem to which Monsignor Camassei had now been appointed. There were only 17,000 Catholics compared with some 500,000 Muslims, 120,000 Jews, 150,000 Greek Orthodox, and 700 Armenian Orthodox. 8 European and 25 indigenous priests

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{C. 2.} Propaganda Fide 1907 Rubrica 115-127, Vol. 402, Folio 237, Memorandum of 7 November 1906 by Cardinal Gotti; and see also \textit{C. 2.} Folio 243, Protocollo N. 73969 of 8 November 1906 from Cardinal Gotti to Monsignor Camassei, and \textit{C. 2.} Folio 239, letter of 18 November 1906 from Monsignor Camassei to Cardinal Gotti.

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{A. 5.} Latin Patriarchate Archives FC 1.6-1.3 Patriarche Biographie: handwritten notes detailing events in the life of Monsignor Camassei from 1848 until his entry into Jerusalem on 18 March 1907; \textit{Le Moniteur Diocesain}, Juillet 1952, Livre d’Or du Diocese, S. B. Philippe Camassei.

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{D. 7.} Segreteria di Stato Anno 1907 Rubrica 283 (Fasc. 5), letter of 1 January 1907 from Ottone Calderavi to Cardinal Merry del Val, to which Cardinal Merry del Val replied on 22 January 1907, \textit{D. 7.} Folio 98.
served the Patriarchate, which had 33 parishes in Palestine and the Trans-Jordan, together with another three in Cyprus. There were 26 seminarians studying in the diocesan seminary, receiving studies in Arabic, Italian, French and Latin. 38 parish boys’ and girls’ schools were supported by the diocese, together with some 10 charitable institutions and a large number of religious institutions. These statistics highlight that the Catholic population of the Holy Land was small in comparison with every other significant religious group except the Armenians.

Monsignor Camassei arrived from Rome on the Orenoque at the Palestinian port of Jaffa on 16 March 1907, entering his See on the Feast of St Joseph, 19 March 1907, wearing simple choir dress, evincing an attitude of great humility, foreshadowing the style he would adopt throughout his occupancy of the Latin see of Jerusalem. He was described at the time as being “a simple father full of solicitude and affection for his children, both clergy and lay alike.”

In appointing his friend Filippe Camassei to the office of Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem Pope Pius X may be seen to be taking steps to fulfill the only two commitments he had made with regard to Palestine, the first to Theodor Herzl in 1904 when he promised that Jewish immigrants to Palestine would be met by Catholic priests to baptize them; and the second when he promised Monsignor Lagrange that he would send a saint to Jerusalem as Patriarch. What Pope Pius X did not do when making Camassei Latin Patriarch was appoint him to the office of Grand Master of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre, held by his three predecessors in the Latin see of Jerusalem.

2.6. POPE PIUS X DECLARES HIMSELF GRAND MASTER OF THE ORDER OF THE HOLY SEPULCHRE

By Pope Pius IX’s Apostolic Letter of 24 January 1868 Cum multa sapienter the then Latin Patriarch, Monsignor Valerga, had been appointed Grand Master of the Order

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56 Latin Patriarchate Archives LP 2.4-3.3 8 Propaganda Fide 1899-1906, Patriarcato Latino di Gerusalemme 14 April 1906. This document refers to the Greek Orthodox as “Photian schismatics”; the Armenian Orthodox as “Eutychian heretics”; and the Muslims as “infidels”.

of the Holy Sepulchre, of which he had previously been Administrator and Rector.\textsuperscript{58}

The Order of the Holy Sepulchre owed its origins to the establishment of Canons of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre following the Latin conquest of Jerusalem in 1099. In 1848 Pope Pius X had entrusted this ancient equestrian Order to the oversight of the new Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. The contributions paid by incoming members of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre constituted one of the principal sources of revenue of the Latin Patriarchs of Jerusalem and had enabled the construction of the Latin Patriarchate Palace and Concathedral in Jerusalem, as well as its seminary, and underpinned the missionary expansion of the Latin Patriarchate. During his tenure as Latin Patriarch and Grand Master from 1889 to 1905 Monsignor Piavi had installed 1,053 Knights and 166 Ladies of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre.\textsuperscript{59} The Order of the Holy Sepulchre was essential to the financial viability of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem.

At the outset of the pontificate of Pope Pius X the Order of the Holy Sepulchre came under attack from within the arcane world of those concerned with chivalric Orders in Italy, led by the Italian Consulta Araldica, which in this period proposed to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that recognition should be denied to the Order of the Holy Sepulchre, the grounds being that membership of the Order was not conferred by a sovereign Head of State but by a person lacking sovereign status who received a financial benefit by the conferral of that membership.\textsuperscript{60} The campaign to suppress the Order was unsuccessful and on 14 March 1906 the Chancery of Pontifical Equestrian Orders issued a communiqué in \textit{L’Osservatore Romano} confirming that there were in existence five pontifical Orders ranked as follows: the Supreme Order of Christ, the Order of Pius IX, the Order of St Gregory the Great, the Order of St Sylvester and the Order of the Holy Sepulchre.\textsuperscript{61}

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\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Le Patriarcat Latin de Jerusalem}, 5-6.
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Le Patriarcat Latin de Jerusalem}, 8.
\textsuperscript{60} \textbf{D.12}. Segreteria di Stato Anno 1909 Rubrica 274 (Fasc. Unico), Memoria of Baron Antonio Manno of Turin to Cardinal Archbishop Bichelmy of Turin advising against the granting of recognition to the Order in Turin.
\textsuperscript{61} De Gennes, Vol. 1, 467.
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The attack upon the Order of the Holy Sepulchre was definitively countered by the Holy See six weeks after Monsignor Camassei arrived in Jerusalem by means of the Apostolic Letter of 3 May 1907, *Quam multa te Ordinemque*, reforming the Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulchre. Pope Pius X “reserved to himself and his successors the title of Grand Master of the Order and appointed the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem his Lieutenant and Administrator with the renewed power of awarding the Knighthood” in the Order. The stated intention of the Supreme Pontiff in conferring this signal distinction on this Order was to strengthen the Order and its membership, and its very timing might be taken to indicate that it was the second step in Pope Pius X’s two-pronged strategy for bolstering the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem to face the challenges he saw before it. He had now appointed a saintly priest as Latin Patriarch and had ensured the very survival of his principal source of revenue to support the mission of the Latin see of Jerusalem.

### 2.7. Monsignor Camassei settles into his new role

Monsignor Camassei was a Roman priest, and this, coupled with his evident humility and saintliness, defined his style in administering the Latin see of Jerusalem. He had been closely involved with Propaganda Fide for many years and he allowed it a high level of involvement in day-to-day decision-making within the Latin Patriarchate, referring seemingly quite ordinary matters to Rome for guidance. Often these matters involved the competing claims of religious Orders with regard to the operation of schools. Monsignor Camassei displayed a scrupulous sense of fairness and practical common sense which avoided the favouring of one religious or national entity amongst Catholic organisations over another. The use by Monsignor Camassei of the terms “*Greci scismatici*” [Greek Orthodox] and “*Protestanti*” [Protestants] in reference to perceived competitors of Catholic institutions in Palestine in the correspondence of this period highlights that the primary target of his pastoral activities, apart from the care of his own Latin Catholic flock, was to win

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63 See, for example, A. 9, Latin Patriarchate Archives FC-LB 2.4-3.3 Propaganda Fide 1907-1920: Propaganda Fide Protocollo N. 77373 of 20 July 1907 to Monsignor Camassei and notation of reply to Propaganda Fide of 5 November 1907; and Propaganda Fide Protocollo N. 78514 of 15 October 1907.
converts from the Orthodox and Protestant denominations and to prevent the drift of any of the Catholic faithful into those denominations. There is simply nothing in the activities or correspondence of Monsignor Camassei to suggest that he saw either the Muslims or the Jews as the object of Catholic missionary attentions in Palestine.

Three major issues which Monsignor Camassei had to deal with in the first years of his tenure as Latin Patriarch reprised some of the issues which had bedevilled the last year in office of the late Monsignor Piavi. The first of these related to the attempts by the Italian, Portuguese and Belgian consuls to secure the paying of liturgical honours to themselves, in which Cardinal Merry del Val counselled him to follow the guiding principle “nihil innovetur”, a position which favoured France. 64 The second of these related to the ongoing saga of Franciscan complaints about the claims by other religious Orders regarding Christian archaeological discoveries in Palestine, in which both Propaganda Fide and Camassei favoured the Franciscans. 65 The third of these related to the discord which broke out within the Franciscan Order of Friars Minor in early 1909 between the Rome-based Minister General of the Order, the German Father Dionysius Schuler OFM, and the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa, led by the Italian Father Robert Razzoli OFM. This resulted in the Visitation of Father Bernardino Klumper and the making of his Report in May of 1909. 66 None of these issues related in any way to the question of the Zionist project for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, or to increased Jewish immigration to Palestine. These matters simply never arose in the correspondence between Monsignor Camassei and the Roman Curia during his entire time as Latin Patriarch. There is no evidence that Pope Pius X, either through his Secretary of State

64 D. 10. Segreteria di Stato Anno 1908 Rubrica 280 (Fasc. Unico), Folios 101-102, letter of 9 October 1908 from Patriarch Camassei to Cardinal Merry del Val, and at Folios 103-104, the latter’s response of 24 October 1908.
65 A. 9. Latin Patriarchate Archives FC-LB 2.4.3.3 9 Propaganda Fide 1907-1920: propaganda Fide Protocollo N. 83125 of 27 August 1908; Patriarch Camassei’s letter of 28 September 1908 to Propaganda Fide; and Propaganda Fide’s Protocollo N. 943/909 of 17 May 1909 to Monsignor Camassei.
or the Prefect of Propaganda Fide, ever sought to direct Monsignor Camassei’s attention to those matters. The evidence suggests rather that Monsignor Camassei was left to handle his role as Latin Patriarch as he saw fit, in close cooperation with Propaganda Fide. This is born out by the Reports he submitted to Rome and the responses he received from Propaganda Fide as his overseer within the Roman Curia.

As his third year in Jerusalem approached Monsignor Camassei prepared for his three-yearly ad limina visit to the Holy See. In advance of this ad limina visit, in May of 1910 Monsignor Camassei submitted his Relazione sullo stato del Patriarcato latino di Gerusalemme, in which he noted the importance of the contributions from the Order of the Holy Sepulchre to the work of his see, and pointed out that there were now some 17,000 Catholics in the Latin Patriarchate, compared to 500,000 Muslims, 150,000 Jews, 150,000 Greek Orthodox and 800 Armenian Orthodox. The Latin Patriarchate now had some forty three parishes, of which thirteen were administered by the Franciscan Custody.

In response to Monsignor Camassei’s Relazione Cardinal Gotti of Propaganda Fide made a formal Risposta on 27 September 1910 in which he congratulated the Latin Patriarch on the zeal and prudence with which he was administering his diocese, and asking only that three specific issues be addressed. The first of these was the need to hold a diocesan synod in accordance with the rulings of the Council of Trent. The second was that he himself make a pastoral visit to Trans-Jordan rather than leaving this task to his auxiliary bishop. The third was that the number of marriages between Catholic women and “Greek schismatic” men be rendered “less frequent”, because the women in such marriages ceased to attend a Catholic Church. We are entitled to take this Risposta from Propaganda Fide as a true reflection of the Holy See’s concerns and priorities with regard to the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem at this time. Those concerns are for greater pastoral involvement of Monsignor Camassei in


69 A. 9. Latin Patriarchate Archives FC-LB 2.4-3.3 9 Propaganda Fide 1907-1920, Propaganda Fide Protocollo N. 1083/1910 of 27 September 1910 Risposta alla Relazione del Patriarcato
the Trans-Jordan and the reduction of the drift through marriage of Catholic women into the Greek Orthodox Church. There is simply nothing to suggest that, at the level of Propaganda Fide, there was any focus on the need for missionary outreach to the incoming Jewish population, which was growing rapidly in this period and now equalled the Greek Orthodox community in size, having grown by 30,000 in three years. The Zionist project was gaining momentum in Palestine with no visible response either from within the Holy See or from the Latin Patriarchate in Jerusalem.

International developments in this period also suggest where the interests of the Holy See were perceived by itself to lie. The Young Turk Revolution which broke out in Constantinople during April 1908 led to the restoration by Sultan Abdul Hamid II of the 1876 Constitution for the Ottoman Empire, Franciscan Custode Razzoli reporting on 10 August 1908 to Cardinal Gotti of Propaganda Fide on the likely impact of this development for the Catholics of the Holy Land.  

Cardinal Gotti referred this report to Cardinal Merry del Val on 3 September 1908. He pointed out that its contents suggested apprehensions of grave difficulties which might impact on the rights of the Latin Catholic Church in relation to the Holy Places of Palestine. This highlights that the principal focus of the Holy See in relation to these momentous events in the Ottoman empire was first and foremost upon the Latin Catholic rights regarding the Holy Places in Palestine.

Whatever may have been the driving concern of the Holy See regarding Palestine, for Monsignor Camassei, the resident bishop, the pressing concerns were very local. On 22 March 1909 Monsignor Camassei wrote to Cardinal Gotti as a result of a fracas which had broken out in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre between the Armenians and the Latins, noting the disgraceful behaviour of the Armenians, Greeks, Syrians and others. He then expressed concern that there existed amongst the Latin Catholic populace grave discontent with the Franciscans over their attitudes concerning such matters as the rentals due for houses, and that this discontent was sufficiently

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71 D. 10. Folios 96-97, Protocollo N. 83105 of 3 September 1908 from Cardinal Gotti to Cardinal Merry del Val, receipt of which was acknowledged by the latter on 8 September 1908, D. 10. Folio 98.
serious that Monsignor Camassei was concerned that there would be questions raised about the Franciscan administration in the Holy Land. This directly connected with the discord then raging within the Franciscan Order of Friars Minor itself over the administration of the Franciscan Custody.

Another local issue which caused Monsignor Camassei to be seriously preoccupied in 1910 was the Latin Patriarchate’s diocesan seminary following accusations of favouritism by the seminary Rector against the seminary’s Prefect of Studies, Father Salvatore Bandak. Monsignor Camassei had made various changes at the seminary in an attempt to address a state of open warfare between the aged seminary Rector and Father Bandak, in which the seminary students were drawn into support for one or other of the two factions. The final breakdown was apparently prompted by Monsignor Camassei’s own stated desire, which he connected to the wishes of Pope Pius X himself, for reform of the seminary following his return from his ad limina visit to Rome in September 1910. The seminary saga continued until at least May of 1912, Monsignor Camassei having written on 15 April 1912 to Cardinal Gotti to say that he intended to proceed to ordain as subdeacons the two French seminarians involved in the unseemly fracas, saying that he found the accusations against them to have been false calumnies and to have emanated at least in part from a sense of division between the European and Arab seminarians in the Jerusalem seminary. This suggests the rising tensions within the Latin Patriarchate between the indigenous, that is Palestinian Arab, clergy and the European priests and religious. A dispute between the parishioners of the small village of Jafa, near Nazareth, and their non-Palestinian priest also drew Camassei into similar tensions. Yet again, this dispute,
one of the few in which Monsignor Camassei encountered criticism of his conduct, suggest the tensions between the indigenous Arab Catholic populace of Palestine and its foreign clergy.


Two issues arose later in the pontificate of Pope Pius X in relation to Palestine which called for the attention of the Holy See. The first was the outbreak of war in April 1911 between Italy and the Ottoman empire over Italy's occupation of Ottoman territories in Libya, in which the new constitutional government in Istanbul had to have explained to it that the Holy See was completely separate from the Italian state and in no way complicit in its actions. The Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, with its Italian-born Patriarch, was particularly vulnerable to suspicion and hostile responses. The Muslim community of Jaffa, the port for Jerusalem, threatened to massacre the Christians there but the local Ottoman authorities intervened, Monsignor Camassei writing to Cardinal Gotti on 15 December 1911 that all was tranquil in Jerusalem thanks to the energetic measures taken by the local Ottoman governor.  

The second issue arose from the fact that the affairs of the Holy See in relation to the Ottoman Empire were handled by an Apostolic Delegate in Constantinople [Istanbul], though France had an overriding role as “Protector” of the Latin Catholics, a role which it continued to take seriously in the midst of the rupture in relations between France and the Holy See.

The seriousness of this problem at such a delicate time was immediately highlighted by Monsignor Camassei’s letter of 21 June 1912 to Cardinal Gotti, drawing his attention to a problem which the French Consul General in Jerusalem was dealing


with the French Ambassador in Constantinople over. This related to the recognition of the role of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem as to the rights existing under the Status Quo, which accorded specific recognition by the Ottoman empire to the Greek and Armenian Patriarchs of Jerusalem, the Ottoman authorities now specifically rejecting recognition of the Latin Patriarch’s authority. \(^{78}\) Propaganda Fide offered an innovative solution to a part of this problem by suggesting the creation of a Chancery within the Latin Patriarchate made up of Ottoman subjects which would deal with matrimonial matters. \(^{79}\) Apart from the innovative solution offered by Propaganda Fide to one aspect of this problem, this situation demonstrated the ongoing reality of the French “Protectorate” which continued in force within the Ottoman empire over all Latin Catholic clergy and affairs. This played itself out in a dispute over the respective precedence due to the French and Italian consuls in Larnaca, Cyprus, in which Monsignor Camassei’s normal diplomatic skills failed to find a solution, leading Propaganda Fide to suggest that the Latin Patriarch endeavour to ascertain the precise extent of the territory over which the French Protectorate reached. \(^{80}\)

During 1913 Monsignor Camassei submitted his second Relazione to the Holy See on the state of the Latin Patriarchate, raising his concerns that the Catholic faith in his diocese had little to fear from the “Israelites, Muslims and Schismatics” [Orthodox]. He observed that the Protestants were a real threat because of the prosperity of their institutions, supported notably from Paris and London, and which were attractive to the impoverished members of the Catholic Church in Palestine. \(^{81}\) This Report indicated that there were now 20,000 Latin Catholics in Palestine, with its principal centres being Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth and Madaba in Transjordan. The notation from Propaganda Fide on this Relazione focussed on the perception


that the propaganda of the Protestants placed in serious danger the faith of many Catholics. Monsignor Camassei’s 1913 Report again highlights that the preoccupations of the Catholic Church in relation to the Holy Land at this time were focussed on the Protestant missionary expansion in Palestine and that the increased Jewish presence in Palestine was not a matter of concern for either the Holy See or the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem.

2.9. THE APPROACH OF WORLD WAR AND THE END OF THE PONTIFICATE OF POPE PIUS X

As the shadow of war descended over Europe and the Near and Middle East the hotly contested issue of consular precedence deriving from the French Capitulations of 1740 continued to preoccupy Monsignor Camassei. When Camassei raised this issue with Cardinal Gotti at Propaganda Fide in early 1914, Propaganda Fide reiterated the French rights deriving from the 1740 Capitulations, but added that in 1849 the Holy See had accorded similar rights to the consuls of Spain and Austria. Shortly afterwards the Spanish Government raised with the Holy See the issue of liturgical honours to be paid to the Spanish Consul in Jerusalem on the occasion of the upcoming birthday of the King of Spain. Cardinal Merry del Val asked Monsignor Camassei to inform the Franciscan Custode that the Holy Father, Pope Pius X, himself wished that the Franciscan Custode should follow the indicated rules in respect of the ceremony which was to occur in Jerusalem on 17 May 1914. This appears to be the last occasion in which Pope Pius X involved himself in the affairs of the Latin Church in Palestine. On 30 May 1914 the Papal Nuncio to Spain, Monsignor Ragonesi, wrote to Cardinal Merry del Val attesting to the happy outcome of the ceremony in Jerusalem for the Spanish King’s birthday, noting that the way in which the Holy See had handled this “growing controversy” had demonstrated to the

84 D. 25. Segreteria di Stato 1914 Rubrica 249 ( Fasc. 3), Folio 71, typed cipher message from Monsignor Ragonesi to Cardinal Merry del Val nof 3 May 1914.
85 D. 25. Folio 73, messages from Cardinal Merry del Val to Monsignor Camassei of 9 May 1914 and 12 May 1914.
Spanish government how just and prudent the Holy See was in relation to the matter.\(^{86}\)

This controversy into which Pius X was drawn over consular precedence in Jerusalem highlights that, whatever he had sought to do in relation to the Zionist proposal for a Jewish national home in Palestine, and whatever he had intended by appointing his friend Filippé Camassei to be Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem and by appointing himself as Grand Master of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre, no change had been effected during his pontificate regarding the policy of the Holy See towards Palestine. Whilst Dr Herzl had offered Pope Pius X the opportunity to secure the “exterritorialization”, or internationalization, of the area of Jerusalem and its environs in any future Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine, at no time did Pope Pius X take up that offer or show any sign that this might be a worthwhile goal for the Holy See to pursue in the long term, particularly given the fragility of the Ottoman Empire by that time. Rather, the Holy See’s twofold primary considerations, the welfare and security of the Christian Holy Places in Palestine and the nurturing of the Latin Catholic congregation there, remained utterly unchanged throughout this pontificate.

Indeed, the available material shows that the Holy See’s policy was completely reactive rather than proactive in regard to Palestinian affairs. Zionism at no time received any significant attention from the Holy See during this pontificate, despite the encounter between Pope Pius X and Dr Herzl in 1904. The assumption of the office of Grand Master of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre by Pope Pius X appears solely to have been intended to boost the status of that Order so that it could continue to generate significant revenues to support the mission of the Latin Patriarchate in the Holy Land. There is no evidence that the Latin Patriarchate gave any attention to the conversion of Jews to Christianity in this period, just as it had never done in regard to Muslims. To the extent that there was any shift, it was towards dealing with the growing strength of the Protestant presence in Palestine, though the conversion of Christians to the Latin Catholic Church from the Orthodox Church remained a serious aim. From a small base the Latin Catholic Church was

\(^{86}\) D. 25. Folio 77, Letter N. 238 of 30 May 1914 from Archbishop Ragonesi to Cardinal Merry del Val.
slowly growing in size and strength, but this paled into insignificance in the presence of the Muslim, Orthodox and Jewish populations, the latter continuing to grow exponentially throughout the reign of Pius X.

At the death of Pope Pius X on 21 August 1914, in the shadow of the outbreak of World War One, the policy of the Holy See towards the Holy Land remained what it had been at its outset, not to ruffle the feathers of the Ottoman Empire in order to ensure the ongoing preservation of the Status Quo regarding the Christian Holy Places and to continue the slow and steady growth of the indigenous Latin Catholic population at the expense of other Christian denominations. Whilst one may read the response of Pope Pius X to Dr Herzl on 25 January 1904 as being anti-Zionist, there is nothing in the subsequent conduct of Pope Pius X, or of any dicastery of the Roman Curia, or of the Latin Patriarch, Monsignor Camassei, to suggest that the Holy See pursued policies in relation to the Holy Land which were anti-Zionist, let alone anti-Semitic, during Pius X’s pontificate.
CHAPTER 3: THE BALFOUR BOMBSHELL

POPE BENEDICT XV AND PALESTINE

3.1. THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PONTIFICATE OF POPE BENEDICT XV

Cardinal Giacomo della Chiesa, Archbishop of Bologna, was elected bishop of Rome on 3 September 1914 by the Conclave which followed the death of Pope Pius X. Taking the name Pope Benedict XV he came to the pontificate amidst the gloom surrounding the outbreak of World War One. By birth a Genoese nobleman, Benedict XV had been one of the most experienced diplomats of the Holy See, having been Substitute Secretary of the Holy See under both Cardinals Rampolla and Merry del Val, before taking up the office of Archbishop of Bologna in 1908.\(^1\) His election as Supreme Pontiff was perceived by some as a victory for the forces opposed to the policies of Pope Pius X, particularly those in relation to France and to the anti-Modernist campaign: “he had easily the best mix of the curial, diplomatic and pastoral experience required of a Pope facing the horrors of general European war, and the difficulties and uncertainties which it presented for the Church”.\(^2\) It will be useful to state at this point that Pope Benedict XV expended himself and the human and material resources of the Holy See to the point of exhaustion and depletion in the pursuit of peace between the conflicting parties to this tragic global conflict and in assisting in the relief of prisoners of war and of civilians suffering as a result of that conflict.\(^3\) Every other issue was secondary for Pope Benedict XV in the period 1914 to 1918, including those pertaining to the cradle of the Christian faith in Palestine.

Benedict XV showed his preoccupation with world peace within days of his election. On 8 September 1914, the Feast of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin, Benedict XV

\(^1\) Pollard, John F., The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism, 29-32.
issued his letter, *Ad Universos Orbis Catholicos*, praying for an end to the war and calling to the conflicting powers for peace.\(^4\) Shortly afterwards, on 1 November 1914, the Feast of All Saints, Pope Benedict XV issued his first encyclical, *Ad beatissimi Apostolorum Principis*, pointing out what he perceived to be the true causes lying behind the present conflict and asking the question: “Surely there are other ways and means whereby violated rights can be rectified”.\(^5\) Yet the Pope and his new Secretary of State, Cardinal Gasparri, were unsuccessful even in their most immediate efforts to prevent Italy from entering the war on the side of the British, French and Russians, which it effectively did on 23 May 1915 with its declaration of war on the Austro-Hungarian empire.\(^6\)

### 3.2. The Immediate Consequences of the War for the Catholic Church in the Holy Land

The consequences of war for the Holy See in relation to Palestine became apparent within weeks of the outbreak of war in Europe. On 10 September 1914 the Ottoman government unilaterally terminated the Capitulations with France, ending the French Protectorate over the Latin Catholics within the Ottoman Empire, including Palestine.\(^7\) Shortly afterwards Monsignor Camassei described to Cardinal Gotti the solemn observance in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre of the death of Pope Pius X and of the election of Pope Benedict XV. He noted the outbreak of war, as a result of which: “The panic is great, not knowing the purpose of this sudden and urgent mobilization”.\(^8\) In fact, as the war erupted, Monsignor Camassei found that his young priests and seminarians between the ages of 18 and 32 were liable to be conscripted for military service in the Ottoman army. The Latin Patriarch sought the aid of Cardinal Gotti in Rome to find places for these young men in Italy so that they could

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\(^4\) Pollard, 86.  
\(^5\) Pollard, 86.  
\(^7\) Propaganda Fide 1917 Rubrica 126 Nuova Serie Vol. 592, Folios 10-12, Newspaper article from the *Jeune Turc*, 10 September 1914, sent from the Apostolic Delegation in Constantinople to Cardinal Gotti on 16 September 1914; see also D. 28. Folios 30-31.  
\(^8\) Folio 370, Letter of 17 September 1914 from Camassei to Cardinal Gotti.
avoid this occurring.\textsuperscript{9} As a precautionary measure in September 1914 Monsignor Camassei gathered various men and women religious from around Palestine in the Franciscan convent in Jerusalem and its guesthouse, Casa Nova, near the Latin Patriarchate Palace.\textsuperscript{10}

The situation became even more difficult for the Latin Patriarchate in Palestine when, on 11 November 1914, the Ottoman Sultan, Mehmet V Rashid, formally declared war on Britain, France and Russia, aligning his Ottoman Empire with Germany and Austria-Hungary.\textsuperscript{11} This was swiftly followed, on 18 November 1914, by the entry into Jerusalem of one of the then ruling triumvirate of the Ottoman empire, Ahmet Jemal Pasha, who set up his headquarters as ruler of Greater Syria in the Augusta Viktoria Palace on the Mount of Olives.\textsuperscript{12} The immediate consequence of these events was shown when all the properties belonging to French religious orders in Palestine, together with all the parish churches, buildings and convents belonging to the Franciscan Custody of the Holy Land, were confiscated by the Ottoman authorities because they appeared on the official list of properties which had been under the protection of France pursuant to the now-terminated Capitulations.\textsuperscript{13} Baron Carlo Monti,\textsuperscript{14} the official intermediary between the Italian government and the Holy See during the pontificate of Pope Benedict XV, gave assurances to the Holy See in mid-December 1914 that the Italian government would act in respect of this violence.\textsuperscript{15}

On 15 December 1914 the Spanish Consul in Jerusalem, the Conde de Ballobar, “closed and sealed the Procura of the [Franciscan] Custody, claiming right of ownership for Spain”, a neutral power, in order to protect it from seizure by the

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\textsuperscript{9} C.15. Folios 459-462, Letter of 21 August 1914 from Camassei to Cardinal Gotti and the latter’s response in Protocollo N.1619/1914 of 17 September 1914 to Monsignor Camassei. \\
\textsuperscript{10} C.19. Folio 3, Letter of 4 September 1914 to Cardinal Gotti detailing the 153 religious from five orders involved. \\
\textsuperscript{11} Sebag Montefiore, 395. \\
\textsuperscript{12} Sebag Montefiore, 395. \\
\textsuperscript{13} C.22. Folios 23-24, Letter N.971 of 22 November 1914 from Monsignor Giannini OFM, Apostolic Delegate to Syria, to Cardinal Gotti, Prefect of Propaganda Fide. \\
\textsuperscript{14} See Appendix 5 for biographical details of Baron Carlo Monti [1851-1924]. \\
\textsuperscript{15} C.19. Folio 8, Letter of 12 December 1914 from Baron Carlo Monti to Cardinal Gotti.
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Ottoman authorities. The intervention of the Spanish consul in the situation in the Holy Land at this time reflected a determined approach by Spain to asserting its long-held rights in relation to the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa. From late 1914 Benedict XV would have cause regularly to discuss with Baron Monti the problems arising from the rebellious conduct of the Spanish Franciscans in the Holy Land, which appears to have been one of this Pope’s major concern for the Holy Land in this first year of the war. However, the effect of this intervention was swift, the Apostolic Delegate in Syria, Monsignor Giannini OFM, reporting to Cardinal Gotti on 16 December 1914 that various properties of the Franciscan Custody in the Holy Land had been recognized as “international” and were therefore now safe from further confiscation. Despite this outcome, the Holy See faced the potential destruction of its long-held policy for protection of the Christian Holy Places in Palestine through the Franciscan Custody, cooperation with the Ottoman Empire, and the assistance of France pursuant to the Capitulations. Looking for new ways of coping with this crisis and the changed relationship between France and the Sublime Porte Cardinal Gasparri, now Secretary of State of the Holy See, asked the Apostolic Delegate in Constantinople, Monsignor Dolci, about the possibility of establishing direct diplomatic relations between the Holy See and the Ottoman Empire and of a formal Concordat being negotiated between the Holy See and the Sublime Porte.

The exile of large numbers of the foreign religious from Palestine in this period also emphasised the risk to the Holy See’s other major policy platform for the Holy Land, in place since 1847, the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem as the means of outreach to the indigenous Latin Catholic population of Palestine. The need for the Holy See to develop a new relationship with the Ottoman Empire with respect to the Holy Land seemed utterly imperative if its long-standing twin policies for Palestine were not to flounder and fail.

16 Ballobar, 17. See Appendix 5 for the biographical details of the Conde de Ballobar [1885-1971].
20 C.19. Folio 15, Letter of 14 January 1915 from Father Briante in Alexandria to Cardinal Gotti advising that some 300 religious sisters had now arrived in Alexandria from Palestine and Syria.
Monsignor Dolci wrote to Cardinal Gasparri on 9 January 1915 regarding his recent discussions with the Grand Vizier and other Ottoman ministers concerning direct diplomatic relations and a Concordat between the Sublime Porte and the Holy See, outlining how complicated such an agreement would need to be if it was to cover all the Catholic interests in the Ottoman empire. On the following day Monsignor Dolci again wrote to Cardinal Gasparri about the pressure being placed by the Ottoman government upon him regarding a Concordat with the Holy See, and suggesting that if a Concordat was to be agreed upon then it should “treat solely general points determined by [Cardinal Gasparri], for example, Recognition of the Catholic Church, election of bishops, Marriage, Property, Seminaries”, and indicating that any such agreement would need to be made in Rome. Shortly afterwards Monsignor Dolci wrote again to Cardinal Gasparri to suggest that one reason not to hasten in concluding such an agreement with the Ottoman government was in order not “to hurt French susceptibilities”. He pointed out that the simple fact of having a formal diplomatic representative of the Holy See in Constantinople would confer immense prestige on the Holy See’s Delegation there in the face of the “schismatics” [that is, the Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate located there].

The need for the Holy See to regularise its relationship with the Ottoman Empire grew more pressing as the plans of the Italian government to enter the war on the side of Britain and France became more likely. On 28 March 1915 Monsignor Dolci wrote to Cardinal Gotti at Propaganda Fide advising that the Ottoman empire had, from the outbreak of hostilities, initiated a struggle which, “while having the appearance of a real religious persecution, is intended principally to knock down and eliminate all that it knows of protection in general, and specifically French [protection]”. This had resulted in the closing of twelve Franciscan convents in the

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24 C.22. Folio 44, Letter No. 993 of 16 January 1915 from Monsignor Giannini, Apostolic Delegate in Syria, to Cardinal Gotti highlighted the growing concern for the Holy See’s relationship with the Sublime Porte now that France was no longer the official protector of the Catholic interest in the Ottoman empire.
Holy Land. The Apostolic Delegate to Syria and the Franciscan Custode themselves came to Constantinople/Istanbul to enlist the aid of the Apostolic Delegate there, Monsignor Dolci, in having the Sublime Porte reverse its decision over the closures, following the failure of representations from the Spanish and Italian Ambassadors. Monsignor Dolci then pursued a different line of argument with the Ottoman Grand Vizier, to the effect that this was a case of setting at rest the view that the Ottoman government was persecuting the Catholic Church and demonstrating that it could deal directly with the Holy See in Rome, through its Apostolic Delegate in Constantinople, which would not convey any notion of a religious protectorate but would rather show that the Ottoman government was able to render justice in its protection of religious interests within the Ottoman domain.

The immediate outcome of this more subtle approach from the Holy See’s emissary in Istanbul was that, on 27 March 1915, the Ottoman Cabinet ordered the reopening of all convents of the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa. This was a notable victory for Monsignor Dolci but it opened up the vista for the Sublime Porte of its control of Catholic interests within its empire through direct negotiation with a representative of the Holy See in Constantinople/Istanbul. In any event the situation was disrupted by the Allied invasion of the Gallipoli peninsula and the opening of naval bombardments by Allied forces on 25 April 1915, which provoked alarm and reaction within the Ottoman government against Catholic religious on the grounds that these religious might be engaging in espionage. Many of these religious were brought before a Court Martial under the authority of Enver Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of War.

26 C.22. Folio 60, Dolci to Gotti 28 March 1915, which makes apparent that the Franciscans had worsened their plight in Palestine by protesting the end of the Capitulations and of the French protectorate, appearing to be the defender of a system which the new Turkish regime was determined to end.
30 C.22. Folios 84-85, Letter from Monsignor Dolci to Enver Pasha concerning six imprisoned Assumptionist Fathers.
Unbeknown to the Holy See at the time, on 26 April 1915 the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Russia concluded the secret Treaty of London which, by Article 15, specifically excluded the Holy See from being a principal participant in any peace conference which might be convened to conclude the current conflict, with the intention on the part of Italy of precluding Pope Benedict XV from procuring a seat for the Holy See at any peace negotiations. The then British Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour, would later explain that this clause was based on the fact that:

The Peace Conference will be limited solely to the belligerents and it will certainly be a congress solely between the belligerents at the outcome of the war, and to such a congress it was absolutely impossible to admit a representative of the Pope.

The deterioration of the situation of Catholics throughout the Ottoman Empire was severely amplified by the declaration of war by Italy against that empire on 21 August 1915. As a result of this event, on 3 September 1915, the Secretary of State of the Holy See wrote to the Apostolic Delegate in Constantinople concerning the continued protection of the properties of the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa. Monsignor Dolci then had a meeting with the Ottoman Director of Political Affairs, the ‘real Minister of Foreign Affairs’ in the Ottoman administration, in which he put forward the argument that the Holy See is the true and sole proprietor of all the Convents of the Holy Land, the Director of Political Affairs not responding directly to this assertion but rather fulminating against the Italian government for its continuous anti-Turkish activity, including in Libya and the Dodecanese Islands, a hostility which he now extended to the Italian religious within the Ottoman empire.

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31 Minerbi, Sergio I., The Vatican and Zionism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 8
33 C.22. Folios 104-105, Letter of 16 September 1915 from Monsignor Dolci to Cardinal Gotti referring to the Secretary of State’s letter of “3 corrente”.
34 C.22. Folio 105.
This conversation highlighted the dilemma of the Holy See’s situation, that it had for centuries relied on the Franciscan Order, largely made up of Italian religious, to gain control of and to oversee and protect the Christian Holy Places in the Holy Land, and that the Franciscan Order, the Franciscan Custody and its Italian religious were all now embraced by the anti-Italian hostility of the Ottoman authorities, leaving the Holy See to make the claim that, in fact, all of those properties and Holy Places controlled by the Franciscans were actually under the “true and sole proprietorship” of the Holy See. Monsignor Dolci was soon able to report to Cardinal Gotti that Enver Pasha had spoken warm words of praise at the peace works of the Holy Father, a reflection of the high regard the Ottoman authorities had for Pope Benedict XV as a result of his considerable efforts to procure peace.\(^\text{35}\)

This high regard was not enough to protect the Catholic religious throughout the Ottoman empire. Monsignor Dolci cabled the Secretary of State on 23 September 1915 that the Ottoman Government had ordered the expulsion of all the religious pertaining to the belligerent States.\(^\text{36}\) Monsignor Dolci vividly described to Cardinal Gotti the scenes surrounding the expulsion of the Religious from their houses in Constantinople and the vain efforts of Monsignor Dolci to procure the assistance of Enver Pasha.\(^\text{37}\) By early October the Convents of the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa had again been closed by the Turks. Those at Jaffa had been taken over for strategic reasons, but the others were the victims not simply of the expulsion of the Italian and French religious from the Ottoman empire but also from the disorganization actually prevailing throughout that empire and the poor information emanating from the Ottoman Minister of the Interior.\(^\text{38}\)

Monsignor Dolci made further representations on behalf of the Holy See to the Ottoman authorities and, on 20 November 1915, was able to report to Cardinal Gotti that the Convents of the Franciscan Custody in the Terra Santa would not be confiscated but that those elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire remained under

\(^{35}\text{C.22. Folio 107, Letter No. 79 of 22 September 1915 from Monsignor Dolci to Cardinal Gotti.}\)
\(^{36}\text{C.22. Folios 133-134, Letter N.83 of 6 October 1915 from Monsignor Dolci to Cardinal Gotti, quoting the telegramme of 23 September 1915 to the Secretary of State.}\)
\(^{37}\text{C.22. Folios 136-137, Letter N.84 of 7 October 1915 from Monsignor Dolci to Cardinal Gotti.}\)
\(^{38}\text{C.22. Folios 140-141, Letter of 10 October 1915 from Monsignor Dolci to Cardinal Gotti.}\)
threat.\textsuperscript{39} It was the view of Monsignor Dolci that, in this distinction between Palestine and the other parts of the Ottoman Empire:

The Government is resorting to choosing a means of retaliation that, without exciting too much Catholic sentiment as with the closure of the Convents in Palestine, is rather efficacious for determining the Holy See to claim its rights over the properties of the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa/Holy Land.\textsuperscript{40}

3.3. THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT PURSUES A CONCORDAT WITH THE HOLY SEE

It is possible to see the more advantageous position that the Holy See found itself in within Palestine as being due to the presence of the Holy See’s own direct representative, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, who was in a position to exercise the Holy See’s ultimate proprietary rights over the Franciscan Custody’s properties in Palestine. This contrasted with the difficulties which existed elsewhere within the Ottoman Empire where no such entity existed and the Holy See’s rights had to be exercised from outside of the empire, conjuring up the spectre of a foreign protectorate of Catholic interests which the Ottoman authorities wanted to destroy forever. In fact, the very existence of a Latin Patriarchate in Jerusalem appears to have encouraged a view within the Ottoman government at this time that a Latin Patriarchate might be established in Constantinople/Istanbul pursuant to a Concordat with the Holy See.\textsuperscript{41} The Director of Worship in the Ottoman Government on 4 March 1915 discussed with Monsignor Dolci for two hours “the situation of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem in relation to the Government”. He raised concerns that “the Latin Patriarch was the envoy from the Holy See and that solely his Vicar was recognized, while this situation was not normal for the Government, and for the

\textsuperscript{39} C.22. Folios 151-152, Letter No.102 of 20 November 1915 from Monsignor Dolci to Cardinal Gotti.
\textsuperscript{40} C.22. Folios 151-154, at 153, Letter No. 102 of 20 November 1915 from Monsignor Dolci to Cardinal Gotti.
\textsuperscript{41} C.19. Folios 80-83, Protocollo No. 21/915 of 13 March 1915 from Monsignor Dolci to Cardinal Gotti.

The intention of the Ottoman administration was that this second Latin Patriarchate would exclude the territory covered by the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem. It was proposed that this Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople would have suffragen bishops at Smyrna and Beirut, ten local Catholics to be chosen as the representatives of the Latin Catholics of the Ottoman empire. Monsignor Dolci’s efforts to subvert or delay this project may be seen at C.19. Folios 93-103.
good of that same Church, enabling the Vicar to treat of important affairs ... against or without the agreement of the Patriarch”. He therefore indicated that “the Government wished to study a reform” in relation to the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, and sought the views of the Holy See as to such a project of reform.\textsuperscript{42}

It appears likely that the Ottoman Government had the reform of the means of appointing the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem as a goal, with the intention of bringing it into line with other such positions within the Ottoman Empire, a move which would have been fundamentally contrary to the interests and wishes of the Holy See. Monsignor Dolci, in order to gain time, had suggested to the Ottoman authorities that “this material was the object of the concordat and it was therefore necessary to await the cessation of hostilities”.\textsuperscript{43} Cardinal Gotti endorsed Dolci’s strategy of delaying progression of this discussion on the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem and of a concordat until after the cessation of hostilities.\textsuperscript{44} By this point it appears that the Holy See had determined that its best interests in relation to Palestine specifically, and the Ottoman Empire more generally, would best be served by allowing a long-drawn out and protracted negotiation over the possibility of a concordat between the Holy See and the Ottoman government, in the hope that there would be a cessation of hostilities between the warring nations before any agreement had to be concluded. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion from the correspondence that the Holy See anticipated the ultimate defeat of the Ottoman Empire and that this view guided its negotiation strategy.

\textbf{3.4. THE ROLE OF THE LATIN PATRIARCH, MONSIGNOR CAMASSEI, DURING THE WAR}

Whilst the Apostolic Delegate in Constantinople, Monsignor Dolci, bore the major burden of direct negotiations on behalf of the Holy See with the Ottoman government in this fraught situation, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem himself,
Monsignor Camassei, must share much of the credit for the successes achieved in relation to the Latin Catholic interests in Palestine following the outbreak of war in 1914. He appears to have justified Pope Pius X’s selection of him as a “saint for Jerusalem”. In the face of the seizures of properties and the expulsion of religious by the Ottoman authorities in Palestine in the latter part of 1914, Monsignor Camassei used his great personal charm and high public reputation to seek the redress of these attacks on the Holy See’s two key interests in Palestine, the protection of the Christian Holy Places and the nurturing of the indigenous Catholic community in the Holy Land. Both Ottoman and German in Palestine treated Camassei with both sympathy and deference at this time, paying courtesy calls upon him and attending Midnight Mass in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem on 25 December 1914. The evidence is that the Latin Patriarch had been able to secure a more favourable treatment for the Catholic Missions and activities under his jurisdiction than had occurred in Syria, “contrary to the intentions of Constantinople”. In February 1915 Camassei reported to Cardinal Gotti in Rome that “all is tranquil, and we live in good harmony with the local civil and military authorities who treat us with much consideration”.

On two fronts, however, Monsignor Camassei now laboured under extreme difficulties. The first was financial and the second was closely connected to the financial, and that was the sheer difficulty of communicating with the Holy See during a time of war. This was made even more difficult once Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire later in August of 1915, the problems with lines of communication impeding the flow from Rome to Jerusalem of funds which were the life blood of the Latin Patriarchate’s Missions and through which it cared for its indigenous Palestinian Catholic community, the local Catholic population, “poor in ordinary circumstances, now begins to be reduced to misery”. Yet despite this poverty Monsignor Camassei was constantly being asked for money by Ottoman

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officials, and his means of meeting these demands were rapidly dwindling as the funds from Rome, and from new admissions to the Order of the Holy Sepulchre, dried up due to the war. This left Monsignor Camassei “anxious in heart” as to how he could continue to provide for his clergy, seminarians and the religious for whom he was responsible.  

In addition to these hardships brought about by the war Palestine suffered a severe plague of “grasshoppers” [locusts] from March to October of 1915, described as being of “Biblical proportions”, which swiftly destroyed all vegetation in its path, causing immense distress and suffering to the local population. The awe in which Monsignor Camassei was held appears to have greatly increased when he conducted a solemn exorcism in the atrium of his Patriarchal Palace in Jerusalem and the plague of grasshoppers dispersed within fifteen minutes. Despite this apparent miracle Monsignor Camassei almost disappeared from the view of the Holy See as communications with him became steadily more difficult. The problems of communicating with him resulted, in January 1916, in a decision by the Holy See, communicated from Monsignor Dolci in Constantinople/Istanbul to Monsignor Camassei in Jerusalem, that it must “prorogue all the powers which she has accorded you for the remainder of the term of the war”. No explanation was provided and the inference may be drawn that the Holy See feared Camassei would be placed under undue pressure by the Ottomans to the detriment of the Holy See’s key interests in Palestine. Whilst Monsignor Camassei would continue to hold office in Jerusalem his authority was completely circumscribed by this withdrawal of his powers, and he ceased to be a significant figure in the events which followed through to November of 1917. The decisions regarding Palestine were being made elsewhere and without any input from the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem.

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50 Le Moniteur Diocesain, Juillet 1952, 138; National Geographic magazine, November 1915 edition;
52 A.6. Latin Patriarchate Archives FC 1.6-1.3. Patriarche Correspondence 1907-1919, Letter of 1 January 1916 from Monsignor Dolci to Monsignor Camassei in Correspondence avec le Delegation Apostolique de Constantinople.
3.5. THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT OF 1916

The Holy See now had no effective power on the ground in Palestine to protect its interests there, either with regard to the Christian Holy Places or with regard to the indigenous Latin Catholic population. The powerlessness of the Holy See to influence events in the Holy Land at this time is highlighted by its exclusion from discussions between France and Britain in early 1916 concerning the possible future partition of the Ottoman territories in Syria and Palestine, which led to the conclusion of the May 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement negotiated by Sir Mark Sykes for the United Kingdom and Francois Georges-Picot for France. Whilst France made clear in these negotiations its desire to reassert its historic role as the protecting power of Catholic interests in the Middle East, and its determination to secure French jurisdiction over the Holy Places of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, the terms of the agreement actually concluded provided for much of central Palestine, including Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Galilee, to be included in a neutral international zone. From Rome, and without the benefit of accurate and timely information about what was happening in Palestine or in major international negotiations affecting its interests in the Holy Land, the Holy See continued its struggle to procure an end to the tragic global conflict which was bringing about the most devastating consequences in Europe.

3.6. NAHUM SOKOLOW’S MAY 1917 MEETING WITH POPE BENEDICT XV

In April of 1917 the United States, following a failed peace initiative by President Woodrow Wilson, entered the war on the side of Great Britain and France. It was in this fraught climate, in which both Pope Benedict XV and Cardinal Gasparri were absolutely focussed on the behind the scenes attempts to broker peace between the conflicting parties, that the promoters of the Zionist project for a Jewish national

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53 Wasserstein, 72. Sir Mark Sykes was a leading English Catholic layman and an enthusiast for the project to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine.
54 Wasserstein, 72.
55 Pollard, Benedict XV, at 91-94, 96-103 and 103-107, sets out the Holy See’s various peace initiatives during World War One.
56 Pollard, 120-123.
home in Palestine once again sought to engage the Holy See in support for that project. The key figure in this approach was Mr Nahum Sokolow, Secretary General of the World Zionist Congress.57

Largely as a result of efforts on his behalf by the prominent English Catholic layman and diplomat, Sir Mark Sykes,58 Sokolow had a series of meetings in Rome in late April and early May of 1917.59 It was said that the French government had urged Sokolow to go to Rome in order “to encourage Italian government involvement and to awaken the Pope’s interest, with the hope that he would support a French protectorate or supervision (while excluding the British) as a way to win back France’s loyalty” to the Catholic Church.60 By the time Sokolow arrived in Rome on 23 April 1917 Sykes had already met with Monsignor Pacelli, Cardinal Gasparri and Pope Benedict XV himself, outlining the “purposes and ideals” of Zionism, in which Pacelli “was most interested, and expressed a wish to see Sokolow”.61 Sokolow met with Monsignor Pacelli at the Secretariat of State in the Vatican in late April and was told, in response to his outline of the goals of Zionism, that “that is not enough. Borders must be determined, what the Holy Places are must be defined, for on this there are differences of view: some hold that they mean all the country, others – that they are only a few isolated sites. We must know in advance what you [the Zionists] demand, in order to avoid conflicts and competition between us”, indicating to Sokolow that “in addition to the existing property, there is also a peripheral area

58 See Appendix for the biographical details of Sir Mark Sykes 6th Baronet of Sledmere [1879-1919].
59 Minerbi, The Vatican and Zionism, at 105-116, gives a detailed outline of these meetings and his interpretation of them. Schneer, 214-215, also sets out their details. Sykes met with Monsignor Pacelli [later Pope Pius XII] in April 1917 and persuaded him to meet with Sokolow, subsequently informing the British Foreign Office that he had “prepared the way for Zionism by explaining what the purpose and ideals of the Zionists were”, Schneer at 215, citing Count John de Salis, British Minister to the Holy See, communication to the British Foreign Office, 17 April 1917, House of Lords Record Office, Lloyd George Papers, box 95, folder 2, No. 16.
60 Minerbi, 106, citing the Armenian Catholic, James A. Malcolm, who had been in Paris with Sokolow.
which we shall require” in order to secure the Christian Holy Places of Palestine.\textsuperscript{62}

Monsignor Pacelli appeared to be stressing that the key point in issue between the Holy See and the protagonists of Zionism was simply one of geography relating to the Holy Places, always the primary interest of the Holy See in relation to Palestine. Accompanying Sykes in Rome was Monsieur Francois Georges-Picot, the French diplomat with whom he had the previous year negotiated the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement for the partition of Ottoman territories following the war. At a meeting in late April with Monsignor Pacelli Monsieur Picot “used ... very decided language with regard to the claims by France to exercise a religious protectorate at Jerusalem, should His Majesty’s forces take it from the Turks”.\textsuperscript{63} This should have placed the Holy See on notice that the French government intended seeking to re-establish the French protectorate over Catholic interests in the Middle East should the Allies be victorious in the present conflict.

Sokolow met with Cardinal Gasparri at the beginning of May. They discussed “the situation of the Jews in general and why they needed Palestine, the situation of the Jews in Russia, political arrangements for Palestine, the Holy Places and the Church’s stand regarding them, and the Church’s attitude toward Zionist aspirations”. Gasparri told Sokolow that “as long as Judaism tends to its own affairs, it can rest assured that it will be fully respected. And if some clerical group or another in various countries comes out with anti-Jewish tendencies, the Church denounces it and if there are complaints they can always be referred to the Church center”, that is, the Holy See itself.\textsuperscript{64} Gasparri went on to indicate that “not only do we [the Holy See] not condone these persecutions [of Jews], we condemn them in the sharpest terms”.\textsuperscript{65} In discussing Palestine itself, Gasparri told Sokolow that Italy had as great an interest as France in the region, and that the Holy See had specific territorial aspirations with regard to the protection of the Holy Places. However, he admitted


\textsuperscript{63} G.1.3.3. FO 380/16, f.151, Despatch No. 30 of 20 July 1917 from Count John de Salis to Mr A. J. Balfour.

\textsuperscript{64} Minerbi, 108.

\textsuperscript{65} Minerbi, 109.
that “we still have no plan and I do not know how this will be settled [but that] the centre will of course be in Jerusalem, branching from there to Bethlehem and Jericho, and we have demands regarding Tiberias, Nazareth, and possibly also Tabor-Nazareth”. When Sokolow responded that he hoped any Vatican discussions on this subject would take place “accompanied by sympathy for our cause”, Gasparri responded that “naturally, we are sympathetic to it. It is absolutely just. You must do this and we will be extremely glad if you succeed in establishing the Kingdom of Israel”. Sokolow then replied that “we do not intend to establish a kingdom, just an autonomous home”. Gasparri concluded by telling Sokolow that the latter must see the Pope, and that “I assure you that from [the] Church you will have no opposition. On the contrary you may count on our sympathy [and] I wish you full success”.

After Theodor Herzl’s Audience with Pope Pius X in 1904, the most significant encounter between a major Zionist leader and the Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church was that which took place on 4 May 1917 when Nahum Sokolow had a private Audience with Pope Benedict XV in the Vatican. The details of this encounter were later reported in The Jewish Chronicle of 8 June 1917:

The Pope has received Mr Sokolow, a member of the Zionist Organisation, in special audience, which lasted three-quarters of an hour. His Holiness listened attentively to Mr Sokolow’s report, and remarked that although he had had a report from Cardinal Gasparri, he welcomed the opportunity of receiving fuller particulars from a representative Zionist. The Pope declared that the Jewish efforts for establishing a National Home in Palestine were viewed by him sympathetically. He saw no obstacle whatsoever from the point of view of his religious interests, but was concerned only with the Holy Places, which he trusted would be safeguarded by special arrangements. Mr Sokolow gave the assurance that the Jews would most carefully respect

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66 Minerbi, 109.
67 Minerbi, 110.
68 Minerbi, 110.
69 Minerbi, 110, citing Sokolow to Weizmann, 1 May 1917, CZA A 18/W, and also excerpts quoted in Stein, The Balfour Declaration, at 406.
70 Whilst Sokolow later said the audience was on 10 May 1917 it is reported in Osservatore Romano on 5 May 1917, Minerbi, 111, fn 47.
Christian religious properties and Christian sentiments. His Holiness replied that he received this declaration with the fullest confidence, and he expressed his best wishes for the realisation of the Zionist programme. He spoke most sympathetically of Great Britain’s intentions and ended by saying emphatically ‘We shall be good neighbours’.  

In a briefing to the press which he gave at Czernowitz on 18 January 1925 Mr Sokolow, by then President of the Zionist Executive, gave his recollections of that Audience with Pope Benedict XV and of his various meetings with Cardinal Gasparri:

I assured the Vatican ... that the Holy graves, the Churches and Monasteries in Palestine would be respected by us. I explained the aims of Zionism. Cardinal Gasparri made objections here and there which I tried to overcome. It appeared to me that Cardinal Gasparri was convinced of the utility of our course. I was very favourably impressed with the result of my audience with the Pope. The Pope listened to me very carefully and asked several pointed questions about Palestine and the development of the colonies [Jewish settlements in Palestine]. I assured the Pope that the Holy Places of Christendom would be respected by us as much as our own. I pointed out that an interconfessional commission would be appointed to undertake the protection of the Holy Places of all creeds. Thereupon the Pope gave his consent to the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, expressing the hope in this connection that the relations between Jew and Christian would be those of good neighbours and of friends. The Pope in the course of the audience expressed also deep condemnation of the persecution of the Jews in all countries. His utterance was published in the official organ

\[71\] B.2. Central Zionist Archives Z4/41030-303/304 Zionist Commission, memorandum by H.Lauber [?] of 29 April 1920 marked “Not to be given until further instruction”, quoting The Jewish Chronicle article of 8 June 1917.
of the Vatican [Osservatore Romano] and made a profound impression on the whole Catholic world.  

Neither Cardinal Gasparri nor Pope Benedict XV left any record of these various encounters, and we therefore must rely principally on Sokolow’s own recollections of these momentous events. From the available information it appears that Sokolow did not canvas the possibility of the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine leading to the establishment of a separate state of Israel, though he did make use of the word “autonomous”. He did, however, offer assurances that any Zionist plans would respect the desire of the Holy See for full protection for the Christian Holy Places, and might lead to the establishment of some form of international commission to oversee the Holy Places of all faiths in Palestine. The Holy See, in response, welcomed the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine, sought assurances that its primary interest with regard to Christian Holy Places in Palestine should be met, gave a commitment that Catholics and Jews would be “good neighbours” in Palestine, and deplored all manifestations of anti-Semitism wherever they might occur. What the available information does not disclose is whether the Holy See sought assurances regarding the rights of the indigenous Palestinian population generally, or those of the Palestinian Catholics specifically, in the face of the further progression of the project for a Jewish national home. Some of Cardinal Gasparri’s remarks appear to indicate a recognition within the Holy See at that time of the desirability of some form of internationalization of the key places in which Christian Holy Places were located, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth in particular.

Cardinal Gasparri’s meeting with Baron Monti on 6 May 1917, in the immediate wake of the Sokolow Audience, made no reference to Sokolow. Rather, Cardinal Gasparri raised the possible internationalization of the Holy Places and of an English protectorate over Palestine, in which freedom of religion would be respected.  

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72 B.2. Central Zionist Archive Z4/41030-190 Zionist Commission memorandum headed Zionists and the Vatican Sokolow and his audience with Pope Benedict XIII [sic]. There is no record extant of Osservatore Romano publishing any such remarks by Pope Benedict XV.  
rather suggests that neither Benedict XV nor Cardinal Gasparri thought that the Zionist project was likely to be implemented as a result of the events which were now unfolding. Only on 19 May 1917, in response to Baron Monti raising the Zionist project with Gasparri, did the Secretary of State respond that the Zionist project as outlined by Sokolow did not constitute a challenge to Catholic interests in Palestine because of the limited nature of its likely scope and intentions.74

The Sokolow encounters of 1917 in Rome highlight the completely opportunistic nature of the Holy See’s foreign policy at this time. It had no army to defend its interests. It was the subject of active hostility from countries which were key protagonists in the war, France and Italy. Its key officials, Pope Benedict XV and Secretary of State Gasparri, were effectively immured in the Vatican and must advance the interests of the Holy See as best they could by responding to situations as they arose and in response to those who came knocking at the door of the Vatican Palace. What the Sokolow episode indicates, in contrast to that of Herzl with Pope Pius X in 1904, is the openness of Benedict XV and Gasparri to the Zionist project as a means of advancing the Holy See’s primary interest in Palestine, the protection of the Holy Places, in the light of the imminent collapse of Ottoman authority and of the very difficulty the Holy See had with communications with the Latin Patriarch in Jerusalem. It shows a sophisticated and nuanced approach but one which did not foresee either the speed or the momentum with which two forces were proceeding, the drive of the Zionists to procure international guarantees for the Jewish national home in Palestine, and the drive of the Allied military forces through Palestine towards Jerusalem.

At the same time that the encounters were taking place with Sokolow in Rome the Holy See also took an important step regarding the affairs of the Catholic Church in the Middle East. On 1 May 1917 Pope Benedict XV issued his Motu Proprio Dei Providentis by virtue of which that part of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith responsible for the affairs of the Eastern Catholic Churches was, from 30 November 1917, established as a separate Congregation, called the Congregatio pro

Ecclesia Orientali, which had the Pope as its head and a cardinal as the Secretary overseeing its affairs, the first Cardinal Secretary being Cardinal Nicolo Marini.\footnote{http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/orientalchurch/profilo_concorient_pro_20030320_profile.html} This would have no immediate bearing on the Holy See’s dealings with Palestine, but it betokened a serious interest within the Holy See in Catholic rites other than the Latin rite, such as the Melkite or Greek Catholics with a significant presence in the Holy Land, an interest which would grow in significance and have a profound impact on the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem in the coming decades.

### 3.6. THE BALFOUR DECLARATION IS ISSUED

In July of 1917 a majority of the German Reichstag, under the leadership of the Catholic Matthias Erzberger, passed a “peace resolution”. This encouraged Pope Benedict XV to undertake a new peace initiative, despite the discouragement of the British government conveyed through the Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Bourne.\footnote{Pollard, Benedict XV, 123-124.} On 1 August 1917 Pope Benedict XV issued his “Peace Note” which proposed terms for ending the global conflict.\footnote{Pollard, Benedict XV, 125-126.} The fundamental point of the papal Peace Note was “that moral force of law is to take the place of material force of arms” and it concluded with an “appeal to the governments to terminate a struggle which appears more and more a useless massacre”, Pope Benedict paying particular attention to the plight of Armenia, the Balkan states and of Poland, and made no reference whatsoever to Palestine.\footnote{G.1.3.2. Draft telegrammes Nos. 38 and 39 of 9 August 1917 from Count John de Salis, British Minister to the Holy See, to Mr A. J. Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary.} This Vatican initiative was decried in The Times as a “German Peace Move”, and was bitterly opposed by Italy for fear that Pope Benedict XV might obtain a leading role in any subsequent peace congress. It finally floundered on the shoals of German militarism and the determination of the American President, Woodrow Wilson, to be the architect of any peace settlement, issuing his own “Fourteen Points” peace plan in January 1918, which took over all of the previous proposals in Pope Benedict XV’s Peace Note of the previous August.\footnote{Pollard, Benedict XV, 127-128.}
Dealing with the progress of this peace initiative must have completely absorbed the attentions and energies of Pope Benedict XV and Cardinal Gasparri during the subsequent months, and Pope Benedict later said that the ultimate failure of this papal peace initiative “was the bitterest moment of his life”.\textsuperscript{80}

Whilst the Holy See was absorbed in the months from August 1917 in its own efforts to procure global peace, in the United Kingdom this same period was marked by the secret negotiations between the proponents of Zionism and the British government for the recognition of the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine as one of the fundamental objectives of any post-war peace settlement. The background to the interest of English politicians in the aims of Zionism are dealt with in Appendix 2. The coalescence of English evangelical Christian and Jewish political, social and financial interests and religious enthusiasms, each in their own way and for very different reasons Zionist in orientation, was vital to the unfolding of events in London in the months from mid-1917.

In December of 1916 Mr David Lloyd George had become Prime Minister of Great Britain and Mr Arthur Balfour then became the British Foreign Secretary, the latter having had a long involvement with Dr Chaim Weizmann regarding the Zionist project and the question of a Jewish national home in Palestine.\textsuperscript{81} On 16 April 1917 a submission was made to Mr Balfour that “the best way of influencing Jews in Russia [to support ongoing Russian support for the war against Germany] would be by providing for them a concrete Jewish object in regard to the War [and] naturally that object would be the restoration of Palestine to the Jews in some form or another”.\textsuperscript{82} This proposal completely ignored the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and France concluded in May 1916 and which had proposed that central and

\textsuperscript{80} Pollard, Benedict XV, 128.
\textsuperscript{81} Sebag Montefiore, Jerusalem, 409-411.
\textsuperscript{82} G.1.1.2. Letter of 16 April 1917 from Mr L. G. Greenberg to Mr Balfour enclosing a memorandum on Russian Jews and the Russian Revolution in which he quotes extensively the views of M. Jabotinsky, then in the Russian Army.
northern Palestine containing all the key Christian Holy Places would become a neutral “international zone”.\[^{83}\]

By mid-1917 Balfour had been persuaded that “the vast majority of Jews in Russia and America now appeared favourable to Zionism [and] it was supposed American opinion might be favourably influenced if the return of the Jews to Palestine became a purpose of British policy”.\[^{84}\] In the British Cabinet discussions on this proposal Lord Curzon asked what was to become of the people of Palestine if a Jewish national home in Palestine was approved, and a number of leading British Jews opposed the proposal, including Mr Edwin Montagu.\[^{85}\] However, Lord Rothschild\[^{86}\] was won over to the concept, the British Cabinet approved the proposal, the Americans and the French endorsed the concept, and Dr Weizmann and Lord Rothschild were given the task of submitting a suitable form of words to Mr Balfour.\[^{87}\] On 2 November 1917, as British and Allied forces advanced further towards Jerusalem and the end of Ottoman rule in Palestine appeared both likely and imminent, Mr Balfour, as Britain’s Foreign Secretary, wrote to Lord Rothschild setting out the British Government’s Declaration that:

> His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of that object, it being understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.\[^{88}\]

What the subsequent British administration of the Palestinian Mandate would mean by this Balfour Declaration is encapsulated in the British High Commissioner’s Interim Report on the Civil Administration of Palestine, 1920-1921:

\[^{83}\] Wasserstein, 72-74.
\[^{84}\] Sebag Montefiore, *Jerusalem*, 413.
\[^{86}\] Lionel Walter Rothschild FRS, 2\(^{nd}\) Baron Rothschild [1868-1937], see Appendix 5.
\[^{87}\] Sebag Montefiore, *Jerusalem*, 414-415.
They [the Jews] ask for the opportunity to establish a ‘home’ in the land which was the political, and has always been the religious, centre of their race. They ask that this home should possess national characteristics – in language and customs, in intellectual interests, in religious and political institutions. ... If the growth of Jewish influence were accompanied by Arab degradation, or even by a neglect to promote Arab advancement, it would fail in one of its essential purposes. In a word, the degree to which Jewish national aspirations can be fulfilled in Palestine is conditioned by the rights of the present inhabitants. 89

There is no evidence that the Holy See received any early notification or briefing concerning the Balfour Declaration. Only on 14 March 1919 did Cardinal Gasparri discuss its contents with Baron Monti. 90 The Holy See’s priorities in relation to the Holy Land in this period, far subordinate to its attempts to progress peace negotiations and procure the release or exchange of prisoners of war, were to ascertain the whereabouts of the Latin Patriarch, Monsignor Camassei, and to respond to the Allied advance on Jerusalem.

3.7. THE FORCED REMOVAL OF THE LATIN PATRIARCH FROM JERUSALEM BY THE RETREATING OTTOMAN AND GERMAN FORCES BEFORE THE FALL OF JERUSALEM

The isolation of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem in Palestine had been a matter of great concern to the Holy See since mid-1916 which in August 1916 launched enquiries as to his whereabouts. 91 Only on 9 October 1916 did Propaganda Fide receive a letter from Monsignor Camassei informing them that he remained in good health, despite the many diseases that were afflicting people in Palestine. He reported that the Jerusalem seminary was itself now a military hospital; and that the

91 C.24. Folio 460, Protocollo No. 1381 of 22 August 1922 from Cardinal Laurenti to Tedeschini, and at Folio 461, Despatch No. 19868 of 25 August 1916 from Tedeschini to Laurenti.
seminary’s country retreat at Beit Jala was now under military occupation, being emptied of seminarians, most of whom were now in the Ottoman army.  

By 1917 the collapse of Ottoman authority in Palestine led to outbreaks of lawlessness and looting, leading Monsignor Camassei on 27 May 1917 to issue a Notice, entitled La Terreur a Jerusalem, which said that:

The furnishings and precious objects and articles in the churches and religious establishments of Jerusalem have been pillaged by the Turkish authorities and the German agents; the destruction of religious establishments has been decided upon, and that the precious furnishings from the churches and monasteries were being transported towards the North.  

Within months it was the Latin Patriarch himself who was being ‘transported towards the North’ by the retreating Ottoman and German forces. At the beginning of November 1917 rumours had reached Cardinal Serafini in Rome that Monsignor Camassei had been taken as a captive.  

Though this was then untrue it swiftly became reality on 10 November 1917 when the chief of police in Jerusalem, Gialal Bey, ordered that Monsignor Camassei be brought to Jerusalem from Abu Gosh, where Camassei had gone to recover his health in a Benedictine monastery, and sent to Nazareth as part of a removal of leading religious figures from Jerusalem as the Allied forces approached the Holy City. The order for the arrest and exile of Monsignor Camassei came directly from Enver Pasha in Constantinople on the grounds that the Latin Patriarch was suspected of being an Italian spy.  

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94 C.24. Folio 527, Protocollo No. 533 of 2 November 1917 from Monsignor Dolci in Constantinople to Cardinal Serafini stated that this rumour was untrue at that point.  
95 D.34. Folio 245, Letter of 1 January 1918 from Monsignor Fellinger in Jerusalem to Cardinal Serafini in Rome.  
96 D.34. Folio 181, Telegram N. 1145 of 2 January 1918 from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Baron Carlo Monti, Director General of the Fondo per il Culto.
The auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem, Monsignor Piccardo, was so ill that he could not be transported from Jerusalem together with Monsignor Camassei, but this situation left the Catholic interests in Palestine in grave jeopardy at a crucial moment, the office of Franciscan Custode of the Terra Santa being also in transition at that time. Monsignor Camassei protested that he could not leave Jerusalem without the express authorisation of the Holy See but this was ignored. On 19 November 1917 Monsignor Camassei was escorted into involuntary exile together with the Greek Orthodox and Armenian patriarchs and the Jewish chief rabbis, the Turkish intention being to create the impression that these religious leaders did not approve the imminent English occupation.\(^97\) Camassei was taken only so far as Nazareth where he was placed in the Franciscan convent there, from which he exercised vestigial authority over the parishes of northern Palestine. His authority in British-controlled Judea and Transjordan was to be exercised by Monsignor Franz Fellinger,\(^98\) former Rector of the Austro-Hungarian Hospice in Jerusalem, who was appointed by Bishop Piccardo to be pro-Vicar General of the Latin Patriarchate on 24 November 1917, just as the Allied forces were about to compel the surrender of Jerusalem by the Ottoman authorities.\(^99\)

In this environment the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem was in no position to comment upon the Balfour Declaration or the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine. The Latin Patriarchate was barely struggling to survive on the ground in Palestine at this crucial time. The Holy See therefore had neither of its two instruments, the Franciscan Custode and the Latin Patriarch, in place for pursuing its two historical overriding interests in Palestine just as the entire socio-political landscape for the Holy Land was being thrust into a period of dramatic transition and change. The immediate challenge both for the Holy See and the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem was to work out the best strategy for dealing with the new British-dominated regime in Palestine and to understand what the British goals for Palestine might be as the war moved towards its conclusion.

\(^97\) A.5. Estratto delle memorie del Sac. Filippo Talvachi, Folios 12, 14; Scotta, Vol. 2, 492.
\(^98\) See Appendix for the biographical details of Monsignor Franz Fellinger [1865-1940].
\(^99\) D.34. Folio 177, Telegram of 24 December 1917 from Sir Reginald Wingate to Count John de Salis.
3.8. THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JERUSALEM AND THE REACTION OF THE HOLY SEE

The contents of the Balfour Declaration had scarcely been made public when, on 9 December 1917, the British General Allenby took possession of Jerusalem on behalf of Great Britain and its Allies and began the process of putting in place “a temporary political framework for administering Palestine”. On 10 December 1917 Foreign Secretary Balfour instructed Count John de Salis, British Minister to the Holy See, to:

inform [the] Pope that troops [of the] Egypt Expeditionary Force have occupied [the] Holy City of Jerusalem. Guards of picked men accustomed to police work have been set at entrance of holy places and a political officer has been detailed for supervision of order therein with executive military authority within sacred precincts. He is in touch with both Custos of Latins and Greek representatives.

The news of the British entry into Jerusalem “was received with expressions of considerable satisfaction at the Vatican [and] a solemn Te Deum was sung in the Church of Santa Croce in Gerusalemme”. On 12 December 1917 Count de Salis informed Mr Balfour that Cardinal Gasparri, Secretary of State of the Holy See, had “begged in the name of the Holy Father to offer thanks to the British Government” for the measures it had taken to protect “the sacred spots of the Holy City” in the wake of the British occupation of Jerusalem. That the Holy See welcomed the British-led occupation of Jerusalem as the liberation of the Holy City from the forces of Islam by Christian, albeit largely non-Catholic, forces seems incontestable. On 13

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100 See Appendix 5 for biographical details of Field Marshal Edmund Allenby.
102 See Appendix 5 for biographical details of Sir John de Salis, 7th Count de Salis-Soglio.
103 D.34. Folio 153, Telegram No. 64 of 10 December 1917 from Mr Balfour to Count de Salis, received on 11 December 1917.
105 G.1.3.2. Telegram No. 66 of 12 December 1917 from Count de Salis to Mr Balfour. D.34. Folio 154 contains the Secretariat of State’s own original notations which reflect what de Salis conveyed to Mr Balfour.
December 1917 the *Osservatore Romano* published the remarks of the Cardinal Vicar of Rome, Basilio Pompili, welcoming the liberation of Jerusalem, and saying: “Let your prayer express thanksgiving to the Lord, for now the Christians in the whole world will again be able to feel at home in the Holy Places”.106 Cardinal Gasparri issued a statement from Pope Benedict XV to the World that “The Holy Father [is] most happy to see Christian nations keeping the feast of the Birth of Our Lord in His Holy City, [and he] trusts that the occupation of those Holy Places where the Prince of Peace was born lived and died for the salvation of mankind may be the harbinger of that peace so much desired by all peoples”.107 Cardinal Gasparri told Count John de Salis that “his hope was that having taken [Jerusalem] the English would keep it [and that] under their rule all legitimate rights – of the Catholics and of others – would be safeguarded”.108 The evidence suggests that Pope Benedict XV, and to a lesser extent Cardinal Gasparri, placed great faith in Britain’s reputation for fairness and justice.

Count de Salis had an audience with Pope Benedict XV on 28 December 1917, and noted that “the Pope’s manner was distinctly more cordial than it has hitherto been within my experience [and that] the Pope expressed great satisfaction with regard to Jerusalem, but asked with evident anxiety whether His Majesty’s Government would maintain their position there ... the Pope, while alluding with expressions of benevolence to the Jews, appeared to fear that His Majesty’s Government might agree to forego direct control over affairs, to the detriment of Christian interests”.109

In his final Report to Marquess Curzon in October 1922, at the end of his term as British Minister to the Holy See, Count John de Salis would say that: “For Zionism the Vatican showed, from the first, great mistrust. British rule, it was frequently repeated, would give [the Holy See] every satisfaction, but they were afraid of anything like Jewish supremacy at Jerusalem [and] there was anxiety lest the

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106 Minerbi, 117, quoting *Osservatore Romano*, 13 December 1917.
108 G.1.3.2. Despatch No. 80 of 16 December 1917 from Count de Salis to Mr Balfour; also at G.1.3.3. FO 380/16.
109 G.1.3.2. telegramme No.70 of 28 December 1917 from Count de Salis to Mr Balfour; also at G.1.3.3. FO 380/16 F.297.
interests of the Church should be placed in danger by the policy pursued” by the British government and its administration in Palestine.\textsuperscript{110} Certainly in late 1917 the Holy See manifested clear enthusiasm for British control of the Holy Land and the Christian Holy Places, and whilst it had endorsed the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine, it always saw this as being something which must be kept in check and which must not be allowed to dominate Palestinian affairs. The Holy See’s constant primary concern for the security of the Holy Places was satisfied by its perception of what the British rule of law would offer in Palestine. Its second main concern, for the welfare of the indigenous Palestinian Catholic population, under the oversight of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, remained in a state of real alarm in late 1917 due to its uncertainty over the fate and safety of Monsignor Camassei.

What stands out in the period of twelve months from the Allied capture of Jerusalem to the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration on 2/3 November 1918 is the complete absence of any mention of that landmark pronouncement or the implications of the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine in the correspondence either of the Holy See or of the Latin Patriarchate during this pivotal period. The preoccupations of the Holy See and of the Latin Patriarchate in 1918 were simply to recover from what had occurred during the war and to re-establish normal administration and services for the Catholic interest in Palestine. The Latin Patriarch was in Ottoman hands in Galilee and the auxiliary bishop, Monsignor Piccardo, had died on 3 December 1917. Only on 20 January 1918 was the Secretariat of State of the Holy See able to inform Propaganda Fide that the day to day affairs of the Latin Patriarchate were now in the hands of Monsignor Fellinger as Pro-Vicar General.\textsuperscript{111} In this climate of extreme vulnerability of the Catholic interest in the Holy Land, by late January of 1918 the British Minister to the Holy See, Count de Salis, conveyed to Foreign Secretary Balfour his impression of the increasing cordiality and sympathy felt towards Great Britain by the Holy See:

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\textsuperscript{111} C.23. Folio 167, Protocollo No. 53374 of 20 January 1918 from the Secretariat of State to Cesare Pecorari, Minutante at Propaganda Fide.
\end{flushright}
The capture of Jerusalem, relieving them as it does of an age-long anxiety in regard to the Holy Places, has been an important factor in this change of atmosphere and their satisfaction at the Holy City being at last in Christian hands is [not the less for] the fact that those hands are British.\textsuperscript{112}

By 28 January 1918 the British legation to the Holy See was working to facilitate the travel plans of the incoming Franciscan Custode of the Terra Santa, Father Diotallevi OFM, from Rome to Jerusalem:

in view of the very favourable attitude assumed by the Holy See in regard to the British occupation of Jerusalem and of the importance this prelate has in their eyes it is very desirable that he should be able to reach his destination with the least possible delay.\textsuperscript{113}

The Holy See’s major international preoccupation at this time was with the continuing the efforts of Pope Benedict XV to bring the global conflict to an early end. On 4 February 1918 the British legation to the Holy See informed Foreign Secretary Balfour that:

the Pope is most gratified by the manner in which the principles set forth in his Note of August 1 [1917] have been accentuated by the Prime Minister [Lloyd George] and President Wilson in their recent speeches and that he is correspondingly disappointed with the German and Austrian replies [and that] the Pope ... is convinced that the future of the Catholic Church lies with the English speaking peoples.\textsuperscript{114}

Whilst the Holy See may then have felt that the future of the Catholic Church now lay in English-speaking hands, the French Government was about to make a formidable power-play by asserting that the Ottoman collapse must lead to the

\textsuperscript{112} G.1.3.3. Letter of 26 January 1918 from Mr Hugh Gaisford, Secretary to Count de Salis, to Mr Balfour.
\textsuperscript{113} G.1.3.3. Telegramme of 28 January 1918 from Mr Gaisford to Cairo.
\textsuperscript{114} G.1.3.3. Telegramme No. 7 of 4 February 1918 from Mr Gaisford to Mr Balfour. Cardinal Gasparri had made clear to Count de Salis that the Holy See considered that the French Capitulations had ceased, and with them the French Protectorate, and that liturgical honours to the French consul in Jerusalem were no longer appropriate, the Holy See only permitting them at the Easter 1918 ceremonies pursuant to the concession by Allenby to Picot.
reinstatement of France’s historic French Protectorate over Catholic interests in the former Ottoman domains.

**3.9. FRANCE RENEWS ITS CLAIM TO THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE**

The Holy See received a severe blow to its hopes of influencing, and participating directly in, any post-war peace negotiations when, on 14 February 1918, the secret terms of Article 15 of the 1915 Treaty of London were made public, making clear that the Holy See would be excluded from direct representation at any such negotiations, precluding it from the signal role it had at the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815. Whatever the Holy See might have said publicly on this subject, this was a very grievous blow to the entire foreign policy strategy of the Holy See and a pronounced rebuff to Pope Benedict XV who had spent the entire period of the conflict seeking the means of procuring its peaceful end.\(^{115}\)

Disappointed in its hopes of influencing the outcome of the war through the machinations of the Italians and French, the Holy See now found itself confronted by the reassertion by France of its claims to a French protectorate over all Catholic interests in the former Ottoman domains, and of Italy’s virulent opposition to any such claim. French eagerness to reassert its prerogatives as Protector was made manifest in a heated exchange between General Allenby and Francois Georges-Picot, co-author of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, who had accompanied Allenby into Jerusalem as French Commissioner and was representing French interests there, initially under the misapprehension that Britain intended to share power in Jerusalem with the French as part of the process for establishing the neutral international zone in central Palestine pursuant to the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.\(^{116}\) Sir Mark Sykes immediately afterwards negotiated an agreement with the French Government to resolve this impasse in Jerusalem which “promised that the status quo at the holy places would be maintained and the ‘traditional honours rendered by ecclesiastical authorities acknowledging Papal Supremacy to French

\(^{115}\) Pollard, *The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism*, 76-77.

\(^{116}\) Wasserstein, 82-85.
officials will be regarded as part of the status quo”.

Pursuant to this agreement General Allenby now permitted special liturgical honours to be accorded to Monsieur Georges-Picot as the French Commissioner in Jerusalem. On 3 April 1918 the British legation to the Holy See informed Foreign Secretary Balfour that “in deference to wish strongly expressed by French Government [the] Vatican informed [the Franciscan Custode Diotallevi] that liturgical honours could be paid to Monsieur Picot pending definite settlement in regard to Palestine. This did not imply [a] change of attitude [by the] Vatican [which] considered that with [the] cessation of Turkish domination [any] French protectorate could have no raison d’être”.

This issue was to bedevil the Holy See’s relationship with France and Britain for another five years, caught up as it was with the Holy See’s own desire, on the one hand, to repair its relationship with France resulting from the breach of 1905, and on the other hand, to avoid the reimposition of the intermediary role of France between the Holy See and any governing authorities in the successor states of the Ottoman Empire. The Holy See wished to handle its own affairs in Palestine without the complication of French assistance, let alone of French interference. The determination of the French government to take advantage of the smallest concession from the Holy See was trumpeted by Monsieur Picot in an article on 13 May 1918 in the Italian journal *L’Italie*, in which he was quoted as claiming, in response to the recent granting of French liturgical honours at the Easter ceremonies in the Holy Sepulchre, that: “the Holy See comes to recognize and to consecrate again one more time the Catholic protectorate of France in the East”. The Holy See was thus presented with the challenge of warding off French pretensions in Palestine without appearing directly to reject France’s renewed claims to be the Protecting Power over Catholic interests in the Holy Land, in which it must use the intermediary power of Great Britain, a firmly Protestant nation.

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117 Wasserstein, 85.
118 G.1.3.3. Telegramme of 22 April 1918 from Count de Salis to Foreign Secretary Balfour.
119 G.1.3.3. Telegramme of 3 April 1918 from Mr Gaisford to Foreign Secretary Balfour.
120 G.1.3.3. Letter of 18 May 1918 from Count de Salis to Foreign Secretary Balfour.
3.10. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT SEEKS TO INFLUENCE THE APPOINTMENT OF THE AUXILIARY BISHOP OF JERUSALEM

As a counter to French pretensions in Palestine, from March of 1918 the Italian government pressed the Holy See to appoint an Italian as auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem in succession to the late Monsignor Piccardo. Monsignor Camassei continued to be isolated from Jerusalem, albeit well-treated by the Ottoman and German authorities in northern Palestine, and he was concerned to have the Holy See appoint an auxiliary bishop to attend to the affairs of the Latin Patriarchate as the British-dominated regime took shape in southern and central Palestine. On 29 April 1918 Monsignor Laurenti, Secretary of Propaganda Fide, wrote to Monsignor Camassei to inform him of the Holy See’s intention to appoint Monsignor Pompili, an Italian cleric presently in Constantinople as deputy Apostolic Delegate, as auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem. The Italian government, through Baron Monti, continued to seek the appointment of an Italian as auxiliary bishop and the Holy See felt compelled to explain to him the reasons for the delay.

The impasse regarding Monsignor Pompili was resolved when, on 1 August 1918, Pope Benedict XV approved the appointment of a personal friend, Monsignor Luigi Barlassina, presently Rector of the Pope’s Cathedral of St John Lateran in Rome, to

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122 C.24. Folios 588-589, Protocollo No. 611 of 22 February 1918 from Monsignor Dolci in Constantinople to Cardinal Serafini in Rome, including at Folio 589 a transcript of Monsignor Camassei’s letter of 21 January 1918 to Monsignor Dolci. Monsignor Camassei could only communicate with Rome through the Apostolic Delegation in Constantinople, and by that means he sent details of his health and welfare in this period of his isolation. C.24. Folio 598, Despatch No. 647 of 14 April 1918 from Monsignor Dolci to Cardinal Van Rossum sets out the text of another letter from Monsignor Camassei of 1 April 1918 seeking the appointment of an auxiliary bishop, stating that he knew nothing of what was happening in Jerusalem but assuring of his own present good health. C.24. Folio 593-594, Protocollo N. 776/1918 of 29 April 1918 from Monsignor Laurenti to Monsignor Camassei. The Holy See had hoped to placate the Ottoman authorities by nominating someone already present within Ottoman territory but, in a last assertion of its authority, this approval was withheld by the Ottomans because Monsignor Pompili would be required to traverse a war zone to reach Jerusalem, see D.39. Folios 39-40, Protocollo No. 848 of 3 June 1918 from Monsignor Dolci to Cardinal Gasparri. C.24. Prop. Fide, 1919 Rubrica 126, Folio 3, Letter of 6 July 1918 from Baron Carlo Monti to Cardinal Van Rossum; C.24. Folio 5, Letter of 31 July 1918 from Cardinal Van Rossum to Baron Carlo Monti.
be auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{126} That this appointment was meant to satisfy the desires of the Italian government is attested by the view expressed by Baron Carlo Monti on 10 August 1918 that: “Barlassina was by sentiment sincerely Italian not only by birth, and the secretary of Propaganda Fide had let it be understood that the choice had been inspired by the desire to realise the wishes of the Italians”.\textsuperscript{127} It is important to understand, in terms of the later unfolding of events, that Monsignor Barlassina was the personal choice of Pope Benedict XV as the candidate in whom he had confidence to deal with the situation in Palestine, where the Latin Patriarch remained in isolation, the Ottoman power faced ultimate defeat, the British-dominated regime seemed likely to last for some time and the Balfour Declaration had signalled the likelihood of a significant influx of Jews to Palestine in pursuit of the goal of a Jewish national home there. On Monsignor Barlassina’s shoulders would now have appeared to rest many of the Holy See’s hopes for the continued fulfilment of its two longstanding policy objectives for the Holy Land, the protection of the Christian Holy Places and the nurturing of the interests of the indigenous Catholic population of Palestine.

Monsignor Barlassina received his episcopal consecration in the Basilica of St John Lateran from Cardinal Pompilj on 8 September 1918.\textsuperscript{128} He arrived in Jerusalem on 28 October 1918 and, on 3 November 1918, he was present at the Jaffa Gate to welcome Monsignor Camassei upon his return from northern exile.\textsuperscript{129} The triumphant return of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem coincided with the Jewish community of Jerusalem’s celebration of the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. The Spanish Consul, the Conde de Ballobar, recorded that: “Having to receive the Patriarch freed us from a big promise, which was attending the Jewish celebration”.\textsuperscript{130} Of the new auxiliary bishop the perceptive Ballobar remarked:

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{126} C.\textsuperscript{24}. Folio 17, File note of 1 August 1918 by Cardinal Van Rossum. C.\textsuperscript{24}. Folios 6-7, 13, Protocollo N.1532 from Propaganda Fide to Cardinal Gasparri of 10 August 1918 informed the latter of Monsignor Barlassina’s appointment.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Minerbi, \textit{L’Italie et la Palestine}, 184.
\item \textsuperscript{128} C.\textsuperscript{24}. Letter of 24 August 1918 from Monsignor Barlassina to Monsignor Laurenti.
\item \textsuperscript{129} \textit{Le Moniteur Diocesain}, Juillet 1952, 140; C.\textsuperscript{24}. Folios 637-638, Letter of 8 November 1918 from Monsignor Camassei to Cardinal Van Rossum.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Ballobar, 228. It should be noted that Ballobar was himself the son of a Jewish mother.
\end{enumerate}
They are all delighted with him, but for me, I’d rather not be under his authority. He is intelligent, young, and they say very energetic, but for some reason I find him to be excessively, utterly Italian.  

At the time of Monsignor Barlassina’s arrival in Jerusalem the Latin Patriarchate wrote to Cardinal Gasparri in order to brief him on the situation of the Catholic Church in the Holy Land, no mention being made of the Balfour Declaration, or the Jewish national home or the Zionists, the full volume of outrage being reserved for the “vertiginous invasion by Protestant associations” who were making their presence felt throughout Palestine, and by the increasing use of English as a result of the British-dominated administration. Another matter of great concern for the Catholic Church on the ground in Palestine was its parlous financial position in the wake of the hardships of war, Monsignor Camassei himself informing Cardinal Van Rossum at Propaganda Fide in Rome on 10 January 1919 that Bishop Barlassina had received no remuneration since he arrived in Jerusalem, and advising that the Latin Patriarchate had no present means of paying its auxiliary bishop.

### 3.11. FIRST EMERGENCE OF ALARM IN CATHOLIC CIRCLES ABOUT THE ZIONIST PROJECT FOR A JEWISH NATIONAL HOME

Shortly after Monsignor Barlassina had arrived in Jerusalem, on 16 November 1918, Count John de Salis sent a telegram to Foreign Minister Balfour drawing his attention to correspondence on behalf of 8,000 Syrians in Chile which had been directed to Cardinal Gasparri, which urged “the claims to independence of their compatriots in Palestine as opposed to those of the Israelite minority”, Cardinal Gasparri having handed the telegram to Mr Gaisford of the British Legation that morning. This appears to be the only correspondence involving the Holy See and the British Foreign Office in 1918 which at all mentions the competing interests of the Jews and Arabs in

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131 Ballobar, 228.
132 A.17. Latin Patriarchate GV-LB 2.4-3.6, letter of 22 November 1922 from the Latin Patriarchate, presumably typed by Bishop Barlassina himself as this is the first item of typed correspondence in the Patriarchate Archives, to Cardinal Gasparri.
134 G.1.3.3. Letter of 16 November 1918 from Count de Salis to Mr Balfour.
Palestine, and there is no suggestion that Cardinal Gasparri sought a particular outcome or response from Britain in regard to the matter. There is some suggestion from Belgian sources that Cardinal Gasparri was at this time expressing the view that “British politicians fail to appreciate the dangers of this solution [the Jewish national home] for Christian interests in the Holy Land”. However, when Benedict XV met in Audience with the British Special Mission to the Holy See on 27 December 1918 the Pope made no mention of these matters, referring only to:

the occupation of Palestine and ... some observations on the attitude of the present British authorities during the past year and their evident desire to deal fairly and in a spirit of moderation with the important spiritual interests associated with the Holy Land.  

That alarm bells were beginning to ring in the head of at least one key person representing the Latin Catholic interest in Palestine by late 1918 is suggested by the fact that Bishop Barlassina had was openly expressing the wish “that the Vatican be mindful of the interpretation the Zionists were offering, according to which the Pope supported ‘political rule by their nation’ over all of Palestine”. There is no evidence that Bishop Barlassina conveyed that view to the Holy See by late 1918, but it does suggest that the shrewd auxiliary bishop had detected that the very goodwill shown by Pope Benedict XV to Nathan Sokolow earlier in 1917 was already being exploited by the Zionist campaigners to support the widest possible interpretation of the Balfour Declaration regarding the implementation of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

Clearly alarm bells were also beginning to ring within Catholic circles in England in late 1918 regarding the British-endorsed Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine. Cardinal Bourne went to Rome, where he presumably had high level talks with Cardinal Gasparri and others in the Curia, before travelling to Egypt en route to Palestine.

135 Minerbi, 122 and 223, footnotes 23 and 24, quoting Belgian Ambassador Van den Heuvel on 26 December 1918 and Belgian Ambassador Van Zuylen to Belgian Foreign Minister Hymans on 14 January 1919.
136 G.1.3.3. Letter No. 135 of 28 December 1918 from Count de Salis to Foreign Secretary Balfour.
137 Minerbi, 121-122, citing “Cable from Soragna, December 1, ASME, file 153/20813”.
138 See Appendix 5 for biographical details of Cardinal Francis Bourne [1861-1935].
route for Palestine on 26 December 1918. His purpose undoubtedly was to assess the situation in Palestine and to make representations on that subject to the British Government. On 25 January 1919 Cardinal Bourne submitted a confidential memorandum entitled “Zionism” to the British Foreign Secretary, Mr A. J. Balfour, which sought:

To urge on the Prime Minister and Mr Balfour the immediate need of a clear and definite declaration on the subject of Zionism. Mr Balfour’s only declaration so far [the Balfour Declaration itself] was very vague and is interpreted in different ways. The Zionists here claim that the Jews are to have the domination of the Holy Land under a British Protectorate; in other words, they are going to force their rule on an unwilling people of whom they form only 10%. They are already asserting themselves in every way, claiming official posts for their nominees and generally interfering. This has resulted already in a great lessening of the welcome which, at the outset, was given wholeheartedly to the British. Both Christians of various kinds and Moslems have approached me on the subject. They feel that they are being handed over unjustly to those whom they dislike more than their late Turkish oppressors. Unfortunately, for some unaccountable reason Mark Sykes has been favouring this movement. The Zionists too claimed that they had obtained the approval of the Holy City [the Holy See] and thereby gained the support of some Catholic bishops in the United States and in England. There is no foundation for this claim.

That Cardinal Bourne had detected correctly the broad thrust and intention of those driving the Zionist project in Palestine is strongly suggested by the Strictly Confidential Statement regarding Palestine issued by the Zionist Organization on 3 February 1919 for use at the Paris Peace Conference now underway. This included a series of “draft resolutions of the Peace Conference” which sought, inter alia, recognition of “the historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine and the rights of

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139 G.1.3.7. Telegram of 1 January 1919 from Count John de Salis to Foreign Secretary Balfour.
140 G.1.1.3. FO 371/4179 Confidential memorandum of 25 January 1919 from Cardinal Bourne headed “Zionism”.
the Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their National Home”; for self-government to be
given as soon as possible to local areas within Palestine; and for the boundaries of
Palestine to reach beyond the Jordan River to the Hejaz Railway. This document
was signed, inter alia, by Lord Rothschild, Nahum Sokolow and Chaim Weizmann,
and its presence in the British War Office archives for the period highlights that the
British Government was well aware in early 1919 of the very breadth and ambition
of the Zionist aims for a Jewish National Home, one which would constitute an
autonomous Commonwealth for Jews in Palestine. Its very terms highlight that the
concerns expressed by Cardinal Bourne a week earlier were fully justified. There was
a serious disconnect between what the Balfour Declaration had originally said, what
the British Government was willing to say about the true scope of that Declaration,
and what the Zionist movement saw as the full potential of the project for a Jewish
National Home in Palestine, which was the establishment of the State of Israel as
Theodor Herzl had always intended, a State that occupied as much of the lands of
Palestine on both sides of the Jordan as could be secured.

Whilst the Holy See may be taken by early 1919 to have been on constructive notice
of the wide-reaching nature of the Zionist ambitions for Palestine, there is no
indication that it was initially aware of the secret Zionist Statement regarding
Palestine. By early February of 1919, however, the British Government was well
aware both of the secret Statement, and also of Cardinal Bourne’s vigorous protests
about the breadth of Zionist plans. On 19 February 1919 British Foreign Secretary
Balfour wrote to his Prime Minister, Mr Lloyd George, to the effect that:-

> If it be possible I should like to avoid any public statement about Palestine
> until the whole Eastern and Mediterranean situation, including Syria, has
> cooled down and we have reached a point in the [Peace] Conference
> proceedings at which we can see our way to a rapid decision of the critical
> problems which for various reasons are now hanging fire. I quite admit,
> however, that silence may be impossible and that a public statement of our

141 **G.1.5.** WO 106/189 Folios 140-149, Statement of the Zionist Organisation regarding Palestine, 3
February 1919, 1-3. The eastern border proposed would have incorporated much of Trans-Jordan and
almost reached Amman.
views may be the lesser of the two evils. ... The weak point of our position of course is that in the case of Palestine we deliberately and rightly declined to accept the principle of self-determination. If the present inhabitants were consulted they would unquestioningly give an anti-Jewish verdict. Our justification for our policy is that we regard Palestine as being absolutely exceptional; that we consider the question of the Jews outside Palestine as one of world importance, and that we conceive the Jews to have an historic claim to a home in their ancient land; provided that home can be given them without either dispossessing or oppressing the present inhabitants. I think the opposition offered by so many Roman Catholics to the Zionist policy is very little to their credit, and cannot easily be reconciled with the tenets of their religion. Those of them who are only animated by the fear that the Christian Holy Places may fall into Jewish hands can be easily consoled. For these should be permanently safeguarded for Christendom by the League of Nations. But I suspect that the motive of most of them is not so much anxiety about the Holy Places as hatred of the Jews: and though the Jews undoubtedly constitute a most formidable power whose manifestations are not by any means always attractive, the balance of wrong-doing seems to me to be greatly on the Christian side.¹⁴²

We have in this connected Bourne/Balfour correspondence a neat summation of the opposing views within the British establishment regarding Zionism and the project for a Jewish national home in Palestine. One can detect on both sides some underlying tinge of traditional English anti-Semitism, but on Bourne’s side we may see the absence of a “proto-Zionist” vision which has never been a Catholic concept, coupled with the traditional concern of the Holy See for the protection of the Christian Holy Places and a new and growing concern for the threatened dispossession of the indigenous majority in Palestine by a presently small minority. On Balfour’s side one can see looming large the “proto-Zionist” view long present in English Protestantism, and a belief that the as yet untested League of Nations would

¹⁴² G.1.1.3. FO 371/4179 Letter from Foreign Secretary Balfour to Prime Minister Lloyd George of 19 February 1919.
be able to provide all of the protection necessary for the safeguarding of the Holy Places. This was coupled with a blind determination that Palestine, alone of all of the world in the wake of global war, was to be denied any right of self-determination whatsoever in order to permit the advance of the Zionist assertion to a historic claim of Jewish peoples around the world to a home in Palestine, their “ancient land”. Whilst all of these competing views now struggled towards the surface, on 19 February 1919 the British Foreign Office was able to issue an instruction that:

The policy of His Majesty’s Government at the Peace Conference is to support the establishment of a Palestinian State under a mandatory, who may be Great Britain. In this State equal civil and religious rights will be ensured for all the inhabitants of whatever nationality, and it is the intention that it shall become a national home for the Jews. Palestinian Jews would become protected subjects of the mandatory power.\(^{143}\)

The Holy See would make this promise of equal rights for all the inhabitants of Palestine a key feature of its ongoing discussions with Great Britain over the Palestine mandate in the years ahead.

### 3.12. GROWTH OF ALARM IN PALESTINE OVER THE ZIONIST PROJECT

Whatever view the British Government was instructing its representatives to make about the Balfour Declaration, by the end of February 1919 there was a growing sense of alarm in Palestine about the Zionist project. On 28 February 1919 General Sir Gilbert Clayton, a former Chief of British Intelligence in Cairo, reported to the British Government from Cairo that:

Fear of Zionism amongst all classes of Christians and Moslems is now widespread, and has been greatly intensified by publication in Zionist journals and utterances of leading Zionists of a far reaching programme greatly in advance of that foreshadowed by Doctor Weizmann in his discussions with Christian and Moslem [communities] here. .... The moderate proposals made

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\(^{143}\) G.1.5. WO 106/189 Folio 180, Telegram No. 128 of 19 February 1919 from the British Foreign Office to Sir George Barclay, British Minister to Rumania from 1912 to 1920.
by Doctor Weizmann ... would have acceptable outcome to the majority provided Great Britain assured maintenance of their rights. The present programme is far more drastic, and all the sections of non Zionists not only in Palestine but also in Syria, are seriously alarmed.\textsuperscript{144}

This alarm was evident in the Holy See by early March, Count de Salis reporting to the British Foreign Office on 2 March 1919 that:

At his weekly reception yesterday I found Cardinal Secretary of State [Gasparri] much preoccupied about future arrangements to be made with regard to Palestine. He was anxious to learn what claims or proposals had been put forward by Zionists, and, in case it should appear desirable, to take some steps to allow views of Holy See to be known.\textsuperscript{145}

This was very swiftly followed by a further message from Count de Salis to the British Foreign Office that:

In addition to any information or rumours from Paris [Peace Conference] relating to proposals of Zionists I understand Cardinal [Gasparri] has had news from Cardinal Bourne who has been in Jerusalem. As Your Lordships may be aware M. De Sokolow was here some time ago. He was well received at Vatican where his ideas were looked on as moderate. But there seems to be greatest distrust of what may be schemes of Weizmann and others. Vatican are well disposed towards British occupation of Palestine and anxious to avoid being forced into subserviency to other Governments by revival of Protectorate or similar arrangements. A settlement of question on initiative of Jews without any reference to their [the Holy See’s] views might create a

\textsuperscript{144} \textbf{G.1.1.3.} FO 371/4179 decyphered message of 28 February/1 March 1919 from General Clayton, Cairo, to the British Foreign Office. General Clayton would later serve as Acting High Commissioner of the Palestine Mandate in 1925, and the High Commissioner of the Iraq Mandate from 1928 to 1929, where he died.

\textsuperscript{145} \textbf{G.1.1.3.} FO 371/4179 message of 2/3 March 1919 from Count de Salis to British Foreign Office, also at \textbf{G.1.3.7.} FO 380/24.
legitimate grievance and force them to look elsewhere for defence of Rights enjoyed in the past.\textsuperscript{146}

The British Foreign Office responded to Count de Salis that “we cannot accept responsibility for Zionist aims and aspirations, but you might point out that M. Sokolow, who appears to have inspired confidence at the Vatican, presented the Zionist case to the [Paris] Peace Conference on February 27\textsuperscript{th} as the first spokesman and representative of the Zionist Organization”.\textsuperscript{147}

In early March of 1919 Cardinal Gasparri told Cardinal Archbishop Amette of Paris that “the Holy See will not object to the Jews’ being received in Palestine, as in any country, with full equality ... but it protests the preferred status the Jews want to acquire when they claim of purchase Palestine for themselves”.\textsuperscript{148} By early March of 1919, therefore, the Holy See was fully on notice of the breadth of the Zionist Organization’s claims with regard to Palestine and had put its opposition to those very wide claims to the British Foreign Office, making clear that it had no objection to the entry of Jews into Palestine provided they received equal treatment with those who were already present there. Cardinal Gasparri expressed the view at this time to Balfour and others that “We are very preoccupied in all that which concerns Palestine. Zionism menaces all which it invades, monopolizing Palestine by purchase”. Gasparri had made clear that the Holy See had no objection to Jews settling in Palestine on equal terms with others, but that “the Holy See protested against the privileged situation which the Jews wished to acquire by obtaining Palestine for themselves”.\textsuperscript{149} By the end of the first week of March in 1919, therefore, there seems no doubt that the Holy See had developed a definite position of objection to the wider claims being made for the Zionists in Palestine, and had let this be known to the British Foreign Office and to other foreign powers. On 8 March 1919 Cardinal Gasparri wrote to Baron Carlo Monti, the Holy See’s principal go-

\textsuperscript{146} G.1.1.3. FO 371/4179 Message of 2/3 March 1919 from Count de Salis to the British Foreign Office.
\textsuperscript{147} G.1.1.3. FO 371/4179 telegram of 5 March 1919 from British Foreign Office to Count de Salis.
\textsuperscript{148} Minerbi, 127.
\textsuperscript{149} H.4. Folios 51-55 at 54-55, Confidential briefing from the French Embassy in Rome to the French Foreign Minister, Stephen Pichon, on the Conversation d’un Francais avec le Cardinal Gasparri, 7 March 1919.
between with the Italian Government, expressing: “the preoccupation that the Holy See has for the future prospects of Palestine, and in particular the Holy Places”, specifically denying that the Holy See had in any way granted approval to the Zionist movement.\footnote{D.39. Folio 107, Letter No. 88184 of 8 March 1919 from Cardinal Gasparri to Baron Carlo Monti.}

### 3.13. Pope Benedict XV’s 1919 Allocution and Motu Proprio

**NUPER EX VENERABILIS**

All of these concerns of the Holy See found their muted expression in Pope Benedict XV’s Allocution of 10 March 1919 to the secret consistory of his Cardinals in which he dealt firstly with his broad concerns for the eastern Christians and their churches in Turkey, Syria, Armenia and Lebanon. The Pope said that he was “most specially anxious [about] the fate of the Holy Places of Palestine, on account of the special dignity and importance for which they are so venerated by every Christian”; and that now, with their return to the hands of western Christians, his “anxiety [was] most keen as to the decisions which the Peace Congress at Paris [was] soon to take concerning them”. He said that “it would be a terrible grief for Us and for all the Christian faithful if infidels were placed in a privileged and prominent position, much more if those most holy sanctuaries of the Christian religion were given into the charge of non-Christians”. He went on to express concern about “non-Catholic foreigners [by which he meant Protestant missionaries], furnished with abundant means and profiting by the great misery and ruin that the war has brought on Palestine” in order to spread “their errors”. He concluded with an appeal to “the bishops of the whole Catholic world” for the support of the Catholic Church and its various charitable institutions in Palestine.\footnote{2.6. *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, 12 March 1919, 87-100 and 100-101.}

Following that Allocution, on 11 March 1919 Pope Benedict XV issued his Motu Proprio *Nuper ex venerabilis* in which he further encouraged the Catholic world to support the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem against the incursions of non-Catholic
foreigners [Protestant missionaries]. As Count de Salis’s briefing to the British Foreign Office on the Allocution pointed out, what was remarkable was that the focus of the Pope’s remarks about Palestine was on the question of the Christian Holy Places and who would control them. What Pope Benedict had told his Cardinals, at the moment when the full realisation of the breadth of scope of the Zionist project had just become apparent to the Holy See, was that, beyond his concerns for the sufferings of Christians in the former Ottoman empire and especially those of Armenia, he had a deep and overriding concern about the safety and welfare of the Christian Holy Places in Palestine and was concerned that, in the Peace Conferences then taking place in Paris, outcomes should be sought which ensured that those Holy Places remained in Christian hands. Beyond this he wanted to urge the support of the global Catholic community for the Catholic institutions of Palestine, and wanted to counter the growing influence of Protestant missionaries who were taking advantage of the economic and political situation in post-war Palestine to make inroads in that place for their brand of Christianity. There was no mention, in either the Allocution or the Motu Proprio, of the Balfour Declaration, or of Zionism, or of Jewish immigration to Palestine, or of any other matter flowing from the Balfour Declaration such as the impact on the indigenous Palestinian communities. The focus remained on what had been the primary concern of the Holy See for the Holy Land for eight hundred years, the protection of the Christian Holy Places. Zionism had rated not a mention.

The following day Count de Salis reported to the British Foreign Office that “the Vatican raised no question as to the responsibility of His Majesty’s Government for the Zionist proposals and that, while they have not shown themselves uncompromising with regard to Monsieur Sokolow and his views, they are well aware that the movement is under the influence of more extreme tendencies”. De Salis went on to acknowledge that “there is very real anxiety that you are at present considering proposals which will place Zionists in privileged position to [the]
detriment of Christians, while it is feared that your engagements to Baron Sonnino [Italian Foreign Minister at the time] prevent as much as a hearing being given to [the] Vatican case without his consent”. 154

Lord Curzon instructed Count de Salis on 12 March 1919 “that you should assure Cardinal Secretary of State that whatever the future of Palestine may be, the Christian Holy Places would have to be permanently safeguarded for Christendom”. 155 Count de Salis informed Cardinal Gasparri to this effect on 16 March 1919. 156 That the sole overriding concern of the Holy See regarding Palestine at this time was for the security of the Christian Holy Places is strongly suggested by the meeting between Monsignor Cerretti, incoming Apostolic Nuncio to France, with Sir Ronald Graham of the British Foreign Office on 14 March 1919, in which Monsignor Cerretti alluded to the anxiety Pope Benedict felt about the Holy Places,. Cerretti outlined the fact that France was no longer able to be relied upon as Protecting Power, and stated specifically that “the Pope looked rather to His Majesty’s Government than to any other to see that the rights and interests of his Church in the Holy Places were protected”, Sir Ronald Graham noting that “no allusion was made to the Zionists” by Monsignor Cerretti. 157 It was only at this precise time that Cardinal Gasparri first raised the matter of the Balfour Declaration with Baron Monti. 158

The evidence suggests that the Holy See was now adopting a two-pronged approach to the question of the Holy Land in this volatile period. At the level of the Supreme Pontiff the only issue which would be raised was that of the Christian control of the Holy Places in Palestine, and no direct challenge was to be made to the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine. However in the background briefing given by the Cardinal Secretary of State for the Holy See to various foreign embassies, Cardinal Gasparri would directly raise the concerns of the Holy See about

154 G.1.1.3. FO 371/4179, telegram from Count de Salis to British Foreign Office of 13/14 March 1919.
155 G.1.3.4. FO 380/21, telegram of 12 March 1919 from Earl Curzon to Count de Salis.
156 G.1.3.4. FO 380/21, handwritten notation by Count de Salis on telegram of 12 March 1919.
157 G.1.3.4. FO 380/21, despatch No. 30 (42976/45A) of 14 March 1919 from Mr Gerald Spicer for Lord Curzon to Count de Salis. This correspondence indicates that the Holy See would pursue the “Roman Question” at the Paris Peace Conference through the good offices of Belgium.
some of the aims and intentions of the Zionists in Palestine, for example, telling the Belgian Ambassador to the Holy See on 16 March 1919 that:

The danger we most fear is the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. We would have found nothing wrong in Jews entering the country, and setting up agricultural colonies. But that they be given the rule over the Holy Places is intolerable for Christians. Balfour’s reply to Lord Rothschild unfortunately gives us reason to fear that the British government supports the Zionist claims [and] the Holy See must speak up, because of the rumour that has been spread that it supports the Zionist claims.159

The result of this bifurcated approach by the Holy See, at the end of March of 1919, was that it was seeking to play the longstanding rivalries between France and Italy over protection of Catholic interests in the Middle East against each other in order to counter British policies towards Palestine, the object being to ensure that Zionists not be placed in a privileged position with regard to Palestine, especially with regard to the question of the Christian Holy Places.160 On 21 March 1919 Count de Salis informed the British Foreign Office that Cardinal Gasparri, whilst expressing gratitude for Mr Balfour’s message about “the safeguarding of the Holy Places”, had indicated that the “chief preoccupation of the Vatican is the idea [that] Zionists are to be placed in [a] privileged position as regards Christians” in Palestine, so much so that the Holy See was seeking support from the French and Italian governments for its views.161

A meeting between Cardinal Amette and the French Prime Minister had discussed the possibility of France reasserting its historic claim to a Protectorate over Catholic interests in the former Ottoman territories, and it appears to have suited the

159 Minerbi, 131-132, citing Belgian Ambassador Pierre Van Zuylen letter to Belgian Foreign Minister Hymans of 16 March 1919, No. 57/26 ABRE, St Siege 1919-1920.
160 G.1.3.7. FO 380/24, Telegram No. 38 of 21 March 1919 from Count de Salis to Lord Curzon; G.1.3.4. FO 380/21 [48530] Despatch No. 311 of 26 March 1919 from Sir George Grahame, British Minister in Paris, to Earl Curzon.
161 G.1.2. FO 608/118 Registry No. 4968 Telegram of 21 March from Count de Salis to British Foreign Office, Minerbi at 134 indicating that British Foreign Office officials at this time shared Cardinal Gasparri’s concerns about Zionist plans; G.1.3.7. FO 380/24 Telegram No. 38 of 21 March 1919 from Count de Salis to Lord Curzon stating that Cardinal Archbishop Amette of Paris had arrived “in haste” in Rome following a meeting with the French Prime Minister.
negotiating strategy of the Holy See at this time to have the spectre of a French Protectorate lurking in the background as a counter to Britain’s strategy to establish its hold on Palestine and Iraq under League of Nations mandates. Cardinal Gasparri informed Count de Salis on 30 March 1919 that, whilst he thought it would be “absurd” for such a Protectorate to be re-established in competition with the emerging British administration in Palestine, “if [a] protectorate is forced on them they will have to make the best of it”.  

In this meeting Cardinal Gasparri also advised the British Minister to the Holy See of a major approaching change in the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem: “Patriarch [Camassei] who is aged and broken is on his way home and retires probably with a Cardinal’s hat [and] it is possible that [the] Vatican may delay making [an] appointment until they know more of the future regime of Palestine”. Count de Salis’s briefing to the British Foreign Office raised the possibility of a British candidate to succeed Monsignor Camassei, the broken and departing Latin Patriarch upon whom Pope Pius X had pinned so many hopes as the “saint for Jerusalem”. The subsequent British machinations for the appointment of a British bishop to the Catholic hierarchy in Palestine would be a recurrent feature of the interaction between the Holy See and the British government for some years to come.

3.14. THE HOLY SEE DEVELOPS ITS OWN RESPONSE TO THE ZIONIST PROJECT

By the beginning of April 1919 the approach of the Holy See towards the Holy Land had entered a new and more proactive phase. The approach of Pope Pius X had been to appoint the best person he could find [a “saint”] as Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, and leave Palestine to itself. This approach was clearly untenable in the rapidly evolving environment in the wake of global war, with the Paris peace conferences, 

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162 G.1.1.3. FO 371/4179 Telegram from Count de Salis to British Foreign Office of 30/31 March 1919. The Foreign Office file note on this observes that “the mandate of Palestine will bring enough difficulties as it is without adding to them. It will always be easier for us to deal with the Vatican direct than to deal with them through Paris” and that “a reservation to the French of the protectorate of Catholics would be an impossible arrangement”.

163 G.1.1.3. FO 371/4179 Telegram from Count de Salis to British Foreign Office of 30/31 March 1919.
discussion of a League of Nations and of a mandate to the British to govern Palestine, the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent pressing lobbying of the Zionist movement to advance and extend the very premise of the Jewish national home in Palestine, all impacting severely upon the long term priorities of the Holy See in relation to the Holy Land, the protection of the Christian Holy Places and the care for the indigenous Palestinian Catholic population. The next four years would see the Holy See play an extremely active role in direct and indirect negotiations regarding the League of Nations and the Palestine Mandate, in which it achieved some real success from its own point of view. Yet the principal priority and objective of the Holy See in regard to Palestine at no point was displaced, that the Christian Holy Places be protected and secured in the best way possible way and for the long term. Over time other secondary aims would be articulated, particularly the need for the Zionist project for a Jewish national home to be balanced justly with the interests of the indigenous peoples in Palestine, but the safety and welfare of the Holy Places always remained paramount for the Holy See.

The British position on Palestine at the Paris peace conferences in April 1919 was that:

If we obtain a mandate for Palestine our intention is that the mandatory should be responsible for: 1) preservation existing rights to Holy places and religious buildings or sites and for free access and worship therein, while insuring requirements of public order and decorum; 2) for transfer of such holy places etc to permanent possession and control of suitable bodies representing adherents of religions concerned, and for selection of places and bodies in question; 3) Responsibility for protection of all religious interests would then be exercised by Mandatory on behalf of League of Nations, all Protectorates previously exercised by any Foreign States would then cease to operate in Palestine.164

164 G.1.1.3. FO 371/4179 Telegram from British delegation in Paris to Mr Balfour and forwarded to Count de Salis in Rome, addressed “to Vatican”, despite the request from the British delegation that its contents be treated as “most confidential” and not be passed on to Cardinal Gasparri unless he raised the matter again.
The Holy See’s position at this time was that it did not favour “international control of Holy places”, but that such an outcome would be preferable to exercise of authority over those places by the “Zionists”, regarding “an impartial British administration as [the] best solution [the Holy See] could have” in the present circumstances. 165 This latter view seems to reflect the position of Pope Benedict XV from the time General Allenby had taken control of Jerusalem in December 1917.

Just as Mr Balfour was seeking an Audience with Pope Benedict XV in the Vatican for Prince Feisal ibn Saud and Colonel T. E. Lawrence, Count de Salis was notifying the British embassy in Paris of the departure from Rome of Father Paschal Robinson OFM and the Franciscan Custos of the Terra Santa who were seeking a meeting with Sir Eric Drummond, the inaugural Secretary General of the League of Nations, regarding the question of the Christian Holy Places in Palestine. 166 Father Robinson was believed by Lord Curzon to be visiting Palestine ostensibly “to examine questions connected with Religious Orders”, but the true “object of his mission is to arrange appointment of British ecclesiastics there to posts in order to facilitate relations [with] British administrative authorities” in Palestine, a fact which Father Robinson “begs … be kept secret for the present”. 167

The significance of the stakes surrounding Palestine in the international diplomacy of the time is suggested by the fact that by the middle of 1919 the King of the Belgians was lobbying at the Paris Peace Conference for Belgium, as a Catholic kingdom, to be appointed the Protecting Power of the Holy Places in compensation for Brussels not having been chosen as the seat of the new League of Nations. Cardinal Gasparri

165 G.1.1.3. FO 371/4179 Telegram of 5 April 1919 from Count de Salis to British Foreign Office marked “repeated to Peace conference”; G.1.2. FO 608/118 Registry No. 6440; also at G.1.3.7. FO 380/24.
166 G.1.3.4. FO 380/21 Telegram of 8 April 1919 from Mr Balfour to Count de Salis; G.1.3.7. FO 380/24 Telegram of 10 April 1919 from Count de Salis to British Embassy, Paris. The visit of Prince Feisal and Colonel Lawrence was later postponed; G.1.3.7. FO 380/24 Telegram of 8 April 1919 from Count de Salis to British Embassy in Paris. See Appendix 5 for biographical details of Father Paschal Robinson OFM (1870-1948). For biographical details of Father Robinson see Appendix 5.
167 G.1.3.5. FO 280/22 Telegram of 27 June 1919 from Earl Curzon to Mr Hugh Gaisford at the British Legation, Rome. Father Robinson’s Report from his first Apostolic Visitation to Palestine is located at G.1.3.8. FO 380/25 as an attachment to Mr Gaisford’s Despatch No. 132 of December 1919 to Lord Curzon.
indicated to the Apostolic Nuncio in Belgium that the Holy See would view a Belgian Protectorate “with much pleasure”. 168

The French government, eager to re-establish France’s centuries old Protectorate in the wake of the Ottoman collapse, used the vexed issue of “liturgical honours” in the Holy Places of Palestine as the stalking horse for the assertion of its right to precedence over the British authorities now in actual control there. In late July of 1919 Cardinal Gasparri informed Mr Gaisford at the British Legation to the Holy See that, whilst the Holy See had permitted the status quo regarding French precedence to be revived in the wake of General Allenby’s entry into Jerusalem in 1917, the Holy See did not consider that this practice should continue with Britain about to become the Mandatory Power in Palestine. The Holy See considered that the French Protectorate had definitively ceased and should not be revived, and therefore expressed the hope that the British government “will take the initiative to bring about cessation of the honours [in which event] the Holy See would support them in the matter”. 169

The very complexity of the diplomatic situation regarding the Middle East at this time is further suggested by the advice given by Lord Curzon to Mr Balfour on 2 August 1919 that “at the present juncture it would seem very undesirable that His Majesty’s Government should take the initiative suggested by the Vatican, as such action would infallibly add yet another to the many subjects of dispute which have already arisen between the French government and ourselves with respect to Syria and the Levant generally”. 170 We may see here both the eagerness of the Holy See to encourage a strong stand by the British government against French pretensions and the reluctance of the British government to endanger its relationship with France when there were so many issues still unresolved over the peace negotiations and over the proposed Mandate for Palestine.

168 D.39. Folio 14, Despatch No. 93074 of 9 July 1919 from Cardinal Gasparri to Archbishop Sebastiano Nicotra, Apostolic Nuncio to the Kingdom of the Belgians.
169 G.1.3.8. FO 380/25 Telegram No. 82 of 29 July 1919 from Mr Hugh Gaisford to the British Foreign Office, and see G.1.3.8. FO 380/25 Despatch No. 67 of 1 August 1919 from Mr Gaisford to Lord Curzon.
The Holy See was also under pressure at this time from Italy to strengthen the Italian presence in the Holy Land. The visit of a papal legate, Cardinal Giustini, to the Holy Land in 1919 celebrated seven centuries of the Franciscan presence in Palestine and was seen by both France and Spain as having the character of Italian propaganda.\textsuperscript{171} Cardinal Giustini certainly manifested little sympathy towards the English administration in Palestine or its enthusiasm for the Zionist project.\textsuperscript{172} The visit of a third cardinal, Dubois from France, from late 1919 to March 1920 marked the third visit of a Cardinal to the Holy Land in 1919, each of these high officials of the Holy See not failing to press the strategic interests of their own native lands rather than those of the Holy See itself.\textsuperscript{173}

\textbf{4.15. THE KING-CRANE COMMISSION REPORT}

The difficulty confronting Britain, the Holy See and every other interested party in relation to Palestine at this time was exposed by the report on 28 August 1919 of the King-Crane Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates, appointed by President Woodrow Wilson, which found that:

There is a further consideration that cannot justly be ignored, if the world is to look forward to Palestine becoming a definitely Jewish state, however gradually that may take place. That consideration grows out of the fact that Palestine is ‘the Holy Land’ for Jews, Christians and Moslems alike ... With the best possible intentions it may be doubted whether the Jews could possibly seem to either Christians or Moslems proper guardians of the Holy Places, or custodians of the Holy Land as a whole [and therefore] in view of all these considerations, and with a deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause, the commissioners feel bound to recommend that only a greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace Conference. ... This would have to mean

\textsuperscript{172} Giovanelli, 26.
\textsuperscript{173} Giovanelli, 28-31.
that Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be given up.\textsuperscript{174}

A number of leading American Jews were opposed to the idea of the establishment of a separate Jewish state in Palestine, Henry Morgenthau, US Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire during the recent war and now Chairman of the Armenian Commission, informed the British authorities at this time that he was “absolutely opposed to the constitution of any Jewish state in Palestine. Such a project is impossible. It would not benefit the Jews”.\textsuperscript{175} It may be seen that, amongst the Americans, there was in mid-1919 extreme doubt about the viability of the Zionist project for Palestine in its most full-blown form, with a separate Jewish state as its goal, and any reservations held by the Holy See appear entirely consistent with those American, and Jewish, reservations.

\section*{3.16. The British Campaign for an English Bishop in Jerusalem}

The British government now entered a phase when it expended considerable energy upon attempting to procure the appointment by the Holy See of someone “British” as Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem in succession to Monsignor Camassei. The launching of this long-drawn out campaign may be discerned when, on 7 September 1919, Mr Gaisford of the British Legation to the Holy See wrote to Lord Curzon explaining that, although he had tried to procure the appointment of a British subject to the office of Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, he had now learned that by a Papal Bull of Pope Pius IX this post must be given to an Italian, and that the most likely appointee would be the Franciscan Father Giannini OFM. He further reported that the current auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem, Monsignor Barlassina, “has been found to be very unsatisfactory and … is to be removed”, leading Mr Gaisford to express the hopeful view “that an Englishman would be appointed as his successor” as auxiliary bishop.\textsuperscript{176} In the Papal Consistory of 15 December 1919 Monsignor Camassei was

\textsuperscript{174} Minerbi, 135-136, citing H. N. Howard, \textit{The King-Crane Commission}, (Beirut: 1963), 351-352.
\textsuperscript{175} G.1.3.6. FO 380/23 Memorandum of conversation with Henry Morgenthau [1856-1946] placed at 632/19 of the British Legation to the Holy See between correspondence of 11 and 12 September 1919 that appears to come from Sir George Grahame [1873-1940], British Minister in Paris at that time.
\textsuperscript{176} G.1.3.8. FO 380/25 Despatch No. 81 of 7 September 1919 from Mr Hugh Gaisford to Lord Curzon.
appointed a Cardinal, thereby signalling that his period as Latin Patriarch would soon end. Shortly afterwards, on 13 January 1920, Monsignor Barlassina commenced as Apostolic Administrator of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, even though he was under active consideration for appointment as Archbishop of Smyrna. He was now very actively opposed by Baron Monti on behalf of the Italian government on the grounds that: “Monsignor Barlassina has on more than one occasion given proof of sentiments hostile to Italy and has shown that he is surpassingly loyal to France”, Baron Monti’s intervention appearing successful in relation to Smyrna but leaving Barlassina available as a candidate for appointment to the See of Jerusalem.\footnote{177}{C.26. Folios 508-509, Letter of 18 January 1920 from Baron Carlo Monti to Cardinal Gasparri. Baron Monti’s objections were based on Monsignor Barlassina’s conduct whilst Rector of St John Lateran in Rome and later as auxiliary bishop in Jerusalem, where he was seen to favour the French interest over the Italian.}

The British Government now made earnest efforts to secure the appointment of Father Paschal Robinson OFM as Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. In December of 1919 Father Robinson had furnished his Report on his Apostolic Visitation to Palestine, and the British Legation to the Holy See provided a copy to Lord Curzon at the British Foreign Office.\footnote{178}{G.1.3.8. FO 380/25 Despatch of December 1919 from Hugh Gaisford to Lord Curzon attaching Memorandum A and Memorandum B from Father Robinson OFM, Memorandum A revealing that he had undertaken a previous Visitation in Palestine some ten years previously, presumably relating to the affairs of the Franciscan Custody.} The Report was strongly supportive of the British administration in Palestine, noting that:

\begin{quote}
\begin{center}
\textit{everything is running smoothly under the provisional British administration of Palestine [which] is admirable and reflects great credit on the comparatively small number of officials, who, under constant difficulties, are bearing the burden and heat of these pioneer days in the evolution of British order out of Turkish chaos.}\footnote{179}{G.1.3.8. FO 380/25 Despatch of December 1919, Memoranda from Father Robinson OFM.}
\end{center}
\end{quote}

Father Robinson canvassed the local concerns about the “Zionist peril”, and the absence of “any satisfactory explanation of the meaning of the ‘National Home’ which is to be set up in Palestine” pursuant to the Balfour Declaration. He concluded that “such fears are, I am sure, utterly groundless, because the rights and interests of
all sects and races will certainly be safeguarded and respected under British protection”. Having given this strong vote of confidence in the British administration in Palestine, Father Robinson went on to canvas what the Holy See should do in the event that Monsignor Barlassina was transferred “to another field of labour”. He expressed the view that it was desirable that an English-speaking bishop should be appointed to succeed him as auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem, who “could do a great deal to develop British ideas and influence”. He further observed that “the appointment of an English-speaking Auxiliary there would do much to bring about a better understanding between the [British] Government and the Catholic Ecclesiastical Authorities in Palestine”. Robinson therefore urged that the opportunity to replace Monsignor Barlassina with a suitable English-speaking candidate not be lost.180

In response to this information Lord Curzon determined that Father Robinson would be the ideal person to succeed Cardinal Camassei as Latin Patriarch in Jerusalem. He wrote on 6 February 1920 to Count de Salis at the British Legation to the Holy See that Cardinal Bourne of Westminster felt Monsignor Barlassina should be replaced by an English Franciscan, the ideal person being Father Robinson. Lord Curzon said that he did not want it to be known in Rome that this was his wish. He therefore instructed Count de Salis to let it be known in the Vatican that de Salis himself was suggesting “that Father Robinson be appointed to succeed Monsignor Barlassina” in the lesser role of auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem, with the clear intention that Father Robinson would subsequently become Latin Patriarch, one sympathetic to the British administration taking shape in Palestine.181

In fact all of the British diplomatic efforts to lobby against Monsignor Barlassina were in vain. At the 8 March 1920 Consistory Monsignor Barlassina was appointed Latin

180 G.1.3.8. FO 380/25 Despatch of December 1919 from Mr Hugh Gaisford to Lord Curzon and attached Memoranda from Father Paschal Robinson OFM.

181 G.1.3.9. FO 380/26 Despatch No. 26 of 6 February 1920 from J. Tilley for Earl Curzon to Count de Salis. Sir John Tilley followed this matter up again in a letter of 1 March 1920 to Count de Salis “emphasizing the good effect on the relationship between the Patriarchate and the Administration which the appointment of a British successor to Monsignor Barlassina is calculated to produce”, G.1.3.9. FO 380/26 Despatch No. 47 of 1 March 1920 from Sir John Tilley for Lord Curzon to Count de Salis.
Patriarch of Jerusalem, Pope Benedict XV having “been influenced by support given to this candidature by all religious bodies concerned in Palestine with the sole exception of the Franciscans”.\textsuperscript{182} The first British campaign to secure a pro-British Latin Patriarch had been an outright failure. Count de Salis laconically observed of Monsignor Barlassina’s elevation that “I cannot say that [this] appointment seems to be a happy one from our point of view”.\textsuperscript{183}

What stands out from this episode, apart from the suspicion that Father Robinson was playing a double game of his own devising, is the imperviousness of the Holy See at this stage to the demands of the British authorities, and its determination to appoint a new Latin Patriarch of its own choosing who would best meet the needs of the Catholic interests in the Holy Land as the Holy See saw them to be at that time. The British were bound now to put the best face possible on the outcome. The British Chief Administrator of Palestine, General L. J. Bois, wrote on 22 March 1920 to Monsignor Barlassina, congratulating him and expressing the “trust that in time to come your Beatitude will see the true prosperity of your flock in a Palestine firmly and happily settled”.\textsuperscript{184}

\section*{3.17. THE HOLY SEE’S INITIAL EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE THE PEACE TREATIES AFFECTING THE HOLY LAND AND HOLY PLACES}

The Holy See now sought to influence the outcome of the various Treaty negotiations which were taking place to settle the outcome of the late war insofar as they related to Palestine. On 24 April 1920 the Supreme Council Meeting took place at San Remo between representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States and Japan. During an intense debate between the British and French delegates about the proposed British mandate in Palestine and the concept of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, the Italian delegate, Prime Minister

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{182} G.1.1.9. FO 371/5191 Telegram of 11/13 March 1920 from Count de Salis to the British Foreign Office.
\item \textsuperscript{183} G.1.1.9. FO 371/5191 Telegram of 11/13 March 1920 from Count de Salis to the British Foreign Office.
\item \textsuperscript{184} A.12. Latin Patriarchate Archives LB 1.6-1.3 S. B. L. Barlassina Giubileo Episcopale/Sacer d’Ordo, letter of 22 March 1920 from Major General L.B. Bois to Latin Patriarch Barlassina.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Nitti, read out to the meeting the text of a letter addressed by Cardinal Gasparri to Baron Denys Cochin, then French Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on 29 June 1917. In this letter Gasparri had insisted that with the end of Turkish rule any notion of a French Protectorate over Catholic interests in the former Ottoman domains would cease to exist. The British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, then earnestly opposed the notion of any continued French protectorate of Catholic interests in Palestine. It was understood by the other delegates that the French representative, Prime Minister Alexandre Millerand, had expressed agreement that the time for any protectorate of Catholic interests in the Middle East had definitely ceased. It appeared that one aim of the Holy See’s foreign policy had been achieved at San Remo, the definitive end of the concept of a French protectorate over Catholic interests in the Middle East, leaving the Holy See free to handle its own interests without French interference in places such as Palestine, Syria and Turkey.

The Resolutions of the San Remo Conference on 25 April 1920 confirmed the original allocation of the Palestinian Mandate to Great Britain made at the First Conference of London in February 1920. They also incorporated endorsement of the intentions of the Balfour Declaration, the final formalisation of the terms of these arrangements to be incorporated in the Treaty of Sevres and the Charter of the League of Nations to be negotiated over the months and years ahead. The Holy See therefore still had ample opportunity to seek to shape the outcomes regarding Palestine that it considered best advanced its interests in the Holy Land.

Whatever France may have thought it had agreed to at San Remo in April 1920, by June of 1920 it had clearly reconsidered its position and was asserting the French right to precedence in Palestine in relation to Catholic liturgical celebrations.

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186 G.1.1.14. FO 371/5244 ibid, text of the San Remo Conference at page 23. Millerand [1856-1943], was minuted as having said: “Je suis d’accord”, “I am in agreement” with the end of the notion of a Catholic protectorate.
187 G.1.3.10. FO 380/27 Despatch No. 105 of 4 June 1920 from Sir John Tilley to Count de Salis informing the latter of representations from the Italian Charge d’Affaires in Britain that “the French Government intended to claim from the Vatican the recognition of France’s traditional privileged position in the matter of certain liturgical ceremonial and precedence, although their agreement to
Holy See would have to struggle for several more years to achieve its ends in relation to French pretensions in Palestine and elsewhere in the Middle East.

In the meanwhile the Holy See had commissioned Cardinal Michele Lega, Prefect of one of the Holy See’s Congregations, to report on affairs of the Catholic missions in the Holy Land, his findings being published by the Holy See in June of 1920. He pointed out the threats to Catholic interests in the Holy Land posed by the “new ferment” between Hebrews, Muslims and the newly arrived Protestant interests, all of which would require the close attention of the Holy See, and of the two principal representatives of the Catholic interest in Palestine, the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem and the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa. This document shows that the Holy See was, by early 1920, conscious that changes had occurred of such a magnitude in Palestine that new ways of making old institutions work together were necessary for the good of the Catholic interest in the Holy Land. It was seen to be vital to “truncate all possible discord or misunderstanding between the Custody and the Patriarchate” in regard to the four identified key areas of the Sanctuaries [Holy Places], the Catholic Schools, the economic administration of Catholic interests and the Catholic Privileges pursuant to established customs [the Status Quo], lest the civil government in Palestine intervene and thereby undermine “the rights of the Catholic interest in Palestine”.

This Ponente raised issues, or Dubbi, rather than identifying solutions, but in its identification of issues one may perceive the underpinnings of various projects pursued by the Holy See in the coming decade. Amongst these were questions relating to the administration of the charitable contributions of the faithful for the Holy Places, and how to regulate the requirements of the Latin Patriarch in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, all with a view to the Catholic Church and its institutions in Palestine being placed in the best position to counter “the invasion of

abandon these rights was definitely stated in the proces verbaux of the San Remo Conference of the 24th April”.


189 F.29. Ponente, pages 150-152.
the non-Catholics, particularly of the Protestants”. Countering the Protestant intrusion into Palestine under the British administration, rather than meeting the challenges posed by the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine, appeared to be the major preoccupation of the Holy See concerning the Holy Land in mid-1920.

3.18. THE APPOINTMENT OF SIR HERBERT SAMUEL AS HIGH COMMISSIONER OF PALESTINE AND HIS JUNE 1920 AUDIENCE WITH POPE BENEDICT XV

Following the decisions of the San Remo Conference regarding the British mandate for Palestine the United Kingdom Government appointed as the first British High Commissioner for Palestine a former Cabinet Minister and leading British Zionist, Sir Herbert Samuel, one of the principal proponents of British backing for the Jewish national home in Palestine. The influence of the Holy See was considered by the British Government to be very important at this time, and accordingly Samuel travelled to Palestine via Rome where he had an Audience with Pope Benedict XV on 25 June 1920, immediately followed by a meeting with Cardinal Gasparri. At the time of Samuel’s visit to the Holy See Cardinal Gasparri told the British Minister, Count John de Salis, that “Samuel’s appointment was troubling to the Holy See”, de Salis responding that “the British Government did not discriminate against Jews in its appointments”. In fact, Samuel’s appointment had provoked outrage from Muslim, Christian and even some Jewish circles, one British officer writing at the time that “No really self-respecting Britisher can stay here [because] Britain may be

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191 Schneer, Jonathan, The Balfour Declaration, 121-123, 144-147, for Samuel’s role in shaping British policy. See Appendix 5 for Samuel’s biographical details.
192 Samuel, Sir Herbert, Memoirs, (London: Cresset Press, 1945), 153; G.1.3.10 FO 380/27, File note by Count de Salis of 16 June 1920 that “Mgr Cerretti has telephoned that the Pope will receive Sir Herbert Samuel at 12.00 o’clock on June 25th”.
193 Minerbi, 138, citing de Salis to Curzon, July 3, 1920, PRO, FO 406/44.
about to commit the greatest injustice that has ever been done by any nation in modern times”. 194

Prior to Samuel’s Audience with the Pope Monsignor Barlassina had warned Baron Monti against the dangers posed by the Zionist project in Palestine. 195 Samuel himself reported of this Audience that Pope Benedict XV:

had read the statement of policy which I had published at the time when my appointment to Palestine was announced, and had read it with much satisfaction: my appointment had caused him some preoccupation but he now felt reassured. I repeated the declaration that an impartial attitude would be observed towards all religions, and that there would be complete religious toleration and liberty in Palestine. I recognised to the full the profound interest which the Catholic Church necessarily took in the Holy Land, and that interest would of course be respected. 196

The Holy See’s response to Samuel may be seen as courteous and mild in the face of the public furore attending his progress towards Palestine. The issues which the Holy See pursued in these meetings principally concerned the question of the French protectorate and French liturgical honours, which the Holy See wished to ensure had been terminated definitively at San Remo. Soon after this Audience, Benedict XV spoke of it to Baron Monti, saying that Samuel had given assurances of English impartiality. Monti felt the Pope was not entirely convinced. 197

Following these meetings the British Foreign Office had “now to decide whether to approach the French Government or to reply to the Vatican without reference to the French”. It was resolved to “inform the Vatican that we see no reason to doubt that the French renunciation by them of their protectorate on the ratification of the Mandate by the League of Nations was final and complete”, observing further that:

194 Segev, Tom, One Palestine, Complete, 146-147, quoting Captain James Pollock, then stationed in Palestine.
the French plea that whilst abandoning the principle of the protectorate France should continue to enjoy the special ceremonial privileges, is absurd, or rather it is an attempt to take back what they have abandoned [and] that we should make it quite plain to the Vatican that we hold the French renunciation to cover all special rights and privileges and that we will not consent to France retaining any ceremonial precedence or privilege whatever.\textsuperscript{198}

A Pro-Memoria furnished by Monsignor Cerretti on behalf of Cardinal Gasparri following the meeting with Sir Herbert Samuel shows that the Holy See’s concerns at the time really related precisely to the question of whether the French protectorate had ended definitively at San Remo, which it was convinced it had. It then raised the possibility that Britain might agree to liturgical honours being paid to the French consul in Jerusalem “as recognition of [France’s] former benefits to the Catholic Church”, bearing in mind that “England not being a Catholic Power, could not of course demand the same honours for her Representative in Palestine”, unless “the Representative might be a Catholic”.\textsuperscript{199} The British Foreign Office strongly encouraged the Holy See to reject the French Government’s assertion of any claim to liturgical honours or precedence in Palestine.\textsuperscript{200} It may be understood, therefore, that at this point in mid-1920, just as Sir Herbert Samuel took up his appointment as High Commissioner in Jerusalem, the Holy See was predominantly concerned to secure freedom from the shackles of the French protectorate of Ottoman times, whilst at the same time being open to some token offering of liturgical privileges to the French consul in Jerusalem, a token too far for the British to be willing to stomach.

\textsuperscript{198} G.1.1.14 FO 371/5244 Register No. E 7910/4164/44 File note of 15 July 1920.
\textsuperscript{199} G.1.1.14 FO 371/5244 Register No. E 7910/4164/44 Despatch No. 82 of 3 July 1920 from Count de Salis to the British Foreign Office and attaching the Pro-Memoria from Monsignor Cerretti.
\textsuperscript{200} G.1.3.11 FO 380/28 Despatch No. 154 of 6 August 1920 from Sir Eric Phipps, for the British Foreign Secretary, to Count de Salis, indicating that the British Government wished to dispel any suggestion of a continuance of the French protectorate.
3.19. THE HOLY SEE APPOINTS MONSIGNOR BARLASSINA AS LATIN PATRIARCH OF JERUSALEM

Despite British opposition, Monsignor Luigi Barlassina was appointed as Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem by Pope Benedict XV at the Consistory held on 8 March 1920 in the Vatican. The evidence shows that he was an intelligent, articulate, energetic and outgoing man who spoke English with Italian gusto and was able to type his own correspondence. He appears to have had the capacity to irritate English people, especially officials, very greatly. One British official, Sir Harry Luke, said that Barlassina had “three bugbears”, “Protestantism, Zionism and Freemasonry”. He was also a man who took himself immensely seriously in his capacity as a prelate of the Catholic Church and who spoke his own mind freely, ever-confident that he had the best interests of the Catholic Church at heart and that he had the support of the Supreme Pontiff and the Holy See. Tact was not one of his virtues. From the moment of his appointment as Latin Patriarch Monsignor Barlassina threw himself energetically into a vigorous round of visits and meetings in Rome and in London held from late April to late May of 1920. The issues which he particularly pursued at this time related to the restitution of sequestered religious properties seized from religious orders during the recent war, especially the German Dormition Abbey and the Austrian Hospice in Jerusalem, on the basis that the Allied Powers had agreed “that all enemy-owned Catholic buildings are henceforth to be considered as belonging to [the] Vatican”. In his Audience with Pope Benedict XV on 27 April 1920 Barlassina outlined his plans for renewal of the Catholic Church within the Latin Patriarchate, and his specific project to establish a “work [opera] which would group together the charity and zeal of the faithful throughout the world to protect and promote Catholic interests in the Holy Land”, a work which the new Latin Patriarch

202 In early October of 1920 the Italian Consul-General in Jerusalem, Alberto Tuozzi, described Monsignor Barlassina as “a man of great initiative and great dignity but [who] has an exaggerated estimation of the importance of his role and person. Today he is engaged in the mission of defending Catholics and fighting Zionism, a program which no one can criticize, but which must be implemented with tact, that the Patriarch wholly lacks”, see Minerbi, 142, citing Tuozzi to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome), Top Secret, October 4, 1920, no.1103/176, ASME file 1457.
203 G.1.1.11 FO 371/5200 from E 921/921/44 of 27 February 1920 to E 9497/921/44 of 7 August 1920.
proposed “to entrust ... in particular to the Knights and Ladies of the Holy Sepulchre” whose Grand Master the Pope was. 204

In London in late May Monsignor Barlassina paid a call on Sir John Tilley at the British Foreign Office in London and handed him a memo setting out his views on the situation of Catholics in the Holy Land. Tilley recorded that:

the Patriarch left this memo with me and indulged in a great flow of language on the subject. He did not impress me as being either a wise or even a sensible man. I assured him he need fear no discrimination against his religion and that his particular complaints would be inquired into. His best plan would be however to discuss them in Jerusalem with the new Administration. 205

The document which Monsignor Barlassina gave to Sir John Tilley was entitled *Memorandum of the Patriarch of Jerusalem*. The matters which Barlassina raised as being of key concern for the Latin Patriarchate at that time included the retention of “all rights we have possessed from time immemorial, specially in connection with Marriage, Heredity and Appointment of Gardians [sic] to orphan children”; protesting the recent alleged mistreatment of the German Benedictines of the Dormition Abbey in Jerusalem; asserting that the authority of the Catholic [sic] patriarch be publicly respected; reminding the British Government of the moderation the Latin Patriarchate had obtained from its own members in Palestine towards the new British administration; committing the Latin Patriarchate to the teaching of English in its schools and seminary; expressing the hope that in a few years there would be some English priests within the diocese as part of a general promotion of good relations between the Patriarchate and the new British administration; and seeking assurances that “there will be no interference with

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204 *Le Patriarcat Latin de Jerusalem*, 10. By a *motu proprio* of 3 July 1920 Pope Benedict XV approved the establishment of this Work for the Preservation of the Faith in Palestine, entrusting its advancement to the individual Chapters of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre throughout the world, K. *La Palestine*, May 1922, No. 5, 76-77 and *motu proprio* No. B-7903 of 3 July 1920 signed by Cardinal Gasparri for Pope Benedict XV.
205 *G.1.1.9* FO 371/5191 Registry Number E5376/588/44, Rights of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, File note of 29 May 1920 by Sir John Tilley.
religious customs or holy places or any curtailment whatever of religious liberty
subject only to the maintenance of public order and security”. 206

Despite the condescending and disparaging nature of Sir John Tilley’s File Note
Monsignor Barlassina’s Memorandum is striking for its fluency in English, apparently
written by the new Latin Patriarch himself, and for its remarkably conciliatory tone,
clearly seeking to establish good relations with the new British administration in
Palestine while at the same time frankly asserting the historic rights of the Latin
Patriarchate in the light of the guarantees contained in the Balfour Declaration as to
the existing rights and liberties of peoples and religions in Palestine. This
Memorandum was forwarded to Sir Herbert Samuel for his information on 1 June
1920 and he asked to retain it so that offending religious sensibilities might be
avoided and so that the new administration could be aware of “the matters to which
the Catholic Community is attaching special importance”. 207 What particularly
appears to stand out from this Memorandum, apart from the very moderation and
conciliatory nature of its overall tone, is that it makes no reference whatsoever to
the questions of Zionism or the proposed national home for Jews in Palestine. The
incoming Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem was primarily concerned to assert long-
established Catholic rights, including in respect of the Holy Places, and the status of
his position in Palestine where Britain now ruled as Mandatory Power. This is
entirely consistent with the maintenance of the two long-established policies of the
Holy See towards the Holy Land, the protection of the Christian Holy Places and the
promotion of the rights and interests of the indigenous Catholic community of
Palestine.

3.20. MONSIGNOR BARLASSINA AND HIGH COMMISSIONER SAMUEL
TAKE UP THEIR POSITIONS IN JERUSALEM IN JULY 1920

Having both now had Audiences in Rome with Pope Benedict XV the new British High
Commissioner for Palestine and the new Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem then

206 G.1.1.9 FO 371/5191 Memorandum of the Patriarch of Jerusalem filed at Registry Number
E5376/588/44, and see also G.1.3.10 FO 380/27.
207 G.1.1.9 FO 371/5191 Letter of 2 June 1920 from Sir Herbert Samuel to Sir John Tilley, Registry
Number E5793/588/44, Rights of Catholic Patriarchate of Jerusalem.
proceeded to Jerusalem for their formal installations in their respective offices. Sir Herbert Samuel’s solemn presentation took place at the Augusta Viktoria Palace on the Mount of Olives overlooking Jerusalem on 7 July 1920, the Pro-Vicar of the Latin Patriarchate, the Austrian Monsignor Fellinger, representing the Catholic Church and being granted precedence over the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, a sign that the Status Quo for such matters from Ottoman times might be observed under the new British administration. On Thursday 15 July 1920 Monsignor Barlassina made his formal Solemn Entry into Jerusalem, being welcomed by Mr Ronald Storrs, the District Governor of Jerusalem, on behalf of the new British High Commissioner. Barlassina processed on foot through the Old City, entering the Church of the Holy Sepulchre where he kissed the Stone of Unction and heard his appointment by Pope Benedict proclaimed to the populace.

In his first Pastoral Letter to his diocese, issued on 20 July 1920, Monsignor Barlassina acknowledged that “we are all pre-occupied about the transformation which, it is said, is contemplated in Palestine. This is the subject of our most serious anxiety, the subject of our consideration”, pointing out that the American King-Crane Commission report of the previous year had recommended that Palestine should “be internationalized rather than to be some servant of Sionism [sic]”. Barlassina went on to outline his visit to the new British High Commissioner, who had “received Us

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208 A.13. Latin Patriarchate Archives LB 1.6-1.3 Barlassina 2 1920-1940, Dossier (B-7), Appendix J, Document X. In fact, when a draft Order of Precedence for Palestine was submitted to Lord Curzon for approval in October 1920, the British Foreign Minister personally amended it, deleting the precedence accorded to the Latin Patriarch under the status quo and replacing it with a shared equality between the Latin, Greek and Armenian Patriarchs whose seniority would be determined by the length of their respective tenures as Patriarchs of Jerusalem, see G.1.1.6 FO 371/5123 Despatch No. 69 No. C.S.243 of 8 October 1920 from Mr W.Deedes to the British Foreign Secretary with attached draft Order of Precedence, and copy letter of 17 November 1920 from Sir John Tilley revising the draft Order.

209 A.12. Latin Patriarchate Archives LB 1.6-1.3 S.B.L. Barlassina Giubileo Episcopale/Sacer d’Ordo, Corriere di Napoli 31 July/1 August 1920; Letter from the District Governor of Jerusalem to Monsignor Fellinger of 15 July 1920. See Appendix 5 for biography of Storrs.

210 A.12. ibid.

211 G.1.1.6 FO 371/5123 copy of Pastoral Letter of Monsignor Barlassina attached to Despatch No. 49 of 13 September 1920 from High Commissioner Samuel to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; C.25. Folios 429-438, Aloysius Barlassina Miseratione Divina et Apostolicae Sedis gratia Patriarchus Hierosolymitanus, ad Clerum et Populum, 20 July 1920. Minerbi, at 141, asserts that Barlassina used this pastoral letter to make a strong protest against “the Great Powers’ decision to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine” but this is not correct, and in fact, at no time did Barlassina ever make such a protest.
[sic] with great courtesy and consideration” and with whom he had discussed the need of the new British administration in Palestine to treat with equal rights all the communities in Palestine. The High Commissioner had offered Barlassina repeated assurances “that all the rights of all Religious Creeds would be maintained and that no injury would be made to the welfare of all in general and of each one in particular”. Barlassina concluded that he expected that these assurances would be put into practice by the British administration, but that, in the event that this did not occur, “We recommend calm to you above all else, because violence is always unworthy of a civilized people and still more so of the disciples of Jesus Christ; our action ought not to be aggressive, but limited to defending our rights alone”.212 In his first report to the British Foreign Secretary on 13 September 1920 High Commissioner Samuel incorporated these extracts from the Pastoral Letter, observing that “Monsignor Barlassina has lately returned to Jerusalem [and] his attitude is personally friendly, and politically he awaits events”.213

Monsignor Barlassina, from the outset of his tenure as Latin Patriarch, kept the Holy See’s Secretary of State, Cardinal Gasparri, abreast of events in Palestine and his views about those events, a practice which Gasparri at first encouraged.214 On 5 August 1920 Monsignor Barlassina sent to Cardinal Gasparri a comprehensive briefing paper dated 4 August 1920 on the Current Situation in Palestine, raising for the first time the issue of Zionism and its intentions and impact in Palestine:

> at present all is calm because Sir H. Samuel uses much tact, but the Zionists work incessantly at the preparation of their plans; and therefore there is a need to await from one moment to the next the painful consequences of the Hebrew injustice.215

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212 G.1.1.6 and C.25 ibid.
213 G.1.1.6 FO 371/5123 Despatch No. 49 of 13 September 1920 from Samuel to the British Foreign Secretary, at page 3.
214 A.17 Latin Patriarchate Archives GV-LB 2.4-3.6 Segreteria di Stato 1849-1921, Segreteria di Stato N.8-9257 of 12 August 1920 from Cardinal Gasparri to Monsignor Barlassina requesting that Barlassina keep him abreast of the latest developments in the Latin Patriarchate.
Monsignor Barlassina counselled “every prudence” but said that he would not cease from insisting upon the independence which “we Catholics must and want to maintain from Zionism, and on the conservation of all our rights”. He noted the trouble he felt would come from the fact that “the English have divided the Palestinian population into three castes, the Muslims, the Christians and the Hebrews”, and that the Catholics were therefore lumped together with all the “schismatics, Greeks, Armenians, Copts, Syrians, and Abyssinians”. The immediate consequence of this were, he asserted, that the Municipal Council of Jerusalem was now composed of two Muslims, two Jews and two Christians, one of them at present a Catholic.216

This briefing paper deserves careful attention because it provides the first informed and detailed Catholic reaction to the situation which had evolved rapidly in Palestine following the entry of General Allenby into Jerusalem in December of 1917. It notes, firstly, the assurances which Monsignor Barlassina understood Sir Herbert Samuel to have given the Pope in his June Audience that he would pursue a program of equity and justice; secondly, that the Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem, Nissim Danon, had indicated that he would prefer to live in Palestine without political Zionism; and thirdly, the opinion expressed in the Zionist newspaper, Barid el-Jem, that following Samuel’s visit to the Pope in June that year there was in Vatican circles a sense of contentment that Palestine would, by “good steps”, become the “homeland of the Jews”.217 Barlassina was therefore putting the Holy See on notice of the fact that, within Palestine, Zionist circles were promoting the notion that the Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church endorsed the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine, and that even within the Jewish population in Palestine there was dissent over the plans of “political Zionism”. Monsignor Barlassina went on to outline the almost Messianic status accorded by Zionists in Palestine to High Commissioner Samuel. He also pointed out that there was talk of destroying the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, of the abolition of Catholic rights regarding marriage, guardianship and the like, and of the ultimate establishment in Palestine of a “JEISH STATE” [sic], the

216 A.17 ibid.
217 A.17 ibid.
trend in this direction being supported by very well-funded land acquisition programs by the Zionists, leaving the local indigenous population in fear of the future. Barlassina warned of proposals to extend the coverage of its proposed Mandate administration for Palestine across the Jordan into Trans-Jordan, which would have the effect of making all of that territory subject to the scope of the Balfour Declaration.

Cardinal Gasparri responded to Monsignor Barlassina on 13 September 1920, indicating acceptance of two of the latter’s previous requests; firstly, that the Holy See had now submitted to the British Government the need not to aggregate the Catholics of Palestine together with “dissident sects” and to ensure to the Catholics an appropriate level of representation on such bodies as the Jerusalem Municipal Council; and secondly, indicating that the Holy See understood the great danger which would flow from the Jews becoming the masters of the land in Palestine. To this end he sought to encourage private persons to counter the land acquisition program of the Zionists, giving 500,000 lire to Monsignor Barlassina for this purpose of local land acquisition for indigenous Palestinians.  

Cardinal Gasparri also indicated that the Holy See was pursuing directly with High Commissioner Samuel the question of the restoration to the control of the Catholic Church of the Cenacle on Mt Zion, site of the Last Supper. This exchange highlights that Monsignor Barlassina was sensitive to the issue of advancement of the Zionist project in Palestine, placing the Holy See on notice of the ambitions for a Jewish state to be established in Palestine. It also highlights the Holy See’s awareness of just what was happening on the ground in Palestine from mid-1920, of the way in which the alleged opinion of the “Vatican” in favour of the Zionist project was being used as propaganda by the Zionists in Palestine, and showing that the Holy See had sufficient reservations about the land acquisition aspect of the Zionist strategy to offer some token monetary assistance to offset its effects.

218 A.17 Latin Patriarch Archives GV-LB 2.4-3.6 Segreteria di Stato 1849-1921, Segreteria di Stato N.B.9780, letter of 13 September 1920 from Cardinal Gasparri to Monsignor Barlassina.

219 A.17 ibid.
3.21. THE HOLY SEE’S EARLY CONCERNS ABOUT THE NEW BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IN PALESTINE

The Holy See’s concern to acquire control of the Cenacle on Mt Zion, once the seat of the Franciscan Custody, shows that the question of Christian Holy Places in Palestine remained at the forefront of the Holy See’s policies for the Holy Land. Sensing this, Monsignor Barlassina made the Holy Places the subject of his next major report to Cardinal Gasparri on 13 September 1920, in which he raised the question of a possible League of Nations International Commission to oversee the sanctuaries, expressing deep concern about the likelihood of inadequate Catholic representation vis à vis the representation which might be accorded to other religions and Christian denominations.220

That the Holy See had, by mid-September of 1920, developed serious concerns about the effect of the British administration and the Mandate upon Palestine is shown by Cardinal Gasparri’s letter of 13 September 1920 to the British Minister, Count de Salis, raising the issue of inclusion of the Trans-Jordan in the Mandate territory and thereby subjecting it to the scope of the Balfour Declaration’s plans for a “Jewish national home”.221 When this was transmitted to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, the Foreign Office File Note recorded that, whilst the Cardinal’s concerns might be premature, it “seems certain that, for military reasons, the frontier of Palestine will eventually run well east of the Jordan”.222 Count de Salis was instructed by the Foreign Office to let Cardinal Gasparri know, if he raised the matter again, that “the terms of the Balfour Declaration regarding a national home for the Jews will apply to any territory, east of the Jordan, which may eventually be included within the frontiers of Palestine; that this declaration will naturally be embodied in the mandate and that, thereby, nothing can be done ‘which may

221 G.1.1.6 FO 371/5123 Letter of 13 September 1920 from Cardinal Gasparri to Count de Salis; G.1.3.12 FO 380/29 Despatch No.B=9782 of 13 September 1920 from Cardinal Gasparri to Count de Salis.
222 G.1.1.6 FO 371/5123 Letter No. 116 of 17 September 1920 from Roger Thynne on behalf of Count de Salis to Earl Curzon of Kedleston KG, and File Note E 11688/85/44.
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”. At the very least we may see in this correspondence a determined attempt by the Holy See to confine the scope of the Balfour Declaration to the territory west of the Jordan.

In this honeymoon period after Sir Herbert Samuel took up office as High Commissioner the key issue which occupied the Holy See’s attention in regard to Palestine, apart from the protection of the holy site of Mt Carmel from a proposed tourist railway venture, was the assertion by France of the right of its Consul in Jerusalem to receive liturgical honours. This was seen as an attempt to revive the French protectorate which had been thought to be definitively abandoned at San Remo. On 20 December 1920 Cardinal Gasparri informed Count de Salis, the British Minister to the Holy See, that, as the Mandate had not yet been formally approved, the Catholic Church should continue to accord liturgical honours to the French Consul in Jerusalem because “it is evident that the status quo ante with regard to these honours still continues and therefore the traditional customs will be maintained during Christmas ceremonies” in Bethlehem and Jerusalem. Lord Curzon instructed Count de Salis to protest this decision vigorously, which he did, but the Latin Patriarch still accorded liturgical honours to the French Consul at the Christmas ceremonies.

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223 G.1.1.6 FO 371/5123 Letter of 23 September 1920 from the Foreign Office (signed by D.G.Osborne) to Count de Salis; also at G.1.3.12 FO 380/29.

224 G.1.1.7 FO 371/5124 Translation of letter No. B-11742 of 16 October 1920 from Cardinal Gasparri to Count de Salis, which speaks of a railway proposed from “Jaffa” to Mt Carmel; G.1.1.7 FO 371/5124 Registry Number E 13184/85/44 and Letter of 1 November 1920 from Sir John Tilley to High Commissioner Samuel.

225 G.1.3.12 FO 380/29 Despatch No. B=14056 of 20 December 1920 from Cardinal Gasparri to Count de Salis.

226 G.1.1.9 FO 371/5191 Despatch No. 51 of 20 December 1920 from Count de Salis to the Foreign Office; G.1.3.14 FO 380/31 Despatch of 24 December 1920 from Count de Salis. In fact, in his report to Lord Curzon of 25 October 1922, at pages 21-22, Count de Salis set out in the plainest terms that the entire fault for this imbroglio lay with the British, because, in April of 1918, the Foreign Office had instructed Count de Salis to tell the “Vatican”, which wished to do away with liturgical honours to the French, that the British Government did not wish to intervene “in a question of ceremonial”, leaving the Holy See to yield to the French over the according of liturgical honours to the French Consul in Jerusalem, and from which the French had simply built their claim to this outdated practice, G.1.1.27 FO 371/7671 Registry No. C 15334/8227/22 Count de Salis Report to Marquess Curzon of 25 October 1922.
3.22. FATHER PASCHAL ROBINSON’S 1920 APOSTOLIC VISITATION AND HIS 1921 REPORT TO THE HOLY SEE ON PALESTINE

Almost immediately after Barlassina and Samuel had their meetings at the Holy See in mid-1920 the Holy See appointed Father Paschal Robinson as Apostolic Visitor to Palestine. The period in which he carried out his investigations was one of comparative tranquility.\(^\text{227}\) It appears that the decision of the Pope to send Father Robinson back to Palestine manifested a range of concerns about what was happening in Palestine, including frictions between the Latin Patriarchate and the Franciscan Custody, issues concerning Eastern rite Catholics, and the effects of the new British administration on the Catholic Church in Palestine. The British authorities saw this Visitation as being “in order to report to [Benedict XV] on various matters there”, the British Minister to the Holy See seeing this move as “very satisfactory from [the British] point of view” because “relations between British authorities [in Palestine] and [the] new patriarch Barlassina are not all that could be wished”.\(^\text{228}\)

The Holy See may have been prompted by Samuel’s Audience with the Pope to reassess the situation in Palestine and therefore now sent a highly trusted agent to carry out this task, taking into account that the newly appointed Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Monsignor Barlassina, was at odds with the new British administration and had his own very strong views on the emerging situation in the Holy Land, views which were not necessarily those of the Holy See. In order to further form its views the Holy See was not content to rely on its own diocesan bishop in Palestine. This marks the beginning of what, over the next ten years, would be a gaping gulf which would open between the views and positions of the Holy See about the Holy Land and those espoused and pursued by the Latin Patriarch resident in Palestine. From the outset of this Visitation the British Foreign Office attached high importance to Robinson’s mission and sought to facilitate his work.\(^\text{229}\)

\(^{227}\) G.1.1.6 FO 371/5123 Private letter from Mr W. Deedes to Sir John Tilley of 27 September 1920 describes the initial honeymoon period of Samuel’s term as High Commissioner.

\(^{228}\) G.1.1.9 FO 371/5191 Decyphered dispatch No. 30 of 22 July 1920 from Count de Salis to the British Foreign Office.

\(^{229}\) G.1.1.9 FO 371/5191 Letter of 20 September 1920 from Father Robinson to Lord Curzon, and reply of 24 September 1920 signed by D. G. Osborne on behalf of the Foreign Office. See Appendix 5 for
Father Robinson’s 1920 Visitation to Palestine ended in January of 1921, High Commissioner Samuel writing on 27 January 1921 to Sir William Tyrrell that Robinson’s “visit here has been [very valuable and that] he has done much to improve the relations between the Latin Patriarchate and the [British] Administration, which, at the time of his arrival, were a little uneasy, because of some misunderstanding on the part of the Patriarch [so that] everything is now working in the smoothest way”. Samuel pointed out that no auxiliary bishop had yet been appointed for Jerusalem and expressed the hope that “an English-speaking Ecclesiastic might be found for this post”, inferring the desirability of procuring Father Paschal Robinson’s nomination to the office.230

Father Robinson endeared himself further to the British in his 1 February 1921 Confidential Report, Brief Report on the Actual Situation Political and Religious in Palestine, in which he expressed the view that since the British had assumed the civil power in Palestine the previous June a “great tranquillity” had descended over the Holy Land and that it showed signs of becoming “the most peaceful and prosperous part of the former Ottoman empire”. He expressed the view that it remained to be seen whether this situation would continue because the Arabs were not satisfied with the actual state of affairs, fearing that power would fall into the hands of the Jews, due to the conduct of the most extreme Zionists. In Jerusalem itself, he said, the Zionist Organization appeared to be in virtually the same guise as the British High Commissioner, and that its activities were too aggressive, favouring the Hebrew predominance in Palestine, but also demonstrated a lack of impartiality in its accounts of what was taking place. Robinson noted that there had been a great influx of Jewish immigrants to Palestine the previous year but a large part of these [25-40%] had already departed, whether because they disagreed with the Zionists or they simply found Palestine not suited to the conduct of business affairs. He

biographical details of Sir D’Arcy Osborne [1884-1964]. The Foreign Office Holy See Mission file correspondence [at G.1.3 FO 380] for this period shows how important the Foreign Office viewed Father Robinson’s mission and sought to ensure that all British authorities in Rome and the Near East gave him every possible support in his journey and work.

230 G.1.1.23 FO 371/6393 Registry No. E2749/2749/88 Despatch of 27 January 1921 from Samuel to Tyrrell; also at G.1.3.18 FO 380/35 Samuel expressed the “hope [that] it might be possible for [Robinson] to return here in some permanent capacity”.
concluded that those Jewish immigrants who remained were often from impoverished backgrounds in Central Europe, fleeing intolerable conditions there, and had no means or education to be able to go elsewhere and so must accept the hardships of life in Palestine. As to the allegations of enormous land purchased by Jews, he found that recent evidence for October and November of 1920 showed that it was Christians and Muslims who were overwhelmingly choosing to sell their land. On balance he concluded that the administration of Sir Herbert Samuel promised well and that the new High Commissioner strove to be impartial despite the strong influence of the Zionists. Robinson pointed out that three out of ten positions on the new Consultative Council for Palestine were held by Jews. Of 289 government positions awarded by the High Commission in the second half of 1920 151 were British, 111 were Arabs and only 27 were Jews, only 3 out of 54 magistrates being Jews. He was of the view that the non-Jewish population was beginning to be convinced of the sincerity of the promises made by Samuel regarding the protection of the Christian and Muslim interests in Palestine. In Robinson’s opinion, the activities of Protestant groups, led by American missionaries, were more harmful and threatening to Catholic interests in Palestine than were the Zionists, who did not undertake religious propaganda. In regard to the Holy Places Robinson felt there was a great need for the swift naming of the members of the Holy Places Commission but that in its absence the only thing to do was to maintain the status quo. Whilst noting that that the problem of the Greek Orthodox [Elemento Greco Scismatico] complicated the question of the Holy Places for the Catholic interest in the Holy Land, his summary conclusion was “that, overall, from a Catholic point of view, the situation in Palestine is now, in various aspects, much more favourable than it was a year before”. In relation to the ongoing conflict between the Latin Patriarchate and the Franciscan Custody, Robinson favoured the positions taken by the Franciscan Custody.

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231 G.1.3.18 FO 380/35 Breve Relazione sull’attuale Situazione Politica nella Palestina, Confidential Report of Father Paschal Robinson OFM, 1 February 1921, which was received both by the Holy See, for whom it was written, and by the British Foreign Office.

232 Giovanelli, 93.
This optimistic and generally positive report by Father Robinson was swiftly countered by three Memoranda from Monsignor Barlassina to Cardinal Gasparri which said that the situation in Palestine was deteriorating, with instances being given of specific cases of discrimination experienced by Arab Catholics at the hands of British Mandate authorities, the Latin Patriarch reporting the threatening advance of Zionism and the consequent ruination of the non-Jews because of the British Administration’s support for the Zionists.233

Amongst the matters reported by Monsignor Barlassina to the Holy See at this time was the news from a high-ranking British police officer that Bolshevik extremists were now operating in Palestine.234 This was swiftly followed by a Note sul Mandato per la Palestina from Monsignor Barlassina to Cardinal Gasparri on 25 February 1921 in which the Latin Patriarch concluded that the new British Administration would be little more than a “Jewish agency” whose efforts would be directed at the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, and that this constituted a threat to the Catholic interest in Palestine, therefore urging the Holy See to make representations on this issue.235

The Holy See thus, by late February of 1921, had two contrasting views as to the actual situation in the Holy Land from its two representatives there, the Latin Patriarch and the Apostolic Visitor. Robinson, whilst not dismissing the significance and potential future impact of the Zionist project, was generally positive and supportive about the British administration in Palestine. Barlassina warned that trouble was imminent; that communal tensions were high; that Bolshevik agents were active in the land and were likely to cause harm in a volatile situation; and that the Holy See should be making representations on these issues in order to defend the Catholic interest in Palestine. Faced with these differing views, the Holy See, in whom the Muslim community of Palestine placed great hope of protecting its

233 A.17 Latin Patriarchate Archives GV-LB 2.4-3.6 Segreteria dei Stato 1849-1921, three Memoranda of 13 February 1922 from Monsignor Barlassina to Cardinal Gasparri.
234 A.17 ibid.
235 A.17 Latin Patriarchate Archives GV-LB 2.4-3.6 Segreteria di Stato 1849-1921, Protocollo 97/21 memorandum from Monsignor Barlassina to Cardinal Gasparri of 25 February 1921 and attached briefing Note sul Mandato per la Palestina; and see also C.27 Folios 159-163 for a copy of this Note.
interests against the Zionists, remained silent as events unfolded and the situation in Palestine exploded.\textsuperscript{236}

3.23. MONSIGNOR BARLASSINA AND THE JAFFA RIOTS OF MAY 1921

Soon after Robinson and Barlassina had made their respective, and quite different, views known to the Holy See about the actual situation in Palestine events quickly unfolded which would have a formative impact on the approach of the Holy See to the Holy Land in the years ahead. On Sunday 1 May 1921 “a Labour Meeting that had been authorised to be held at Jaffa was disturbed by a group of Jewish Communists. The latter were driven back into the mixed Moslem/Jewish Quarter of the town, and a riot thereupon broke out”.\textsuperscript{237} A number of senior British Administration officials, including the Civil Secretary, Mr W. Deedes, and the Legal Secretary, Mr N. Bentwich, rushed to the scene of the Jaffa riots. They reported that twenty people had been killed and one hundred and fifty wounded on that first day, concluding that “the town was then quiet and Military dispositions had been taken to meet the situation; but the possibility of further outbreaks still existed”.\textsuperscript{238} In fact the riots broke out again the next day and High Commissioner Samuel was driven to proclaim Martial Law, press freedom being suppressed to conceal what was actually now taking place.\textsuperscript{239}

For an understanding of what Monsignor Barlassina then did, and how the Holy See would subsequently respond to this grave crisis, which appeared to confirm the views previously expressed by the Latin Patriarch, it will be helpful to consider the British secret intelligence report on the events and Winston Churchill’s subsequent Secret Cabinet Memorandum. Captain C. D. Brunton of British General Staff

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\textsuperscript{236} A.17 Latin Patriarchate Archives GV-LB 2.4-3.6 Segreteria di Stato 1849-1921, Protocollo 84/21, memorandum of 17 February 1921 from Monsignor Barlassina to Cardinal Gasparri.
\textsuperscript{237} G.1.1.16 FO 371/6375 Registry No. E 6888/35/88 Despatch No.107 of 15 May 1921 from High Commissioner Samuel to Rt Hon Winston Churchill, Principal Secretary of State for Colonies, London, on the Jaffa Riots. Mr Bentwich was Samuel’s nephew by marriage.
\textsuperscript{238} G.1.1.16 ibid Samuel to Churchill, 15 May 1921.
\textsuperscript{239} G.1.1.16 ibid, Samuel to Churchill, 15 May 1921. In response to a request from Samuel for naval support H.M.S. \textit{Calypso} arrived at Jaffa on 6 May 1921.
Intelligence arrived in Jaffa on 8 May 1921 and wrote his Report to Colonial Secretary Churchill on 13 May 1921:

In order to understand the causes and significance of the outbreak on the 1st May, it is necessary to know what the political situation was in Palestine at the time. .... Ever since our occupation of the country the inhabitants have disliked the policy of founding a national home for the Jews in Palestine. This feeling has gradually developed into nothing short of bitter and widespread hostility, and the Arab population has come to regard the Zionists with hatred and the British with resentment. Mr Churchill’s visit [in February 1921] put the final touch to the picture. He upheld the Zionist cause and treated the Arab demands like those of a negligible opposition to be put off by a few political phrases and treated like bad children. After this the Arabs decided to send a delegation to Europe, and funds have been collected all over Palestine and subscribed with extraordinary enthusiasm by all classes. ... The causes of the Moslems and Christian opposition to and hatred of the British Zionist policy may be shortly summed up under some of the main headings:- (1) The special privileges accorded to the Jews; (2) The influence of the Zionist Commission and the openly declared political aims of the Zionists; (3) The use of Hebrew as an official language; (4) The immigration of great numbers of low-class Jews; (5) The behaviour and immorality of the immigrants; (6) The fall in price of land, trade depression, and the prohibition of export of cereals affecting the peasantry; (7) Arrogance of the Jews towards Moslems and Christians; (8) No representation in the Government of the country or control of expenditure being accorded to the Arabs ...; (9) Loss of confidence in the Palestine Administration and in the British Government; (10) The realisation of the injustice of self-government being given to nomadic savages in Trans-Jordania and refused to Palestine; (11) Moslem and Christian religious feeling aroused by conduct and aims of the Jews; (12) The Government attitude towards Moslem and Christian petitions, protests and complaints
which are frequently not answered or disregarded while Jews appear to have
at all times the ear of the administration; (13) The use of the Zionist flag”. 240

Mr Churchill reported to the British Cabinet, when submitting this scathing critique
from Captain Brunton, that “there is no doubt that we are in a situation of increasing
danger which may at some time involve us in serious military embarrassments [and
that] I do not think things are going to get better in this part of the world but rather
worse”. 241

On 3 May 1921 Monsignor Barlassina made what he described as a “pacifying
intervention” at Jaffa, being driven down from Jerusalem to see what was actually
taking place. He reported to Cardinal Gasparri on 8 May 1921, his memorandum
typed in red and with sixteen vivid attachments setting out the evidence in support
of what he was saying. 242 According to Monsignor Barlassina, during the night of 1
May 1921 certain people had gone from Jerusalem to Jaffa to issue May Day
Communist manifestos in Arabic and Hebrew calling for “workers to cast off their
chains of slavery”; denouncing the English despot and ending with the cry to “Down
the English and French bayonettes, Down the rich Arabs and Foreigners, Long live
the 3rd International, Long live the Palestine Soviet”. During the same night a number
of grave incidents occurred in which it was reported in Jerusalem that two dead
bodies had been seen in the streets of Jaffa, leading the British Mandate government
to issue a statement to the effect that 20 people had been killed and 100 wounded
in an insurrection between Arabs and Jews in Jaffa on 1 May. The government had
sent troops from Lodd [Lydda] to restore order. On 2 May 1921 the Latin Patriarch
had been informed that all was not calm, leading him to decide to go down to Jaffa,
a fact of which he advised Jerusalem District Governor Storrs in writing on 3 May
1921.

240 G.1.1.16 FO 371/6375 Registry No. E 8146/35/88 Secret Cabinet Memorandum of 9 June 1921
from the Secretary of State for the Colonies and enclosed account of Captain Brunton of 13 May 1921.
241 G.1.1.16. FO 371/6375 Registry No. E 8146/35/88 Memorandum of 9 June 1921 from Mr W.S.
Churchill.
242 A.17. Latin Patriarchate Archives GV-LB 2.4-3.6 Segreteria di Stato 1849-1921 Monsignor Barlassina
memorandum 28/21 to Cardinal Gasparri with 16 attachments outlining Barlassina’s account and
evidence as to the Jaffa Riots.
At Jaffa on 3 May Barlassina went to the French Hospital where he received the news that by midday that day 50 Hebrews had been killed and 150 wounded, with 14 non-Hebrews dead and 50 wounded. He then went to the Franciscan Convent in Jaffa where he met with various people and then returned to the French Hospital to visit the wounded, returning in his automobile with the local Muslim Mufti to the Municipal Hospital. At that Hospital the local people, who had heard of his presence, gathered en masse to greet him and he told them that he would seek to assist them in resolving the situation through his personal intervention with the city governor and with High Commissioner Samuel in Jerusalem. As Monsignor Barlassina was leaving the crowd had again surrounded his car and he had assured them that he would make representations to the government about the affair, and asking that they should restore order, at which calm had descended.

The Latin Patriarch left Jaffa at 7.00pm and arrived at the Mount of Olives residence of High Commissioner Samuel at 9.30pm where the High Commissioner met with him immediately in the presence of Mr W. Deedes. Monsignor Barlassina there expressed the view that at the heart of the Jaffa Incident lay the clear perception by non-Jews that the British mandate authorities favoured the Jews against all others. High Commissioner Samuel replied that the inhabitants of Tel Aviv were determined to defend themselves from attack, especially following the assassination of the famous writer Yosef Haim Brenner [1889-1921] together with all his family. Monsignor Barlassina acknowledged the truth of that but said that there were many more incidents where the Jews had brutally assaulted undefended people, including mothers and children, and that public order should be maintained by soldiers and police, not by “self-defence”. High Commissioner Samuel responded that at Jaffa it had not involved English Jewish soldiers, but young men previously connected with the military to whom arms had been given. As the Latin Patriarch continued to press his point about the involvement of young Jewish men in uniform and armed, Mr Deedes intervened sarcastically to say that the fact that there were 50 Jewish dead and only 14 non-Jews killed was “eloquent”. High Commissioner Samuel brought the meeting to a close by promising to hold an impartial inquest into the Jaffa Incident,
having also thanked Monsignor Barlassina for his role in helping restore peace in Jaffa.  

High Commissioner Samuel’s own despatch of 15 May 1921 to Colonial Secretary Churchill in London substantially bore out what Barlassina had reported, noting that he had appointed a Commission of Enquiry into the Jaffa Riots, and that the precise list of casualties was 85 dead, including 41 Jews, 42 Muslims and 2 Christians, and 230 wounded, including 167 Jews, 61 Muslims and 2 Christians.

In response to the very detailed briefing from Monsignor Barlassina Cardinal Gasparri agreed to the Latin Patriarch’s request for approval to undertake an overseas trip to inform public opinion as to the current situation in Palestine. This occurred at the same time as delicate negotiations for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between France and the Holy See [broken since 1904] were reaching their climax. President Millerand of France wrote to Pope Benedict XV on 18 May 1921 to accredit the new French Ambassador to the Holy See, the announcement of renewed diplomatic relations being made on 21 May 1921, immediately bringing to the fore France’s desire to reassert its former protectorate of Ottoman times. There was open speculation at the time in the Italian Press that the Holy See had “emerged from the War with increased moral force and prestige”, and that the time was right for the resolution of the festering “Roman Question”, leading to a normalisation of relations between the Holy See and Italy.
In this heady and vibrant period in the foreign relations of the Holy See the affairs of the Holy Land attracted the very public attention and action of the Supreme Pontiff. Undoubtedly influenced by the gravity of the situation as revealed by the Barlassina briefing, Pope Benedict XV devoted his entire public Allocution of 13 June 1921, entitled *Causa Nobis*, to the plight of Palestine. He said that:

> When Christian troops regained possession of the Holy Places, We joined in the general rejoicing with all our heart; but our joy was not unmixed with fear ... that after such a magnificent and joyful event the Jews would acquire a preponderant and privileged position in Palestine [and that] if We are to judge by the present situation, our fears have been only too well realised [because] it is known that the position of Christians in Palestine has not only not been improved, but it has become worse under the new civil regime which has been established and which tends – if not in the intention of its founders, certainly in its effect – to deprive Christianity of the position which it has hitherto held and to substitute it for the Jews.  

Pope Benedict deplored “the effort of many persons to deprive the Holy Places of their sacred character and to transform them into pleasure resorts”, and stated that he did “not indeed wish that the rights of the Jewish element should be infringed but that the just rights of Christianity should not be subordinated to them”. He concluded with an exhortation to “all Christian nations, Catholic and non-Catholic, to urge these considerations on the League of Nations, which .... is to examine the terms of the British Mandate in Palestine”.  

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248 G.1.1.16 FO 371/6375 Registry No. E 7189/35/88 Translation of the Pope’s Allocution of 13 June 1921 conveyed by Count de Salis in his Despatch No. 65 of 20 June 1921 to Lord Curzon; G.1.1.16 FO 371/6375 No. E 6874/35/88 Telegram of 14 June 1921 from Count de Salis to the Foreign Office giving his initial briefing on the Allocution.

249 G.1.1.16 FO 371/6375, translation of Pope Benedict XV’s Allocution of 13 June 1921. The alleged “pleasure resorts” appears to refer to Cardinal Gasparri’s concerns about proposals for a railway line to take Jewish day-trippers up to the summit of Mt Carmel, overlooking the Bay of Haifa.
This Allocution is remarkable both for what it said and what it did not say. Firstly, it made clear that the Holy See had concerns about the British takeover of Palestine from the outset in December 1917. Secondly, the Holy See had deep concerns that the accretion of rights to the Jewish element of the population in Palestine was occurring at the expense of the Christian population, made up almost entirely of indigenous Palestinians, and wished for a proper balance to be restored and maintained. Thirdly, the Holy See was deeply concerned about non-Catholic [that is, Protestant] proselytising which was now perceived by the Holy See to be occurring in Palestine. Fourthly, the Holy See was deeply concerned about the Holy Places and wanted the Christian public around the world to make their voices heard about those matters in the negotiations on the terms of the Palestine Mandate being conducted by the League of Nations. The Allocution was very direct, if restrained, and made no call for the revocation of the Balfour Declaration, nor for an end to the Zionist project for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, nor for the termination of the proposed British Mandate over Palestine. Rather, Pope Benedict called for a situation which had suddenly slipped into imbalance to be restored to balance. It showed the focus of the Holy See remained on its two long-held policies for the Holy Land, the protection of the Holy Places and the care for the indigenous Catholic population and the protection of its long-held rights from erosion.\footnote{Minerbi at 148-151 refers to this Allocution as Pope Benedict XV’s “public attack on Zionism”, but it never refers to Zionism and ought to be seen as a model of temperance in all the circumstances, especially when one compares it with the material submitted to the British Cabinet at this time by Winston Churchill. The briefing to Lord Curzon by Count de Salis on the Allocution noted that “the Pope does not desire that the rights of the Jewish element should be infringed but that the just rights of Christianity should not be subordinated to them”, \textit{G.1.3.18 FO 380/35 Telegram No. 18 of 14 June 1921 from Count de Salis to Lord Curzon}. On 21 June 1921 Count de Salis further briefed Lord Curzon that he was now “under the impression that much of the nervousness at the Vatican as betrayed by the Pope’s Allocution is due to the delays in appointing the Commission which is to deal with the Holy Places”, see \textit{G.1.3.18 FO 380/35 Telegram No. 20 of 21 June 1921 from Count de Salis to Lord Curzon}.}

In a private letter to a colleague at the Foreign Office in London, Mr Cecil Dormer of the British Mission to the Holy See wrote about the Pope’s recent Allocution, observing that “there is an undoubted feeling of anxiety at our Zionist policy”. He said that “information had been coming in from Palestine, not only from Mgr
Barlassina the Patriarch, but from different sources, tending to show that our original plan for a ‘national home for the Jews’ was developing into one of complete Jewish control”. He observed that “the position as felt inter alia at the Vatican [is that] it is not Zionism, as it was announced, which alarms them, but what may lie behind it [and that] the more active Zionists in Palestine have done the mischief, not only by their activities but by their foolish boasting of what is to come”. He further pointed out that “the delay in setting up the Commission on the Holy Places helps to make us suspect, although until approval of our Mandate is given it is perhaps inevitable”. Dormer pointed out that the new French Ambassador to the Holy See was making “efforts to regain for France the protection of Catholics in the East”. He concluded that “what will perhaps help matters will be if the appointment can be brought about of a British auxiliary bishop to the Patriarch to act as go-between and keep the latter better informed on things English [sic] generally, [observing that] Mgr Barlassina is a good man … but does not understand us and has an unhappy habit of writing in English, which he does not know properly”. 251

In the wake of the papal Allocution members of the joint Muslim-Christian Delegation from Palestine, en route for London, went to Rome and called on Cardinal Gasparri on 25 July 1921, seeking an Audience with Pope Benedict XV. 252 When the delegates began to discuss with the papal Secretary of State the situation of the Arabs in Palestine, Cardinal Gasparri “cut them short and said that this question lay outside the concern of the Vatican, but that with regard to the interests of the Catholic Church in Palestine the case was different”. Cardinal Gasparri referred the delegates to the Pope’s recent Allocution, and the delegates informed him that its contents had been censored by the authorities in Palestine. The Pope agreed to meet with the Delegation very reluctantly, having made clear his opinion that the Cardinal should deal with them rather than himself. The Audience was very brief and discussion was confined strictly to those matters raised by the Pope in his

251 G.1.1.16 FO 371/6375 Registry No. E 7594/35/88 Personal letter of 24 June 1921 from Mr Cecil Dormer to Mr Charles Tufton, British Foreign Office. See Appendix 5 for biographical details of Cecil Dormer.

252 G.1.1.24 FO 371/6396 Registry No. E 8767/8364/88 Despatch No. 25 of 28 July 1921 from Count de Salis to the British Foreign Office; and see also G.1.3.18 FO 380/35. Cardinal Gasparri said that the Delegation consisted of 3 Arabs [ie Muslims] and 2 Christians.
Allocution, with the instruction that nothing be published about the Audience. Marquess Curzon and Winston Churchill specifically disapproved a proposal that Britain lodge a protest at this Audience having been granted. On 26 July 1921 Lord Curzon authorised Count de Salis “to let it be known [to the Holy See] that, pending the coming into force of the Palestine Mandate, it is not the intention of His Majesty’s Government to set up this Commission [for the Holy Places]”.

This set of exchanges shows that the Holy See had little interest at this time in the views of non-Catholic Palestinians and that its major preoccupation was with the Holy Places and the protection of its local Catholic Church from any prejudice arising from the implementation of the Balfour Declaration by the British authorities in Palestine pursuant to the proposed League mandate. When a representative of the Latin Patriarch in Rome raised with the British Mission to the Holy See the alleged “regular persecution of the Catholic Church” in Palestine, Mr Cecil Dormer rejected those allegations and said they arose from the problems of Monsignor Barlassina in understanding “the British character”. Dormer raised the possibility of the Latin Patriarch having an “Englishman” on his staff, whether as a private secretary or an auxiliary bishop. He concluded that “the Vatican … are not much in favour of Mgr Barlassina, whose main support, indeed, comes from Cardinal Van Rossum” at Propaganda Fide. Yet again, this suggests that the interests and views of the Holy See and those of the Latin Patriarch at this time were not always absolutely aligned.

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253 G.1.1.24 FO 371/6396 Registry No. E 8767/8364/88; F.19 Folio 37 Note [handwritten] from Pope Benedict XV to Cardinal Gasparri of 26 (?) July 1921 in which the Pope said that, if the delegates insisted on coming up to see him, “We will use vague words that may express courtesy but no more!”

254 G.1.1.24 FO 371/6396 Registry No. E 9154/8364/88 Letter of 10 August 1921 from Hubert Young on behalf of Mr Churchill, Colonial Secretary, to Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office. That the Holy See attached little significance to this first meeting with an Arab delegation from Palestine is strongly suggested by Mr Cecil Dormer’s letter of 4 August 1921 to Lancelot Oliphant in the Foreign Office that Cardinal Gasparri had no idea of the names or identities of any of the delegates and had “to inquire why they had come to visit him”, see G.1.3.18 FO 380/35 Letter of 4 August 1921 from Mr Cecil Dormer to Mr Lancelot Oliphant.

255 G.1.3.18 FO 380/35 Despatch No. 141 of 26 July 1921 from Mr D. G. Osborne for the Foreign Minister to Count de Salis.

256 G.1.3.18 FO 380/35 aide memoire by Mr Cecil Dormer of his meeting with Monsignor Biasiotti, Rome-based representative of the Latin Patriarch, 5 August 1921.
3.25. GOVERNOR STORRS VISITS THE HOLY SEE IN AUGUST 1921

High Commissioner Samuel, concerned about possible misunderstandings by the Holy See over what was actually happening in Palestine, arranged for the Governor of Jerusalem, Mr Ronald Storrs, to visit Rome, where his cousin, Count John de Salis, was British Minister to the Holy See.\(^{257}\) Cardinal Gasparri was making his August *villegiatura* in his native village in Le Marche at the time Storrs arrived in Rome. He was granted an Audience by Pope Benedict XV on 24 August 1921. In that Audience the Pope “expressed great esteem” for Sir Herbert Samuel but pointed out that in his 1920 Audience with Samuel, the incoming High Commissioner for Palestine “had declared his intention of acting with complete impartiality in Palestine”. The Pope observed that it was “to His Holiness’ surprise and disappointment [that] signs had arisen showing that the impartiality of the Palestine Government had its limits”, specifically with regard to the manifest “preponderating influence of the Jews” which showed itself through their having a majority of members “in all ‘committees’ of importance … and were consequently able to influence political decisions”\(^{258}\).

Mr Storrs gave a detailed response with regard to the issue of appointments, of the prospects for the Holy Places Commission, and the concerns expressed by Pope Benedict XV in his June Allocution. The Pope concluded the Audience by urging Storrs to see Cardinal Gasparri “and remarked that he was happy to learn that good-will existed, adding that he trusted that the Latin, and in general Christian, susceptibilities would not be neglected in the development of the Mandate, which he assumed would go to the British”, and that “it would be a great disgrace to any mandatory if, after a certain period, the departure of the Turks should be openly

\(^{257}\) G.1.1.25 FO 371/6397 Registry No. E 9382/9382/88 Telegram of 15 August 1921 from High Commissioner Samuel to Mr W. S. Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies. Both Lord Curzon and Winston Churchill approved this “unofficial mission of Mr Storrs to the Vatican”, see letter from Mr Hubert Young of 20 August 1921 and note on behalf of Lord Curzon on 26 August 1921, E 9535/9382/88. Ronald Storrs’ mother was the sister of the 5\(^{th}\) Baron Brownlow and great-niece of the 1\(^{st}\) Earl Brownlow, matrilineal great-grandfather of Count John de Salis.

\(^{258}\) G.1.1.25 FO 371/6397 Registry No. E 10039/9328/88 Despatch No. 90 of 27 August 1921 from Mr Cecil Dormer to Marquess Curzon and Memorandum by Mr Ronald Storrs of 25 August 1921 about his Audience with Pope Benedict XV. Lord Curzon expressed the view that “Mr Storr’s visit is most opportune and it will, I think, have an excellent effect in helping to remove some of the apprehensions which the Holy See has entertained in regard to the British Administration of Palestine”.

regretted”. From Mr Storrs’ account it seems clear that the Pope made no reference to Zionism or to the Balfour Declaration and its promise of a Jewish national home in Palestine, focussing rather on the need for fairness and balance to be accorded to the Christians of Palestine by the new British administration pursuant to the terms of the proposed League Mandate.

Mr Storrs also met in Rome with Father Robinson who counselled that the real and crucial issue for the Holy See was the apparent inaction about the Holy Places Commission, saying that “it would be preferable to announce its formation, even though it never sat”.

Governor Storrs then undertook the long journey to Cardinal Gasparri’s remote home village of Ussita. There the Vatican Secretary of State expressed the view that “it was not the mass immigration elements in Zionism which alarmed him so much as the preponderating influence in Palestine which might be acquired by a comparatively small number of Jews occupying high positions”. Gasparri acknowledged that “certain apprehensions with regard to Zionism had existed and continued to exist at the Vatican, but said that he personally was convinced of the good-will and good intentions of the British Government”.

3.26. THE HOLY SEE’S DECEMBER 1921 OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROPOSED BRITISH MANDATE FOR PALESTINE

Whatever the Cardinal Secretary of State may have said or meant in the relaxed atmosphere of his home-village summer holiday, his official view was expressed clearly and definitively on 19 December 1921 in the Holy See Secretariat of State’s Observations on the Project for an English Mandate for Palestine:-

1. the project’s objective of establishing a national home for the Jews, although it was stated to be subject to the obligation not to derogate from the civil
and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, appeared to favour an absolute preponderance of the Jewish element to the detriment of the other nationalities within Palestine;

2. in fact the articles of the project, in contrast to Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, appeared solely preoccupied with the Jews, in that it recognized a Jewish commission as an institution in public law, which was none other than the very powerful Zionist Commission, and which commission would stand side by side with large powers not only in relation to the Jewish national home but also relative to the overall development of the country; and that Jews were to be favoured in relation to immigration and in regard to the construction of public works;

3. by Article 1 His Britannic Majesty would be given all the powers of the government of a State over the affairs of Palestine to establish an administration in a manner which it believes most opportune, and that given the appointment by Britain of Sir [Herbert] Samuel as High Commissioner it appeared likely that this administration would be “Jewish or philo-Jewish”, the terms of the draft Mandate appearing to give considerable favouritism to the Jewish interest in respect of colonization, the construction of public works, economic development, and that this became of particular significance because the mandatory Power would have a large degree of influence over the Holy Places;

4. particular attention needed to be paid to Article 14 which referred to “a special commission to study and regulate questions and claims relative to the different religious confessions”, and which would be appointed by the mandatory Power, that is, England [sic], and would have a president nominated by the League of Nations. The Holy See could not consent to England having the right to nominate membership of this Commission rather than its members being nominated by the relevant competent religious authorities. This Commission would have the responsibility for entrusting permanent control of the various Holy Places to the appropriate representatives of the religion to whom the Holy Places pertained, leaving open the possibility that a Holy Place previously controlled by the Catholics might be assigned to “schismatics”. This Article 14 therefore was highly problematic
for the position of the Catholic interests and would need to be redrafted to be made “more precise and more complete”;

5. that it appeared useless to suggest modification of the project, the overall spirit of which was unacceptable because of its tendency towards an absolute Jewish preponderance in Palestine, administrative, economic and ultimately political. It would not be possible to attain a declaration that the Mandate should be entrusted to the British Government for the administration of Palestine above all in the interests of the indigenous Palestinian population. Therefore it was at least necessary to achieve the result that the Jewish element would not be able to have rights which outweighed those of the indigenous population.\textsuperscript{262}

These Observations seem to have settled the future policy of the Holy See towards the question of the Palestine Mandate, which was not to oppose it but to press the claim for equal rights for all segments of the Palestinian population, and to press for greater clarity and certainty regarding the Holy Places, and particularly the membership of the Holy Places Commission.

Pollard has recently observed that “the overall thrust of Vatican policy on Palestine was anti-Zionist rather than anti-Semitic”\textsuperscript{263} I argue that the Holy See’s policy should be seen neither to have been anti-Semitic nor even openly anti-Zionist but rather was opposed to the more extreme ends of Zionism, especially the establishment of a separate Jewish state in Palestine. The Holy See at this time took a frank and far-seeing approach to the likely consequences for the non-Jewish population of Palestine from the unfettered pursuit of the Zionist project under any British Mandate from the League. Once again, its terms show that the Holy See remained quite focussed on its two long-term policies for the Holy Land, protection of the Holy Places and protection of the rights of the Latin Catholics in Palestine.

\textsuperscript{262} F.1 Protocollo No. B-29076 of 19 December 1921 from the Secretariat of Sate for the Holy See, Osservazione sul Progetto del Mandato Inglese per la Palestina, prepared in response to a submission to the Holy See by the Delegation to the Holy See from the Netherlands on 2 December 1921, see F.1 Folios 32-34.

\textsuperscript{263} Pollard, The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism, at 90.
3.27. THE END OF THE PONTIFICATE OF POPE BENEDICT XV IN JANUARY 1922

The Secretariat of State’s December 1921 Observations were quickly followed by the traditional Christmas religious ceremonies in Bethlehem and Jerusalem, at which Cardinal Gasparri had ordered the status quo as to the French liturgical honours be maintained until the Palestine Mandate was formally granted to Britain. This was the last Pope Benedict XV would know of the Holy Land about which he had so much concern: “in the latter half of January 1922 the Pope fell ill. His malady, apparently at first a cold, soon turned to disquieting symptoms, and within a week, on the 22nd January, he was dead.” He had veered between warm support for Nahum Sokolow in 1917 and open alarm for the tendency of events in Palestine in 1921. Yet at no time did he ever express opposition to the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine. The Holy See’s two long-standing historical policies for the Holy Land remained firmly in place at the end of his pontificate.

In the light of the news of Pope Benedict XV’s death the editor of the Zionist publication Israel wrote that “we still believe in the sound judgement of the Vatican”. The “Zionist Review” wrote that in Jewish history Pope Benedict XV would be remembered for the various acts of mercy affecting Jews during World War I, and according to this journal, the Jews had especially appreciated his benevolent attitude toward Zionist proposals at the most critical period, at a time when unfriendly intervention of the papacy would have caused serious misgivings in authoritative quarters”. The Palestine Weekly in Palestine itself praised the late Pope for his

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understanding of the importance of the Balfour Declaration and its role in “the redemption of a race which has suffered so much at the hands of Christianity”.266

Pope Benedict XV never opposed the Balfour Declaration, nor even criticised it. He never opposed the proposal for a Jewish national home in Palestine. He never opposed the granting of the Palestine Mandate to Great Britain. Rather, he was critical of the manner in which the British administration was handling its role in Palestine and was particularly critical of the way in which it placed Jewish people in privileged positions and favoured Jewish interests at the expense of other communities in Palestine, especially the Christian interests. In doing this, Benedict XV was being entirely consistent with the terms of the Balfour Declaration itself which guaranteed that the project for a Jewish national home was to be achieved without derogating from the existing rights and privileges of those other communities present in Palestine.

The clear and constant preoccupation of Pope Benedict XV for the Holy Land was for the Holy Places and the membership of the proposed Holy Places Commission. His statements on Palestine were always restrained, leaving his Secretary of State to undertake more forceful background briefing to those with whom he inter-acted and which expressed concern at the way in which the Zionist project was being allowed far greater scope than had previously been foreshadowed. Cardinal Archbishop Bourne of Westminster pursued a more forceful line in his representations to the British Government about Zionism but he did not do so as a representative of the Holy See.

The new Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Monsignor Barlassina, quickly became a frank and vocal critic of what he felt was occurring in Palestine but it becomes apparent that his views and policies did not necessarily reflect those of the Holy See. The evidence supports the conclusion that, although he was never anti-Semitic in his openly expressed views, Barlassina quickly became a staunch critic of the speed and

266 Minerbi, 162-163. Minerbi himself rejects these “encomiums” on behalf of Pope Benedict XV from Jewish and Zionist quarters, seeing in them “blindness”, but they reflect how Jewish and Zionist circles saw this Pope at that time and show that he was considered in those circles neither to be anti-Zionist nor anti-Semitic.
vigour with which the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine unfolded from 1919. His overriding concern was for the maintenance of the long-held rights of the Latin Catholic Church in the Holy Land and for the rights and interests of the indigenous, and particularly but not exclusively, Catholic populace of Palestine. He would continue this approach during the pontificate of Pope Pius XI as the Holy See continued to pursue its own long-held policies for the Holy Land, the protection of the Holy Places and the nurturing and safeguarding of the interests of the largely indigenous Latin Catholic community there.
CHAPTER 4: UNEASY MANDATE – POPE PIUS XI AND PALESTINE

4.1. THE ELECTION OF POPE PIUS XI

In the papal conclave which began on 2 February 1922 there were “two tendencies” in competition, the “Zelanti”, or “reactionaries”, who “centred around Cardinal Merry del Val”, and the “Politici”, or “progressives”, of whom “the life and soul of the latter was Cardinal Gasparri; as Camerlengo he became the executive organ of the Holy See the moment the Pope had breathed his last, and his strong personality seemed to dominate the situation from that moment”.¹ Cardinal Gasparri telegraphed the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Monsignor Barlassina, on 7 February 1922 to notify him of the election the previous day of Cardinal Achille Ratti, Archbishop of Milan, as bishop of Rome with the regnal name of Pope Pius XI.² The coronation of the new Pope took place in St Peter’s Basilica on Sunday, 12 February 1922.³ The new Supreme Pontiff of the Holy See, a Lombard by birth and a mountaineer for recreation, had enjoyed a career as an eminent Church librarian at the Ambrosian Library in Milan and then as Prefect of the Vatican Library before becoming Apostolic Visitor and then Nuncio to Poland from 1918. He was appointed as Archbishop of Milan only in 1921, having been made a cardinal at the Sacred Consistory at the time of Pope Benedict XV’s 13 June 1921 Allocution.⁴ He had visited Palestine in 1907 and so was the first Pope in many centuries to have actual first-hand knowledge of the Holy Land.⁵ He was a highly regarded scholar both of the Old and New Testaments, had actively sought good relations with Jews and had “a relatively enlightened view on the Jewish question”.⁶

Whereas the election of the two previous Popes in 1903 and 1914 had been followed swiftly by the replacement of the Holy See’s Secretary of State, Cardinal

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² A.18. Latin Patriarchate Archives LB 2.4-3.6.2 Segreteria di Stato Ott 1921-1947, Palestine Posts and Telegraphs Telegram of 7 February 1922 from Cardinal Gasparri to Monsignor Barlassina. See Appendix 5 for biographical details of Pope Pius XI.
⁵ Minerbi, 192.
⁶ Pollard, The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism, at 123-125.
Rampolla in 1903 and Cardinal Merry del Val in 1914, Pope Pius XI renewed the appointment of Cardinal Gasparri in that office, suggesting that there would be no significant change in papal policies. The driving issue for the new Supreme Pontiff from the outset of his pontificate was the resolution of the Roman Question with the Kingdom of Italy and the re-establishment of the Papacy as a territorial sovereign state, an issue which he would pursue with the incoming Fascist administration of Benito Mussolini from October 1922.  

He declared, in his December 1922 encyclical *Ubi Arcano Dei*, that he desired “the peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ”, and flagged his interest in the lay Catholic Action movement as one of his main concerns.

Shortly after the election of Pope Pius XI Benito Mussolini came to power as the leader of a Fascist regime in Italy. The whole of the pontificate of Pius XI therefore operated in the shadow of a Fascism which grew increasingly anti-Semitic with the years. David I. Kertzer, in his 2014 work *The Pope and Mussolini*, gives a masterly account, based on exhaustive research in Vatican and other records, of the relationship between Pius XI and Mussolini, and between the Holy See and Italy’s Fascist regime from 1922 to 1939. He presents a scathing indictment of the extent to which the Holy See tolerated the worst excesses of the Fascist regime in Italy, including the anti-Semitic Racial Laws from 1938, in the hope of protecting the Catholic Church and its interests in Italy. It appears unarguable, in the light of this evidence, that many individuals and organs close to the Vatican, not least the head of the Jesuits, Father Wlodomierz Ledochowski SJ, and the Jesuit publication *Civiltà Cattolica*, were consistently anti-Semitic in their actions and attitudes. However, Kertzer’s analysis of the evidence supports the view that Pius XI was progressively disillusioned with Mussolini and the Fascist regime in Italy and sought repeatedly to oppose its adoption of anti-Semitic laws, wishing to issue an anti-racism encyclical in his last months in office. This thesis seeks, as one of its minor strands, to consider

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7 Townsend, 163.
8 Pollard, *The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism*, at 134-135, 139.
the extent to which the actions of the Holy See in relation to Palestine during the pontificate of Pius XI manifested overt or concealed anti-Semitism.

In the face of his own overall priorities for the Holy See and the pressures arising from these events and ongoing developments in Italy and elsewhere in Europe, Pope Pius XI could not avoid dealing with the question of the Holy Land at an early date because of the events unfolding so swiftly in Palestine and as the struggle for finalization of the terms of the League of Nations mandate to Britain for the governance of Palestine entered its final stages.

**4.2. THE HOLY SEE PROCURES DELAY OF APPROVAL OF BRITAIN’S PALESTINE MANDATE**

One of the major foreign policy issues which Pius XI had to deal with early in his time in office was the question of the proposed League of Nations mandate over Palestine and its provisions relating to a Jewish national home. Cardinal Gasparri set out the position of the Holy See in relation to the Zionist project at the outset of the pontificate of Pope Pius XI in a letter to Count de Salis on 6 March 1922. Gasparri informed de Salis that the Holy See did not oppose the Jews of Palestine having equal civil rights with those of the other nations and confessions of that land. However, it could not consent to the Jews being placed in a privileged and preponderant position above all other nations and confessions. He expressed concern that the rights of the Christian believers of Palestine would not come to be sufficiently protected under the Mandate regime. Gasparri then went on to set out very specific concerns both with regard to the question of equality of treatment in the light of article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles and also as to the Special Commission on the Holy Places covered by article 14 of the Mandate and by article 95 of the Treaty of Sevres, observing that the text of article 14 gave Britain excessive powers over those contemplated by article 95 of the Sevres Treaty.\(^{10}\)

The Zionist Organization, in turn, was determined to “ensure a speedy approval [of the Palestine mandate] without revisions detrimental to Zionism”, to which end it

\(^{10}\) F.2. ff 67-70, Protocollo No. 1477 of 6 March 1922 from Cardinal Gasparri to Count de Salis.
was decided that Dr Chaim Weizmann should come to Rome to meet with the new Pope and with Cardinal Gasparri.\textsuperscript{11} The Executive of the Zionist Organization “attached considerable weight to the cultivation of friendly relations with the Roman Catholic Church” and the visit of Dr Weizmann to Rome was intended to bring about “as friendly an understanding as possible with the Holy See, and to remove misapprehensions which, if uncorrected, may be seriously detrimental to Zionist interests” because of “the influence which the Holy See is in a position to exercise, both directly through its agents in Palestine, and indirectly through its relations with the Roman Catholic Powers”.\textsuperscript{12} These remarks highlight the importance which, at this stage, the Zionist movement still attached to the support of the Holy See for the project for a Jewish national home in Palestine. The Apostolic Nuncio to France, Monsignor Ceretti, recommended that Dr Weizmann should be granted an Audience with Cardinal Gasparri and with the Holy Father, because “this would seem opportune, the more so because upon him depends a great part of the Zionist Organization of Palestine”.\textsuperscript{13}

In late March of 1922 “Dr Weizmann came to Rome, with the object of removing difficulties as far as possible”, in terms of the Holy See’s attitude to the Zionist project and the British mandate for Palestine under the new Pope. This “visit was not altogether unsuccessful; some misconceptions were put aside, and if no actual agreement was reached on the main issue, the policy of the Zionists, the Vatican were reassured on hearing from Dr Weizmann that there was no desire on his part to interfere with the Holy Places which were entirely outside the scope of the [Zionist] movement”.\textsuperscript{14} Dr Weizmann had two meetings with Cardinal Gasparri, separated by a brief visit of the Zionist leader to Naples,\textsuperscript{15} the second meeting between Dr Weizmann and Cardinal Gasparri being arranged by Count de Salis for

\textsuperscript{11} Minerbi, 164.
\textsuperscript{12} B.2. Central Zionist Archives Z4\textbackslash{}41030-293/299 Zionit Organization-letter of 7 May 1922 to the Zionist Organization, Berlin Office, from the Zionist Organization Central Office, and related correspondence.
\textsuperscript{13} F.19. f.39. Protocollo No 812 of 26 March 1922 from Monsignor Ceretti to Cardinal Gasparri.
\textsuperscript{15} G.1.6.3. CO 733/30 ff.305-306, Despatch No. 67 of 25 April 1922 from Count de Salis to Marquess Curzon.
Sunday, 2 April 1922.\textsuperscript{16} It appears to have been at the first meeting in late March 1922 with Cardinal Gasparri that Dr Weizmann “gained a distinct impression of hostility on the part of the Vatican towards the Zionist movement despite the genial attitude of His Eminence”, “the Vatican authorities [having] sent a memorandum regarding the Palestine mandate to the Council of the League of Nations and he suspects that this document refers to, and probably protests against, terms of articles 2, 4 and 14”. This may have been the first occasion upon which Weizmann heard of the Holy See’s submissions to the League of Nations objecting to those three articles.\textsuperscript{17} According to Dr Weizmann, when he met with Cardinal Gasparri on this occasion, the latter “asked him what financial advantages had been offered to the Rothschilds by His Majesty’s Government in order to secure Jewish support for the British mandate”. Weizmann subsequently observed to Sir Ronald Graham in the British Embassy in Rome that “the delay in granting the mandate was paralysing the progress of the Zionist cause.\textsuperscript{18} The Zionist Organization’s \textit{Bulletin} of 4 April 1922 reported the meeting and noted Gasparri’s objections to the draft Mandate. It observed that: “Notwithstanding this, the Vatican and he [Gasparri] personally were in no way opposed to the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine, so long as the interests of the other faiths in the country are safeguarded, and the Jews were not given any privileged position”.\textsuperscript{19} This latter appears to be an accurate assessment of the Holy See’s view at this and all other relevant times.

Following his first meeting with Cardinal Gasparri, Dr Weizmann addressed the Istituto per l’Oriente at the Collegio Romano. Count de Salis reported that the Zionist leader told his audience that “the program of Zionism tended to be the foundation of a true Hebrew state in Palestine, liberal, as far as desired, toward other

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{G.1.1.28.} FO 371/7773 Registry No. E 4091/65/65 Despatch No. 58 of 13 April 1922 from Count de Salis to Marquess Curzon.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{G.1.1.28.} FO 371/7773 Registry No. E 3737/65/65 letter No. 90 of 8 April 1922 from Lancelot Oliphant to Count de Salis, the contact from Weizmann having come through letter from him to the Colonial Office by 6 April 1922; Minerbi, ibid, 164-165.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{G.1.1.28.} FO 371/7773 Registry No. E 3559/65/65 Despatch No. 282 of 29 March 1922 from Sir Ronald Graham to Marquess Curzon.
\textsuperscript{19} Minerbi, ibid, 166, citing the Zionist Organization \textit{Bulletin} of 4 April 1922.
nationalities and confessions but sovereign in its own territory”. This statement, if correctly reported, placed well in the public domain the Zionist aspiration that out of the Jewish national home in Palestine would develop a sovereign Jewish state. At his second meeting with Dr Weizmann Cardinal Gasparri raised concerns about press reports of the Collegio Romano address. Dr Weizmann insisted that “the account of the lecture published in the Osservatore was incorrect”.

Dr Weizmann had a second meeting with Cardinal Gasparri on 20 April 1922 at which the Zionist leader sought to correct what he perceived to be inaccuracies in reporting of his 4 April address at the Collegio Romano, telling Gasparri that “the Jews will occupy [in the Holy Land] a position in accordance with their numbers, influence, work, means and energy”. The discussion concluded with a mutual agreement between Gasparri and Weizmann that the Jews and the Catholic Church in Palestine should “think how to live together in peace”. It appears most likely that Dr Weizmann was being disingenuous in his dealings with Cardinal Gasparri in regard to the Zionist plans for a future Jewish state in Palestine, and that Cardinal Gasparri recognized this. For whatever reason, all efforts by Dr Weizmann to meet with Pope Pius XI himself were unsuccessful. This tends to infer that the new Pope did not want to appear to be giving any suggestion of public support to the Zionist cause at this time.

Prior to this second encounter with Dr Weizmann, Cardinal Gasparri submitted to Count de Salis his 6 March [sic, but actually April] 1922 “observations on the Draft British Mandate for Palestine which Mr Balfour presented to the Secretary General of the League of Nations on December 7, 1920”. The key elements of this

20 Minerbi, ibid, 166.
21 G.1.6.3. CO 733/30 ff.305-306, Despatch No. 67 of 25 April 1922 from Count de Salis to Marquess Curzon.
22 Minerbi, ibid, 169, citing Jewish Correspondence Bureau, Bulletin, April 27, 1922, CZA KH 1/28A-1. The date used by Minerbi for the second Weizmann/Gasparri meeting is clearly incorrect as the cited correspondence from Count de Salis shows.
23 Minerbi, 170, citing correspondence from Chief Rabbi Lattes of Rome and from Count de Salis.
24 G.1.1.28. FO 371/7773 Registry No. E 4091/65/65 Despatch No. 58 of 13 April 1922 from Count de Salis to Marquess Curzon and attached Translation of Cardinal Gasparri’s observations of 6 March [April] 1922. As Minerbi, at 168, points out, “the memorandum is dated March 6, 1922, but Gasparri added to it in his own handwriting a comment on Weizmann’s lecture on April 4, and the British legation received [it] only on” 11 April.
document were that: “the Holy See does not oppose the acquisition by Jews in Palestine of equal civil rights as are enjoyed by other nationalities and confessions, but it cannot consent 1. That the Jews should have given them a privileged position over other nationalities and confessions; 2. That the rights of Christian confessions should not be adequately safeguarded”. It noted that whilst the Balfour Declaration in favour of a national home for the Jews guaranteed that nothing would be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, in fact the articles of the draft mandate did set out to establish “an absolute economic, administrative and political preponderance of Jews over other nationalities”, particularly in article 4 with regard to the “Jewish Commission which is no other than the powerful Zionist organisation” which is proposed to be “placed alongside of the Palestine Administration and has been given a powerful voice in all questions relative to the ‘developpement du pays’”. Concerns were also expressed about articles 6, 7 and 11 in regard to immigration, naturalisation, close settlement on State and waste lands, and “with regard to the construction of public works”. The resultant effect, it noted, was that “the draft mandate ... in aiming at the absolute preponderance of Jews over all other peoples in Palestine is not only seriously damaging to the rights acquired by other nationalities, but is also contrary to art. 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, which establishes the idea and aim of each mandate”. He noted further that “a mandate would be contrary to all of this were it the instrument for subordinating native populations to the advantage of other nationalities”.

Cardinal Gasparri then cited Dr Weizmann’s own reported remarks at the conference at the Collegio Romano in Rome on 4 April 1922 in which “he expounded the Zionist programme as aiming at the constitution of a real Jewish State in Palestine, as liberal as could be desired towards other nationalities and confessions, but sovereign in its own territory, which quite contradicted Dr Weizmann’s own assurances to Cardinal Gasparri ‘that Zionism did not have, and did not wish to have a privileged and superior position in Palestine over other nationalities or religious confessions’”.

25 G.1.1.28. FO 371/7773, ibid, Gasparri’s observations
26 G.1.1.28. FO 371/7773, ibid, Gasparri’s observations.
Cardinal Gasparri then went on to address the Holy See’s concerns about the Commission on the Holy Places. This matter was dealt with in article 14 of the draft mandate, Gasparri observing that “the Holy See ... cannot agree that Catholic interests should be dealt with by representatives chosen, not by the competent Hierarchical authorities, but by England”; and that the terms of the draft article were unsatisfactory as to dispute resolution processes and leaving to the mandatory power the very decision as to what came within the scope of the term “Holy Places”.\(^{27}\) Cardinal Gasparri told Count de Salis that the draft Vatican response on the draft mandate for Palestine “had been considered [by the Congregation for Foreign Affairs] and especially the dispositions of Article 14 which relates to the Holy Places”. He said that it would be circulated “to each cardinal, with a request for observations”, and that when these were received “a decision would no doubt be taken” as to the use to which the document would be put.\(^{28}\)

Count de Salis met with Cardinal Gasparri on the Saturday before 25 April 1922. The Secretary of State informed de Salis that, a few days before, “the Congregation for Foreign Affairs had sat [and] the question of the Palestine mandate had been considered and especially the dispositions of Article 14 which relates to the Holy Places”; that “after discussion it had been decided to send a copy of the English text together with the French translation to each cardinal, with a request for observations”; and that “when these had been obtained, a decision would no doubt be taken”.\(^{29}\)

Shortly afterwards, Count de Salis wrote to Cardinal Gasparri seeking an audience for the Governor of Jerusalem, Ronald Storrs, with the Secretary of State and the Pope when he visited Rome on 29 and 30 April 1922.\(^{30}\) Cardinal Gasparri then informed de Salis that he would meet with Governor Storrs and would then decide, on the basis of their conversation, whether an Audience with Pope Pius XI was necessary.\(^{31}\)

\(^{27}\) G.1.1.28. FO 371/7773, ibid, Gasparri’s observations.
\(^{28}\) G.1.1.28. FO 371/7773 Despatch No. 67 from Count de Salis to Marquess Curzon.
\(^{29}\) G.1.6.3. CO 733/30, ff.305-306, Despatch No. 67 from Count de Salis to Marquess Curzon.
\(^{31}\) F.13. f.64, Protocollo 2571 of 26 April 1922 from Cardinal Gasparri to Count de Salis.
At this time the Holy See was giving thought to the question of the best person to preside over the proposed Holy Places Commission, to which the Holy See attached enormous importance. Cardinal Gasparri wrote to the Brazilian Ambassador on 28 April 1922 expressing the view that the Holy See favoured the appointment of a Belgian Catholic as President of the Holy Places Special Commission, showing the determination of the Holy See that the Holy Places Commission should be in “safe” Catholic hands.\(^32\)

This intervention by the Holy See elicited an infuriated response from the British Foreign Secretary to Count de Salis on 8 May 1922. Lord Curzon said:

> I am at a loss to understand in what manner Vatican can regard itself as being entitled to intervene in the matter in this way except in so far as it may reasonably expect to be consulted about selection of Roman Catholic Representative on the commission on Holy Places. On this point Cardinal Secretary of State has no ground for supposing that His Majesty’s Government wish to ignore reasonable views of Roman Catholic Hierarchy. It appears to me memorandum from Cardinal Secretary of State of March 6\(^{th}\) ... amounts to nothing less than protest against whole policy which His Majesty’s Government are being commissioned by Powers and League of Nations to carry out in Palestine.\(^33\)

The outraged tone of Lord Curzon’s telegram highlights the extent to which the Holy See was seen as being the sole meaningful opponent of the terms of the Palestine Mandate, even though its objections were consistently directed at procuring equal treatment for all peoples in Palestine and for an acceptable regime for the protection of Catholic, and broader Christian, interests in regard to the Holy Places by means of the Holy Places Commission.

The *Osservatore Romano* on 13 May 1922 affirmed that “the Vatican is not against Zionism so long as it does not seek anything other than equality of all the races and

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\(^{32}\) F.2.ff 78-79, Despatch 2576 of 28 April 1922 from Cardinal Gasparri to Signor Magalhay de Azeredo.

\(^{33}\) F.3. f.34, Telegram of 8 May 1922 from Lord Curzon to Count de Salis, G.1.1.28. FO 371/7773 Registry No. E 4545/65/65 Foreign Office File Note of 8 May 1922 initialled LO [Laurence Oliphant] and indicated as having been “seen by Lord Curzon”.

religions in Palestine; but finds that the aspiration to a purely Jewish Palestine is in contradiction with this species of Zionism”. The Italian Jewish newspaper Israel on 18 May 1922 published a belligerent response to the Vatican position voiced by the Osservatore Romano in an article headed “A violent attack by the Vatican press against Zionism” which highlights how quickly the Jewish community began its attack against any criticism emanating from the Holy See about any aspect of the Zionist project on the basis that it was “against Zionism”. 34 The Osservatore Romano article had not attacked Zionism at all but had, in the words of the article, simply put the Holy See’s steadfast and unchanging position that the Zionist project should proceed on the basis of equal treatment for all races and religious confessions in Palestine.

Notwithstanding, and apparently undaunted by, the evident ire of Britain’s powerful Foreign Secretary, on 15 May 1922 Cardinal Gasparri made the Holy See’s formal submission through Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the League, to the members of the Council of the League of Nations. It was, as Mr G. A. Carnegie of the Foreign Office noted, “for all practical purposes identical with that which the Vatican” had made available through Count de Salis the previous month.35 It was not, as Sergio Minerbi has sought to assert in The Vatican and Zionism, an effort “to thwart approval or, at the least, to obtain substantial revision of the Zionist articles”.36 It was, rather, a clearly focussed diplomatic campaign to ensure limited modification of six provisions of the draft mandate document, articles 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 and 14, to seek equality for all under a future mandate regime, to limit the role of the Zionist Organization, to safeguard the religious rights of Christians, and to ensure an acceptable outcome regarding the question of the Christian Holy Places.37 At no stage did the Holy See seek to use this process to overturn the Balfour Declaration, to reverse the promise of a Jewish national home in Palestine, or to prevent the immigration of Jews to Palestine. It was a stance which was not anti-Zionist, let alone

34 F.8. f.9. Israel, 18 May 1922, article headlined “Un violent attacco della stampa contro il Sionismo”.
36 Minerbi, ibid, 178 et seq.
37 Minerbi, ibid, 69-71,178-179 citing “Notes from Gasparri to the Council of the League of Nations (Geneva), May 15, 1922, PRO, CO 733/34”; F.2. ff.94-95, Despatch No. 3445 of 15 May 1922 from Cardinal Gasparri to Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the League of Nations; Drummond was a “fervent Catholic”, see F.4. ff 5-6 at f.5r, letter of 20 July 1922 from Cardinal Bourne to Gasparri.
anti-Semitic, but it sought limits upon the realization of certain aspects of the Zionist project under a future mandate administration and was underpinned by a clear opposition to the concept of Palestine becoming a sovereign Jewish state at some stage in the future. It was focussed on equal treatment for all in Palestine in accordance with Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, the avoidance of the creation of a privileged coterie or minority within Palestine, the safeguarding of the religious rights of Christians and the safeguard and protection of the Christian Holy Places, the latter having been the driving policy consideration of the Holy See in regard to the Holy Land for seven hundred years. It is simply unable to be supported by the available evidence that the Holy See sought, either directly or through the so-called “Catholic powers”, to delay or thwart the granting of the Palestinian Mandate to Great Britain “until the Balfour Declaration had been reversed”. 38

At the meeting of the League of Nations at Geneva on 11 May of 1922, the Holy See’s campaign did contribute to the decision to defer consideration of the Palestinian mandate until the next meeting of the Council of the League in London on 15 July 1922. Weizmann commented to his wife at the time that “our enemies – especially the Vatican and the Orthodox Jews, are working very hard against us”. 39

The British Foreign Office sought the best way to meet the challenge posed by the Holy See’s position, Lord Balfour himself suggesting “that Count De Salis be sent for” from the British Mission to the Holy See, whilst the idea that “Sir H. Samuel should visit the new Pope [appeared to at least some in the Foreign Office] open to objection [that] the bête noir of the Vatican at present is the Jews” and that Samuel, being Jewish himself, “might well be persona non grata at the Vatican”. It was feared that if Samuel were to meet a rebuff in Rome “it might even have an adverse influence on his position in Palestine”. 40

38 Rokach, Livia, The Catholic Church and the Question of Palestine, (London: Saqi Books, 1987), at 14-15 at the very least implies that this was what the Holy See sought to do at this time.
39 Minerbi, ibid, 179 citing a letter from Weizmann to his wife of 12 May 1922, in Weizmann, Letters, vol. 11, no.97, page 93.
40 G.1.1.28. FO 371/7773 Registry No. E 5249/65/65 Minutes of 25 May 1922 signed by L.Oliphant and initialed by R.C.L. [Hon. R.C.Lindsay].
4.3. THE MAY 1922 VISIT OF MONSIGNOR BARLASSINA TO ROME AND LONDON

Shortly after the League of Nations vote on the Palestine mandate Monsignor Barlassina arrived in London following a visit to Rome, the British Foreign Office enquiring of Count de Salis “whether he has in fact been sent by the Holy See, as reported in the press”. In fact, Barlassina had departed from Palestine on 22 April 1922, ostensibly to visit England “to obtain some English students for his seminary”. On his way to England Barlassina had visited Rome where on the day following the League of Nations vote, at the invitation of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre, he addressed a large gathering at the Institute of St Joseph in central Rome, the audience including three cardinals, a number of bishops and the sister of the late Pope Benedict XV. He was described afterwards as having given his address “with clear and vibrant voice, burning with apostolic zeal”. He was reported as having spoken of the “Zionist invasion” of Palestine which “really had the scope to eliminate gradually from Palestine the actual inhabitants and to take complete possession of the country and to found the Zionist kingdom”, appealing to all Catholics “to save Palestine threatened with falling into a pit a hundred times worse than that of the Turks”. When he arrived in London in late May Barlassina gave an interview to The Times in which he decried the Zionist project in Palestine, saying that “Zionism laid its foundation during the military occupation [and that] since the advent of Sir Herbert Samuel, the influence of the Zionists has become almost absolute”. That Barlassina came to London to attend to some business of his own with the permission of the Holy See but with no mission from the Holy See seems apparent on all of the available evidence. In the face of concerns at his activities while he was in London, the Holy See sent him a telegram at the beginning of June.

G.1.1.28. FO 371/7773 Registry No. E 5249/65/65 Minutes of 25 May 1922 signed by L.Oliphant and initialed by R.C.L. [Hon. R.C.Lindsay].

G.1.1.35. FO 371/7791 Registry No. E5832/582/65 Letter of 10 May 1922 from W. H. Deedes, Acting High Commissioner Palestine, to Winston S. Churchill and endorsed Report on the Political Situation in Palestine During the Month of April, 1922.

G.1.1.28. FO 371/7773 E 5249/65/65 Despatch No. 85 of 18 May 1922 from Count de Salis to Marquess Curzon and enclosed articles from the Osservatore Romano of 13 May 1922 entitled Sionismo e Palestina, and enclosed article from l’Italie of 13 May 1922.

G.1.1.28. FO 371/7773 Registry No. E 5655/65/65 Foreign Office Minute of 7 June 1922.
recalling him from London “to Rome forthwith”. This episode is a useful illustration of the fact that there is no necessary identicality of purpose between the policies and actions pursued by the Holy See and those pursued by its own diocesan bishops. From this point on it seems apparent that the Holy See and Monsignor Barlassina diverged in their positions in relation to Zionism, the project for a Jewish national home in Palestine, and the most advantageous manner in which to pursue an effective working relationship with the British Government over the Holy Land, both in London and through the British administration in Palestine. The steady distancing which the Holy See progressively placed between itself and the Latin Patriarch may be seen to originate with this episode.

The Apostolic Nuncio to France, Monsignor Ceretti, himself met with Dr Weizmann in the wake of Barlassina’s recently reported speech in Rome. Dr Weizmann said that he had read the newspaper accounts of this speech “with stupefaction and regret and that he feared that this idea, especially of a crusade against Zionism, divulged amongst the Arabs would have the power to provoke grave rebellions amongst their co-nationals; and that many of the matters mentioned by Monsignor Barlassina were without foundation, and especially the allegation that the Zionist movement was aiming to set up a Jewish state in Palestine, rather than a place which Jewish peoples could feel was their own home”. Monsignor Ceretti responded to Dr Weizmann that “the opposition of Catholics was not directed against all the Jews, but towards those who had flooded Palestine from all parts of the world, especially from Russia, and who were now seeking to introduce usages into Palestine that were against local tradition and against the sanctity of the holy places, for the purposes of commerce, and that this hurt the legitimate sentiments of Catholics and Arabs alike”. Dr Weizmann partially admitted the truth of these matters, especially in relation to the many immigrants from Russia who brought revolutionary ideas with them.

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45 G.1.1.28. FO 371/7773 Registry No. 5655/65/65 Count de Salis No 23 (tel) June 4 1922.
46 F.19. ff.61-62, Protocollo No 1030 of 21 May 1922 from Monsignor Ceretti to Cardinal Gasparri.
47 F.19. ff.61-62.
4.4. THE HOLY SEE’S JUNE 1922 AIDE-MEMOIRE ON THE PALESTINE
MANDATE AND ITS CAMPAIGN ON THE HOLY PLACES COMMISSION

Count de Salis wrote to Marquess Curzon on 25 May 1922 regarding the latter’s concern at the Holy See’s critique of the draft Palestine Mandate. He said that Cardinal Gasparri had just informed that “it was not the intention of the Holy See to call into question the British policy on Palestine. Quite the contrary”, but that the draft Mandate had been made available by the League of Nations for comment and, in the view of the Holy See, “there are articles which deserve amendment [and therefore] the Holy See was entitled to send, and has in fact sent its observations to the members of the Council of the League”. Cardinal Gasparri “considered that he was acting with straightforwardness and courtesy [and was therefore] surprised that there should be given an unfavourable reception to a note drawn up in that spirit”.49

The well-defined statement of the Holy See’s then position on the Palestine Mandate was incorporated in its Aide-Memoire of 4 June 1922. This stated that: “The Holy See does not oppose the decisions already taken by the League of Nations to confer upon England the mandate for Palestine; because, for the reasons which it has already stated, it has reason to rejoice at the spirit of justice and impartiality of that nation”.50 However, the Aide-Memoire went on to set out a limited number of objections to the articles of the draft Mandate, notably that the Jews would have a privileged situation over those of Catholics and other groups in Palestine; that the rights of the Christian confessions, especially those of the Catholics, were not sufficiently safeguarded. It pointed out that it would be a manifest contradiction of article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles for the Mandate to be an instrument of subordination of the Catholics and the indigenous population of Palestine to the benefit of another nationality or religious confession. The Holy See would never consent that the proposed Holy Places Commission would have the right to place under discussion the ownership of Holy Places for many centuries in the hands of the Catholic Church. The Aide-Memoire concluded that the presently proposed terms of

49 G.1.6.3. CO 733/30, ff.468-469, Despatch No. 89 of 25 May 1922 from Count de Salis to Marquess Curzon, and, at f.470, a translation of Cardinal Gasparri’s reply to Count de Salis of 24 May 1922..
50 F.4. ff.58-59, Aide-Memoire from the Holy See on 4 June 1922.
article 14 on the Holy Places Commission were problematic and required amendment.\textsuperscript{51}

Cardinal Gasparri also submitted the Holy See’s view with regard to the function and composition of the Holy Places Commission. Amongst these were that the Commission must be permanent; that the representatives of the Catholics of the various nations must be in a majority on the Commission; that the Consuls resident in Palestine might form its membership; and that “the Commission in question cannot be authorised to question any rights already acquired by Catholics over the Holy Places, rights which they were allowed to enjoy unmolested even under Turkish rule”.\textsuperscript{52} One may see in this submission that the driving focus of the Holy See’s policy in regard to the mandate and its terms was neither the question of a Jewish national home in Palestine, nor the operations of the Zionists in Palestine. Rather it was what had been the consistent primary concern of the Holy See for seven hundred years in relation to Palestine, the protection of the Christian Holy Places of the Holy Land, and for that purpose to ensure that the status quo which had applied under the Ottoman rule in regard to those Holy Places was at least preserved under the new regime.

Count de Salis attended a meeting with Foreign and Colonial Office officials in London at which it was “decided that a reply should be prepared by the Colonial Office to the memorandum ... which the Vatican recently addressed to the Council of the League of Nations [which] reply will be made direct to the Council”. De Salis was then directed to return to his post and “explain to the Cardinal Secretary of State the action which His Majesty’s Government are taking [and] at the same time point out to him how unfounded are the apprehensions which appear to be entertained by the Vatican regarding the policy of His Majesty’s Government in Palestine”. He was instructed to “discuss with Cardinal Gasparri the draft article which His Majesty’s Government intend to propose to the Council of the League in

\textsuperscript{51} F.4. ff.58-59, Aide-Memoire from the Holy See on 4 June 1922.
\textsuperscript{52} G.1.1.33. FO 371/7786 Registry No. E 8706/178/65 Note by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations on the Holy Places Commission of 24 August 1922, Annex 4, Letter of 18 August 1922 from Cardinal Gasparri and attached Memorandum of 15 August 1922, the last page of which details the Vatican’s 4 June 1922 submission to the League of Nations.
substitution for the present article 14 of the Palestine mandate”. De Salis was authorised “to guarantee to the Cardinal Secretary of State that the name of a Roman Catholic will be included among those finally put forward by the Council of the League of Nations”. At this meeting it was generally agreed, particularly by Sir Eric Drummond and Count de Salis, that if the Vatican could be “satisfied on the subject of the Holy Places, the Vatican opposition to the Zionist portions” of the draft Mandate terms would “disappear”. Subsequent events would prove this conclusion to have been correct.

Drummond expressed the view that “the more moderate Vatican circles do not expect any change [on the Balfour Declaration promise of a Jewish national home in Palestine] and it may well be that the demand for this was put forward in order to have something to bargain with as regards the Holy Places, to which the Vatican, and Catholic opinion generally, attaches the greatest importance”. Notwithstanding the statement in the accompanying “Note in reply to Cardinal Gasparri’s Letter of May 15” that it was “based upon an imperfect understanding of the measures which [Britain] propose to introduce in Palestine”, it appears that the British government had made a substantial concession to the Holy See which completely vindicated the strong stand which the latter had taken over the terms of the Palestine mandate. The fresh draft of article 14 dealing with the Commission for the Holy Places “had meanwhile been prepared”, which the Holy See now supported, and “Cardinal Gasparri, though conscious of the drawbacks, was inclined towards the solution of forming the commission from the consular corps at Jerusalem”. On 15 June 1922 Drummond wrote from the League of Nations to Sir Cecil Hurst at the Foreign Office to say that “your new form of Article 14 seems to me to be admirable, and I

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53 G.1.1.29. FO 371/7776 Registry No. E 6068/78/65 The Earl of Balfour to Count de Salis of June 29 1922 pursuant to the meeting in London on 14 June 1922.
54 G.1.1.29. FO 371/7776 Registry No. E 6067/78/65 Minutes of meeting held at Foreign Office on 14 June 1922.
55 G.1.1.29. FO 371/7776 Registry No. E 6033/78/65 Briefing paper from Sir Eric Drummond for the 14 June 1922 meeting at the Foreign Office.
57 Sir Cecil Hurst KCB GCMG KC (1870-1963), President of International Court of Justice 1934-1936.
sincerely hope that it will solve all the difficulties, and that we shall get the Mandate through without trouble”. 58

Sir John Shuckburgh59 of the British Colonial Office submitted to the Foreign Office a draft memorandum in reply to Cardinal Gasparri’s Letter of 15 May together with a revised draft of article 14 of the mandate on the Holy Places Commission, to consist “of not less than seven members ... appointed by the mandatory subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations”. Its duty was to be “to frame a report defining [the existing rights in the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine], including rights of ownership, user and access [and also might contain] recommendations for ensuring that certain Holy Places, religious buildings or sites which the Commission finds to be regarded with special veneration by the adherents of one particular religion are entrusted to the permanent control of suitable bodies representing the adherents of the religion concerned”. The report was to be “laid before the Council of the League of Nations for confirmation and when confirmed shall be binding on the mandatory”, and control of any Holy Places entrusted to any particular religious body “will be guaranteed by the League of Nations”. 60

Shortly afterwards, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs made representations to the Apostolic Nuncio in Paris that the proposed Holy Places Commission “should consist of a representative of France, Great Britain, Italy and Spain ‘and perhaps Belgium’. President was to be a Frenchman and a Catholic. Gout had said that this proposal was acceptable to His Majesty’s Government and would no doubt be agreed to by [the] League of Nations. French Government would then insist on liturgical honours being paid to president”. The Nuncio “expressed surprise and pointed to San Remo agreement”. Commenting on this French proposal, Cardinal

58 G.1.1.30. FO 371/7777 Registry No. EE 6680/78/65 Letter of 15 June 1922 from Sir Eric Drummond at the League of Nations, London, to Sir Cecil Hurst at the Foreign Office; also at G.1.6.3. CO 733/30, f.512. Sir Cecil Hurst replied to Drummond on 15 June 1922 saying that he had referred Drummond’s letter “on to Shuckburgh” at the Colonial Office, which was mainly responsible for the issue, see G.1.6.3. CO 733/30, f.513.
59 Sir John Evelyn Shuckburgh KCMG CB (1877-1953), Deputy Under Secretary in the British Colonial Office.
60 G.1.1.30. FO 371/7777 Registry No. E 6282/78/65 Letter of 22 June 1922 from J.Shuckburgh to Under Secretary of State Foreign Office and attached draft memorandum and draft Article 14.
Gasparri indicated that the post of president should rotate but that the “Holy See would not object to liturgical honours but naturally they could only be paid to the Catholic [sic]”. The British Ministry to the Holy See commented that it “had not heard of the French proposal and as it stood doubted it being acceptable in any quarter”. 61

Lord Balfour, now Britain’s Acting Foreign Secretary, and Senator Carlo Schanzer, Italy’s then Foreign Minister, met at the Foreign Office in London on 26 June 1922 to discuss “the general desirability of strengthening the ties which bound together Italy and Great Britain”. 62 In this meeting the question of the Palestine Mandate was discussed and Senator Schanzer indicated that “the majority of the [Italian] Government was based on the popular Catholic Party ... which very strongly supported the question raised by the Vatican concerning the Palestine Mandate”. 63 He therefore begged “Lord Balfour to consider the possibility of accepting the Italian demands for modification of the terms”. 64 Lord Balfour sought clarification as to whether these “objections of the Vatican were based upon fear that Catholic interests would suffer in connection with the Holy Places”. Senator Schanzer responded that “what was feared was a system of political oppression of other sects, Christian and Turk”. 65

Sir John Shuckburgh then submitted to the Hon. R. C. Lindsay of the British Foreign Office a draft revision of paragraph 11 of the Note in Reply to Cardinal Gasparri’s letter of 15 May. This proposed that the British Government “would be prepared, if the Council of the League approved this course, to select nominees for the [Holy Places] Commission from a panel put forward in the first place under some international procedure, whether by the Assembly or Council of the League of Nations, or by the President of the Court of International Justice, while reserving to

61 G.1.1.32. FO 371/7785 Registry No. E 6318/178/65 Despatch No. 25 of 24 June 1922 from Mr Dormer at the British Ministry to the Holy See to the Foreign Office.
63 G.1.1.27. FO 371/7671, ibid, Notes of Conversation, page 4.
64 G.1.1.27. FO 371/7671, ibid, Notes of Conversation, page 9.
65 G.1.1.27 FO 371/7671, ibid, Notes of Conversation, page 10. In fact, Italy was interested in Italian emigration to Palestine, see ibid, Appendix 3.3.4. hereof.
themselves the right to submit additional names for stated reasons to the Council of the League for approval”, and on which all of the Great Powers and all of the three religions, Christian, Mohammedan and Jewish, would be represented.66

On 30 June 1922 Lancelot Oliphant 67 of the Foreign Office submitted to the British Cabinet Office “for communication to the Secretariat of the League of Nations, copies of the revised final draft of the mandate for Palestine”. This document recited Turkey’s renunciation of its rights over Palestine in favour of the Allies by the Treaty of Sevres of 10 August 1920 and the adoption of the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917 by Britain and the other Allied Powers. It then set out the proposed Terms of the Mandate, including imprecisely worded terms in Article 14 regarding the Holy Places Commission.68 An article of 1 July 1922 in Osservatore Romano presented the Holy See’s position in regard to the draft Mandate and observed that “it would be a manifest contradiction [of the Treaty of Versailles] if the Mandate would be an instrument of subordination of the Catholics and the indigenous population or religious confessions to the advantage of another nation or confession”.69

The British Government published a White Paper on the Mandate for Palestine on 3 July 1922 setting out the amendments to the draft terms of the mandate, including the recently discussed amendment to article 14, and also the British Government’s Note in Reply to Cardinal Gasparri’s Letter of 15 May to the League of Nations.70 The “new nine-point British policy toward Palestine ... included reaffirmation of the Balfour Declaration, the founding of a Jewish nation ‘as of right and not of suffrance’, the equality of all citizens and the fostering of gradual self-government, the

66 G.1.1.30. FO 371/7777 Registry No. E 6502/78/65 Letter of 27 June 1922 from J. Shuckburgh to Hon. R. C.Lindsay and attached Revised draft of paragraph 11 of the Note in Reply to Cardinal Gasparri’s Letter to the League.
67 Sir Lancelot Oliphant KCMG CB (1881-1965) then Assistant Secretary in Foreign Office, later its Director General.
69 F.3. f.68, Osservatore Romano, 1 July 1922.
70 G.1.1.30. FO 371/7777 Registry No. E 6601/78/65 Miscellaneous No. 4 (1922) Mandate for Palestine, F.1. f.40, Mandate for Palestine Letter from the Secretary to the Cabinet to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations of 1 July 1922, enclosing a Note in reply to Cardinal Gasparri’s letter of May 15, 1922, addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.
exclusion of the Zionist Executive from the country’s government, the promise that Jewish immigration would not exceed the country’s economic capacity, and the promise that all religious communities would have the right to appeal to the League of Nations”. On that day Count de Salis met with Cardinal Gasparri in Rome and was informed that “draft article 14 respecting Holy Places appeared quite satisfactory to [the Cardinal’s] wishes” and the Cardinal “spoke of the great value of these declarations” contained in the British Note in Reply to his letter of 15 May. On the following day the British House of Commons upheld the revised Palestine policy “by a decisive majority”.

4.5. SIR HERBERT SAMUEL’S JULY 1922 AUDIENCE WITH POPE PIUS XI

Sir Herbert Samuel arrived in Rome on 4 July 1922 and met with Pope Pius XI in private Audience two days later. Samuel reported to Mr Churchill that “His Holiness maintained a very friendly attitude, and said that he had no doubt that the known impartiality and well-tried powers of administration of the British Government and its representatives would overcome any difficulties that might exist in Palestine and succeed in establishing peace and concord there”. The Pope said that having read the British Note in Reply to Cardinal Gasparri he “regarded it as satisfactory on the whole [though] there were some details still to be discussed, but he considered the reply to be ‘reassuring’”. He expressed “his gratification that such careful attention had been paid to the Cardinal’s representation”. He went on to say “that he well understood the special interest which the Jewish people took in Palestine ... but he did not think it at all probable that the Jews would become the majority of the

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71 Minerbi, ibid, 185 citing Palestine, Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization (London, 1922), and stating that the Zionists accepted these principles but the Arabs did not.
72 G.1.1.30. FO 371/7777 Registry No. E 6625/78/65 Despatch No. 27 of 3 July 1922 from Count de Salis to Foreign Office; E 6840/78/65 Letter from Count de Salis to the Earl of Balfour received on 10 July 1922. See also G.1.1.32. FO 371/7785 Registry No. E 6642/178/65 for further discussion of the draft article 14, including notes communicated by the Italian delegation on 4 July 1922 which stated that “the interests of the religious communities in Palestine do not appear sufficiently protected by the new British draft”.
73 Minerbi, ibid, 185 citing Weizmann, Letters, Vol. 11, footnote to no. 144, p.135.
74 G.1.1.30. FO 371/7777 Registry No. E 6840/78/68, ibid, de Salis to Balfour received 10 July 1922.
population of Palestine [but that] in any case it was essential that no section of the inhabitants should receive privileges to the detriment of others”.  

Samuel then reiterated that this was not the intention of the British Government and went on to speak in defence of the impartiality of the British administration in Palestine. He noted that “its impartiality had, indeed, been recognised by the representatives of all the various communities, with the unfortunate exception of Monsignor Barlassina, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem”. Samuel ventured that “the information given to the Holy See by the Patriarch was not always correct”, specifically citing Barlassina’s recent Address in Rome “in which he made a number of general complaints against the Government of Palestine, unsupported by facts”. Pope Pius XI replied that “he had heard of the speech to which [Samuel] referred [and] the Patriarch had explained that what he had said had been misunderstood [but that] the Pope would ... be seeing him very soon and would take up the point”.  

Samuel told the Pope that “the Government of Palestine would very readily examine and endeavour to remedy any grievance of which the Catholic Church might complain, and would be grateful if any such grievance were brought to its attention”. Pope Pius responded that “the Vatican would not fail to act in that sense, and again expressed his confidence that the impartiality of a British Administration would ensure peace in Palestine, which he himself was most anxious to promote”.  

This Audience with Sir Herbert Samuel could have left the new Pope in no doubt that the British authorities viewed Monsignor Barlassina as a problem which they hoped the Holy See would do something about. Immediately following this Audience High Commissioner Samuel and Count de Salis met with Cardinal Gasparri. In that meeting Samuel “spoke at some length on the policy which was being pursued in Palestine, [stating that] autonomous government was the object in view, and as the Jews were not, and were not likely to become, a majority in the country, the fears expressed

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75 G.1.1.30. FO 371/7777 Registry No. E 7014/78/65 Letter of 6 July 1922 from Sir Herbert Samuel to Mr Winston S. Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies regarding the Audience that day.
77 G.1.1.30. FO 371/7777, ibid, Samuel to Churchill of 6 July 1922.
78 G.1.1.30. FO 371/7777, ibid, Samuel to Churchill of 6 July 1922.
respecting a Jewish domination over the rest of the inhabitants should be groundless [and that] there was to be a Legislative Assembly, composed largely of elective members”. Samuel stressed the point that “the Zionist Organisation had no share in the government” of Palestine.79 Cardinal Gasparri responded that “it would be very desirable if these facts were more generally known”.80 Cardinal Gasparri also said that he was “gratified at the general sense of the British reply to his note to the League of Nations and particularly at the recognition that Article 14 in the Draft Mandate could not stand in its original form”.81

4.6. THE FINALIZATION OF THE TERMS OF THE PALESTINE MANDATE

The British Foreign Office continued to ponder how to deal with the Holy See’s recent Aide-Memoire.82 It also had to deal with French Government objections to the revised draft article 14 on the grounds that it did not “take sufficient account of the ‘moral interests’ of France in the Holy Places”. As a result of this French objection, “Cardinal Gasparri ... informed the French Ambassador at the Vatican that the Pope, after hearing details of the proposal from Sir Herbert Samuel, [did] not approve of it”.83 That the French were moving to obstruct the Palestine mandate because of the new draft of Article 14 might now have seemed apparent.84

The French Ambassador to Great Britain, the Comte de Saint-Aulaire, wrote to Lord Balfour in order to set out the French Government’s position regarding the Holy Places under the proposed British Mandate for Palestine. He urged that they be placed under a form of “international regime”, a number of them deserving

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79 G.1.1.30. FO 371/7777, ibid, Samuel to Churchill of 6 July 1922.
80 G.1.1.30. FO 371/7777 E 6840/78/65, ibid, Letter from de Salis to Balfour received on 10 July 1922; see also G.1.1.30. FO 371/7777 E 7014/78/65 Letter of 6 July 1922 from Samuel to Churchill for more details of the interview between Gasparri and Samuel from Samuel’s viewpoint.
81 G.1.1.30. FO 371/7777 E 7014/78/65 Letter of 6 July 1922 from Samuel to Churchill.
82 G.1.6.4. CO733/31, ff.117-122, Despatch No. E 6841/78/65 of 15 July 1922 from Mr Oliphant to the Colonial Office, Despatch No.1010 of 6 July 1922 from Count de Salis to Earl Balfour, and Aide-Memoire, the Vatican, 4 June 1922; G.1.6.4. CO 733/31, ff.119-122, Aide Memoire of the Vatican, 4 June 1922.
83 G.1.1.30. FO 371/7777 Registry No. E 6886/78/65 Letter of 11 July 1922 from Lord Harding of Penshurst to Earl Balfour, enclosing a letter from M.Poincare to Lord Harding; see also G.1.1.30. FO 371/7777 Registry No. E 7055/78/65 for the Foreign Office correspondence arising from the French Note of 13 July 1922, none of which appears to give credit to the French claims as to what the Pope had said following his meeting with Samuel on 6 July 1922.
84 See the discussion of this in Minerbi, ibid, 186.
recognition as being “extraterritorial and anational’, being in Palestine but not properly being Palestinian. He proposed that the Holy Places Commission should have a French president. The Holy See appears to have briefly taken up this proposal for “extraterritorialization”, or internationalization, of the Holy Places as proposed by the French at this time but did not pursue it to any fruitful conclusion.

On 17 July 1922 Count de Salis informed Lord Balfour that on the previous Saturday Cardinal Gasparri had “made a brief allusion to the new draft article 14 of the Mandate for Palestine”. Gasparri had discussed certain details relating to it, including possible members of the Holy Places Commission, the Cardinal indicating that Monsieur Van den Heuvel of Belgium seemed an outstanding candidate.

That British public opinion itself might be having some doubts about its government’s strategy for Palestine is suggested by the Morning Post article on The Mandate for Palestine on 18 July 1922:

On 19 July 1922 Cardinal Gasparri conveyed to Monsignor Cerretti, Apostolic Nuncio to France, the direct instruction of Pope Pius XI that the Nuncio should “leave immediately for London and inform himself exactly [as to what was happening in the Mandate negotiations there] and to act in consequence” on the basis of what he perceived the situation to be there, the Holy See proposing to send further instructions care of Cardinal Bourne of Westminster.

Cardinal Bourne wrote to Cardinal Gasparri from London in late July following a series of briefings he had received from a number of recent visitors to London involved in the League’s discussions as to the current desires of the Holy See regarding Palestine. Cardinal Bourne agreed with what he understood those desires to be: “There is agreement that the ‘status quo’ in Palestine must be confirmed and not ignored by the new Commission, but there are diverse views as to what actually

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85 F.4. ff.85-87, Despatch No.1 of 13 July 1922 from the Comte de Saint-Aulaire to Lord Balfour.
86 G.1.1.33. FO 371/7786 Registry No. E 7356/178/65 Despatch No. 105 of 17 July 1922 from Count de Salis to Earl Balfour.
87 F.4. f.43, Cifra 6385 of 19 July 1922 from Cardinal Gasparri to Monsignor Cerretti. Monsignor Cerretti cabled on 22 July 1922 from London to Cardinal Gasparri to advise that he had arrived the previous evening, see F.4. f.44, Cifra 6386 of 22 July 1922.
constitutes the ‘status quo’. These references to the “status quo” anticipated what would end up being the final and continuing outcome regarding the Holy Places of Palestine. Whilst Cardinal Bourne went on to discuss the positions of the main nations about membership of the projected Commission for the Holy Places, the key point to be understood is that at this time just before ratification of the Palestine Mandate by the League the Holy See’s objective was that the “status quo” from the Ottoman empire should be maintained in respect of the Holy Places in the Holy Land.

The French Embassy for the Holy See in Rome then wrote to Cardinal Gasparri conveying the view of the French Government as to the revised draft of article 14. He said that it “seems manifestly contrary to the Catholic interests” and asked that the Holy See convey its urgent views on the matter to the French Government through its Nuncio in Paris, Monsignor Cerretti. In immediate response, Cardinal Gasparri cabled to Monsignor Cerretti, who was now staying with Cardinal Bourne in London where the League was meeting, to instruct him that “to the Holy See the counter-proposal of France in relation to article 14 seems acceptable. The Holy Places, that is, the Sanctuaries of Palestine, are international or anational. A Commission can be nominated later but in the meanwhile the status quo will continue”. Cardinal Gasparri also suggested that if possible a representative of the Holy See should be allowed to take part in the deliberations taking place. On the same date Monsignor Cerretti wrote to Cardinal Gasparri detailing discussions he had now held in London with the representatives of the various Catholic nations participating in the League’s deliberations in which he had emphasised to those representatives that “the Holy See wishes that the status quo should be maintained in this sense: that the rights and privileges acquired by the Catholic Church in relation to the Holy Places should not be placed under discussion.

What had occurred, and the Holy See’s role in it, became clearer when Count de Salis met with Cardinal Gasparri on 22 July, two days before the Council of the League was

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88 F.4. ff.5-6 at f.5v, letter of 20 July 1922 from Cardinal Bourne to Cardinal Gasparri.
89 F.4. ff.7-8 at f.7r, letter of 21 July 1922 from M. Jonnart, French Ambassador to the Holy See in Rome, to Cardinal Gasparri.
90 F.4. f.11, Cifra of 21 July 1922 from Cardinal Gasparri to Monsignor Cerretti in London.
91 F.4. f.11, Cifra of 21 July 1922 from Cardinal Gasparri to Monsignor Cerretti in London.
due to meet in London. He was informed by the Holy See’s Secretary of State that attempts to procure the amendment or entire suppression of draft article 14 had occurred from the French and Italian sides. Gasparri had then sent the Apostolic Nuncio in Paris, Monsignor Cerretti, to London with instructions to “act for the best” in relation to the discussions taking place there. The Cardinal acknowledged that the Vatican had accepted the revised text; “but there were features in the new suggestion which had their value for the Holy See [especially] as regards the idea that the Holy See should be able to appoint its own representative for the defence of its position, instead of being obliged to have recourse to the interested help of others”. Gasparri felt that an international regime outside of the scope of the Mandate itself might be a preferable course for the Holy See.93 He also advised Count de Salis that the Pope would “take no notice” of recent communications from the Hejaz and Egypt rejecting the concept of the Jewish national home and calling for complete independence for Palestine under a national government.94 There appears at least the inference in this latter remark from Cardinal Gasparri that Great Britain should appreciate the Holy See’s restraint when it considered the Holy See’s approach regarding the Holy Places and the draft Palestine Mandate.

At the meeting of the Council of the League in London on 24 July 1922, held in public in the presence of “Archbishop Cerretti, the Archbishop of Canterbury, members of the Arab delegation, and Mrs Chaim Weizmann”,95 the text of the draft Palestine mandate was agreed to, subject to the replacement of the draft article 14 with a new and shorter form. This stated that:

A special Commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of

93 G.1.1.33. FO 371/7786, ibid, Despatch No. 107 from Count de Salis to the Earl of Balfour of 22 July 1922.
94 G.1.1.33. FO 371/7786, ibid, Despatch No. 107 of 22 July 1922 from de Salis to Balfour. The intensity of French opposition to a British mandate in Palestine, and the deep desire to reestablish the French protectorate is shown in the work of the Comite Dupleix, for which see C.27. Folios 608-611, La Question de Palestine devant le Conseil de la Societe des Nations, July 1922.
95 Arauja and Lucal, ibid, 180.
this Commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for its approval, and the Commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council.96

Yet within those very days when the Palestine Mandate was to be approved by the League of Nations on 24 July 1922 France did procure the dropping of the draft replacement Article 14 and its replacement by a new and much shorter form of words. The Foreign Office instructed Count de Salis on 25 July that the: “Terms of Palestine mandate were definitely approved by Council of the League of Nations on July 24th, but owing to French attitude it was necessary to substitute shorter draft of article 14 for our text, leaving method of nomination, composition and functions of Commission for further consideration and approval by the Council. Please assure Cardinal Gasparri that adoption of this procedure implies no change in our general policy as regards the Commission”.97

Cerretti then wrote to Gasparri, setting out a detailed briefing of the outcome of the negotiations in London. He noted that Lord Balfour had focussed his closing remarks on the Palestine Mandate, repeating the declaration regarding the “Jewish Home” and the Holy Places, that all existing rights would be recognized and protected. Cerretti had assured Lord Balfour that the Holy See did not wish to create difficulties and desired only to cooperate with England “in order to reach an equable solution of the question and for a complete pacification of the people of Palestine, naturally based on respect and the observation of the rights of all”. Monsignor Cerretti had, on the spur of the moment, introduced into his discussion with Lord Balfour the concept of the Holy Places as being “international” in character. Cerretti had insisted to Lord Balfour that all the Catholic nations, including Spain and Belgium, must have representation on the proposed Commission as well as the Holy See itself. He

96 G.1.1.31. FO 371/7779 Registry No. E 7731/78/65 Letter of 3 August 1922 from Mr Charles Tufton, Cabinet Office, to Sir Cecil Hurst, Foreign Office, enclosing text of the mandate for Palestine as received from Geneva that day with article 14 in that form; and E 8954/78/65 Printed text C.529 M.314 1922 VI, League of Nations Mandate for Palestine with text of article 14 in this form; F.2.ff.3-9, Mandate for Palestine, at f.8. for text of Article 14. For the full text of the Mandate for Palestine see also Luke and Keith-Roach, ibid, Appendix 1, 494-504.

97 G.1.1.33. FO 371/7786, ibid, Cypher telegram No. 15 of 25 July 1922 from Foreign Office to Count de Salis.
concluded that the Holy See should urgently send a Memorandum on its views as to the Holy Places Commission and the operation of article 14 of the Palestine Mandate. 98

Whilst Cardinal Gasparri was critical of the various attempts to attribute disquiet to the Holy See about the negotiations over the Palestine Mandate, not least by France and other so-called Catholic nations, 99 he went on to articulate a clear position for the Holy See in relation to the Holy Places of Palestine. His Memorandum on the Holy Places Commission set out the Holy See’s position: that as to those nations interested in the Sanctuaries, these were France, Italy, Spain and Belgium; that it was incontestible that the Holy See must have the right to participate through its own representative as to the Catholic interest throughout the world; the non-Catholic interest could be represented by the United States of America and Greece; that as to composition of the proposed Commission it would be best to nominate as members of the Commission the consuls of those various nations residing in Jerusalem; that the Commission must be permanent; that the Commission should judge and decide as to all controversies regarding the Sanctuaries; that the Mandatory Power would be responsible for the implementation of decisions of the Commission; and that all Catholic Holy Places belonged to the Catholic Church, and not just to a particular religious community which might be administering that particular Holy Place. 100

4.7. THE ONGOING STRUGGLE OVER THE HOLY PLACES COMMISSION

Although for Britain the adoption of the Mandate in final form was an undoubted relief and brought certainty to its administration of Palestine, in relation to the question of the Holy Places Commission the same could not be said. Squabbling over its functions and composition now reached a crescendo, beginning with

98 F.4. ff.49-52, Despatch No.1311 of 26 July 1922 from Monsignor Cerretti to Cardinal Gaasparri.
99 F.4. ff.21-23, Despatch N.6341 of 26 July 1922 from Cardinal Gasparri to Monsignor Cerretti.
100 F.4. ff.24-31, despatch No.6352 of 31 July 1922 from Cardinal Gasparri and attached Memorandum on the Holy Places Commission [Commissione pei Luoghi Santi].
representations from the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, Damianos I.\textsuperscript{101} Count de Salis explained to Gasparri the meaning of the provisions of article 14, and that “in spite of the procedure which His Majesty’s Government had been forced to adopt, there was no intention of going back on the policy already outlined”. Cardinal Gasparri then discussed the composition of the Commission and the suitability of Monsieur Van den Heuvel as a member. He wondered “whether something along the lines of his original proposal, a commission chosen from amongst the consuls at Jerusalem, might not be better, [though] it would have to be laid down that the consuls were acting, so to speak, in a judicial capacity and not sitting as representatives of the interests of the country to which they belonged”.\textsuperscript{102} Gasparri’s expressed view at this time was “that the Vatican had obtained what it wanted” from the negotiation process.\textsuperscript{103}

The very complexity of the situation posed by the question of the Holy Places was highlighted by the British Foreign Office response to French submission regarding the Holy Places on 5 August 1922. This response noted that the status quo must be maintained; and that, when considering the complexity of issues surrounding the Holy Places, it would be difficult to transfer to representatives of foreign governments some form of international authority over the Holy Places when the Mandatory Power had the responsibility for overseeing and enforcing the existing rights in regard to those places within Palestine.\textsuperscript{104} Discernable in this, yet again, is the growing realisation of the intractability of satisfying all the parties about the membership and scope of the proposed Holy Places Commission and the need to ensure the maintenance of the status quo.

Cardinal Gasparri clearly reflected further on the need for the Holy See to press for a different approach to the Holy Places Commission along the lines recently discussed.

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{G.1.1.33}. FO 371/7786 Registry No. E 7947/178/65 Telegram of 9 August 1922 from Patriarch Damianos to British Foreign Secretary.  
\textsuperscript{102} \textit{G.1.1.33}. FO 371/7786 Registry No. E 7971/178/65 Despatch No. 112 of 4 August 1922 from Count de Salis to the Earl of Balfour. See also ibid, Registry No. E 8319/178/65 Letter of 21 August 1922 from Colonial Secretary to Foreign Secretary about the further unfolding of the imbroglio over the Holy Places Commission.  
\textsuperscript{103} Minerbi, ibid, 192.  
\textsuperscript{104} \textit{F.4.ff.89-96}, Italian translation of British Foreign Office Despatch No. E.7055/78/65 of 5 August 1922 to the Comte de Saint-Aulaire, French Ambassador in London.
with Count de Salis. On 18 August 1922 the Holy See suggested to Count de Salis the following proposal:

(1). The Commission for the Holy See [sic, clearly meaning Holy Places] should be of a permanent character; (2) The principal Catholic nations should be represented; notably Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and Brazil; (3) The members should reside in Palestine; it might be composed of the consuls of the Powers represented. But whatever the composition, points (1) and (2) should be borne in mind. The Commission should be under an international organisation, such as the Council of the League of Nations and should not be allowed to raise discussion on rights already acquired by the Catholics which have been peacefully enjoyed, even under the Turks.\(^{105}\)

Inherent in this proposal was the importance of preserving the status quo, an outcome which was now seen as paramount by the Holy See in relation to the Holy Places.

In fact on that date Cardinal Gasparri submitted directly to the Secretary General of the League of Nations a Memorandum which reflected what had just been put informally to de Salis in Rome. This Memorandum stressed that the proposed Holy Places Commission “cannot be authorised to question any rights already acquired by Catholics over the Holy Places, rights which they were allowed to enjoy unmolested even under Turkish rule”.\(^{106}\) The status quo was becoming the Holy See’s non-negotiable goal. A submission to the League at this time from the Greek Orthodox Patriarch Damianos of Jerusalem also stressed the importance of maintaining the status quo, which had the advantage of being “recognised by all and confirmed by

\(^{105}\) \texttt{G.1.1.33.} FO 371/7786 Registry No. E 8343/178/65 Despatch No. 118 of 18 August 1922 from Count de Salis to Marquess Curzon.

\(^{106}\) \texttt{G.1.1.33.} FO 371/7786 Registry No. E 8706/178/65 Note by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations of 24 August 1922 on the Commission on the Holy Places, Annex 4, Letter from Cardinal Gasparri of 18 August 1922 to the Secretary General of the League and attached Memorandum. See \texttt{G.1.1.33.} FO 371/7786 Note by the Secretary-General, League of Nations, of 1 September 1922 and Enclosure in No. 1, Memorandum by the British Representative of 31 August 1922 on the proposed composition and operations of the Holy Places Commission. \texttt{F.5.} ff.16-17, \textit{Memorandum of the Holy See of 15 August 1922}; \texttt{F.8.} ff. 4-6, \textit{Memorandum}, and \texttt{F.8.} f.3, letter of 18 August 1922 from Cardinal Gasparri to the Secretary of the League of Nations submitting the Holy See’s Memorandum; \texttt{G.1.6.4.} CO 733/31, ff. 411-412, Despatch No. 118 of 18 August 1922 from Count de Salis to Marquess Curzon briefing him on the 15 August 1922 Memorandum of the Holy See.
international treaties". One may see the moving towards some form of consensus between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches about the centrality of the status quo to resolution of the Holy Places issue.

The Holy See now continued to oppose British proposals for the composition and operation of the Holy Places Commission submitted to the League by Lord Balfour on 31 August 1922. Shortly after Britain took official possession of the Palestine Mandate on 11 September 1922, Count de Salis had an audience with Pope Pius XI who said that he:

feared that the proposals [for the constitution of the Holy Places Commission] were not acceptable, insisting on the fact that most of the Holy Places were beyond dispute the possession of the Catholic Church which would find itself outvoted in the commission in matters which concerned interests to which the highest importance was attached [stating further that] he did not wish to make a public protest, but was afraid he might find himself obliged to do so.

Count de Salis then met with Cardinal Gasparri who indicated that the Holy See was “considering what to do”, but “thought of making an appeal to the justice of the British Government who hardly seemed to realize the importance which the Catholic Church attached to the rights it had enjoyed for so many centuries, even under the

107 F.8. ff.50-51 at f.50r, Telegram from the [Greek Orthodox] Patriarch of Jerusalem to the Secretary General, Jerusalem, 10 August 1922, Annex 1 to the Note by the Secretary of the League of Nations of 24 August 1922 on the Commission on the Holy Places.
108 F.5. ff.88-97, Note from the Secretary General of the League of Nations of 1 September 1922 and attached submission of 31 August 1922 from Great Britain on the Holy Places Commission; see also F.5. f.102; G.1.1.33. FO 371/7786 Registry No. E 9462/178/65 Despatch No. 128 of 15 September 1922 from Count de Salis to Marquess Curzon to the effect that “the proposals [of 31 August 1922] seem likely to encounter opposition from the Vatican” because Catholics would be in a small minority on the proposed Christian sub-commission “against a majority of elements which for centuries has been opposed to them”. The final floundering of the imbroglio over the proposed Holy Places Commission may be seen in G.1.1.33. FO 371/7786 Registry No. E 9839/178/65, Letter of 21 September 1922 from Mr Charles Tufton to Mr E.G. Forbes Adam of the Foreign Office attaching Mr Tufton’s Memorandum of 20 September 1922 on the Holy Places Commission, which shows that France and Italy would oppose each other over any proposals for a French President of the Commission. F.10. f.3. sets, out at pages 1153-1154, the French language text of the British proposal on the Holy Places Commission submitted by Lord Balfour to the Council of the League on 31 August 1922. See also the discussion in Araujo and Lucal, ibid, 182-183.
109 K. La Palestine, September 1922, No.9, 142.
110 G.1.1.33. FO 371/7786 Registry No. E 9924/178/65 Despatch No. 129 of 19 September from Count de Salis to Marquess Curzon.
rule of the Turk”.  

Gasparri then went on to tell the British Prime Minister, Mr Lloyd George, that pursuant to the current British proposals “the interests and rights of Catholics will be, for all practicable purposes, in the hands of a Protestant [the proposed American President of the Plenary Holy Places Commission], always arbiter of the situation” and “should it become an accomplished fact, the Holy Father would find himself under the unpleasant necessity of making a public protest”.  

4.8. THE HOLY SEE COMES UP WITH THE SOLUTION TO THE HOLY PLACES PROBLEM

Having made its threat of a papal protest, the Holy See now came forward with the concept which it believed would resolve the present imbroglio. Monsignor Borgongini Duca old Mr Cecil Dormer on 26 September 1922 that whilst the Vatican “would certainly have more confidence in a British Court of Justice than in such a Commission as was at present contemplated”, in the opinion of the Holy See “it would be far preferable to maintain the status quo of the Turkish regime, i.e. if any claim as to ownership were to be raised let them be dealt with by the British tribunals”. Mr Dormer pointed out that, in his view, “this idea runs counter to article 95 of the Treaty of Sevres”.

The complete inability of the British government to resolve this issue was made public on 4 October 1922 when Lord Balfour informed the 20th Session of the Council of the League in Geneva that the proposal to have a Protestant American preside over the Holy Places Commission would have represented an improvement over the situation which had prevailed for the previous thousand years during which “les mahometans” had “assumed the role of a court of appeal” in regard to Christian

111 G.1.1.33. FO 371/7786, ibid, Despatch No.129 de Salis to Curzon of 19 September 1922.
112 G.1.1.33. FO 371/7786 Registry No. E 9925/178/65 Cardinal Gasparri Despatch No. 8131 of 21 September 1922 to His Excellency the Prime Minister of England [sic]; Despatch No. 133 of 22 September 1922 from Count de Salis to Marquess Curzon; F.6.ff.3-4, Despatch No.8131 of 21 September 1922 from Cardinal Gasparri to Prime Minister Lloyd George.; see also F.9.ff.76-77 for the French-language text of the Gasparri letter of 21 September 1922.
interests in respect of the Holy Places in Palestine.\textsuperscript{114} He continued that in view of the impasse negotiations had now reached over the Holy Places Commission, Britain did “not propose to persevere with it longer”. He opined that “it is a difficulty which must be settled between those [Catholic] powers themselves ... for unless we can bring together Catholic opinion upon this subject I do not see how we can hope easily and quickly to arrive at some satisfactory conclusion”. His conclusion was that “we ask for the cooperation of our colleagues around this table to help us to solve their own difficulties, and to help us arrive at a solution which shall be regarded as equitable over all the world”.\textsuperscript{115}

That there was now some disunity even within the British Government on how to respond to Cardinal Gasparri’s letter to Prime Minister Lloyd George is highlighted by the reply sent on behalf of Mr Churchill, Secretary of State for Colonies, to the Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, on 6 October 1922 to the effect that “Mr Churchill finds himself in some difficulty in suggesting a suitable reply to Cardinal Gasparri’s letter on this subject as the scheme originally put forward by the Colonial Office was referred to the Council of the League in a somewhat modified form”; and that “he ventures to suggest that the arrangements originally contemplated would effectively meet the objections advanced by His Holiness and also by the Italian Government in so far as it appears desirable that these objections should be met”.\textsuperscript{116}

Mr Lloyd George himself replied to Cardinal Gasparri on 13 October 1922 defending the scheme for article 14 put forward in the Palestine mandate document. He noted that:

\begin{quote}
since unfortunately agreement on this point could not be reached, Lord Balfour formally withdrew the British project at the last session of the Council [of the League] on October 4\textsuperscript{th}; making it clear that His Majesty’s
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{114} F.10.f.3, Societe des Nations Journal Official, III.Annee, No. 11 (deuxieme partie) Novembre 1922, at 1151.

\textsuperscript{115} G.1.1.34. FO 371/7787 Registry No. E 10829/178/65 Provisional Minutes of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Meeting (private) held at Geneva on Wednesday, 4\textsuperscript{th} October, 1922, at which were present “all the Representatives of the Members of the Council and the Secretary-General”; and see F.10. f.3, ibid, at 1151 for the French language text.

\textsuperscript{116} G.1.1.34. FO 371/7787 Registry No. E 10617/178/65 Letter of 6 October 1922 from Mr Hubert Young for Mr Churchill to Under Secretary Foreign Office.
Government were prepared, sympathetically to consider any equitable scheme which commends itself to the other members of the Council and might be brought forward in agreement by them”; concluding with the excuse that “if such agreement has not yet been found, the fault does not lie with my government or its delegates at Geneva, who spared no pains to bring the discussions of the Council to a successful issue.¹¹⁷

That the Holy See intended to try bringing about a resolution of the impasse is indicated by the further meeting held on 30 October 1922 between Monsignor Borgongini Duca, now Secretary to the Sacred Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, and Mr Cecil Dormer of the British Mission to the Holy See in which Borgongini Duca referred to his previous private suggestion “that there should be no Commission and that the status quo of the Turkish regime in Palestine [should] be maintained [so that] if any claims were raised regarding the Holy Places they should be dealt with by the ordinary British tribunals”. He sought to know “how His Majesty’s Government regarded his proposal” and urged that “the more he thought about the matter the more convinced he was that they offered the best solution of the difficulty”. Mr Dormer concluded that “it is evident that he would not have insisted on his suggestion unless he had obtained approval”, presumably from Cardinal Gasparri.¹¹⁸ Lancelot Oliphant wrote to the Colonial Office on 11 November 1922 to the effect that:

His Majesty’s Government would raise no objection to the solution put forward by Monsignor Borgongini-Duca, if all the other governments represented on the Council of the League of Nations were persuaded by the Vatican, in the first instance, to agree to such a solution. If this solution were adopted, however, it would, of course, involve the modification of article 14

¹¹⁷ G.1.1.34. FO 371/7787, ibid, Letter of 13 October 1922 from Mr Lloyd George to Cardinal Gasparri; F.6. ff7-9, Letter of 13 October 1922 from Prime Minister Lloyd George to Cardinal Gasparri.
¹¹⁸ G.1.1.34. FO 371/7787 Registry No. E 12127/178/65 Despatch No. 146 of 30 October 1922 from Mr Cecil Dormer to Marquess Curzon. The British Government thereafter struggled for months as to how to deal with Monsignor Borgongini Duca’s proposal, the Foreign Office declining to have the substance of it communicated to the League of Nations, see G.1.1.34. FO 371/7787 E 13719/178/65 Letter from Mr D.G.Osborne, Foreign Office, to Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office, by which time Lloyd George was no longer Prime Minister.
of the Mandate for Palestine as approved by the Council of the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{119}

The covering file notes, to the effect that this was “the best possible way out of the impasse”, suggests the evident relief of the British officials that the Holy See was providing a constructive way out of the difficulty over Article 14 of the Mandate.\textsuperscript{120}

The Duke of Devonshire wrote to Sir Herbert Samuel on 20 November 1922 stating that the Holy See’s proposal “offers the most satisfactory solution to the many problems to which the proposed Commission has given rise”; but sought the High Commissioner’s opinion.\textsuperscript{121} It now seemed certain that the British Government would accept what the Holy See had proposed as the compromise solution for dealing with the Holy Places by means of retention of the status quo and that this would be made known to the members of the Council of the League.

\section*{4.9. \textsc{Pope Pius Xi’s Allocution of 11 December 1922}}

\textsc{Vehementur gratum}

In the absence of any British reply to the Vatican approach on a resolution of the Holy Places impasse, Pope Pius XI, in his first public consistory on 11 December 1922, gave the first Allocution of his pontificate, \textit{Vehementur gratum}. In this he referred to the Allocution given on 13 June of the previous year by Pope Benedict XV. He joined himself with the expressions of concern about Palestine therein contained; and noted that the League of Nations was soon to consider again the question of Palestine. He therefore reiterated the plea of his predecessor: “That when time

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} \textbf{G.1.6.4.} CO733/31,f. 637, Letter E 12127/178/65 of 11 November 1922 from Mr Oliphant to the Colonial Office.
\item \textsuperscript{120} \textbf{G.1.6.4.} CO733/31, f.636, Colonial Office file notes on Mr Oliphant’s letter of 11 November 1922.
\item \textsuperscript{121} \textbf{G.1.6.4.} CO733/31, f.640, Despatch No.1429 of 20 November 1922 from the Duke of Devonshire to Sir H. Samuel. The Duke of Devonshire sought an expedited reply from Samuel on 20 December 1922, see ibid, file cover note. Victor Cavendish, 9\textsuperscript{th} Duke of Devonshire KG, [1868-1938] was Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1922 to 1924.
\end{itemize}
comes to establish there a permanent condition of things, to the Catholic Church and to all Christians shall be assured the inalienable rights they hold”. 122 Once again, there was no call for a revocation or modification of the Balfour Declaration or the project for a Jewish national home in Palestine but rather a crystal-clear assertion of the need for the League of Nations to ensure that the long-established rights of the Catholics of Palestine were maintained in any Mandate regime.

Whilst Pius XI’s December Allocution placed strong emphasis on the situation in the Holy Land, the real priorities of the new Pope’s pontificate were actually set out in his 23 December 1922 encyclical, *Ubi arcano Dei*. In this key policy statement he signified the essential features of his intended programme as Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church. He foreshadowed the possibility of a reconvening of the Vatican Ecumenical Council interrupted in 1870. 123 Most importantly, he opened his call for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Italy, including the resolution of questions relating to the sovereignty of the Holy See. 124 The situation of the Holy Land, of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem and of the British Mandate in Palestine did not figure in this program.

### 4.10. REVIEW OF THE FIRST YEAR OF THE PONTIFICA T OF PIUS XI IN RELATION TO THE HOLY LAND

The first year of the pontificate of Pope Pius XI saw the Holy See giving significant time and attention to the question of the Holy Land, in the specific form of the terms of the proposed League of Nations mandate for Palestine and the nature and scope of the proposed Holy Places Commission. Not surprisingly so early in his pontificate, Pope Pius XI appears to have left these matters substantially in the hands of his highly capable Secretary of State, Cardinal Gasparri. The new Pope declined to meet

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with Zionist representatives, notably Dr Weizmann, but was readily accessible to Britain’s High Commissioner for Palestine, the British politician and leading Zionist, Sir Herbert Samuel. At the same time that major domestic political events were developing in Italy which required his urgent attention, Cardinal Gasparri was intimately involved in the detailed negotiations with Britain, France, Belgium, Spain, Brazil and the League of Nations itself regarding the terms of the Palestine Mandate generally, and very specifically with regard to the Holy Places Commission. In the face of the palpable anger of Britain’s formidable Foreign Secretary, Marquess Curzon, Cardinal Gasparri pressed on with his critique of the draft Palestine Mandate terms. The Holy See was successful in preventing that Mandate from being approved by the League of Nations in May of 1922 and being deferred for further consideration in July of that year. While the Holy See did not secure every point it wished to make, it succeeded in isolating the question of the Holy Places Commission as being one which must meet with the Holy See’s approval. The reality is that the outcome which the Holy See ultimately obtained from the international imbroglio it engendered is the one which has substantially prevailed to the present day, that the status quo as confirmed by the Ottoman firman of 1852 would be maintained in relation to the Holy Places of Palestine. Whilst it may not have been an ideal outcome, it is one which the Catholic Church and other Christian denominations had lived with for centuries and pursuant to which the Holy Places are able to be protected and maintained and as a result Christian pilgrimages have continued without disruption.

What stands out from the conduct of the Holy See in relation to these matters during 1922 is that it vigorously pursued its two long-established policies towards the Holy Land at an extremely delicate time, the protection of the Christian Holy Places and the care of the indigenous Catholic population of Palestine. The Holy See at no time in these negotiations opposed the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine, though it made clear that it opposed the extension of that project to include the future establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine. It vehemently argued the case for the maintaining of equal rights for all ethnic and religious groups in Palestine, and opposed the favouring of one group over another.
It was the outspoken champion of equal treatement for all Palestinians. It highlighted the need for Britain, as the mandatory Power, to adhere to the totality of the provisions of the Balfour Declaration and not to permit the development of a Jewish national home to be achieved at the expense of, or in derogation of the rights of, other peoples present in Palestine. And it highlighted the need for the terms of the Balfour Declaration itself to be implemented consistently with the Treaties of Sevres and Versailles and the terms of the Charter of the League of Nations itself.

For an entity which possessed not one acre of real estate in its own name, and had for its own military defence a meagre band of Swiss Guards, it was no mean feat. A review of the Holy See’s approach in this period does, however, highlight that the first and foremost priority of the Holy See in relation to the Holy Land was, as it had been for seven centuries, the protection of the Holy Places. However hard Cardinal Gasparri fought, in the end the one issue he would not yield over was with regard to the protection of the Catholic Church’s historic rights and privileges over the Holy Places. His final fallback position, the reassertion of the status quo, was completely successful and has prevailed to the present day, long after Britain’s Palestine Mandate had stumbled and failed. One cannot detect, in the matter surrounding these negotiations, the least sign of anti-Semitism on the part either of the Holy See or of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Monsignor Barlassina, though the latter had clearly become a fierce critic of the way in which the Zionist project was being implemented in Palestine. The evidence supports the conclusion that, in this period, the Holy See and its principal resident diocesan bishop, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, developed different views and took different approaches to the situation which was unfolding in the Holy Land. There can be no doubt that at the international level it was the position of the Holy See which prevailed. For Pope Pius XI the year 1922 ended with his focus set firmly on the resolution of the Holy See’s relationship with the Kingdom of Italy. That issue, and the rise of Fascism, Communism and Nazism, coupled with the very rise of public anti-Semitism itself, would occupy the major focus of his pontificate until his death in 1939. Whilst the Holy Land would always remain important for him, it was far from being a major preoccupation of his pontificate.
4.11. THE STRUGGLE OVER THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ENGLISH AUXILIARY BISHOP TO THE LATIN PATRIARCHATE OF JERUSALEM

One of the most illuminating issues through which to consider the Holy See’s relationship with the Holy Land, with the various British authorities involved with Palestine, and with the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem as the diocesan bishop during the first part of the pontificate of Pope Pius XI, is the struggle over the appointment of a person of British birth as auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem to “assist” the Latin Patriarch, Monsignor Barlassina, in the discharge of his duties. That struggle demonstrate palpably that whilst the Holy See did attempt to accommodate the desires of the British Government over this matter, the Holy See is generally reluctant to interfere in the day to day affairs of one of its own diocesan bishops or to influence any bishop’s conduct within his own diocese and does so only in exceptional circumstances, as Pope Pius XI himself did when he rebuked Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna in 1938 following the Austrian Anschluss.

The Holy See had, since 1919, favoured the use of Father Paschal Robinson, a highly talented American Franciscan priest of Irish birth, in the conduct of inquiries regarding matters pertaining to the Holy Land. He enjoyed the confidence of Cardinal Gasparri at the Vatican’s Secretariat of State and had impressed the British authorities since their first encounters with him in Jerusalem after 1918. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, when considering Father Robinson’s correspondence and reports, that he was always eager to encourage the British authorities, and the Holy See, in the notion that his appointment as Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem in replacement of Monsignor Barlassina would be in the best interests of both the Catholic Church generally and of the new British administration in Palestine. It seems doubtful that he was ever seriously interested in a subordinate role as either English-language secretary or auxiliary bishop to Monsignor Barlassina in Jerusalem, though he never appears to have clearly stated this and permitted the possibility of one of these events occurring to be discussed from time to time. However, his various very capable, subtle and diplomatic forays into the affairs of the Latin Patriarchate and

125 Father Paschal Robinson O. F. M. [1870-1948], as to whom see Appendix 5 for biographical details.
other Catholic Churches in the Holy Land fostered a view that an “Englishman” holding episcopal office in the Latin Catholic Church in the diocese of Jerusalem could do much to help smooth the three-way relationship between the British Government, the Holy See and the Latin Patriarchate. The British Government, at as senior a level as Marquess Curzon himself, actively desired and sought this outcome. The Holy See, at the level of its Secretary of State and even of the Pope himself, was willing to accommodate Britain’s reasonable aspirations in this regard. The Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Bourne, very actively championed this cause. The Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Monsignor Barlassina, worked relentlessly to avoid this manifestation of interference in his authority by both the Holy See and the British Government. Whilst he was not ultimately able to prevent an Englishman from being appointed as his auxiliary bishop he was able to thwart Robinson’s appointment and then to undermine from the outset the position of the unsuspecting appointee and reduce his position to a nullity, finally driving him into impoverished exile in the north of England. The whole adventure brought no apparent benefits either to Great Britain or to the Holy See other than for the latter to be seen to have accommodated the British request to make this appointment.

The campaign to appoint an English-speaking auxiliary bishop in Jerusalem was well underway by the middle of 1922 when Father Robinson wrote from Rome to Mr Shane Leslie, a socially prominent Anglo-Irish Catholic layman, on 25 June 1922 to concur with Leslie about the desirability of Monsignor Barlassina being replaced in Jerusalem but opining that this did not appear possible at that time:

> The Holy Father himself told me so. What is all important, therefore, in my opinion, is to secure the appointment of an English-speaking auxiliary who could act as an “officier de liaison” when questions arise between the ecclesiastical and civil authorities. I have reason to know that both the English Cardinals [Bourne and Gasquet] recently spoke to the Pope and the Secretary of State in favour of such an arrangement and that there was no objection

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126 See Appendix 5 for biographical details of Sir John Randolph [Shane] Leslie (1885-1971).
made whatever on the part of the Holy See. Quite the contrary. It only remains, therefore, for the Foreign Office to take up the matter without further delay.\textsuperscript{127}

The Colonial Office file notes show that “Father Robinson wishes to be auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem” but that “Barlassina is opposed to an English auxiliary bishop”.\textsuperscript{128} The evidence supports the conclusion that Robinson was subtly lobbying to be appointed auxiliary bishop with a view to being soon thereafter appointed Latin Patriarch in succession to Barlassina.

Cardinal Archbishop Bourne of Westminster initiated his own campaign to have Robinson made Secretary to Monsignor Barlassina and “liaison officer” between the British administration in Palestine and the Latin Patriarchate in late July of 1922. Bourne had recently met Robinson in London when the latter accompanied Monsignor Cerretti, Apostolic Nuncio to France, for meetings regarding the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine.\textsuperscript{129} Mr Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, became one of the key drivers of this strategy, telephoning a senior official in the Colonial Office on 28 July 1922 “to say that Mgr Cerretti and Cardinal Bourne are prepared to support all action towards the appointment of an English Auxiliary Bishop in the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem”. He went on to say that the Colonial Office must do two things to support this cause, firstly, to put forward the name of Father Robinson for the office, and secondly, to get the Foreign Office “to press Count de Salis to take up the matter vigorously at the Vatican”.\textsuperscript{130} The Colonial Office then consulted the Foreign Office as to “whether Father Paschal Robinson would make a good Auxiliary Bishop and also whether the support of Monsignor Cerretti and Cardinal Bourne is likely to be sufficiently strong for us to have some prospect of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{127} \textit{G.1.6.4.} CO 733/31, ff.54-55, Letter of 25 June 1922 from Father Paschal Robinson to Mr Shane Leslie.
\item \textsuperscript{128} \textit{G.1.6.4.} CO 733/31, f.49, Colonial Office file note of 11 July 1922, from Sir John Shuckburgh (see ibid, f.56).
\item \textsuperscript{129} \textit{F.21.} ff.61-62., letter of 27 July 1922 from Cardinal Bourne to Cardinal Gasparri.
\item \textsuperscript{130} \textit{G.1.6.4.} CO 733/31, f.51, Colonial Office file note by Sir John Shuckburgh of 28 July 1922 (see ibid, f.56).
\end{itemize}
success if we suggest to the Vatican that Father Robinson should be appointed”. 131 Lancelot Oliphant of the Foreign Office then wrote to the Colonial Office to say that: “we are convinced that Father Paschal Robinson is eminently suitable and far superior to any other possible candidate” as auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem. 132 Oliphant wrote confidentially to Count de Salis on 9 August 1922, instructing him to raise the issue of Father Robinson’s appointment immediately with the Pope and the Cardinal Secretary of State and to act while the Cardinal Prefect of Propaganda Fide, Cardinal Van Rossum, was away because “he alone is likely to offer opposition to the appointment”. Oliphant stressed that “His Majesty’s Government attach considerable importance both to the appointment being made in the near future and also to the selection of Father Robinson to the post”. 133

Count de Salis must have acted very promptly because, on 11 August 1922, Cardinal Gasparri informed him that “the Pope was anxious to send Father Robinson to Palestine” as Auxiliary Bishop of Jerusalem and that although “there was a question or two to be settled first, ... the Pope was anxious for the thing to be done”. 134 In the same despatch Count de Salis informed Marquess Curzon that: “for some time past the relations between the British authorities in Palestine and the Latin Patriarch, Monsignor Barlassina, have not been satisfactory” but that it would be difficult to ease Barlassina out of his present position because it was so senior that it would be difficult to find something else suitable for him at that level. 135

Cardinal Gasparri then attempted to persuade Barlassina to engage Robinson as his Secretary. 136 Barlassina explained to Gasparri that such an appointment made by Rome over his head would create the impression that the Holy See was in direct charge of affairs in Palestine, rather than the Latin Patriarch, and that this would

131 G.1.6.4. CO 733/31, f.56, Letter of 1 August 1922 from Major H. Young to L. Oliphant.
132 G.1.6.4. CO733/31, f.264, letter E7655/582/65 of 8 August 1922 from Mr Oliphant to Major Young.
133 G.1.6.4. CO733/31, ff.266-267, Despatch No.169 of 9 August 1922 from Mr Oliphant to Count de Salis.
134 G.1.1.35. FO 371/7791 Registry No. E 9131/582/65 Despatch No. 117 of 11 August 1922 from Count de Salis referred to in his Despatch No. 125 of 8 September 1922 to Marquess Curzon.
135 G.1.6.4. CO733/31, ff.355-356, Despatch No.117 of 11 August 1922 from Count de Salis to Marquess Curzon.
undermine the role and influence of the Latin Patriarch in the face of the various threats posed to the Catholic interest in Palestine. He suggested that if the Secretary of State must send him an English priest as Secretary, it should be one not attached to a religious Order but one who could become a part of the Diocesan clergy of the Latin Patriarchate and thereby “will conserve the prestige of the Ordinary”, Monsignor Barlassina himself. Pope Pius XI was now further drawn into the issue, writing a note in early October 1922 to the effect that:

I do not know this Father Robinson. Perhaps he would be a good fit with respect to Patriarch Barlassina, but how will the latter take this? And the Arabs? And the others who are already frightened that the Holy See is too deferential to the English in Palestine.

It was apparent that the new Pope did not want the Holy See to be seen as being too deferential to the wishes of the British administration in Palestine and did not necessarily favour the appointment of Father Robinson to the staff of Monsignor Barlassina. However, on 21 October 1922 Cardinal Gasparri wrote to Barlassina to say that the Pope, having reconsidered the matter, had returned to the idea of Father Robinson for the role of English language secretary to the Latin Patriarch.

Barlassina then used one of his contacts in Rome to oppose Robinson’s appointment to any such position because it would create the impression that “the Patriarch is in the hands of the Franciscan Custody and does not exist any more” and that his humiliation would be complete. Cardinal Gasparri continued to press the appointment of Robinson upon Barlassina, whilst the latter sought to avoid

138 F.21. f.71., handwritten note from Pope Pius XI and dated “ottobre 1922”.
140 F.21. ff.75-76., letter of 28 October 1922 from Monsignor Barlassina to Monsignor Carlo Respighi.
141 F.21. f.77., cable of 2 December 1922 to which Barlassina immediately replied that day apologizing for his “fallo involontario”, at F.21. f.78.
complying with the Secretary of State’s request.\textsuperscript{142} What appears to have particularly made Father Robinson so unacceptable to Monsignor Barlassina was the outcome of Father Robinson’s Apostolic Visitation earlier in 1922 to consider certain matters pertaining to the relationship between the Latin Patriarchate and the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa in which Robinson had favoured his own Franciscan Order.\textsuperscript{143} As a result of Barlassina’s strong ongoing opposition to Robinson’s appointment to any position in Jerusalem, the Holy See “decided that someone who was not a Franciscan should be found to act as ‘liaison officer’ under the Patriarch”. In the face of this imbroglio, the English Cardinal Gasquet, a Benedictine resident in Rome, suggested to Cardinal Gasparri that an English Benedictine would be the ideal person to undertake the role of Secretary,\textsuperscript{144} a suggestion which Cardinal Gasparri for a time unsuccessfully pursued.\textsuperscript{145}

The British Foreign Minister, Lord Curzon, was informed of the failure of the campaign to have Barlassina appoint Robinson as his Secretary in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{146} There now followed the determined efforts of the British Government to procure Robinson’s appointment as Auxiliary Bishop of Jerusalem, all episcopal appointments in the Catholic Church being made by the Holy See. When it appeared that Monsignor Barlassina might be appointed to the See of Turin or Genoa, the British authorities pursued the possibility of Robinson being appointed to succeed him as Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. When that met with failure there followed the happenstance nomination of Father Godric Kean as Auxiliary Bishop of Jerusalem, in which the Holy See went out of its way to meet the British Government’s wishes for a British bishop in the Latin Patriarchate, and the British Government pursued...
determinedly its desire to be rid of “the nefarious Monsignor’s influence”.147 Cardinal Gasquet had, following a conversation with Bishop Casartelli of Salford who was visiting Rome at the time, made the suggestion to the Holy See that Father Godric Kean of Salford diocese would be suitable to act as secretary to Monsignor Barlassina and “who could act as ‘liaison officer’ between the [British] Government and the Patriarchate”.148 The Holy See now enquired of Count de Salis whether Kean’s appointment would be “agreeable to His Majesty’s Government” and Count de Salis suggested that the British Government accept the proposal.149 In accordance with Marquess Curzon’s instructions, Count de Salis then informed Cardinal Gasparri that “His Majesty’s Government would raise no objection to the appointment of Father Keane as Secretary to the Latin Patriarch at Jerusalem”. Gasparri responded “that there had been a slight hitch owing to a protest raised by the Franciscans”.150 In late June of 1923 Cardinal Gasparri still did not know whether or not Father Kean had been appointed as Secretary to Monsignor Barlassina, but was aware that the Franciscans did not object to Kean’s appointment provided under “no circumstances is he to act either officially or officiously as intermediary in any questions concerning or affecting the Holy Places”.151 On 1 July 1923 Monsignor Barlassina wrote to Cardinal Van Rossum at Propaganda Fide to report that he had heard talk of the nomination of an English priest as Auxiliary Bishop of Jerusalem, and observing that, in view of the “total aversion of the local populace to the English government”, such an appointment would produce “a most unfavourable impression both to the

147 G.1.1.36. FO 371/9010 contains the Foreign Office correspondence on this saga which is instructive as to the interplay of relations between the British Government, the Holy See, the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem and the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa. G.1.1.36. Registry No. E 3022/1411/65 contains the file note referring to “the nefarious Monsignor’s influence”. Mr Lancelot Oliphant called him the “nefarious prelate”.
148 G.1.1.36. FO 371/9010, ibid, de Salis to Curzon, 18 February 1923; see also G.1.1.36. FO 371/9010 Registry No. E 4367/1411/65 Letter of 27 April 1923 from Hon. Theo Russell to Mr Lancelot Oliphant.
149 G.1.1.36. FO 371/9010, ibid, de Salis to Curzon, 18 February 1923.
150 G.1.1.36. FO 371/9010 Registry No. E 6080/1411/65 Despatch No. 75 of 6 June 1923 from Count de Salis to Marquess Curzon. De Salis sought Father Robinson’s aid as to the Franciscan objection without success, ibid.
151 G.1.1.36. FO 371/9010 Registry No. E 6539/1411/65 Despatch No. 79 of 22 June 1923 from Sir Odo Russell to Marquess Curzon. Sir Odo Russell said that Father Robinson was “somewhat upset by recent events”. In respect of the latter, Mr Lancelot Oliphant asked Mr Dormer “to reiterate to Father Pascal Robinson the value which I set on retaining his cooperation and the advantage of his expert advice in ecclesiastical matters connected with Palestine”.
Catholics and the Muslims, and would cause them to believe that the Catholic Church had come to “a compromise with the Zionist hearth”. 152

In early September of 1923 no appointment had yet been given to Father Kean, leading to a commitment being made by Monsignor Borgongini Duca for Cardinal Gasparri that Monsignor Barlassina would now be told that “the appointment of Father Keane must be made”, and noting that “Father Keene’s [sic] appointment in no way prejudices any prospects of Father Paschal Robinson being given some day a position of authority in Palestine”. 153 In fact, whilst British hopes for Robinson to succeed Barlassina in Jerusalem remained active for another year, Barlassina’s manoeuvres were ultimately successful in warding this off. In November of 1923 Father Godric Kean joined the staff of Monsignor Barlassina in Jerusalem as his English-language secretary, and on 14 July 1924 the Holy See appointed Kean to the office of auxiliary bishop to Monsignor Barlassina. 154 General G. F. Clayton, the Officer Administering the Government of Palestine, soon reported to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that “excellent relations now exist between the Latin Patriarchate and this Administration, and a considerable measure of credit for this satisfactory state of affairs must be attributed to Father Godric Keane”. 155 The Italian newspaper Popolo expressed “the opinion that Monsignor Keane’s appointment should induce the British Government to look more favourably on Cardinal Gasparri’s proposals regarding the Holy Places ... which are still before the League of Nations” and that “if all goes well and Monsignor Kean proves himself capable it is quite within the bounds of possibility that he may eventually succeed Monsignor

152 E.19. Protocollo 2355, Protocollo No.429/23 of 1 July 1923 from Monsignor Barlassina to Cardinal Van Rossum.
153 G.1.1.36. FO 371/9010 Registry No. E 9056/1411/65 Despatch No. 113 of 5 September 1923 from Mr Cedric Dormer to Marquess Cuzon.
154 G.1.1.37. FO 371/10087 Registry No. E 7082/71/65 Despatch No. 114 of 14 August 1924 from Mr Cecil Dormer to Right Honourable James Ramsay MacDonald, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The records of the Holy See show that Father Godric Kean was appointed Titular Bishop of Tavium and auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem on 14 July 1924.
Barlassina”. In fact, Barlassina and Kean co-habited in the Latin Patriarchate Palace in a state of frigid mutual hostility for four years until Barlassina sent Kean into exile in Cyprus in August of 1928. Barlassina’s treatment of Kean provoked the latter’s resignation as auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem, which was accepted in December 1928.

A consideration of these events highlights a strand of this thesis’ argument, that once the Holy See appoints a diocesan bishop it has very limited powers in respect of the actions and policies of that diocesan within his own See. There may well be two different policies being pursued regarding the same issue within the Catholic Church, the one at the level of the Holy See and the other at the level of the diocesan Bishop. Despite his conduct in Rome and London in 1922 Monsignor Barlassina continued to be Latin Patriarch until his death in 1947 in the face of the vigorous opposition of the British Foreign Office from 1922 to 1924 to his continued tenure and recurring, though reduced, opposition to him from that quarter for another twelve years. This episode also highlights that the Holy See was anxious to appease and accommodate the British Government in relation to a British secretary to the Latin Patriarch and the appointment of a British auxiliary bishop, and that it had the capacity to impose these requirements on the Latin Patriarch, Monsignor Barlassina, even if he thwarted the appointment of the preferred nominee both of the British Foreign Minister and the Pope, Father Robinson. Behind it all one perceives the Holy See’s overriding concern related to the Holy Places and its determination to procure an acceptable regime which would protect the Catholic Church’s historic claims and position in the Holy Land on that front and to try to procure the best relationship with the British administration in Palestine to advance these ends. At the end of the day the British Government had not been able to overcome the internal politics of

156 G.1.1.37. FO 371/10087 E 8363/71/65 DESpatch No. 126 of 24 September 1924 from Mr Cecil Dormer to Right Hon James Ramsay MacDonald.

157 E.19. Protocollo 3792, Protocollo 7/2 of 5 December 1928 from Cardinal Van Rossum to Monsignor Kean. Monsignor Kean retired to Abbey House, Shincliffe, Durham, and wrote pleading letters to have his annual stipend from Jerusalem of 120 pounds increased, his death apparently occurring during 1931, see E.19. Protocollo 4296, Letter of 31 October 1930 from Monsignor Kean to the Cardinal Prefect of Propaganda Fide, and Protocollo 1042, Protocollo 7/2 of 30 March 1931 from Cardinal Van Rossum to Monsignor Kean.
the Holy See and the Latin Patriarchate to procure the appointment of Father Robinson, its favoured candidate in Jerusalem, whilst the Holy See had shown itself willing to oblige the British Government in appointing an Englishman as auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem, meeting that request in the end by the almost accidental appointment of a priest of utter obscurity and uncertain temperament whose own diocesan bishop was eager to offload him onto another diocese even if this meant him being elevated to episcopal rank.

In almost every respect Godric Kean’s appointment as auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem had been an abject failure, the only aspect of success being that the Holy See had shown itself willing to meet the demands of the British Government regarding this appointment and thereby to prove itself determined to be cooperative with the British administration in Palestine. This accorded with its principal policy of protecting the Christian Holy Places but subordinated its second policy, the nurturing of the local Catholic Church in the Holy Land, at a time when Pope Pius XI was preparing to promulgate a new policy for better treatment of indigenous clergy in Catholic dioceses around the world.

4.12. THE FINAL OUTCOME REGARDING THE HOLY PLACES

Whilst the Holy See and the British authorities pursued their protracted negotiations over the appointment of an English auxiliary bishop in Jerusalem, they also had to negotiate with each other over the resolution of the vexed question of the Holy Places Commission and the best way to deal with the Christian Holy Places under the British mandate in Palestine. In the absence of any resolution of the issues concerning the Holy Places Commission, and in the face of a major dispute between the Soviet Government and Russian ecclesiastical authorities over the ownership of extensive properties in Palestine [none of which were actually Holy Places], the British Government promulgated an Order in Council on 25 July 1924, known as The Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council 158. This decreed that “no cause or matter in

158 For the background to this Order in Council see Molinaro, ibid, 67-68.
connection with the Holy Places or religious buildings or sites in Palestine or the rights or claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine shall be heard or determined by any Court in Palestine”, other than as exercised “by the Religious Courts of the jurisdiction conferred upon them”. It continued that questions as to jurisdiction were to be settled by the High Commissioner whose decision as to be final.\textsuperscript{159}

It appears that the Palestine administration was concerned about disputes regarding Holy Places and religious properties arising in the absence of appointment of the Holy Places Commission and wanted to avoid these matters coming before the ordinary Courts of Palestine, and therefore “it was decided to issue an Order in Council removing from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts all matters relating to the Holy Places, religious buildings or sites in Palestine”. The role conferred by the Order on the High Commissioner “does not empower the High Commissioner to settle disputes connected with the Holy Places and religious questions, but merely to decide whether or not a case should be removed from the Jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts..”.\textsuperscript{160} The intention of this Order was therefore that “if the High Commissioner decides that any case should be removed from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in Palestine, the matter will be referred to the Council of the League of Nations and proposals laid before that body for approval”.\textsuperscript{161}

Sir Ronald Storrs subsequently wrote to the Foreign Secretary agreeing with the proposal to “lay before the Council of the League of Nations proposals outlining the

\textsuperscript{159} \textbf{G.1.1.38}. FO 371/10112 Registry No. E 4970/4300/65 Memorandum from Sir John Shuckburgh of 5 June 1924 which backgrounds the Russian ecclesiastical property dispute and attaches a Draft Order in Council; and \textbf{G.1.1.38}. FO 371/10112 Registry No. E 6905/4300/65 The Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council, 1924, of 25 July 1924.

\textsuperscript{160} \textbf{G.1.1.38}. FO 371/10112 Registry No. E 8067/4300/65 Letter of 27 October from Mr D. G. Osborne [Foreign Office] to Count de Pradere.

\textsuperscript{161} \textbf{G.1.1.38}. FO 371/10112 Registry No. E 8734/4300/65 Letter of 27 October 1924 from Mr D. G. Osborne to Sir Odo Russell. See also the discussion on this issue and this correspondence in Molinaro, ibid, 70-71, which explains that, following a series of subsequent disputes over the Western Wall, “on January 14, 1930 the League Council decided that there should be no change in the interpretation and implementation of Article 14 [and] the League of Nations’ body, pending the constitution of the commission provided for in the same article, was to continue to supervise directly, through its yearly reports, the Mandatory administration of the Holy Places”, the question of whether or not “the High Commissioner had been authorized by the Order to decide the disputes” being vital to the post-1948 question of whether or not any such power in the High Commissioner had passed to the Government of Israel as successor state of the Palestine Mandate.
steps to be taken in the event of any cause being removed from the jurisdiction of
the Palestine Courts under the Order”.

Only on 8 December 1924 did the Colonial Office put to the Foreign Office the
proposed procedure for the High Commissioner dealing with matters under the 1924
Order. The Foreign Office agreed with the procedure but suggested that the
approval of the League was not needed for the adoption of such procedures or
specific actions arising from them. In fact this was to be the end of all meaningful
attempts to procure the implementation of a Holy Places Commission. The 1924
Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council is still in force in Israel today, except where
it has been superceded by later Israeli legislation, having long outlasted the British
Mandate administration which put it in place.

This outcome may be seen as perhaps the most enduring legacy of the Holy See’s
interventions in regard to the Palestine Mandate and the question of the Holy Places
in the period 1922-1924, the securing of the ongoing operation and effect of the
Status Quo, and its ultimate oversight by an international body such as the League of
Nations. This marked the Holy See’s fallback position in the event that it could not
procure the appointment of a Holy Places Commission with a composition
acceptable to it in order to ensure the protection of Catholic rights and interests in
the Holy Places, the Holy See’s overriding concern in regard to the Holy Land. It
was a triumph for Cardinal Gasparri because it ensured that the interests of the
Catholic Church in regard to the Holy Places in Palestine would continue to be the
same under the British and subsequent regimes as they had been under the
Ottoman Empire. It may be seen as a significant outcome of the Holy See’s policy of
placating and accommodating the reasonable desires of the British administration in
Palestine in the interests of ensuring the achievement of the Holy See’s long-

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162 G.1.1.38. FO 371/10112 Registry No. E 9194/4300/65 Despatch No. Adm.965. of 31 October 1924
from Sir Ronald Storrs to Right Hon. J.H.Thomas, Secretary of State for the Colonies.
163 G.1.1.38. FO 371/10112 Registry No. E 11059/4300/65 Letter of 15 January 1925 from Mr
D.G.Osborne [Foreign Office] to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office.
165 See Araujo and Lucal, at 186-187, for a discussion of the Holy See’s aspirations in this regard.
standing and primary policy for the Holy Land, the protection of the Christian Holy Places.

4.13. THE HOLY SEE SEEKS TO ESTABLISH ITS OWN DIRECT REPRESENTATION IN PALESTINE, DOWNGRADING THE STATUS OF THE LATIN PATRIARCH OF JERUSALEM

The Holy See had long pursued its two separate policies for the Holy Land. In furtherance of its second policy, the nurturing of the indigenous Catholic community in the Holy Land, the Holy See had invested a great deal of effort and energy in building up the prestige and status of the successive Latin Patriarchs, who were seen universally as the local presence of the Holy See in the Holy Land. In the period from 1924 to 1929, when the approach of the Holy See towards the British administration and its policies in Palestine began to diverge from the conduct and policies pursued by the incumbent Latin Patriarch, Monsignor Barlassina, the Holy See proceeded to undermine and diminish the status and functions of the Latin Patriarch. In doing this it appears that the Holy See’s purpose was to protect its relationship with the British Government in the hope of procuring the outcomes it desired in relation to the Christian Holy Places, this policy of the Holy See therefore manifesting itself as the principal ongoing concern of the Holy See in this period in relation to the Holy Land.

As the saga of Father Godric Kean’s elevation to episcopal office had shown, the Holy See in this period wished to placate the “reasonable expectations” of the British Government as the price for ensuring a satisfactory working relationship, even if it meant disappointing the emerging aspirations of Palestinian Catholics to hold leadership positions within their own diocese.

As a result of this approach by the Holy See, and despite Monsignor Barlassina’s petty triumph over Monsignor Kean in this period, the status of the Latin Patriarch was itself reduced by the Holy See in a deliberate process which clearly reflected dissatisfaction by Cardinal Gasparri, if not Pope Pius XI himself, with the belligerent Latin Patriarch. The discreet, behind the scenes manoeuvres and strategies of Father, afterwards Monsignor, Robinson may be detected in what now occurred.
During 1925 there had developed within the Roman Curia, particularly the Congregation for the Eastern Churches and the Secretariat of State, a view that there were now very serious issues existing within the various parts of the Catholic Church in the Holy Land which necessitated some intervention from the Holy See itself. In July of 1925, Cardinal Gasparri spoke to Cardinal Tacci, Secretary of the Congregation of Oriental Churches in the Roman Curia,166 about the need for an Apostolic Visitation to be undertaken in Palestine. An internal Secretariat of State briefing note of 9 July 1925 recorded the contents of the discussion:-

1. the problems of the Catholic interests in Palestine offered the Holy See “many grave problems to study and resolve”.

2. there was a need in Palestine for a person who was free of diocesan duties and able to stand above the array of complex local interests who could study how to “freeze the bad undercurrents, promote and encourage initiatives for the good, reunite all the Catholics in a common sense of purpose, reconciling the matters which were presently dividing the Catholics of Palestine, encouraging the schismatics towards reunion, and keeping the Holy See informed about the true current situation in general and as to a specific single question”.

3. on various fronts the necessity was confirmed of having present in Palestine an Apostolic Visitor or Delegate.

4. Father Robinson had been in Palestine in May for the Congregation for Eastern Churches “in order to follow at close quarters the encounter between the Anglicans and the Greek Orthodox” and was well-suited for such a mission.

5. the opportunity now existed in the Holy Land to recruit many Greek Orthodox Church members to the Catholic Church by means of the Greek Catholic, or Melkite, Church but the poor relations between Monsignor Barlassina and the Melkites, including the White Fathers of the Melkite

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166 See Appendix 5 for biographical details of Cardinal Giovanni Tacci Porcelli (1863-1928).
seminary of St Anne in Jerusalem, were a hinderance to such progress and it would be opportune to have the intervention of “a neutral person” to prevent this becoming “too open and unedifying”.

6. the Apostolic Delegate responsible for Palestine, Monsignor Giannini, was based in Syria and was too far away to have meaningful impact, and this was made worse by the fact that Palestine was now under English rule and that Monsignor Barlassina had demonstrated that he did not recognise any Delegate of the Holy See for Palestine.

7. the Latin rite religious in Palestine, of whatever their national backgrounds, “demonstrate amongst themselves independence from any jurisdiction of the Latin Patriarch as the diocesan Ordinary in the conduct of their apostolate”, with a baleful effect upon the indigenous Catholic populace and upon the standing of the Holy See in regard to the rights of the Eastern rite Catholic bishops in Palestine”; and therefore it would seem necessary to have “the vigilance of a Delegate of the Holy See” present in Palestine.

8. all these various sources of information, as well as the newspapers, “confirm the necessity of uniting all the Christians including the Orthodox against the Zionist project.

9. in the face of this parlous situation the briefing note concluded that “the presence of a Delegate of the Holy See would have better procured the assistance of the Catholic community” of Palestine.\textsuperscript{167}

This demonstrates that, by the middle of 1925, at the highest level of the Roman Curia below the Supreme Pontiff himself, there was a realization that the Holy See had a profound problem in relation to the Catholic presence within the Holy Land, a problem which the personal inadequacies of Monsignor Barlassina were contributing to, and which involved the relationship between Latin rite and Eastern [or Oriental] rite Catholics and their respective bishops. There was perceived to be a need for a

\textsuperscript{167} \textit{F.27} ff.3-4, briefing note headed “Archivio: comunicato a voce dall’Emo Gasparri all’Emo Tacci, and bearing the pencil notation 9.VII.25 Mgr Papadopolou [who worked in Pro Ecclesia Orientale].
far more united Catholic front in the face of the practical impact of Zionism and the encroachments of the Protestant and Orthodox presence in Palestine.

The solution to this problem which suggested itself was for the Holy See to establish a direct representative in the Holy Land by the appointment of an Apostolic Delegate who would be a real presence there as the representative of the Holy See to deal with all these issues and demonstrate a united Catholic front in the Holy Land. Father Robinson was seen to be the ideal person to progress this to the next stage through the process of an Apostolic Visitation. Whilst Monsignor Barlassina was absent from his See on an extended overseas tour in early 1926, Robinson had written to Cardinal Gasparri about a suggestion the Secretary of State had earlier made to him “on the manner of being able to treat more directly between the Holy See and the Government of Palestine”, and said he would send the Cardinal “a little pro-memoria in reply very quickly”. 168 Shortly afterwards, Father Robinson informed the British administration in Jerusalem that:

he had received instructions from the Cardinal Secretary of State to the effect that His Beatitude the Latin Patriarch was not to be considered as representing, in any diplomatic capacity, the Vatican in Palestine, of which he was the diocesan bishop and nothing more.169

This radical downgrading of Barlassina’s role in Jerusalem drew forth a spate of correspondence with the Foreign Office. The then British Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain, was notified on 30 July 1926 that Father Robinson was now “definitely charged by the Holy See with the duty of acting as representative of the Vatican in all communications with the High Commissioner in Palestine”. Cardinal Gasparri had confirmed this directly, explaining that “Father Robinson having no diplomatic rank, his relations with the High Commissioner [were], from a strictly official Vatican point of view, unofficial”. The strictly legal position was that Apostolic Delegate for Syria, Monsignor Giannini [appointed in 1905], was also the actual

168 F.27. f.20, letter of 3 March 1926 from Father Robinson to Cardinal Gasparri.
169 G.1.1.39. FO 371/11478 Registry No. E 2442/2442/65 Despatch No. 4163/26 of 24 March 1926 from High Commissioner Plumer to Right Hon. L. Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies.
Apostolic Delegate for Palestine. Since Giannini resided in Syria, Barlassina had in practice tended to assume the functions of the Delegate in Jerusalem. Barlassina was now reminded that he was not the Delegate and Father Robinson was nominated “to act, albeit ... *ad referendum* to the Patriarch, as representative of the Holy See in Palestine in all matters appertaining to discussion with the High Commissioner”. It was noted that a separate Apostolic Delegation to Palestine was not likely to be established formally until Monsignor Giannini vacated his office; and therefore “for the present the Holy See considers that the actual arrangements, although not entirely regular, should work smoothly, given the present harmony between the Catholic Church and the High Commissioner, to whom ... the Cardinal Secretary of State paid a high tribute, and given also Father Robinson’s well-tried tact and ability”.170

Sir Odo Russell, Minister at the British Legation to the Holy See, confirmed to the Foreign Secretary that “the question of the relations between the Latin Patriarchate and the Delegate Apostolic, Monsignor Giannini, had now been settled in the sense that the former was subject, as regards religious discipline and rank, to the latter [and that] this public removal of any claims by Monsignor Barlassina to be de facto Delegate Apostolic to Palestine [was] the first step to a division of Monsignor Giannini’s sphere and the formation of a separate Delegacy Apostolic for Palestine”.171

The signs quickly showed that Barlassina had been downgraded in the eyes of the Holy See and that Cardinal Gasparri was now looking to Robinson rather than to Barlassina for advice about developments in Palestine. Two examples of this are in relation, firstly, to the *Religious Communities Organisation Ordinance, 1926*,172

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170 **G.1.1.39.** FO 371/11478 Registry No. E 4571/2442/65 Despatch No.119 of 30 July 1926 from Mr A. W. G. Randall to Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.


172 **E.7.** Protocollo 166/26 of 12 May 1926 from Patriarch Barlassina to Propaganda Fide; and see **F.16.** ff.74-75.
where Gasparri referred Barlassina’s advice to Robinson for comment; and, secondly, to the Mandate administration’s 1 July 1926 draft *Expropriation of Land Ordinance, 1926*, when, once again, Cardinal Gasparri referred the Latin Patriarch’s concerns to Father Robinson in Rome. In respect of the latter matter, on 24 December 1926 Father Robinson wrote to Cardinal Gasparri from Jerusalem, assuring him that he had now met with the Mandate’s Attorney General, Norman Bentwich, and that the Expropriation Ordinance had no sinister intent, and that even the Latin Patriarch seemed no longer so concerned about it. This correspondence demonstrates the extent to which Father Robinson had become the source of objective advice to the Holy See on the situation prevailing in Palestine, rather than the Latin Patriarch himself who had nominal control over the affairs of the Latin Catholic Church in the Mandate territory.

Father Robinson wrote a report in late November 1926 to Cardinal Sincero, now Secretary of the Sacred Congregation for the Eastern Churches [Pro Ecclesia Orientali] on his Apostolic Visitation to Palestine. Robinson acknowledged that he had been entrusted with the task of “studying secretly” the opportunity of definitively detaching Palestine from the Apostolic Delegation for Syria in order to form a separate Apostolic Delegation for Palestine. He pointed out that, pursuant to the post-war settlements, Syria and Palestine were now subject to separate League of Nations mandates with separate mandatory powers, France and Britain. He observed the fact that the Apostolic Delegate being resident in Syria was bound...
to favour the French point of view on matters, and that this point of view must inevitably diverge from that of the English, for example on the questions of the Holy Places and the Zionist movement. This made it very difficult for the Delegate to maintain his position in Palestine. The sheer logistical problems involving the vastness and diversity of the territory covered rendered the desirability of separate Delegations for Syria and Palestine, the current Apostolic Delegate having been to Galilee only once in twenty years. Robinson observed that the previous Latin Patriarch, Monsignor Camassei, had been “always a sincere friend and protector of the Uniates” [Greek rite Catholics], but that Monsignor Barlassina was the opposite of his predecessor, seeking always to place in a bad light the Orientals in general and the Melkites in particular, demonstrating “an extraordinary antipathy and has left nothing undone which could discredit and damage them both at home and abroad”. Monsignor Barlassina had done this in good faith in the conviction that the only hope for the progress of the Catholic Church in Palestine was the “Latinization” of this region. The result had been that converts to Catholicism were being forced into the Latin rite rather than the Greek rite, thereby frustrating the will of the Holy See regarding the Uniate rites expressed through the Apostolic Constitution *Orientalium Dignitatis* in 1894 which was disgracefully ignored in Palestine. Robinson concluded that the best way to deal with this situation was for there to be a “pro-Eastern rite” Apostolic Delegate appointed by the Holy See to reside in Jerusalem as “Representative of the common Father of the faithful, the Sovereign Pontiff”, in order to oversee the spiritual care of the Eastern Catholics.\(^\text{178}\)

Immediately following Robinson’s Report being received by the Holy See in late November of 1926, the Congregation for the Eastern Churches in Rome wrote to Propaganda Fide seeking the creation of a separate Apostolic Delegation in Palestine with Robinson as Apostolic Delegate.\(^\text{179}\) The matter then stalled for two years, possibly due to Cardinal Van Rossum’s opposition, encouraged by Monsignor

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\(^{179}\) E.12. Protocollo 3882 of 1926, Protocollo N.20871/26 of 26 November 1926 from Monsignor Papadopolou to Monsignor Marchetti, receipt of which was acknowledged without comment on 30 November 1926, ibid.
Barlassina, to Robinson as the resident Apostolic Delegate. The substantive position of Apostolic Delegate to Palestine, however, was to elude the subtle Franciscan.

4.14. THE HOLY SEE MAKES FURTHER USE OF FATHER PASCHAL ROBINSON IN THE HOLY LAND

The Holy See would spend the next three years in further developing and implementing its strategy for a separate Apostolic Delegation for Palestine sympathetic to the plight of Eastern rite Catholics, which would involve the progressive downgrading of the role and public position of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. The overriding objectives appear clearly to have been to strengthen the capacity to achieve the two long-term policies for the Holy See in the Holy Land, the protection of the Holy Places and the nurturing of the indigenous Catholic population of Palestine. For these purposes the Holy See now felt it could no longer rely on either the Latin Patriarch or the Franciscan Custode, its historic agents for progressing these policies, and needed its own direct representative. With regard to the indigenous Catholic population of Palestine, the Holy See now demonstrated its growing perception that the Eastern rite Catholic Church, principally under Greek-Melkite bishops, might be a better vehicle for attracting Greek Orthodox Palestinians/Arabs into union with the Roman Church than the Latin Patriarchate had proved itself to be.

This perception would now dominate the thinking of the Holy See about its second major strategy for the Holy Land throughout the remainder of the pontificate of Pope Pius XI. Two different Congregations of the Roman Curia, Propaganda Fide and the Eastern Churches, would be pitched against each other in a long-drawn out and sometimes bitter struggle, the former defending its long dominance of the Catholic missions in the Holy Land and its oversight of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, and the latter seeking to take over responsibility for the whole of the Catholic missions work in Palestine, including oversight of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem itself. Monsignor Barlassina would find himself something of a pawn in this struggle over the next decade. Father Robinson was seen within the Roman

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180 See Propaganda Fide in Appendix 4.
Curia as the best person to handle these difficult matters for the Holy See and bring them to a successful outcome.

Whilst the various efforts to have Robinson appointed to episcopal office within the Catholic hierarchy of the Holy Land had been unsuccessful, it seems clear that the Holy See continued to consider Robinson as having an invaluable role to play in resolving difficult issues within the Catholic Church, both Latin and Eastern rites, in Palestine. Cardinal Van Rossum of Propaganda Fide wrote to Monsignor Barlassina on 4 December 1926 to inform him that Robinson was once again being asked to undertake an Apostolic Visitation in Palestine on behalf of the Holy See, this time ostensibly to consider the questions of relations between the German Society in the Holy Land and the Franciscan Custody and certain other matters relating to the Franciscan Custody, including one minor matter concerning the Latin Patriarchate.¹⁸¹

The Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported favourably on this appointment from Rome on 2 July 1927, noting that:

The appointment of Father Robinson is regarded as a demonstration of the desire of the Vatican to be in good relations with the British Mandatory Power in Palestine, a desire which was demonstrated also by the elevation in 1925 [sic] of Monsignor Godric Kean, an Englishman, to be Auxiliary Patriarch in Jerusalem. It was stated at the time that the Vatican regarded Monsignor Kean’s position as of great value in the furtherance of its efforts to bring about a friendly understanding with the British Mandatory in Palestine on the subject of the rights of the Catholic Church in Palestine and the regulation of the question of the Holy Places.¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ E.9. Protocollo No 7/1 of 4 December 1926 from Cardinal Van Rossum to Monsignor Barlassina.
¹⁸² Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Rome, 2 July 1927, Englishman Appointed Apostolic Delegate to Egypt and Palestine, http://www.jta.org/1927/07/05/archive/englishman-appointed-apostolic-delegate-to-egypt-and-palestine. It appears that Monsignor Robinson had been appointed Apostolic Visitor, not Delegate, to Palestine but with a status which exceeded that of the Latin Patriarch.
The now Monsignor Paschal Robinson left Rome and arrived in Jerusalem on 13 September 1927 to undertake his Apostolic Visitation, a Visitation which would last until Robinson’s departure from Jerusalem on 28 April 1928 and which would actually focus closely on the relationship between Latin and Greek rite Catholics in Palestine and the Transjordan. The presence of Monsignor Robinson, and his enquiries into the relationship between Latin and Eastern rite Catholic Churches in the Holy Land, provoked serious tension with the Latin Patriarch under whose roof Robinson was lodged in Jerusalem. On 26 October 1927 Monsignor Barlassina himself submitted a Memoria entitled “The Melkites in Palestine”, which traced the history of the perceived disorders between the Greek rite and Latin rite Catholic communities of Palestine from 1893. Barlassina complained bitterly to Propaganda Fide about the treatment being accorded to the Latin Patriarchate by the Holy See through this Robinson enquiry.

The 1927 Robinson Visitation now drew towards a successful conclusion in early 1928. Robinson wrote to Cardinal Van Rossum on 28 February 1928 to report on his progress, noting that he had been able to resolve amicably the problems involving the Patriarchate and the Custody by September 1927 and that the relationship between the Patriarchate and the Custody were now cordial. One senses the discrete and almost invisible healing touch of Monsignor Robinson which had caused the Holy See to turn to him so often to resolve difficulties within the Catholic Church there. In the various correspondence of this period between Barlassina, Robinson and Gasparri one detects that the Secretary of State of the Holy See was now ensuring that he had dispassionate and reliable advice on the situation in Palestine from Robinson to counterbalance what were increasingly seen as alarmist reports.

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183 E.9. Rendiconto del Danaro Ricevuto e Speso dal Visitatore Apostolico di Palestine, which gives the date of the now Monsignor Robinson’s departure from Rome, and Protocollo 169/28 of 30 April 1928 from Monsignor Barlassina to Cardinal Van Rossum which gives the date of closure of the Visitation and departure of Monsignor Robinson from Jerusalem.


185 E.18. fasc.1, Protocollo No 348/27 of 26 October 1927 from Monsignor Barlassina to Cardinal Van Rossum.

186 E.9. Protocollo 74/28 of 28 February 1928 from Father Robinson to Cardinal Van Rossum. Monsignor Haggiar was the Greek-Melkite Archbishop of Akka.
submitted to him by Barlassina. The Holy See was losing confidence in its own principal diocesan bishop in the Holy Land and it now sought an alternate approach to securing its own long-term policies for the Holy Land.

4.15. CHANGES IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE HOLY SEE, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE LATIN PATRIARCH IN 1928-1929

The Holy See now took a series of steps which effected changes to its own relationship with the Latin Patriarch and the Catholic Church in the Holy Land. By Litterae Apostolicae of 6 January 1928, Decesores nostri, Pope Pius XI announced that “the duties of the Grand Master of the Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulchre have ... expired, and consequently, [were] to be completely abolished”. The Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem was therefore appointed “Rector and Perpetual Administrator of the Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulchre”, with the right of naming new knights, not only by delegation of the Supreme Pontiff, but in virtue of the office and authority granted him” by the Pope’s Order. The effect of this decree was that the Pope ceased to be Grand Master of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre and the Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulchre ceased to be a pontifical Order under the direct jurisdiction of the Holy See. Monsignor Barlassina presented this event as a promotion for him, and it is possible that the Holy See was satisfied with giving him a mere bauble at the very time when, with Robinson’s assistance, it was diminishing his real status and authority in the Holy Land, in which, by 1928, there were only some 41,147 Catholics of both Latin and Greek rites. This compared to 327,000 Greek Orthodox, 1,118,800 Muslims, 148,200 Jews and 8,100 Protestants. The interest of the Holy See in the Holy Land greatly exceeded the actual number of its faithful on the ground in Palestine, driven by its overriding policy priority with regard to the Christian Holy Places. However, the comparatively small size of the Catholic faithful under its jurisdiction appears to have contributed to a perceptible downturn in the regard shown by the British authorities towards views of the Holy See about

187 F.16. f.103, Protocollo 607/28 of 3 March 1928 contains Cardinal Gasparri’s note of thanks to Father Robinson for his advice.
188 2.11.; D’Assemani, 66; A.1. Latin Patriarchate Archives: Breve della Santita di N.S. Papa Pio XI.
affairs within Britain’s Palestine Mandate. Whilst the British Foreign Office was in favour of the incoming High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir John Chancellor, visiting the Holy See on his way from London to take up his post in Palestine, Sir John Shuckburgh of the Colonial Office opposed this, stating that:

it is undesirable on the merits that the new High Commissioner should visit Rome at this stage. It is difficult to see what good he could do, or how he could smooth over difficulties either with the Vatican or the Italian Government [and] we are against taking any step that might serve to emphasise the claims either of the Italian Government or of the Vatican to a position of special influence or privilege in respect of Palestine. We do not want it to be said that the British High Commissioner cannot take up his duties at Jerusalem without first obtaining the blessing of M. Mussolini and the Pope.

This exchange of correspondence throws remarkable clarity on the fundamental change which had occurred in the three-way relationship between the Holy See, the Latin Patriarch and the British Government since Sir Herbert Samuel and Ronald Storrs had regularly sought Audiences with Popes Benedict XV and Pius XI and their Secretary of State. Now the issues being raised by the Latin Patriarch were, in fact, relatively unimportant and the British Colonial Office authorities in London did not consider there was any benefit to be gained by having the new High Commissioner meet with the Pope or his Secretary of State. It appeared that the British Government had reached the view that the Holy See was no longer a significant player in relation to the affairs of the Palestine Mandate.

190 See Appendix 5 for biographical details.
191 G.1.6.9. CO 733/162/7,f.12, Letter E 5426/5426/65 of 16 November 1928 from H.Seymour to the Colonial Office.
193 G.1.6.9. CO 733/162/7, ibid, f.10.
The ceremonial attending the arrival of Chancellor as the new High Commissioner for Palestine brought to a head again the question of the precedence of the Latin Patriarch viz a viz the other Patriarchs in Jerusalem. The Holy See sought, through Cardinal Bourne’s good offices in London, to have the precedence of the Latin Patriarch reinstated, but without success. The Foreign Office and Colonial Office both insisted on maintenance of a 1925 ruling that the several Patriarchs of Jerusalem would take precedence by date of appointment for the arrival of the new High Commissioner, but opened up the possibility of a review of the 1925 ruling if there was convincing proof of the status quo on precedence of the Patriarchs under the Ottoman empire. Monsignor Barlassina was therefore instructed by the Holy See that he could proceed as he had proposed, on the basis that, when the new High Commissioner arrived, he would find on his table a letter from Barlassina which paid all due respect and homage and which sought a private Audience for the Latin Patriarch with the incoming High Commissioner.

One of the bases upon which Monsignor Barlassina argued his claim for precedence was that he “represented the Holy See in Palestine”. This was put to the Colonial Office by Cardinal Bourne’s office and met with the query as to the manner in which the Latin Patriarch represented the Holy See, presumably because the Colonial Office was well aware that the Holy See had specifically stated that Barlassina did not represent the Holy See in Palestine. In fact, this issue was definitively clarified when, on 24 November 1928, Pope Pius XI approved the uniting of the positions of Apostolic Delegate for Palestine with that of the Apostolic Delegate to Egypt, both those countries being under some form of British administration or indirect rule by Britain. Despite this event Barlassina went on trying to argue his right to

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194 F. 31. f.6, Telegram of 30 November 1928 from Monsignor Barlassina to the Vatican.
196 F. 31. f.12, telegram No 40 of 4 December 1928 from Holy See to Patriarch Barlassina.
197 F. 31. ff.29-30, Letter of 7 December 1928 from Bishop M. E. Bidwell to Cardinal Gasparri, which went on to say that the Colonial Office did not feel persuaded that the 1925 ruling could be amended.
198 F. 28. f.41, Protocollo N.930/28 of 3 January 1929 from Cardinal Sincero, now Secretary at Propaganda Fide, to Cardinal Gasparri. It seems likely that Cardinal Sincero, rather than the very aged Cardinal Van Rossum, was now setting the agenda at Propaganda Fide, but Cardinal Van Rossum’s
precedence. Monsignor Robinson provided a scathing briefing from Rome which pointed out the harm caused by Barlassina’s obsession with this matter:

the continued abstension of Monsignor Barlassina from all Government receptions and similar social gatherings has created a highly unfavourable impression and has created prejudice to the entire Latin Community, of which the Patriarch is the chief and consequently has brought joy to the schismatics and other non-Catholic groups in Palestine.

Robinson went on to express the view that, speaking from twenty years of personal knowledge of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, he doubted “that its prestige and influence have ever been as low as at present”. He therefore recommended that Barlassina should change strategies to one “more peaceful, more conciliatory and more constructive” in order to “increase the prestige of the Catholics in Palestine and thereby advantage the best interests of the Church”.200

At this time the real priority of the Holy See, and hence its primary attention, was far closer to home than the Holy Land. On 11 February 1929 the Lateran Pacts between the Holy See and the Kingdom of Italy were signed at the Lateran Palace in Rome, paving the way for the resolution of the “Roman Question”, and the establishment of the Vatican City State. As a result of this event the Holy See, “although it was not itself a state”, “now ‘possessed a state’, and with it all the required attributes of sovereignty”, thereby countering “the positivist legal argument that sovereignty required territory”.201 This marked the triumphant realization of Pope Pius XI’s overriding foreign policy objective for his pontificate, “winning the restoration of territorial sovereignty for the Holy See [which] enormously increased its

opposition to Monsignor Robinson as resident Apostolic Delegate in Jerusalem seems to have been successful.

199 F. 31. ff.32-49, Protocollo No.476/28 of 31 December 1928 from Monsignor Barlassina to Cardinal Gasparri, including the attachments which recited the proof of the Latin claim pursuant to the status quo.


201 Araujo and Lucal, ibid, 257.
international standing”. However, the final resolution of the Roman Question may have diverted Cardinal Gasparri’s attention from such secondary matters as the appointment of an Apostolic Delegate of the Holy See for Palestine.

4.16. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN APOSTOLIC DELEGATE FOR EGYPT AND PALESTINE IN 1929

It was not until 28 February 1929 that the Holy See appointed Monsignor Valerio Valeri as the Apostolic Delegate for Palestine, Transjordan and Cyprus. He was already the Apostolic Delegate for Egypt and Ethiopia, and he thereby became the official representative of the Holy See in Palestine and the entire territory covered by the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem. This marked a further erosion of Barlassina’s status and prestige within Palestine and confirmed the Holy See’s previous instruction, conveyed through Monsignor Robinson in 1926/27, that the Latin Patriarch did not represent the Holy See in Palestine.

Monsignor Valeri made his first official visit as Apostolic Delegate to Jerusalem on 14 March 1929, being greeted at the Lydda Station by Monsignor Barlassina, the Franciscan Custode, and the heads of the various religious congregations present in Palestine, and subsequently made his Solemn Entry into the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. He reported to Cardinal Gasparri that: “the Catholics as much of the Eastern rites as those of the Latin rite have manifested without exception their contentment because the Holy See has decided to send an Apostolic Delegate to Palestine”. Monsignor Valeri pointed out that the affable welcome given him by Barlassina was especially appreciated given that the arrival of an Apostolic Delegate for Palestine must inevitably diminish his authority there. The High Commissioner informed Valeri that, in regard to the Christian Sanctuaries, the instruction from the Foreign Office was to “maintain the ‘Statu quo’”. Valeri gained the impression that these British representatives would have preferred not to have had the change in

Apostolic Delegate arrangements because it suited them to play on the dissensions between the Latin Patriarch and the Franciscan Custode. The new Delegate suggested that it would be advantageous for him to be provided with an English secretary to facilitate smooth and effective relations with the British authorities in Palestine which was now part of his role. Valeri was shortly able to report to Rome that the issue of precedence between the Greek Orthodox Patriarch and the Latin Orthodox Patriarch should no longer matter because the new Apostolic Delegate now took precedence over the Greek Orthodox Patriarch and the Latin Patriarch in Palestine, being the representative of the Holy See in that place. The Latin Patriarch had now, in the eyes of the Holy See and of the world, been demoted and substantially disempowered.

Between 1924 and 1929 the Holy See pursued a deliberate and careful strategy for distancing itself from its own principal diocesan bishop in Palestine, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. It made clear, both to the British Government and to Barlassina himself, that the Latin Patriarch did nor represent or speak for the Holy See in Palestine. By 1926 this role had been given “unofficially” to Robinson, the Holy See’s “Mr Fixit” with regard to the Holy Land at the time. By 1928 it had detached the role of Apostolic Delegate from that of the Apostolic Delegate resident in Syria and had given it to the Apostolic Delegate resident in Egypt, who took up his new position in Palestine with great fanfare in early 1929. These extraordinary manoeuvres leave no doubt that the Holy See, whilst it would not remove its appointed diocesan bishop even when dissatisfied with certain aspects of his own locally pursued policies and conduct, was determined to minimize any direct connection between that bishop and the British administration in Palestine. The Holy See replaced the Latin Patriarch’s long-exercized historic role as the public face of the Vatican in Jerusalem with that of a direct representative of the Holy See who would act in accordance its current policies and priorities. In doing this the Holy See appears to have been according the highest priority to its most ancient policy for the

Holy Land, the protection of the Christian Holy Places and the capacity of Christian pilgrims to visit those Holy Places freely and safely. Whilst the Holy See would not forbid its local diocesan bishop from expressing such views as he wished regarding local issues in Palestine, the Holy See was determined to distance itself from his conduct and views and to ensure that a good working relationship with the British Government, both in London and in Jerusalem, was maintained so that there would be no impediment to the pursuit of the Holy See’s policies for Palestine.

A substantial aspect of this change of direction for the Holy See in the Holy Land at this time was the friction being experienced between the Latin Catholic and Greek-Melkite Catholic hierarchy and clergy in Palestine, which brought into play the interaction within the Roman Curia between the two Congregations, Propaganda Fide and the Eastern Churches, in exercising oversight of the Catholic missionary activity in Palestine. However, this had not been a significant issue during the tenure of Monsignor Camassei as Latin Patriarch and all of the available evidence tends to suggest that the Holy See’s growing disillusion with its principal diocesan bishop in the Holy Land, Monsignor Barlassina, was a significant contributory reason for the Secretary of State to pursue the change of direction proposed by the Robinson Visitations from 1926 to 1928. It might also be observed that, just as the British Government waived the priority of the right of the local population to self-determination in Palestine alone of all League of Nations Mandates, so the Holy See, which in this period adopted a policy of “localization” in regard to the clergy and episcopal appointments in its dioceses around the world, made the decision to downplay the claims of the indigenous Catholic population of Palestine in favour of maintaining this valued good working relationship with the British Government in the Holy Land. In doing this it made sure, in particular, that it never criticized the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine, never sought to reduce the level of Jewish immigration to Palestine, and never said anything to oppose the progress towards establishing a “self-governing Jewish Commonwealth” within the territory of Palestine.

4.17. THE WAILING WALL HOLY PLACE CRISIS
Whilst the Holy See’s principal policy concern for the Holy Land continued to be the protection of the Christian Holy Places in Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth, in the furtherance of which it had decided to rely on the principles and privileges of the Status Quo deriving from Ottoman firman of 1852, the fact was that there were other places in Palestine which were also holy both to Jews and Muslims. The British administration in Palestine found itself having to resolve substantial disputes between those two communities. In doing this, and in the absence of appointment of the Holy Places Commission contemplated by the terms of the Palestine Mandate, its officials were drawn to the concept and principles of the Status Quo as the model upon which to base dispute resolutions between the Jewish and Muslim communities.208 The key area of dispute related to the entire Temple Mount [al-Haram al-Sarif in Arabic] but in particular the area at the western base of the Temple compound, known as the “Wailing Wall” or “Western Wall” [often referred to as the Mur Occidental or Mur des Lamentations]. The disputes between the Jewish and Muslim communities in Jerusalem over this site overflowed into the broader relationships in Palestine and contributed to the ongoing decline in intercommunal relationships in Palestine from 1928 onwards and which the Holy See could not ultimately ignore.

On 23 September 1928, the eve of the Jewish Day of Atonement [Yom Kippur], as the result of a dispute between members of Jerusalem’s Sephardic and Ashkenazic religious communities, a small and portable dividing screen [mechitza] was set up in front of the Wailing Wall to divide male and female worshippers.209 A complaint was made “by the Mutawali of the Abu Madian Waqf [property belonging to the religious Muslim endowment, in which the pavement and the whole area around the Western or Wailing Wall were vested], ‘that the dividing screen had been affixed to the pavement adjoining the Wall, and that other innovation had been made in the established practice’”. This action led to an attempt by officials of the Mandate administration to remove “an appurtenance of Jewish worship” in order to meet

208 Molinaro, The Holy Places of Jerusalem in Middle East Peace Agreements, 64-66.
209 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 295-296.
“the Mandatory obligation ‘to preserve the status quo’. The concern of the Muslim community was that the erection of the screen might simply be the first step towards appropriation by the Jewish community of the entire Western Wall area to the detriment of the Muslim community. The subsequent British inquiry into the violence which erupted between Muslim and Jewish communities in Palestine as a result of this dispute led to the British Secretary of State for the Colonies’ ‘Memorandum entitled The Western or Wailing Wall’. This report was presented to the British Parliament in November 1928 and confirmed the Status Quo’s purported progressive extension to non-Christian Holy Places in Palestine by stating, in relation to the terms of Article 13 of the Mandate for Palestine, that “the Palestine Government and His Majesty’s Government” also felt “bound to maintain the status quo” in relation to the Western or Wailing Wall.

In the months following the 1928 Wailing Wall disturbances tensions remained very high between the Muslim and Jewish communities in relation to the Wailing Wall and surrounding area. In 1929 the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, convened an international Islamic conference for the protection of the Western Wall area of the Temple compound and this was attended by four hundred people. On 14 August 1929, the Jewish fast day of the ninth of Av marking the destruction of the Temple, hundreds of members of the Jewish Committee for the Western Wall marched on the Wailing Wall, violated the conditions of their permit, and shouted inflammatory slogans whilst waving the Zionist flag. This initiated a cascading series of events which climaxed when, on 23 August 1929, some thousands of Muslims poured into Jerusalem to pray at the Temple Mount, gunshots were fired and the Arab mob began to attack Jewish shops and individuals, violence quickly

210 Molinaro, ibid, 65. This had been preceded by a similar episode in September 1925 when Palestinian officials had applied the concept of the Status Quo to Jewish activity around the Western or Wailing Wall, Molinaro, ibid,65; Segev, One Palestine, Complete, at 296-297, provides an account of the way in which this dispute escalated in September 1928.
211 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 298-299.
212 Molinaro, ibid, 65.
214 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 309-310.
spreading through the Old City. This violence quickly spread to Hebron, Motza and Safed and continued for a week or more.

Barlassina wrote to Cardinal Gasparri on 29 August 1929 to report on these recent grave disturbances in Palestine, saying that they resulted from economic suffering as a result of increased taxes, and that many Arabs were selling their lands to the Jews. The Latin Patriarch began his list of causes of the disorders with “the Jewish invasion which impoverishes frighteningly” and concluded that “amongst the people life is becoming impossible”. This episode, following on similar disturbances in 1925 and 1928, led to the appointment by the British Government of the Shaw Commission whose Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929 was presented by the British Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament in 1930. This Report confirmed that the Mandate Government and the British Government would apply the principle of the status quo to non-Christian Holy Places such as the Western Wall in Jerusalem. As a result of these events, and the various resulting enquiries including a White Paper issued by Lord Passfield in October 1930, the incumbent British High Commissioner, Sir John Chancellor, developed the very strong private view that “the Balfour Declaration had been a ‘colossal blunder’, unfair to the Arabs and detrimental to the empire’s interests” and that it should be withdrawn as the basis of Britain’s administration of the Palestine mandate.

The Holy See could not avoid some involvement in these events. Dr Fuad Shatara, President of the Palestine National League, cabled Pope Pius XI on 29 August 1929 to inform him that:

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215 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 314-314.
216 F.34. f.38, The Palestine Weekly, 6 September 1929, Palestine’s Week of Terror.
218 E.1. Prot.3133, ibid, Protocollo No. 279/29 of 29 August 1929 from Monsignor Barlassina to Cardinal Gasparri.
219 Molinaro, ibid, 65 and fn.410 at 157.
220 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 334-335.
221 Fuad Issa Shatara MD, President of the Palestine National League [formerly called the Palestine Anti-Zionist Society].
we regret present situation in Palestine. Zionism is responsible for these conditions. Present form of government deprives Arabs of all their political and national rights. Abrogation of Balfour Declaration is only solution to ensure permanent peace. Arabs world over look to Your Holiness and Catholic world for sympathy and support in their cause.\textsuperscript{222}

On the same date Barlassina also wrote to Gasparri to give him a comprehensive briefing on the causes of the disorders in Palestine, concluding with the plea that the Holy See “bless and take in hand our cause”.\textsuperscript{223} Barlassina wrote again to Gasparri on 10 September 1929 about the recent inter-communal violence, observing that “for us Catholics this is a most grave question that outweighs anything else: the unbelievable and exorbitant immorality brought here by the Jews”. He deplored the miserable lot of the Christians, and particularly the Catholics, of Palestine who were caught between the British, guilty of “culpable negligence concerning the Jews, and the fanatical Muslims on the other side”. Barlassina expressed the view that Britain would not change its position in Palestine because it was necessary for its global strategic interests; and concluded with a word of caution to the Holy See that any benevolent act on its part towards the Jewish community of Palestine was likely to be dangerous to the Catholics of Palestine because of possible adverse Muslim reaction.\textsuperscript{224}

Valeri, the Apostolic Delegate, wrote to Gasparri on 18 September 1929 about the violence in Palestine in late August, reporting that calm had now been restored on the surface, but that below the surface there still ran “the most bitter passion and the most profound divisions of race and of religion”. He said that the question of the Wailing Wall was only a pretext for the riots, whose real causes were political and economic, inextricably connected with the rise of the Zionist project and the dissatisfaction of the Arab population. He did point out that no one could deny “the

\textsuperscript{222} F.\textit{34}, ff.12-13, cable of 29 August 1929 from Fuad Shatara, Abbas W. Abushakra and Abd. M. Katef to Pope Pius XI.
\textsuperscript{223} F.\textit{34}, ff.21-29, at f.28, Protocollo No.279/29 of 29 August 1929 from Monsignor Barlassina to Cardinal Gasparri. Cardinal Gasparri simply thanked Monsignor Barlassina for the report, see F.\textit{34}, f.30, dispatch 2065 of 23 September 1929 from Cardinal Gasparri to Monsignor Barlassina.
\textsuperscript{224} F.\textit{34}, ff.44-46 at ff.45r-46, Protocollo No.312/29 of 10 September 1929 from Monsignor Barlassina to Cardinal Gasparri.
great progress that have been made by the Jewish agricultural colonies which are turning Palestine into an agricultural field, and that if the Zionists abandoned the countryside as a boycott against the Arabs it would take years for Palestine to recover.\(^{225}\)

On the same date Monsignor Maglione, Papal Nuncio in France, forwarded to the Holy See a report in French from the Greek-Melkite Archbishop of Caesarea, Archbishop Rizk,\(^{226}\) which deplored the actions of the Zionists in Palestine, whom he strongly differentiated from the non-Zionist Jews whom he assessed to be numerous and unsupportive of the Zionists and their conduct, acknowledging the right to a Jewish national home in Palestine. He suggested that the solution was for the League of Nations to give an official explanation of the Balfour Declaration and its application by the Mandatory Power with impartiality and at the same time to deal with the question of the Wailing Wall.\(^{227}\) It may thus be seen that, in contrast to Monsignor Barlassina, both the Apostolic Delegate and the Greek-Melkite Archbishop of Caeserea provided information to the Holy See which was supportive of the Jewish national home and the continuance of the Balfour Declaration in the face of strong Arab demands for its repeal. Yet again, this highlights the different sources of information which flowed through to the Holy See, often unsolicited, and the very different opinions formed by those sources from the same sets of facts.

Valeri suggested to the Holy See that, in his opinion, “England will have to withdraw little by little from the Balfour Declaration in order not to experience more serious woes.”\(^{228}\) Whilst most of the opinions from Catholic sources furnished to the Holy See at this time were disapproving of extreme Zionism, none of it appears to have been anti-Semitic and much of it remained supportive of the Balfour Declaration and

\(^{225}\) F.34. ff.52-56, at ff.52, 56, Protocollo N.15 of 18 September 1929 from Monsignor Valeri to Cardinal Gasparri. Gasparri acknowledged receipt without further comment on 10 October 1929, see F.34. f.57, Despatch 2242/29.

\(^{226}\) See Appendix 5 for biographical details of Archbishop Cyrille Riza/Rizk/Rizq [1863-1954].

\(^{227}\) F.34. f.59. Protocollo No.8234 of 18 September 1929 from Monsignor Maglione to Cardinal Gasparri, and F.34.ff.61-68, Les evenements sanglants de Palestine by Archbishop Rizk at ff.66-67.

\(^{228}\) F.34. ff.75-76 at f.76, Protocollo No 72/SP of 15 October 1929 from Monsignor Valeri to Cardinal Gasparri.
the Jewish national home in Palestine. In this they differed from the opinion now held by the incumbent British High Commissioner of the Palestine Mandate, Sir John Chancellor, who privately believed the Balfour Declaration should cease to underpin British policy in Palestine.

The visits of British officials involved in these various enquiries raised the issue of the proper role of the Latin Patriarch and whether he should be met with along with other local religious leaders in Palestine. Monsignor Barlassina now sought guidance from the Holy See on this question.\textsuperscript{229} Cardinal Gasparri’s response on 6 December 1929 reveals the view of the Holy See as to the precise nature of Monsignor Barlassina’s area of responsibility within the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, which was that:

\begin{quote}
the mission entrusted to Your Excellency, as Latin Patriarch, is a pastoral mission similar to that of bishops and parish priests, and which does not involve getting involved in political questions. These latter matters pertain to the role of the Apostolic Delegate to whom the Commission from London must refer itself.\textsuperscript{230}
\end{quote}

There could be no doubting the clarity of these instructions: the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem was confined now to a purely pastoral role and must have no involvement in political matters, which would be dealt with by the Apostolic Delegate to Palestine, including and specifically meeting with the members of the Shaw Commission.

Valeri wrote to Gasparri on 22 December 1929 to report on his official entry to Haifa on 9 December 1929. He was greeted by Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim notables as the representative of the Holy Father and he found that “Christians and Muslims wished it to be seen that they were perfectly united in the struggle against Zionism and in the defense of their rights they hoped to have the support of the Holy See”.

\textsuperscript{229} F.34. f.86, Protocollo No.420/29 of 28 November 1929 from Patriarch Barlassina to Cardinal Gasparri.
\textsuperscript{230} F.34. f.89, Despatch No.2839/29 of 6 December 1929 from Cardinal Gasparri to Patriarch Barlassina.
The Apostolic Delegate pointed out that Barlassina and Monsignor Haggiar were viewed by the Arabs “with special sympathy because they are esteemed as champions in defense of their rights whether violated or minimized”. This correspondence shows that the views of Valeri were not necessarily very different from those of either Barlassina or Haggiar of the Greek-Melkite Church, and that one of the major concerns that the Holy See had with those bishops was the level of their “prudence” in dealing with the tense situation unfolding in Palestine.

The internal briefing paper of the Vatican’s Secretary of State prepared at this time, entitled Appunto, recited a despatch of 23 December 1929 from the Cardinal Secretary of State to Valeri which had set out the previous history of failure to establish the Holy Places Commission pursuant to Article 14 of the Mandate due to disagreement amongst the interested nations, particularly Italy and France. The views of the Latin Patriarch and Franciscan Custode were both transmitted to the Holy See on 11 January 1930. The report of Barlassina was thought to be “more considered and more complete”. The reference to Barlassina’s report being “more considered and more complete” highlights that the incumbent Latin Patriarch did have real strengths, of intelligence, analysis and expression, which could be very useful to the Apostolic Delegate and to the Holy See. However, the unfolding of events showed that these positive qualities were considered to be greatly outweighed by his weaknesses, particularly his capacity to annoy both the British authorities of the Palestine mandate and the leaders of other religious groups in the Holy Land, not least his brothers of the Franciscan Custody and the Greek-Melkite Church.

In March 1930 the Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929 was presented to the British Parliament by the Secretary of State for Colonies. This Report found that “the outbreak in Jerusalem on the 23rd of August [1929] was from the beginning an attack by Arabs on Jews for which no excuse in the form of earlier murders by Jews has been established”. Both Muslim and Jewish

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231 F.36. ff.3-6 at ff.3r,5,6, Protocollo C.No.3457 of 22 December 1929 from Monsignor Valeri to Cardinal Gasparri, who acknowledged receipt without comment on 10 January 1930, see F.36.f.7, despatch 62/30 of 10 January 1930.
232 F.36. ff.82-85, Appunto, undated and unsigned but held with papers for early 1930.
authorities shared some part of the blame for innovations in the area of the Wailing Wall. The problems of excessive Jewish immigration and uncertainty as to British intentions with regard to the Balfour Declaration, and the failure to establish a Legislative Council in 1922, had all contributed to the profound sense of grievance and “resentment among the Arabs of Palestine”. The Report concluded that the British Government should “take such steps as lay within their power to secure the early appointment, under Article 14 of the Mandate for Palestine, of an *ad hoc* Commission to determine the rights and claims in connection with the Wailing Wall”, this being “a measure essential in the interests of peace and good government in Palestine”.\textsuperscript{233}

The Holy See’s support for the observance of the Status Quo in reference to the Christian Holy Places of Palestine had a significant influence upon the approach taken by the British authorities to the resolution of the Wailing Wall crises of 1928-1929. During the period of this crisis the Holy See, the Latin Patriarch and the Apostolic Delegate all sought to settle the best way for the Holy See to have input to the resolution of such matters. The position taken in this period by the Holy See through its Secretariat of State was to confine the Latin Patriarch to purely pastoral matters and to allow the Apostolic Delegate to have unfettered principal carriage of almost all other matters affecting the affairs of the Catholic Church in the Holy Land.

### 4.18. THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE FURTHER DETERIORATES

Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli, former Papal Nuncio in Germany, succeeded Cardinal Gasparri as Secretary of State for the Holy See on 7 February 1930. Pollard has expressed the view that this change occurred after the signing of the Lateran Treaties because “Pius XI wanted more direct control over the Secretariat of State and this could only be achieved with a younger colleague, a real subordinate”.\textsuperscript{234} In

\textsuperscript{233} F.35. f.10 at pages 168, 158, 159, 162, 163, 164, 166, *Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August*, 1929, presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament in March, 1930 (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1930).

\textsuperscript{234} Pollard, *The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism*, 240.
the midst of the international debate over the situation in Jerusalem, on 18 March 1930, Rabbi Dante Lattes of the Organizzazione Sionistica in Rome wrote to Cardinal Pacelli, now Secretary of State of the Holy See, seeking an audience for Dr Chaim Weizmann, now President of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, with Pope Pius XI when he was in Rome in April 1930. Cardinal Pacelli indicated that such a meeting had ‘Better not’ take place.\textsuperscript{235} At the very least this suggests that the Secretary of State did not wish to place the Pope in the position of having direct discussions with the leading figure in Zionism at that time. It is also possible that it was an early indicator of a less activist role for the Holy See in international affairs now that Cardinal Pacelli was the Secretary of State.

In Palestine itself, the Apostolic Delegate himself found that increasingly the substance of issues he was being drawn into were of a mundane, even trivial nature. On 4 April 1930 Monsignor Valeri wrote to Cardinal Pacelli expressing concern about the issueing by the Governor of Jerusalem of an official programme for the times for use of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre for that Easter, when Latin and Orthodox Easters coincided, pointing out that the approach taken by the British authorities had been to accord the Greek Orthodox church precedence and priority over the Latin church, contrary to “most ancient tradition”.\textsuperscript{236} On 20 April 1930 Monsignor Valeri further reported to Cardinal Pacelli that Palestine’s High Commissioner, Sir John Chancellor, had now explained to him that that programme had had no official status and in no way should be taken to deal with the question of precedence between the religious groups in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{237} This episode highlights the trivial detail that the Apostolic Delegate was now drawn into due to the side-lining of Monsignor Barlassina in Jerusalem, and the way in which, in the present volatile atmosphere,

\textsuperscript{235} F.20. f.42., letter of 18 March 1930 from Dante Lattes to Cardinal Pacelli. The note on this correspondence indicates that Cardinal Pacelli had spoken to Monsignor Enrico Pucci, the Holy See’s unofficial press officer at the time and closely involved with Monsignors Tardini and Ottaviani in the Secretariat for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, the inference being that Pucci should tell Rabbi Lattes “off the record” that such an Audience was ‘not convenient” at that time.

\textsuperscript{236} F.32. ff.58-59, Protocollo N.247/D of 4 April 1930 from Monsignor Valeri to Cardinal Pacelli, and f.60, Calendar of Religious Ceremonies for the Period April 4\textsuperscript{th} to April 20\textsuperscript{th}, 1930, E. Keith-Roach, Deputy District Commissioner, Jerusalem Division, which places the Orthodox first, followed by the Latins, Armenians, Other Churches, Moslems [for Nebi Musa pilgrimage] and then Jewish [for Passover].

\textsuperscript{237} F.32. ff.62-63, Protocollo N.188 of 20 April 1930 from Monsignor Valeri to Cardinal Pacelli.
the British High Commissioner himself was drawn into the resolution of such minor matters.

The substantive issue which did continue to be of ongoing importance within the dicasteries of the Holy See in relation to the Holy Land was the relationship between Latin rite and Eastern or Greek rite Catholics and this did consume the time of the Apostolic Delegate. Valeri wrote to the Congregation for the Eastern Churches on 16 November 1930 about the issue of the Latin and Greek Catholics of the Transjordan. He observed that the Latin missions were making their conversions amongst the Greek Catholics and not from the local Greek Orthodox population. The local people still preferred the Greek rite to the Latin rite, as evidenced by their apparent doubts as to the validity of baptisms and weddings performed by the Latin rite clergy. This extract was transmitted by Cardinal Sincero, Secretary of Pro Ecclesia Orientali, to Cardinal Van Rossum at Propaganda Fide on 10 December 1930, with the comment that:

> From various times, this Holy Congregation has directed its attention and care to the region of Trans-Jordania, where there is a real and substantial movement of conversion to the true Church; and the principal object of our care is how best to foster, regulate, help and care for this state of affairs.

Sincero drew attention to Valeri’s suggestions regarding the Catholic schools in the Transjordan and proposed that, if these could be implemented, it promised “a great good for all the faithful, whether Latins or Eastern rite Catholics”. It is clear from this correspondence that, whatever Monsignor Barlassina thought of the situation, both the Apostolic Delegate in Palestine and the Congregation for the Eastern Churches considered that achieving greater cooperation between Latin and Greek rite missions in the Transjordan was necessary for the future growth of the Catholic Church.

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Church there. This served to advance the second of the Holy See’s principal policy objectives for the Holy Land, the nurturing of the local Catholic community.

Whilst the Holy See may have been avoiding or minimizing its direct involvement in the contentious issues of Palestine at this time, its primary concern over the Holy Places necessitated its taking an ongoing interest in the political situation which was unfolding in Palestine. Monsignor Valeri wrote to inform Cardinal Pacelli on 30 August 1931 that the current political situation in Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews was marked by the continued deterioration in the relationship between those two communities and that “the maintenance of order depends, therefore, on armed force that is being substantially augmented in recent times”. One sign of the tenor of the situation was that High Commissioner Chancellor was to be replaced by General Wauchope, who had been Army Commander in Ulster.\footnote{F.33., ff.9-12 at f.9, Protocollo No.639 of 30 August 1931 from Monsignor Valeri to Cardinal Pacelli. General Sir Arthur Wauchope GCB GCMG CIE DSO[1874-1947] had been General Officer Commanding in Northern Ireland from 1929.} Valeri observed that the Arab community, through its Executive Council, had declared that if the Jewish community armed itself then the other citizens must also do the same.\footnote{F.33., ibid, f.10.} The Arab population was declaring with strength and clarity that the Palestine Mandate and the Balfour Declaration must be revoked. There was now support for a movement of passive resistance and disobedience as was being followed in India. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and his Executive Council wanted to have the Indian Muslim leader Schakwat Ali buried in the Mosque of Omar, with the purpose of turning Jerusalem into a Muslim Holy City on a par with Mecca.\footnote{F.33. ibid, ff.10-11. See Appendix 5 for biographical details of Mohammad Ali Jouhar [1878-1931].} The Apostolic Delegate expressed the view that the British had a tough ride ahead of them in Palestine but that “for us Catholics, even though not directly interested in the conflict between Jews and Arabs, and between these and the English government, it is obvious that a state of peace and tranquillity for the Holy Places is of supreme interest and that this is affected by any modification in the enforcement and application of the mandate”.\footnote{F.33., ibid, f.11.} This highlights that for the Holy See in 1931 the key
issue in Palestine was, as it had been for centuries, the safety and well-being of the Christian Holy Places rather than the inter-communal frictions which had arisen in Palestine since 1918. In the view of the Apostolic Delegate, “us Catholics” had no direct interest “in the conflict between Jews and Arabs” in Palestine, even though that conflict was the major issue facing the indigenous Palestinian Catholic population at that time.

The grounds for concern by the Holy See about the security of the Holy Places were increased by the news that, on 6 December 1931, an Islamic Congress had taken place adjacent to the El-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem under the leadership of the Grand Mufti of Palestine, Haj Amin al-Husseini, and attended by Muslim delegates from India, at which the idea was advanced of Jerusalem as a Muslim Holy City of the type of Medina.²⁴⁴ Valeri informed Cardinal Van Rossum that the issue of the Holy Places of Jerusalem, and the Muslim dissatisfaction with the decision of the ad hoc Commission on the Wailing Wall under the auspices of the League of Nations, all received an airing at this Congress, and that the British authorities had undermined their reputation with the Christians in Palestine by allowing the environs of the El-Aqsa Mosque to be turned into a sort of Pantheon of the Muslim world by permitting ex-King Hussein of the Hejaz and other foreign Muslim notables to be buried there.²⁴⁵ Valeri, in his astute and dispassionate brief, pointed out that this Congress had not been able to overcome the traditional rivalries within the Muslim Arab community of Palestine.²⁴⁶

Notwithstanding the considerable efforts by the Holy See to isolate and quarantine the Latin Patriarch from contact with the British administration in Palestine, Monsignor Barlassina evidently had some influence on the thinking of the Apostolic Delegate to Palestine in this period. Valeri wrote to Pacelli on 20 April 1932 to inform

²⁴⁴ E.1. Prot.126, Protocollo N.2356/D. of 4 January 1932 from Monsignor Valerio Valeri, the Apostolic Delegate in Egypt, to Cardinal Van Rossum, which was copied to Cardinal Pacelli, see F.33. ff.24-28.
²⁴⁵ E.1. Prot.126, ibid, N.2356/D of 4 January 1932. These included Mohammad Ali Jouhar who had died on 4 January 1931 leaving a request to be buried near the Dome of the Rock.
²⁴⁶ E.1. Prot.126, ibid, N.2356/D of 4 January 1932. The al-Husseini and Nashashibi families had long been bitter rivals for leadership of the Muslim community in Jerusalem.
him of the approaching completion, at a cost of one million US dollars, of the grand YMCA building in Jerusalem which the Prince of Wales was rumoured to be coming to open. At the behest of Barlassina, the Apostolic Delegate pointed out to the Holy See the “disastrous impression” that would be created amongst the Catholics of the world if the Prince of Wales was to attend the opening of a building which was a “a war machine against the Catholics”.247 One hears the voice of Barlassina in these belligerent words since he had been decrying the construction of the YMCA building, the “Protestant Palace”, from its inception under Lord Plumer. Yet notwithstanding such minor eruptions as this, the policy of the Holy See to allow the Apostolic Delegate to have the carriage of relations with the British administration was reaping significant benefits. The new High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Arthur Wauchope, commented very favourably on the improvement which had occurred in the relationship between the Mandate Government and the Catholic religious authorities within Palestine, the High Commissioner noting that his approach was “not to favour one Christian church over another, but rather to safeguard the rights of each”.248

The significant achievement of the Holy See in the previous ten years in ensuring equal treatment for the Catholic Church in Palestine is highlighted by the reality of the religious demographics in the Holy Land at this time. The Latin and Greek Catholic communities of Palestine were only a very small part of the population mix. Out of a total population of 1,035,154 inhabitants, there were now 759,952 Muslims, 175,006 Jews, 90,607 Christians, and 9,589 members of other religions.249 The Catholic component was substantially less than half of the total Christian minority,

247 F.33. f.33, Protocollo No.792 of 20 April 1932 from Monsignor Valeri to Cardinal Pacelli. On 3 May 1932 Cardinal Pacelli, on behalf of Pope Pius XI, asked Cardinal Bourne of Westminster to ascertain whether the Prince of Wales was going to perform this task and to undertake such lobbying as he could to prevent the royal presence which would “produrrebbe anche più penosa impressione cattolici”, see F.33. f.35, telegram from Cardinal Pacelli to Cardinal Bourne of Westminster, 3 May 1932. On 13 August 1932 Monsignor Valeri Informed Monsignor Pizzardo that only Lord Allenby’s name was being mentioned as the guest of honour at the YMCA opening, see F.33., f.40, Protocollo No.980 of 13 August 1932 from Monsignor Valeri to Monisgnor Pizzardo, Vatican City.


itself a diminishing minority as the Jewish population increased due to immigration. At this time of international economic depression the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem was also very vulnerable to fluctuations in income from abroad which was vital to its ongoing work.\textsuperscript{250} The current economic and political climate posed serious challenges for the Catholic Church in the Holy Land at this time.

This occurred at the very time that the Holy See was reassessing its own approach to its role in international affairs. The Comte de Fontenay, outgoing French Ambassador to the Holy See, reported a conversation he had just had in early June of 1932 with Monsignor Borgongini Duca, then Apostolic Nuncio to Italy, in which the latter expressed some opinions on the state of thinking of Pope Pius XI and the Holy See at that time:

> For the people of the Church it has been difficult to take a judgement on the actuality of the exterior political environment notably on the interests of an economic order which divide or bring people together, so that more and more the Vatican is withdrawing itself into the spiritual role which the Church must exercise, without seeking to engage itself in some quarrels where her intervention has neither good sense nor any chance of success. It is thus that the Holy See must congratulate itself that it is not a member of the League of Nations, and in that regard, Pope Pius XI has taken the decision no longer to accept the role of international arbitrator except in the most exceptional circumstances where the most general interests are in play.\textsuperscript{251}

This briefing suggests strongly that the Holy See had, by the middle of 1932, substantially contracted its own view of the extent to which it could hope to influence world or national politics.

\textsuperscript{250} E.18. fasc.1, Protocollo 1981 of 1931, Protocollo 156/31 of 20 May 1931 from Patriarch Barlassina to Cardinal Van Rossum and the attached De Bonis Ecclesiae for 30 June 1930

\textsuperscript{251} H.9. ff.1-2, at f.1, Monsieur le Comte de Fontenay, Tres Confidential Despatch No. 181 of 7 June 1932 to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris.

In line with its historic role regarding spiritual matters, and in keeping with its historic policy of promoting the focus on and security of the Holy Places of the Holy Land, Pope Pius XI, in his Bull *Quod nuper* of 6 January 1933, proclaimed an extraordinary Holy Year in honour of the nineteenth centenary of the Redemption of humankind through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. This was intended by the Holy See to take place from 2 April 1933 to 2 April 1934.\(^{252}\) Pollard has recently suggested that the Holy See intended this Holy Year to eclipse the Italian Fascist Government’s own celebration of ten years of Fascist rule in Italy.\(^{253}\) In fact, this celebration showed a firm focus by the Holy See on its core business, faith in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. This Holy Year would have a particular emphasis on the Holy Places in Palestine, the Pope encouraging “numerous pilgrimages to the Holy Places of Palestine”, particularly those in Jerusalem most closely connected with the Passion and Resurrection of Jesus Christ, the Coenaculum on Mt Zion, the Garden of Gethsemane, the Mount of Olives and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. In accordance with the Pope’s wishes, as stated in *Quod nuper*, Monsignor Barlassina organised various conferences of religious and laity on the theme of the Redemption and the Royalty of Christ.\(^{254}\)

Whilst the Holy Year of the Redemption provided the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem with the opportunity to take a prominent role in relation to the Holy Places, the first priority of the Holy See in the Holy Land, his ongoing struggles with the Greek-Melkite Church embroiled him in disfavour in those parts of the Roman Curia interested in progressing the other key aspect of the Holy See’s policies for the Holy Land, the nurturing and support of the indigenous Catholic population of the Holy

\(^{252}\) 2.15. at page 8 states that the Jubilee was to run from 2 April 1933 to 2 April 1934.

\(^{253}\) Pollard, *The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism*, at 157.

\(^{254}\) Jerusalem, ibid, 179, and *Un Grand Patriarch*, page 2, in Latin Patriarchate Archives LB 1.6-1.3 Barlassina 2 1920-1940.
Land. In the midst of the Holy Year celebrations, on 2 June 1933, Cardinal Sincero, now the Secretary of the Congregation for the Eastern Churches, wrote a strident letter to Barlassina setting out the long-standing problems that had arisen for the Holy See within the Eastern countries due to the affairs of the Church being dealt with by two different dicasteries in the Roman Curia, Propaganda Fide and the Eastern Churches. Sincero stated that there had now been a proposal put forward within the Roman Curia that it would be best if the affairs of all the Catholic churches in the East be placed under the oversight of a single dicastery, his own Congregation for the Eastern Churches. As this change could only be achieved with the cooperation of the various Latin and Oriental bishops in those lands, Cardinal Sincero now asked Monsignor Barlassina to respond as to how he thought this proposal might work.

Barlassina countered this proposal on 15 August 1933, “dispassionately and in all sincerity” stating that the real problem was that the Greek-Melkite clergy were “cordially averse to Rome” and were therefore an obstacle to obedience to the Holy See and its directives. They “cunningly” depicted to their people that such directives were innovations “to the pure and ancient Faith”, and any change in oversight of both Churches to the one dicastery was not likely to change this fact. Barlassina said that he had not been aware of any inconvenience flowing from the involvement of the two dicasteries. He concluded firmly that he saw no necessity for the fusion of the work of the two dicasteries, but if a fusion was to occur, he preferred that the oversight be given to Propaganda Fide because it was essential that these matters be kept exclusively in the hands of the Latins, “indispensable to the preservation of the True Faith in the East”.

As this power struggle within the Holy See over the control of the Catholic Church in the Holy Land unfolded, the violence continued in Palestine throughout the Holy

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255 See Appendix 5 for biographical details of Cardinal Luigi Sincero (1870-1936).
257 A.19. Latin Patriarchate Archives FC-AG 2.4-3.3 1 S.Cong.pro Ecc. Orientali 1919-1953, Protocollo 449/33 of 15 August 1933 from Monsignor Barlassina to Cardinal Sincero.
Year of the Redemption. Monsignor Barlassina cabled Cardinal Pacelli on 28 October 1933 to report that “today at Jaffa there were grave demonstrations protesting at the arrival of Jews: three soldiers dead, ten Muslims dead and sixty four wounded. Serious disturbances are following in other cities, great fears held for tomorrow”.  

In Europe as well, as the Holy Year advanced, events unfolded that would come to absorb the almost complete attention of the Supreme Pontiff and his Secretary of State, Cardinal Pacelli. In the wake of the advent to political power of Adolf Hitler in Germany, “the Eighteenth Zionist Congress (Prague, August 21 – September 4, 1933) called for the Jewish National Home to be built as rapidly and on as large a scale as possible”, refugee Jews increasing “legal and illegal Jewish immigration to [Palestine] dramatically, from 9,553 in 1932 to 61,854 in 1935”.  

Events in Germany now had a rapid impact on neighbouring countries and this engaged the urgent attention of the Holy See. On 19 January 1934 the Apostolic Nuncio in Poland, Monsignor Marmaggi, submitted a Report on “Zionism in Poland” to the Secretariat of State on the influx of Jewish refugees into Poland from Russia and from Germany, the latter increasing since the recent order from Adolf Hitler for their expulsion from Germany. Poland was coming to be called “the second promised land” by Zionists. This rapid increase in the presence of Jews was a cause of disquiet to the Poles who felt that the Jews in Poland in the past had colluded with the enemies of Poland, and that most anarchist and subversive elements in Poland were made up of Jews. The Government of Marshal Pilsudski and the Catholic episcopal hierarchy of Poland had a deep commitment to the Zionist project in Palestine, Poland having become “the approved quartier generale of the world Zionist movement”. Cardinal Fumasoni-Biondi, Prefect of Propaganda Fide, in transmitting this Report to Barlassina, pointed out that the open favour towards the Jews and towards Zionism by a Catholic nation such as Poland suggested dangers
ahead for Catholicism in the Holy Land. This correspondence shows that the Polish Catholic episcopacy of the time was strongly pro-Zionist but the tenor of Monsignor Marmaggi’s Report has a distinct air of anti-Zionism, if not of anti-Semitism, making it unique amongst the correspondence of the Catholic Church I have considered in researching this thesis.

In this growing atmosphere of crisis Dr Chaim Weizmann visited Rome in February of 1934 and an Audience was sought for him at the Vatican. This followed closely upon a meeting between Cardinal Pacelli and Emir Chekif Arslan in which the latter had requested that the Holy See make representations to the British government seeking the reduction in the volume of Jewish immigration to Palestine. The Holy See made no such representations to the British government. Now, in response to the request for a papal Audience for the world leader of Zionism, Pope Pius XI observed to Cardinal Pacelli that “Zionism is their business ... We cannot side with the Arabs because they conquered the Holy Land. Nor can we side with the Zionists. We have no other choice but to stay out of this”. The Holy See did not grant an Audience to Dr Weizmann.

Whilst it was considering the granting of this request, the Secretariat of State received a lengthy typed briefing paper on the situation in Palestine from an unnamed English-language source, possibly from Barlassina. An internal Vatican briefing paper of this time commenced that “Zionism has its Magna Carta in the Balfour Declaration” and concluded that “the prolific descendents of Israel will become the absolute masters of Palestine from which will be chased the Arabs and the Christians”.

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264 F.20. f.50., letter of 17 February 1934 from Signor Theodoli to Cardinal Pacelli.
266 Ventresca, at 70, quoting from Pacelli’s notations of his discussion with Pope Pius XI.
267 F.20. ff.51-63., briefing paper to “Eccellenza” and pencil-dated 12 Febbraio 34.
268 F.20. ff.68-71., handwritten internal briefing paper of the AA.SS.EE.
In the first half of 1934, as the Holy Year of the Redemption moved towards its originally scheduled end, the English Archbishop Hinsley,\(^{269}\) then Apostolic Delegate for Missions in Africa, launched a campaign to create a separate Apostolic Delegation for Palestine alone. The intention was to have “a British Apostolic Delegate who would hold in check the activities of Monsignor Barlassina”.\(^{270}\) Archbishop Hinsley described the latter as seeming “to be universally unpopular and ... having a completely mediaeval mentality” and expressed the opinion “that Monsignor Barlassina is anti-British and indeed ... [Barlassina] went so far, in a public pronouncement, as to describe our [British] rule as ‘worse than that of the Turks’”. Hinsley considered that “it is therefore extremely desirable that someone with an understanding of British ideas and British mentality should be placed in a position to curb the activities of Monsignor Barlassina”.\(^{271}\)

Whilst this profoundly negative view of Barlassina came from within the diplomatic service of the Holy See itself, it was not a view necessarily shared by all officials within the British Foreign and Colonial Offices at the time. Mr [afterwards Sir George] Rendel,\(^{272}\) of the British Foreign Office, expressed the view that “Monsignor Barlassina has of course been a thorn in the sides of all of us for very many years, but I had gathered that he had recently become a little easier to deal with” and that “the Vatican certainly have no illusions about him”.\(^{273}\) Rendel followed up those remarks a little later in 1934 with the opinion that: “I am inclined to think that Archbishop Hinsley is thinking of rather earlier days when he says that Monsignor Barlassina is so universally unpopular and uniformly difficult to deal with. He certainly was so some years ago, but I was under the impression that matters had much improved in recent

\(^{269}\) Arthur Hinsley [1865-1943], English Catholic prelate, Archbishop of Westminster from 1935 and created Cardinal in 1937.
\(^{270}\) G.1.6.10. CO 733/262/1,ff.48-50, private and confidential letter E 2761/2334/65 of 9 May 1934 from G. W. Rendel to O. G. R. Williams and attached EXTRACT from memorandum of Statements made in conversation by Archbishop Hinsley.
\(^{271}\) G.1.6.10. CO 733/262/1,ff.50-51, EXTRACT from Memorandum of Statement made in conversation by Archbishop Hinsley, Apostolic Delegate for Missions in Africa, appended to a letter of 9 May 1934 from Mr Rendel to Mr Williams, G.1.6.10. CO 733/262/1,ff.48-49.
\(^{272}\) Sir George William Rendel (1889-1979), head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office 1930-1938.
\(^{273}\) G.1.6.10. CO 733/262/1, ibid, ff.48-49, G. W. Rendel to O. G. R. Williams.
years”. However, the new British High Commissioner in Palestine, Sir Arthur Wauchope, shared Hinsley’s opinion of Barlassina:

I am afraid that the attitude of the Latin Patriarch has not improved during recent years, and that he is still a serious thorn in the Government’s side ... His attitude in general towards the Palestine Administration is, to say the least, obstructive and unhelpful, and I am bound to say that I should welcome his departure from Palestine or the institution of any measures which would curb his activities. ... He has also done all he can to prevent Roman Catholics from joining the YMCA, but I am happy to say so far without much avail.275

This in turn prompted the Colonial Office to write to Mr Rendel at the Foreign Office asking whether Barlassina’s behaviour could be brought to the notice of the Vatican “in the hope that his superiors might be able to administer a word in season”. The Holy See could now do no more than it had already done. Despite these various concerns being expressed about Barlassina and the relationship with the British officials in Jerusalem, the Holy See did not see fit to take further action. In fact the Holy See did not split the post of Apostolic Delegate to Palestine and Egypt, as had been urged by Archbishop Hinsley, appointing Monsignor Gustavo Testa to the dual post in May 1934, he having “had little nor no experience of British rule or administration but knows some English”.277

The controversial Monsignor Barlassina continued in office, writing to Cardinal Pacelli on 13 September 1934 to plead that the Holy See now try to obtain from the British government what had been promised sixteen years before, which was a written guarantee that it would enforce the Status Quo with all its rights and

274 G.1.6.9. CO 733/262/1, f.41, Letter E 3295/2334/65 of 4 June 1934 from Mr G. W. Rendel to Mr O.G.R. Williams. Williams in turn passed this on to the High Commissioner in Palestine, Sir Arthur Wauchope, see G.1.6.10. CO 733/262/1,f.40, Letter of 19 June 1934 from O. G. R. Williams to Sir Arthur Wauchope.
275 G.1.6.10. CO 733/262/1,ff.34-35, Letter of 21 July 1934 from Sir Arthur Wauchope to Mr O. Williams.
276 G.1.6.10. CO 733/262/1,f.33, Letter of 8 August 1934 from O.G.R.Williams to G. W. Rendel
277 G.1.6.10. CO 733/262/1,f.46, Despatch No. 7 of 16 May 1934 from Mr Montgomery, British Legation to the Holy See, to the Foreign Office.
privileges accrued to the Catholic Church over the past centuries.\(^{278}\) One sees in this briefing the fundamental basis of Monsignor Barlassina’s approach to affairs in the Holy Land, the constant assertion of the privileges of the Catholic Church by the means of which he believed its prestige and status would be upheld and maintained. It is apparent from the way in which the Holy See eroded his own status and scope of duties and functions that the Holy See did not agree with this approach, and that it considered a far milder and more accommodating approach was necessary to secure the outcomes it desired to ensure the success of its two key policies for the Holy Land, protection of the Holy Places and the nurturing of the indigenous Catholic population of that land.

Evidently recognizing the strong signals he was receiving from the Holy See about the nurturing of the indigenous Catholic community of his diocese, on 27 and 28 September 1934 Barlassina held \textit{Reunions Ecclesiastiques} at the Latin Patriarchate Palace in Jerusalem, with a clear intention and purpose of trying to heal the divisions between the various parts of the Catholic community in Palestine, the invitation being addressed to both Latin and Greek/Eastern Catholic communities of Palestine. Its subject matter covered a comprehensive outline of the privileges of the Catholics of the Holy Land from Ottoman times, problems with schools, taxes and morality, the issue of Catholic Action, and the problem of Protestant propaganda in Palestine.\(^{279}\) The presentation on rights said that “the Magna Carta of our privileges are the Treaty of Mytilene, with the Capitulations of 1740, and the Accord between France and Turkey signed on 18 December 1913 and notified on 21 June 1914”.\(^{280}\) One may search this document for a concern about the Balfour Declaration or the problems arising from Jewish immigration or Zionism. The priorities remained much as they had been for the Latin Patriarchate and the Holy See since 1847-the protection of the Christian Holy Places of the Holy Land under the Franco-Ottoman

\(^{278}\) \textit{A.18.} Latin Patriarchate Archives LB 2.4-3.6 2 Segretaria di Stato Ott.1921-1947, Protocollo 700/34 of 13 September 1934 from Patriarch Barlassina to Cardinal Pacelli. There is no evidence of a reply from Cardinal Pacelli, whose letters to the Latin Patriarch become repeated expressions of thanks for greetings or gifts the Latin Patriarch has conveyed to Rome, see, for example, Protocollo No.150810 of 14 January 1936 from Pacelli to Barlassina.


\(^{280}\) \textit{F.18.} Ibid at f.79.
Capitulations and the opposition to any Protestant incursions into Palestine. The conference appeared utterly silent on the tensions between the Latin Patriarchate and the Franciscan Custody, and between the Latin and Greek Catholic communities and their clergy.

The campaign that had long been simmering between the Colonial and Foreign Offices and Monsignor Barlassina was at long last brought to an end by a letter of 6 October 1934 to Mr O.G.R.Williams at the Colonial Office from Mr J. Hathorn Hall, Chief Secretary of Palestine, who discouraged any attempt to have Monsignor Barlassina removed as being only likely to embarrass both the British Government and the Holy See. Hathorn Hall said that, whilst it was true that the Latin Patriarch was “a most difficult old man”, he himself had had no difficulty in establishing a very good working relationship with him. As a result, “I have given much more attention to him than to any other religious dignitary in Palestine”, and the late Apostolic Delegate Bartolini had, within days, been able to effect a marked improvement in Barlassina’s attitude. In Hathorn Hall’s view, the same should now be hoped for and encouraged from Monsignor Testa.

Barlassina now continued his tireless briefing to the Holy See on the situation as he perceived it in Palestine. In October of 1934 he wrote to Monsignor Pizzardo in the Secretariat of State of the Holy See predicting that by 1935 the Jews would possess 85% of the land in Palestine; by 1936 they would have secured a monopoly on labour; by 1937 they would have equalled the Arab population of Palestine; in 1938 the Arabs would go to the Transjordan to work in the land acquired from the Jews; and in 1939 there would be stabilized the Jewish rule in Palestine, concluding a Treaty with Great Britain. In Barlassina’s opinion it now only remained for the Holy See to try to extract from Britain the honouring of past commitments it had made regarding rights and privileges in the face of the imminent end to the Protecting

\[281\] See Appendix 5 for biographical details of Sir John Hathorn Hall GCMG DSO OBE MC (1894-1979).
\[282\] G.1.6.10. CO 733/262/1,ff.21-23, Letter CF/264/34 of 6 October 1934 from Mr J. Hathorn Hall to Mr O.Williams.
Power's administration in Palestine. Barlassina clearly foresaw that the campaign to establish a Jewish state in Palestine would succeed, and very quickly, and he wanted to ensure that the Holy See procured from the British Mandate administration those guarantees of Catholic privileges from Ottoman times which he considered essential for the future well-being of the Catholic Church in Palestine.

Monsignor Pizzardo replied to Barlassina, pointing out that his suggested scenario in an earlier briefing seemed at odds with a proposal earlier in the year that the Emir Abdullah should come to Jerusalem and take office as the sole sovereign of both Palestine and the Transjordan. Pizzardo therefore deemed it inopportune for the Holy See to make another diplomatic approach in the face of what appeared to be two opposing approaches from the Protecting Power. One can only be struck by the fact that Monsignor Barlassina’s reading of the situation was far closer to reality than that of the official he was dealing with in the Roman Curia, a reminder that a diocesan bishop generally has a very good understanding of the real situation prevailing in his own territory. This response of Monsignor Pizzardo appears to be in line with the more low-key and passive approach which the Holy See was wanting to pursue in the Holy Land at this time.

As this exchange of views occurred about Barlassina and about the situation in Palestine, the Holy Year of the Redemption failed to end on its due date in April of 1934 due to the very uncertainty of the political situation there. Cardinal Sincero wrote to Monsignor Testa, the new Apostolic Delegate, on 16 March 1935 enquiring about the possibility of holding a function in Jerusalem to close the Holy Year. He said that he was aware of “the grave difficulties prevailing in Jerusalem at present”, and asked Testa to see if it would be opportune for him to take the initiative concerning some ceremony”. Testa replied on 27 March 1935 that he had discussed the matter with Barlassina, who could not hide his disappointment that his idea of having a Cardinal Legate there for a Solemn function had not been accepted.

283 F.20. f.72., Protocollo No 824/34 of 22 October 1934 from Monsignor Barlassina to Monsignor Pizzardo.
284 F.20. ff.73-74., Protocollo 3561/34 of 8 November 1934 from Monsignor Pizzardo to Monsignor Barlassina.
285 See Appendix 5 for biographical details of Cardinal Gustavo Testa [1886-1969].
He indicated that in view of the present difficulties dignity would be better preserved by having either Barlassina or himself preside at a solemn pontifical Mass in the new Basilica at Gethsemane, with a letter from the Holy Father to be read out, as a worthy crown to the Holy Year.  

On 5 May 1935 the Solemn Pontifical Mass for the close of the Holy Year of the Redemption was at last held after the delay of more than a year, being presided over in the new Basilica of All Nations at Gethsemane by the Apostolic Delegate of the Holy See. Pope Pius XI’s Apostolic Letter was read at this Mass, the Supreme Pontiff stating that “everything, indeed, which is beheld in that place, has the greatest efficacy and power to move the spirit and to enflame it with a desire to lead a life in harmony with the admirable example and teaching of Christ, our Redeemer”. This was the closest the message came to acknowledging the disharmony which now existed in Palestine.

These events strongly suggest that by the end of the Holy Year Monsignor Barlassina was persona non grata in Rome, or at least strongly out of favour, and that control of Catholic affairs in the Holy Land was coming to be dominated by the Congregation for the Eastern Churches and by the new Apostolic Delegate. The new Church of All Nations at Gethsemane seemed to be preferred to the venerable Holy Sepulchre in which the key events of the Redemption had actually occurred.

4.20. THE STATE OF THE LATIN PATRIARCHATE IN 1935 AND THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE HOLY SEE IN THE HOLY LAND

Despite the incoming pilgrims brought by the Holy Year the revenues of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem continued the serious downward trend which had begun with the onset of the international economic downturn from 1929. For the year ending 30 June 1933 the contributions from the Order of the Holy Sepulchre

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287 D.1. Litterae Apostolicae Pii PP.XI ad D.D.Gustavum Testa; ibid, Osservatore Romano, 8 May 1935 and 15 May 1935.
accounted for 8,800.30 Palestinian pounds out of the total Latin Patriarchate income of 18,521.80, the Work for the Preservation of the Faith providing 1,400 Palestinian pounds, Propaganda Fide 1,933.50 Palestinian pounds, and contributions from the foreign faithful 2,200 Palestinian pounds, showing an overall decline in the Patriarchate’s revenues but an increase in that from the Order of the Holy Sepulchre, which now accounted for some forty percent of the Patriarchate’s revenues.  

As at 30 June 1935 there were 30,540 Latin Catholics in the Holy Land, including the Transjordan, of whom 28,659 were lay people and some 1,850 were religious, clergy and seminarians. Of these, 21,249 of the lay people were in Palestine; 15,764 were in Franciscan parishes, 10,866 were in Latin Patriarchate parishes and 2,029 were in Carmelite parishes. There were 46 Latin Patriarchate clerics, of whom 18 were European. These served 51 Latin parishes, of which 36 were run by Patriarchate priests, 14 by Franciscans and one by Carmelites. Thirty two parishes were in Palestine, 16 in Transjordan and 3 in Cyprus. There were 127 religious houses and 22 hospices for pilgrims and tourists; 9 Latin Catholic hospitals, seven in Palestine and two in Transjordan; 73 parish schools, 45 in Palestine, 24 in Transjordan and four in Cyprus; 24 orphanages, all in Palestine, 6 for boys and 18 for girls; and 8 professional schools. In addition, there were eleven periodic publications in the Patriarchate, of which three were published by the Latin Patriarchate Curia itself (Le Moniteur, La Palestine, Raqib-Sion). More than three quarters of the revenues of the Latin Patriarchate now came from overseas, largely from the Order of the Holy Sepulchre.

In the face of this financial and pastoral situation, and to advance the Holy See’s concern to improve the relationship between Latin and Greek/Eastern rite Catholics in the Holy Land, on 24 July 1935 a “Scheme for a Modus Vivendi in the Transjordan” was issued, presumably by the Apostolic Delegate to Palestine. This proposed a

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288 E.18. fasc.II., Protocollo No 484/33 of 20 September 1933 from Monsignor Barlassina to Cardinal Fumasoni Biondi and attached accounts, De Bonis Ecclesiae, for the financial year ending 30 June 1933.


290 E.18. fasc.II., Prospectus Status Missionis sets out the figures for the year ending 30 June 1935 and the attached accounts, De Bonis Ecclesiae, which notes that the pound Sterling is equivalent to the Palestinian pound.
rationalisation of resources and operations between Latin and Greek rite missions in the Tran-Jordan, the resulting schools to be called “Catholic Schools”. The Apostolic Delegate was given substantial decision-making responsibility in regard to establishment of new parishes and the reception of converts to Catholicism from the Greek Orthodox Church.\textsuperscript{291} Once again, the strong focus of the Holy See may be seen to be the aggrandisement of the Catholic Church in the Holy Land at the expense of the other Christian denominations in Palestine and the Transjordan and the use of its own Apostolic Delegate rather than the local diocesan bishop to advance this work.

In the face of the Latin Patriarch’s irressible determination to advance his own views upon it, the Holy See, in the period from 1928 to 1935, continued its deliberate and considered strategy of reducing the role and scope of action and influence of its key diocesan bishop in Palestine, Monsignor Barlassina, for the twofold purpose of reducing his capacity to impede a successful working relationship with the British Mandate administration and of increasing the role and status of the Greek-Melkite Catholic Church hierarchy in Palestine. The former purpose met the perceived need of the Holy See to protect the Holy Places which were now, effectively, in British hands. The second purpose met the Holy See’s desire to promote the welfare of the indigenous Catholic population in the Holy Land. These strategies therefore were undertaken to promote the two long-standing policies of the Holy See for the Holy Land, the protection of the Holy Places and the nurturing of the local Catholic Church and population.

Throughout this period the Holy See maintained its public position of not criticizing the Balfour Declaration, of not calling for any change to the British policy for a Jewish national home in Palestine, and of not opposing the continued immigration of Jews to Palestine. At no time could its position be called anti-Zionist, let alone anti-Semitic. Its concern was to preserve a good relationship with the British Government for the primary purpose of procuring outcomes acceptable to the Holy See in

\textsuperscript{291} E.10. Protocollo 1032 of 1937, \textit{Linea Schematica per un ‘Modus Vivendi’ per la Transgiordania” of 24 July 1935.}
relation to the Christian Holy Places. The deteriorating relationship between Arabs and Jews was not a matter of major concern for the Holy See in this period. Whilst its own attentions were now centred more closely on the rise of Communism, Nazism and Fascism in Europe, and the possibility of a renewed global war, it failed to see the reality of what was taking shape in Palestine, the emergence of an independent Jewish state, despite the warnings from its resident diocesan bishop in Jerusalem, Monsignor Barlassina. It therefore did nothing to develop a new policy or strategy regarding the protection of the Holy Places in the face of the possible imminent collapse of the British Mandate in Palestine.


The Holy See entered the last years of the pontificate of Pope Pius XI with its focus very firmly on the situation in Europe with the rise of Communism, Fascism and Nazism, and the racial intolerance, especially anti-Semitism, which the latter regime promoted in the German lands. On 28 August 1935 Pope Pius XI issued an Appeal for Peace in the face of the rising international tensions in Europe. Whilst the Supreme Pontiff prayed for peace throughout the world, and made this his most earnest aim, it was a goal which was to elude him, both in Europe and in the Holy Land.

In Palestine tensions between Jews and Arabs, and amongst the Palestinian Arab population itself, erupted in April 1936, beginning the first phase of the "Great Arab Revolt". This:

had the character of a social protest movement, being directed against the higher strata of Palestinian Arab society as well as ‘foreigners’ (the British Mandatory Power and the Jewish immigrants). At all stages the revolt was carried out mainly by Muslim peasants of the lower economic, social, and political strata. The majority of Arab Christians did not want to be involved in any form of armed struggle or violence.293

The first phase of the revolt began on 15 April 1936 when two Jews were murdered by Arab bandits, leading to the fourth major outbreak of intercommunal violence in Palestine since the commencement of British rule in 1917. The events were so serious that, on 7 August 1936, King Edward VIII appointed the Earl Peel294 to chair a Royal Commission “to ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances”. The Peel Commission held hearings in Palestine and Trans-Jordan between mid-November 1936 and mid-January 1937 and reported to the British Parliament in July of 1937.295

It could not be said that the Holy See was unaware of these developments in Palestine. On 6 September 1936 the Arab Catholics in Jerusalem sent a telegram to Monsignor Celso Costantini, Secretary of Propaganda Fide, saying that:

Catholic Arabs assembling today in Jerusalem deplore present political situation. Christian Arabs protest vehemently against Zionist Policy endangering Arab rights and prospects and the Holy Places in Palestine. We appeal to the Christian World to take steps against this unchristian policy.296

293 Kreutz, 60.
294 See Appendix 5 for biographical details of William Robert Wellesley Peel, 1st Earl Peel, GCSI, GBE, PC [1967-1937].
296 E.1. Prot.3196, Letter of 6 September 1936 from the President of The Peoples’ Friends setting out the text of the telegram to Celso Costantini of that date. Celso Costantini [1876-1958] was Secretary of Propaganda Fide from 1935 and was made a Cardinal in 1953.
However, there is no evidence that the Holy See responded either to this appeal specifically or more generally to the immediately unfolding events of the Great Arab Revolt. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the Peel Commission’s public hearings, and while its Report was being drafted, the Holy See seemed more concerned to promote the Catholic Action movement in the Holy Land, and to resolve the mysterious issue of the proper flag to be used by the Latin Patriarch in his diocese. In February of 1937 Cardinal Fumasoni Biondi complained to Barlassina that there appeared to be no Catholic Action group in the Holy Land, and asked that something be done in this area within the Patriarchate.\textsuperscript{297} There was no mention of any other issue which the Holy See considered required further attention or better addressing by the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem in this period. Barlassina responded that the conditions in Palestine and the Trans-Jordan made Catholic Action groups inappropriate, but reassured Propaganda Fide that “we have the country well in hand”.\textsuperscript{298} The Holy See’s established policy regarding the promotion of the lay Catholic Action movement around the world was clearly not a priority Barlassina chose to adopt in the Holy Land. In fact, at this time of serious crisis for Palestine, perhaps the most concerted correspondence between the Holy See and the Latin Patriarch in Jerusalem concerned the proper flag to be used by the Latin Patriarchate in the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{299} At this stage the Holy See appears to have been impervious to the situation now unfolding in relation to Palestine, which would vitally impact on the Holy See’s two key historic policies in relation to the Holy Land.

Whilst the Peel Commission issued its Report on 7 July 1937, the British Legation to the Holy See only furnished a copy to Monsignor Pizzardo of the Secretariat for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs in the Roman Curia on about 23 July 1937.\textsuperscript{300} As

\textsuperscript{297} E.18. fasc.II., Protocollo 2504/36 of 19 February 1937 from Cardinal Fumasoni Biondi to Patriarch Barlassina.
\textsuperscript{298} E.18. fasc.II., Protocollo No. 334/37 of 14 March 1937 from Patriarch Barlassina to Cardinal Fumasoni Biondi.
\textsuperscript{300} G.1.6.11. CO 733/353/5, f.28, Despatch E. 4325/22/31 of 23 July 1937 from Mr D. G. Osborne to O. St. C. O’Malley at Foreign Office.
Kreutz has remarked, there is no “evidence that the Peel Commission received any official representations on the Holy See’s views with respect to Palestine, not even on the Holy Places”.\textsuperscript{301} My own researches in the Vatican Archives have unearthed no such representations or even any discussion as to whether such representations should be made. As Kreutz has himself theorized, the Holy See appeared at that time to be much preoccupied with affairs in Europe. However, an additional factor is likely to have been the isolation of the Latin Patriarch, Monsignor Barlassina, from the decision-making processes in the Vatican under the Secretariat of Cardinal Pacelli. However, this situation swiftly changed when, on 5 July 1937, the Apostolic Nuncio to France, Monsignor Valeri, wrote to Cardinal Pacelli informing him of British intentions to divide Palestine into two zones, one for the Arabs and the other for the Jews.\textsuperscript{302} In addition to that, on 10 July 1937, the Apostolic Nuncio in Switzerland, Monsignor Bernardini, wrote to Pacelli to brief him on the fact that the British Government had “decided to welcome the conclusion of the Royal Commission into Palestine, which suggested the partition of Palestine into two independent states, the one Arab and the other Jewish”. Bernardini reported that the Zionist Organisation had protested at Britain proposing to abandon its obligations as Mandatory Power and asked that the 1922 Mandate be integrally applied and continued.\textsuperscript{303}

These approaches to the Secretariat of State prompted an immediate response by Pacelli who, on 14 July 1937, wrote to both the Apostolic Delegate for Palestine, Monsignor Testa, and to Barlassina regarding the proposal for partition of Palestine. Pacelli told them that the matter would come before the Council of the League in September, and that “given the importance that the political settlement of Palestine has for the Catholic religion, and the probability in various countries of violent moves against the Jews it is necessary that the Holy See be fully up to date with these current events”. He therefore asked both the Apostolic Delegate and Barlassina to tell him all that they might know in order to help the Holy See to “protect the rights

\textsuperscript{301} Kreutz, ibid, 62.
\textsuperscript{302} F.37. ff.11-12, Despatch No.2287 of 5 July 1937 of 5 July 1937 from Monsignor Valeri to Cardinal Pacelli.
\textsuperscript{303} F.37. ff.7-8, Protocollo No.2534 of 10 July 1937 from Monsignor Bernardini to Cardinal Pacelli.
of the [Catholic] religion and the inhabitants”. On 20 July 1937 Pope Pius XI himself drew a pencil diagram headed “Contingencies” which shows Jewish, Muslim and Catholic columns and refers to “the English permanent mandate” and to “the same for France in Syria/Lebanon”. Whatever else this diagram might mean, its contents seeming very vague, it certainly indicates that Pius XI himself was now taking a close personal interest in the unfolding of events in Palestine.

Barlassina and several other senior Catholic clerics of Palestine, including Monsignor Haggiar, the Greek-Melkite Archbishop of Akka, wrote to Pacelli on 22 July 1937 to protest at the proposed partition of Palestine which had thus far in its history maintained its unity. They stated that the Christians of Galilee, both Catholic and Orthodox, would be forced to leave their lands rather than fall under the rule of “stubborn enemies of all that which has rapport with Christianity”. They pleaded that the Holy See should now seek that Nazareth not be placed under Jewish rule but join Jerusalem and Bethlehem under an “international” Mandate, one which would not have a government “not disposed at all to learn our rights and our religious sentiments”.

Testa replied to Pacelli, supplying his understanding of the British proposal for partition of Palestine. He expressed the opinion that England would seek to achieve two objectives by this partition, firstly, to satisfy the demand to create the nation of Israel, and secondly, to keep the two warring parties in a state of continuous agitation in order to permit it to continue its development of facilities suited to its military objectives relative to the Suez Canal. He concluded that it was difficult for the Holy See to be seen to oppose England over the proposed partition without being thought to be following the lead of Italy. It would therefore be best for the Holy See to “to take this opportunity for claiming that the question surrounding the Holy Places, left in suspense in the Treaty of Sevres, Article 95, becomes finally defined, overcoming all the difficulties that England has known how to create until

304 F.37. f.10, Despatch No.2753/37 from Cardinal Pacelli to Monsignor Testa and to Patriarch Barlassina of 14 July 1937.
305 F.38. f.8, pencil diagram captioned by the Archivist as “Appunto autografo Papa Pio XI, 20.7.1937”.
306 F.38. ff.105-107, Protocollo No.1033/37 of 22 July 1937 from Monsignor Barlassina, Monsignor Gregory Haggiar and others to Cardinal Pacelli.
the motion passed at the Council of the League of Nations on 14 January 1930”. He observed that Great Britain did not like any outside interference and that the differences between the two “Catholic powers”, France and Italy, made any diplomatic action by the Holy See problematic. 307

Barlassina responded promptly to the invitation from Pacelli to send briefing on the situation in Palestine. He furnished a “Report on Palestine” to Pacelli on 24 July 1937 in which he pointed out the dangers to the Catholics of Palestine from the proposed partition, both from the Jews and from the Arabs. He observed that the English government had never favoured the Catholic Church in its period as Mandatory Power and the proposed partition was likely only to lead to the abolition of the privileges which the Catholic Church had long enjoyed. Therefore it was essential to ensure that the rights which the Catholics had enjoyed in Palestine, derived from the Sublime Porte, must be respected and that any transfer of authority should be subject to guarantees about those rights. He concluded that the Holy See needed to avoid any odium from the “phenomenal universal Jewish activity”; and that to do this it might be advisable to enlist the support, indirectly, of Dr Weizmann who, “like all the other Zionist leaders, likes to be seen to be in good relationship with the Catholic Church”. 308

Pacelli subsequently reiterated the concern that the Holy See had voiced throughout the period of the British Mandate in Palestine as to the direction in which events were leading, and expressed the strong twofold concern the Holy See now had both “for the guardianship of the monuments of the Redemption and also for the

307 F.39. ff.4-7 at f.5r, 6r-7, Protocollo N.583/P of 23 July 1937 from Monsignor Gustavo Testa to Cardinal Pacelli, which enclosed the Summary of the Peel Commission Report and Map, F.39. ff.8-9. 308 F.39. f.13, Protocollo No.1050/37 of 24 July 1937 from Monsignor Barlassina to Cardinal Pacelli; F.39. ff.15-21, Rapporto sulla Palestina by Monsignor Barlassina, at ff.18-20. The Rapporto attached various documents, including “Alcuni Fatti Sgradevoli degli Ebrei a Insultano dei Cattolici”, F.39. f.28, and the petty detail of its recitation of incidents going back to 1921 appears to be what prejudiced the Secretariat of State officials against Monsignor Barlassina’s counsel in this current matter of the proposed partition of Palestine. The scrupulous non-anti-Semitism of the Holy See in all its documents relating to this question stands out starkly.
situation of the Catholic minority in Palestine”, and sought more information on what was being proposed. 309

A further internal Holy See discussion paper of this period sought to canvas the views of Monsignors Testa, Barlassina, and Robinson, but did little other than to cast doubts upon the reliability of views expressed over the years by Monsignor Barlassina, suggesting the poor opinion in which the Latin Patriarch had been held for some time within the Secretariat of State. 310 However, Barlassina, having been asked to provide his views to the Secretariat of State for the first time in some years, now submitted a stream of briefing despatches to Pacelli and Pizzardo, which elicited the thanks of the Cardinal Secretary of State on 10 August 1937. 311

At this time an internal Holy See briefing paper was prepared entitled “Stato Della Questione” which attached the Peel Report and gave a summary of its contents and proposals for partition of Palestine into three, including a vastly reduced British Mandate which would contain Jerusalem, Bethlehem and a land corridor to the port of Jaffa, with Nazareth being placed in the Jewish state that would contain Galilee and the Mediterranean littoral. This memorandum traversed the issue from the point of view of the Holy See, noting that Jesus’ ministry had encompassed the whole of Palestine, and pointing out the dangers for the Christian Holy Places and for the Catholic minority of being apportioned amongst the proposed Jewish and Arab states. It stressed that “the defense of the Holy Places is particularly close to the heart of the Holy See”. The proposals for Jerusalem and Bethlehem would seem to ensure their protection in those places under a revised British Mandate, but Nazareth was not being treated as one of the Holy Places, and the Holy See should be seeking to have both Nazareth and the Sea of Tiberias included in the British Mandate territory. The report suggested that the Holy See should seek the “internationalisation” of this territory, as had been proposed in the 1922 Aide-

310 F.38. f.9, Internal Secretariat of State paper “Le informazioni degli Ecmi Monsignori Testa, Barlassina, Robinson”.
311 F.39. f.81, Despatch No.3178/37 of 10 August 1937 from Cardinal Pacelli to Monsignor Barlassina.
Memoire which the Holy See had submitted to the League of Nations. It therefore proposed that the Holy See should submit another Aide-Memoire to the League dealing with the plight of the Christian minority and the need for the defence of the Holy Places which must be left in Christian hands and within an internationalised mandate. This paper, possibly by Monsignor Pizzardo, shows that the Holy See was now treating the question of the Peel Report with urgency, and that its basic concerns were twofold, as they had been for the Holy See for centuries, the protection of the Christian Holy Places and the rights and protection of the Christian, and especially Catholic, minority in Palestine.

A further internal Secretariat of State paper, “Progetto di Nota”, also canvassed the issues for the Holy See, which was “desirous that the monuments of the Redemption not fall into non-Christian hands”. This paper concluded its recitation of the history of the British Mandate and of the attempt to establish the Holy Places Commission with the laconic statement that, after the rejection of Lord Balfour’s attempts to establish the Holy Places Commission in 1922, “from that day onward the problem of responsibility for the Holy Places was deferred indefinitely.

By 29 July 1937 the Secretariat of State had prepared an advanced draft of its Aide-Memoire on the Holy See’s response to the Peel Commission’s Report. This was further redrafted by 31 July 1937 but solely with a view to refining or taming the use of words without changing its overall thrust. Attached to the draft Aide-Memoire was a list of all the Christian Holy Places in Palestine, identifying their location and the Christian denomination or religious order in whose hands they were held, the

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312 On 4 June 1922 the Holy See issued an Aide-Memoire in relation to its position on the draft Palestine mandate then before the League of Nations for ratification, see F.4. ff.58-59. Whilst internationalization of the Holy Places was not a significant aspect of this document, its contents contributed to a discussion in which the French Government canvassed the issue of internationalization of the Holy Places, see F.4. ff.85-87, Despatch No.1 of 13 July 1922 from the Comte de Saint-Aulaire, French Ambassador, to Lord Balfour; and also G.1.1.33. FO 371/7786, ibid, Despatch No. 107 from Count de Salis to the Earl Balfour of 22 July 1922 in which Count de Salis reported Cardinal Gasparri’s approval of some notion of internationalization of administration of the Holy Places in Palestine.

313 F.37. ff.16-20, Stato della Questione, internal Secretariat of State briefing paper of unidentified authorship.

314 F.38. ff.17-22 at f.17, f.22, Progetto di Nota, internal Secretariat of State discussion paper.

315 F.38. ff.38-42, draft Aide-Memoire dated 29 July 1937, the first page crossed out in blue pencil.

number of those Holy Places being 34, of which some twenty were in the environs of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{317}

At this critical moment the Holy See’s Secretariat of State displayed the concern not to antagonize the British authorities which had marked its entire approach during the period of Great Britain’s Palestine Mandate. To this end, on 3 August 1937, Monsignor Pizzardo, effectively the Vatican’s Foreign Minister at the time, came to the British Legation to give a draft of the Holy See’s Aide-Memoire on the Peel Commission’s Palestine Report. This draft Aide-Memoire stated that the Holy See was “seriously preoccupied” at the proposals to carve up Palestine and to separate Jerusalem and Bethlehem from Nazareth and Lake Tiberias. It said that “a further cause for anxiety was the future fate of the Christian minorities of Palestine”, expressing the opinion that “what had happened since 1917 did not altogether reassure the Holy See [because] in spite of the assurances originally given that the rights and privileges enjoyed under the Turkish regime would be maintained, frequent representations to the British High Commissioner had been necessary to defend the reputation, property and religious practices of Catholics in the face of difficulties arising from the influence or preponderance of adversaries of the Catholic religion”. It went on to ask the question, “if the situation of Catholics had been difficult under the mandate, what would it be when their adversaries could do what they liked with the Catholic communities scattered over the territories of the two proposed sovereign States?”\textsuperscript{318}

The British Minister to the Holy See’s response to the draft Aide-Memoire was that “we are full of ennui: we pray not to increase them”; and urged that the Vatican officials should “avoid the appearance that Italy or Fascism is able to exert influence on the Holy See surrounding this Note”.\textsuperscript{319} What stands out in relation to this encounter are the extraordinary steps taken by the Holy See to ensure that any

\textsuperscript{317} \textit{F.38.}, ff.73-77, internal Secretariat of State briefing paper “Santuari della Palestina”; \textit{F.38.}, f.78, handwritten comment by Monsignor Pizzardo or Cardinal Pacelli as to the number of Sanctuaries and the number in Jerusalem.

\textsuperscript{318} \textit{G.1.6.11.} CO 733/353/5, ff.24-26, Eastern(Palestine and Transjordan) E 4639/22/31, Despatch No.125 of 4 August 1937 from Mr Osborne to Mr Eden. Monsignor Pizzardo redrafted the Holy See’s proposals several times in discussion with Mr Osborne to take into accounts the views he expressed.

\textsuperscript{319} \textit{F.38.}, f.102, \textit{Osservazioni Ministero Inglese}. 
public position it might promote on the question of partition of Palestine should be acceptable to the British Government. The evidence shows that Holy See’s draft position paper was modified to make it acceptable to the British authorities.

On the basis of those discussions with the British legation to the Holy See, Pizzardo redrafted the Aide-Memoire for the Royal Commission in regard to the Holy Places, demanding “that the guarantees envisaged by the Rapport in question will be really provided”.$^{320}$ A proposal from within the Vatican’s Secretariat of State that the Holy See should send a representative to London to further explain the contents of the Aide-Memoire was deleted at the last minute at British request, Lord Halifax strongly discouraging the idea of a visit to London by a representative of the Holy See to discuss the Palestine Report and the Holy See’s response.$^{321}$ This shows that the Holy See’s entire focus was on the protection of the Christian Holy Places in Palestine in accordance with its entitlements under the Ottoman Empire, and to protect the situation of the Christian, and especially Catholic, minority. It demonstrates that Pizzardo’s response was both vigorous and sensitive. However, it was an essential element of this strategy that the Holy See placate the British Government which would remain the controlling power in relation to the key Holy Places in Jerusalem and Bethlehem under the proposed tripartite partition plan in the Peel Report.

The Holy See now sought to enlist the assistance of Catholic public opinion around the world in support of the Holy See’s position in relation to Palestine. On 18 August 1937 Pacelli wrote to the various legations of the Holy See bringing to their attention the Promemoria prepared for the League of Nations on the Holy See’s position on the question of the partition of Palestine. It urged that Palestine had always been considered as an indivisible entity which was known as the Terra Santa and expressing the concern which the Holy See had for the protection of the Holy Places and of the Christian minority in Palestine.$^{322}$

$^{320}$ G.1.6.11. CO 733/353/5, ibid, f.25, Enclosure in No.2., Aide-memoire from Monsignor Pizzardo; F.38. ff.95-99, Secretary of State Despatch N.3018/37, Aide-Memoire of 6 August 1937.
$^{321}$ G.1.6.11. CO 733/353/5, f.22, Letter E 4640/22/31 of 20 August 1937 from Lacy Baggallay for Lord Halifax; F.38. ff.95-99 at ff.98-99, in which this proposal is deleted by hand.
The difficulty for the Holy See in responding to the situation it now confronted is suggested by an internal Secretariat of State briefing paper of 25 August 1937 to Cardinal Pacelli which traversed Barlassina’s suggestion that the Holy Places Commission should be put in place as part of any change to the mandatory arrangements in Palestine. This briefing paper observed that while Barlassina’s proposal made sense and was based on proposals of Cardinal Gasparri, the present difficulty was that the Catholic nations [principally France and Italy] were not interested in it. The proposal was based on the existence of a Mandate, and Nazareth would, under the proposed partition, not be within a Mandated territory and would thus be outside its scope.\textsuperscript{323} Partition was, in the view of the Holy See, a disaster which must be avoided if possible.

4.22. THE LAST EFFORTS OF THE HOLY SEE TO RESIST THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE

That the belated efforts of the Holy See to counter the partition proposals were appreciated by Arab Palestinians is suggested by a telegram from Christian Arabs of Palestine in August 1937 to Pope Pius XI that:

the Christian Arabs appreciate the efforts of Your Holiness against the partition of Palestine [and] assuring Your Holiness that the Arabs who have inhabited Palestine for thirteen centuries were and always will be good protectors of the Holy Places.\textsuperscript{324}

The British authorities were themselves not unappreciative of the efforts of the Holy See to accommodate British concerns over its response to the partition proposals. The British Legation to the Holy See wrote to Monsignor Pizzardo on 6 September 1937 to inform him that:

\textsuperscript{323} F.39. ff.66-71, holograph briefing note to Cardinal Pacelli of 28 August 1937, probably from Monsignor Pizzardo.

\textsuperscript{324} F.40. f.34, Radiogramma from Exarch Mogabgad Boulos Said Tewfik Batato Iissa Bandak Fuad Saba to Pope Pius XI.
the Aide-Memoire on the subject of the Holy Places in Palestine which you handed me on August 6th will receive the most careful attention of His Majesty’s Government, and I am to assure you that His Majesty’s Government much appreciate the tactful manner in which the Holy See have expressed their views and will for their part raise no objection if the Vatican see fit to bring these views to the notice of other powers.  

In this difficult situation the Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church became a last hope for those who opposed the partition proposals. Pope Pius XI received a telegram from the Arab National Congress for Palestine on 12 September 1937 asking the Pope to intervene in order to prevent the partition of the Holy Land and the formation of a separate Jewish state.

The low-key approach taken by the Holy See, which avoided anything like provocation of the British Government over the partition issue, continued to be greatly appreciated by the British administration during the tense period of consideration of the Peel Report’s partition proposals. On 30 December 1937 Mr C. J. W.Torr of the British Legation to the Holy See pointed out that the Pope had not mentioned the situation in Palestine in his Christmas address to the Cardinals and that “he deliberately refrained from doing so in order to avoid any possible suggestion that he approved of Italian propaganda there”; and that “by his silence [he sought] to dissociate himself from Fascist policy”.

The overwhelming hostility to the Peel Commission’s recommendations for a tripartite partition of Palestine led, in late February 1938, to the appointment of the Woodhead Commission to investigate further the feasibility of partition, its work being carried out between April and August of 1938. The tactful diplomacy of the

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326 F.40. f.90, telegramma of 12 September 1937 from Naji Swaidi president of the Congress to Pope Pius XI.
327 G.1.6.12. CO 733/369/9, f.16, Despatch E 39/16/31 of 30 December 1937 from Mr Torr to Mr E.M.B.Ingram at the Colonial Office in London.
328 The Woodhead Commission was chaired by Sir John Woodhead, a former official in British India, and it was dominated by British officials from British India. It reported on 9 November 1938 and made various recommendations, none of which endorsed the Peel Commission’s partition proposals.
Holy See, albeit belatedly activated, had contributed to the delaying of the partition of Palestine.

4.23. THE FINAL CAPITULATION OF THE LATIN PATRIARCH IN 1938

In this period of continued uncertainty over Britain’s plans for its Palestine Mandate, the decline in the financial fortunes of the Latin Patriarchate continued, still impacted by a difficult world economy. By 30 June 1937 the revenues of the Latin Patriarchate had shrunk considerably. From its greatly reduced revenues the Latin Patriarchate had to provide pastoral care for 26,767 indigenous Catholics and 1,497 foreign Catholics in the Diocese. Paying at least some attention to the preoccupations of the Roman Curia, Barlassina had overseen the establishment of a single branch of Catholic Action in Ramallah. In the face of the crisis unfolding in Palestine, this event attracted the favourable comment of Cardinal Fumasoni Biondi at Propaganda Fide. However, this faint praise was not sufficient to protect Barlassina from the final unfolding of his defeat at the hands of the Roman Curia, a defeat which had been in the making for a decade.

In the midst of the international crisis regarding the future of Palestine it was apparent that the long campaign by the Congregation for the Eastern Churches against Barlassina had not diminished. Cardinal Eugene Tisserant, Prefect of that Congregation, wrote a very firm memo to Barlassina in July of 1937 complaining about the process of excessive and unscrupulous Latinization which was allegedly occurring in Palestine and Trans-Jordan at the instigation of clergy of the Latin

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329 E.18. fasc.II., Prospectus Status Missionis for the year ended 30 June 1937, and the attached Patriarchate accounts, De Bonis Ecclesiae, Palestinian pounds continuing to equate to pounds Sterling.
330 E.18. fasc.II., Prospectus Status Missionis for the year ended 30 June 1937.
332 See Appendix 5 for biographical details of Cardinal Eugene Tisserant (1884-1972).
Patriarchate. He urged that the differing Eastern rites and languages be respected within the Latin Patriarchate.

Almost a year later, Barlassina wrote another volley in his combative correspondence with the Congregation for the Eastern Churches, this time to Cardinal Fumasoni Biondi at Propaganda Fide. Barlassina assured the Cardinal of the good disposition of himself and his clergy towards the Melkites and Orientals generally, contrary to views previously expressed by Cardinal Tisserant that the Latin Patriarchate was engaged in a process of “unscrupulous Latinization” in the Latin Patriarchate against the instructions of the Holy See, the actual existence of which instructions he questioned. It was with some apparent satisfaction that Cardinal Tisserant now wrote almost immediately, on 16 May 1938, noting that by the Motu Proprio Sancta Dei Ecclesia of 25 March 1938 Pope Pius XI had transferred oversight of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem to the Congregation for the Eastern Churches with effect from 1 June 1938. Tisserant therefore directed Barlassina that from that date he was to send his correspondence to that Congregation, and not to Propaganda Fide. Tisserant concluded with the expression of faith that the Latin Patriarch would give the same efficacious cooperation to the Congregation for the Eastern Churches that he had thus far given to Propaganda Fide. The Latin Patriarch had been defeated and had passed into what he clearly saw as enemy hands.

The Latin Patriarch, confronted by this fait accompli, now offered his formal surrender. On 19 May 1938 Barlassina wrote to Monsignor Cesarini of the Congregation for the Eastern Churches, stating that “the will of the Holy Father is for us indisputable and therefore in the name of all the clergy of the Latin Patriarchate

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333 A.13. Latin Patriarchate Archives LB 1.6-1.3 Barlassina 2 1920-1940 Dossier (B-5), Generale, Sacra Congregazione Orientale Protocollo 335/37 of 29 July 1937 from Cardinal Tisserant to Patriarch Barlassina.


335 A.19. Latin Patriarchate Archives FC-AG 2.4-3.3 1 S.Cong. pro Ecc.Orientali 1919-1953, Protocollo 955/32 of 16 May 1938 from Cardinal Tisserant to Monsignor Barlassina. It appears that Monsignor Barlassina had not been apprised of the contents of the Pope’s motu proprio of 25 March 1938.
of Jerusalem [he] rendered homage to the new immediate superior who had come to be assigned to them by the Holy See”. 336 Barlassina wrote to Cardinal Fumasoni Biondi on 20 May 1938 acknowledging that “We have no alternative than to bow to the august will of the Holy Father”, but seeking such instructions from Cardinal Fumasoni Biondi “as he believes opportune”. 337 No further instructions were now forthcoming from Propaganda Fide to the Latin Patriarch. He had passed into new hands.

Cardinal Tisserent wrote to Monsignor Barlassina for the first time in their newly clarified and accepted reporting relationship on 14 July 1938, speaking of his own past visits to Jerusalem and knowledge of the local ecclesial scene, deploiring as one of the most grave defects of the Near East the giving and receiving of gifts. His first act upon taking over his new dicastery was to issue an instruction to all the Eastern Patriarchs not to receive gifts under any form or on any pretext. Only in conclusion, and almost in passing, did Tisserant refer to the “tragic times for Palestine” that were presently being endured. 338

The depth of Barlassina’s realization of the difficulty of his present situation is suggested by his remarks to the Apostolic Delegate to Iran, Monsignor Marina, 339 that: “I ought to go to Rome, but it is impossible, given the situation in Palestine. When I am able, I will come to you”; and also that: “Unless they make me resign! Then I will be most happy, I will retire with my books to private life and my repose, because my life has become a continual struggle”. 340 The Latin Patriarch appeared to be at the end of his tether.

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336 A.19. Protocollo 620/38 of 19 May 1938 from Monsignor Barlassina to Monsignor Cesarini, who on 11 May 1938 had sent to Monsignor Barlassina the copy of the relevant Motu Proprio concerning jurisdiction.
337 E.18. fasc.II., Protocollo No 622/38 of 20 May 1938 from Monsignor Barlassina to Cardinal Fumasoni Biondi.
339 Archbishop Alcide Marina, Apostolic Delegate in Iran from 1936 to 1945.
4.24. THE DESCENT OF THE HOLY LAND TOWARDS WAR AND PARTITION

Whilst Barlassina contemplated his own fall from favour and the parlous financial plight of his diocese, the unrest continued amongst the Arab population of Palestine. The Osservatore Romano published a leading article on 13 October 1938 “drawing serious attention to the situation in Palestine”, reporting “836 killed and 926 wounded between July 1st and September 30th. Of these, 640 were Arabs as against 162 Jews and 28 English [and that] the rate of assassination is moreover increasing”. It noted that “London’s attitude remained reserved” whilst “the publication of the Report of the [Woodhead] Commission of Enquiry is awaited; but the atmosphere is not encouraging”. The Pan Arab Congress had, it reported, called “for the denunciation of the Balfour Declaration, the suspension of Jewish immigration into Palestine, the abandonment of the plan of tripartition, the end of the British Mandate and the establishment of Palestine as an independent Arab State with only minority guarantees for the Jews already there”. 341

The views of the Woodward Commision were soon forthcoming, reporting on 9 November 1938 that partition of Palestine was not feasible. 342 The British Government immediately issued a statement saying that “the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem is impracticable”; and that “His Majesty’s Government will therefore continue their responsibility for the government of the whole of Palestine”. 343 The British Mandate over Palestine would continue, in the face of two Commissions of enquiry which had highlighted the hopeless imbroglio in which Britain was now involved in Palestine. Whilst the Woodhead Commission enabled the British Government to continue administering Palestine as it had done since 1922 pursuant

341 G.1.6.12. CO 733/369/9.f.4, Telegram No 13 of 13 October 1938 from Mr Osborne to the Foreign Office.
342 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 414.
343 F.41. ff.83-84, Statement by His Majestys’ Government in the United Kingdom, 9 November 1938, at pages 2 and 3 thereof.
to the terms of the League’s Palestine Mandate, the Peel and Woodhead Reports can have left little doubt that the Jewish and Arab populations could not be reconciled, both of them now seeking some form of national independence. For the Holy See, the deepest alarm should have been ringing that both of its historic policies for the Holy Land were now under threat and that it should be developing a new strategy or strategies to secure their ongoing success. Strategies based, as had that of the Holy See for Palestine since 1922, on maintaining a good relationship with the British Government as the best means of securing its two historic policies for the Holy Land would be of rapidly diminishing value if Britain’s tenure as mandatory power was coming to an end. In fact, events now intervened which prevented both the Holy See and the Latin Patriarch from taking any further immediate action.

On 29 January 1939 Monsignor Barlassina was involved in a very serious automobile accident on the road to the national shrine of Our Lady Queen of Palestine which he had caused to be established at Deir Rafat, 40 kilometres from Jerusalem,\textsuperscript{344} resulting in his serious injury and attracting outpourings of sympathy to him from around his diocese and from Europe as well.\textsuperscript{345} The news of his accident was itself quickly eclipsed by that of the death of the Armenian Patriarch of Jerusalem, Torkom Koushakian, on 10 February 1939, swiftly followed by that of Pope Pius XI himself on that same day.\textsuperscript{346} Christian Jerusalem was plunged into mourning.

The Holy See, in the last four years of the pontificate of Pope Pius XI, appeared to have turned its attentions away from the Holy Land as the Pope and his Secretary of State struggled to deal with the critical situation unfolding in Europe. Both for the purposes of maintaining its good working relationship with the British Government and also, it appears, to suit the internal politics of the Roman Curia, the Holy See had continued its long process of disempowering its key diocesan bishop in the Holy Land, the Latin Patriarch, Monsignor Barlassina. The result was that he no longer felt

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\item \textsuperscript{344} \textit{Il Giornale d’Oriente}, 3 February 1939, XVII, in A.11. Latin Patriarchate Archives LB 1.6-1.3 S.B.Barlassina.
\item \textsuperscript{345} A.11. Latin Patriarchate Archives LB 1.6-1.3 S.B. Barlassina, Grave scontro automobilistico di Mgr. Patriarca.
\item \textsuperscript{346} A.11. Latin Patriarchate Archives LB 1.6-1.3 S.B.Barlassina, letter from Mesrob Nishinian, Grand Sacristan of the Armenian Patriarchate, to Patriarch Barlassina of 18 February 1939.
\end{itemize}
able or obliged to inform the Holy See of key political developments in Palestine, this now being the clear responsibility of the Apostolic Delegate to Palestine, resident in Egypt. The Holy See therefore failed to seek to influence the findings of the Peel Commission until its Report had been issued. It did not realize that the partition of Palestine was to be proposed and it therefore had no position developed to meet that recommendation. In the meanwhile Propaganda Fide and the Latin Patriarch were left to dither over the introduction of Catholic Action into the Holy Land, and the precise form and origins of the Latin Patriarchate’s flag.

In the background, Cardinal Tisserant of the Congregation for the Eastern Churches continued his campaign against Barlassina which would result in the transfer of responsibility for the Latin Patriarchate from its historic reporting base at Propaganda Fide, which also oversaw the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa, to Tisserant’s relatively new dicastery, eager to expand its jurisdiction and authority over all the Catholic Churches of the Middle East. This process of disempowerment and jurisdictional rivalry at so vital a time in the history of Palestine undoubtedly contributed to the difficulties the Holy See had in developing suitable strategies and responses to the situation which confronted it in the Holy Land at this time.

In 1904 Theodor Herzl had offered Pope Pius X the prize of internationalization of the Christian Holy Places, including the whole of Jerusalem, and that saintly Pope ignored his offer. In 1922, during the negotiations of the terms of the British mandate for Palestine, the Holy See had the opportunity to develop a clear and well-articulated policy regarding the internationalization of the Christian Holy Places in Palestine, and it did not do so, contented to have effected a modification of the terms of the mandate which ensured the continuation of the Ottoman Empire’s Status Quo regarding the Holy Places. Now the Peel Commission once again raised the issue of some form of internationalization of parts of Palestine containing the Holy Places, notably Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and the Woodhead Commission considered including the whole of Galilee in an international zone under British authority. Yet again, the Holy See failed to grasp those proposals in order to advance a coherent case for internationalization of Jerusalem, at the very least.
With its attention distracted, the Holy See maintained its historic adherence to its two policies for the Holy Land, the protection of the Christian Holy Places and the nurturing of the local Catholic Church and population, but now failed to develop sensible or appropriate strategies to ensure the ongoing success of those policies in the face of the situation which both the Peel and Woodhead Commissions foresaw, the breakdown of the British Mandate and the partition of Palestine. In this last critical phase of the Holy See’s relationship with the Holy Land before the outbreak of another global war the Holy See continued to refrain from any criticism of the Balfour Declaration or the project for a Jewish national home in Palestine. Its policies at no time in this period could be categorized as being anti-Zionist, let alone anti-Semitic. To the extent that its key diocesan bishop in Palestine, the Latin Patriarch, manifested anti-British or anti-Zionist tendencies, the Holy See continued its relentless process of disempowering and isolating him with a view to accommodating its perception of the desires of the British authorities in London and Jerusalem. In pursuing this approach the evidence shows that the Holy See’s constant and overwhelming concern was to ensure that the Holy Places of Palestine should be protected and that the Holy See’s views regarding the Holy Places should be respected and satisfied by the British Mandate authorities. This accorded with what had been for seven centuries, and still remained, the Holy See’s principal policy regarding the Holy Land. The plight of the indigenous Catholic community of the Holy Land remained the Holy See’s second principal policy concern, but it seems evident that this was very much subordinate to the policy regarding the security of the Christian Holy Places.
CHAPTER 5: AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSION – RESPONSE TO THE HYPOTHESIS

5.1. THE FINAL FAILURE OF THE BRITISH MANDATE IN PALESTINE AND THE ATTEMPT BY THE HOLY SEE TO ESTABLISH JERUSALEM AS AN INTERNATIONAL TERRITORY

Soon after the death of Pope Pius XI, Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli was elected as Bishop of Rome and was enthroned as Pope Pius XII on 12 March 1939. With the German invasion of Poland in early September 1939 the world descended once again into global war and the preoccupations of the Holy See were utterly absorbed for the next six years with the progress, effects and consequences of that war. The British Mandate continued to operate and the seething unrest in Palestine abated temporarily due to the very circumstances of the war. The Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Monsignor Barlassina, continued in office during the war, impoverished but undisturbed. He was treated with courtesy by the British administration in Jerusalem despite his Italian nationality and his past reputation for belligerance. He died in the Latin Patriarchate Palace on 27 September 1947.¹ His successor as Latin Patriarch was the Franciscan Custos, Father Albert Gori OFM.² Whereas the life of the once-belligerant Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem came to a peaceful end, the last days of Britain’s Palestine Mandate were not to be peaceful.

Following the conclusion of the Second World War all of the problems which had been apparent in the British Mandate in Palestine before 1939 reasserted themselves and the United Kingdom moved towards a humiliating withdrawal from its obligations as mandatory power, announcing in September 1947 that its mandate would cease at midnight on 14 May 1948. By its Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947 the United Nations General Assembly approved the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state, an Arab state and an internationally administered “Corpus Separatum” containing Jerusalem and Bethlehem, the latter to come into existence no later than

¹ *Le Patriarcat Latin de Jerusalem*, ibid., 14. His successor, Msgr. Albert Gori OFM, was not appointed until 23 November 1949.
² *Jerusalem*, ibid., 184.
1 October 1948 and to be administered under a special international regime by the United Nations Trusteeship Council. After an intense civil war and withdrawal of British troops the independent State of Israel was declared on 14 May 1948, fulfilling the vision of Dr Theodor Herzl almost to the year. In his Audience with Pope Pius X on 25 January 1904 Herzl had offered the Supreme Pontiff the internationalization, or “exterritorialization”, of Jerusalem and the Christian Holy Places of Palestine, an offer which Pius X had ignored and which had never been seriously raised by the Holy See as a policy it wished to pursue in relation to the Holy Land despite the many opportunities it had to do so at the end of the First World War and thereafter. Suddenly, and in the face of the grave crisis consuming the Holy Land, the Holy See took up the cause of internationalization of Jerusalem and Bethlehem as its preferred outcome from the British withdrawal from Palestine.

The Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem and the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa, clearly recognizing the power vacuum which now opened before them in the Holy Land, joined in denouncing “the erroneous policy which has been imposed in the country and which has culminated in the partition of Palestine”. When the UN’s deadline for the establishment of the Jerusalem corpus separatum passed with no sign of its being realized, the Holy See began a public campaign to ensure its implementation as the best means of ensuring the protection of the Holy Places, always the Holy See’s principal priority for the Holy Land. On 24 October 1948 Pope Pius XII issued his Encyclical In multiplicibus curis which deplored “the destruction and damage of sacred buildings and charitable places built around the Holy Places”, and stated that “it would be opportune to give Jerusalem and its outskirts ... an

3 Pappe, 125-127.
4 Herzl, Diaries, 428-429. Herzl made clear to Pope Pius X that the Zionists were not seeking control of Jerusalem and the Holy Places but for the “secular land” of Palestine, Diaries, 429. Herzl’s proposal was that Jerusalem and the Holy Places would form some sort of internationally governed enclave separate from the Jewish state proposed for Palestine. This is what the UN’s 1947 Resolution 181 provided for.
5 Ferrari, Silvio, The Holy See and the Postwar Palestine Issue: The Internationalization of Jerusalem and the Protection of the Holy Places, International Affairs, 60: 2, (Spring 1984), 261-283 at 266.
international character which, in the present circumstances, seems to offer a better guarantee for the protection of the sanctuaries”.

The urgency of the situation in the eyes of the Holy See was signalled by the issue of a second Encyclical on the Holy Places of Palestine on 15 April 1949, *Redemptoris nostri cruciatus*. This referred to “the recent truce” in Palestine and declared that:

> the time has come when Jerusalem and its vicinity, where the previous memorials of the Life and Death of the Divine Redeemer are preserved, should be accorded and legally guaranteed an ‘international’ status, which in the present circumstances seems to offer the best and most satisfactory protection for these sacred monuments.

Forty five years after Theodor Herzl had offered the Holy See the promise of an internationalized Jerusalem the Holy See finally adopted internationalization as the best means of ensuring the maintenance of its primary concern for the Holy Land, the protection of the Holy Places. It must be acknowledged that in both these encyclicals it was the Holy Places, rather than the indigenous Palestinian population, which were the first concern of the Holy See.

That Jerusalem, through all its vicissitudes since 1948, has never yet been established as an internationalized entity and that Jerusalem and Bethlehem are now divided between Israel and the Palestinian state by a terrible concrete wall are self-evident. The Holy See’s last minute attempt to influence a different outcome failed. This thesis traverses a period in the Holy See’s relations with the Holy Land when it might, with more appropriate and considered strategic responses, have been able to secure a better outcome for ensuring the attainment of its two major policies for Palestine, the protection of the Holy Places and the nurturing of the indigenous Catholic population of that land.

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6 Pope Pius XII, *In multiplicibus curis*, 24 October 1948, 2, 4 and 8.

7 Pope Pius XII, *Redemptoris nostri cruciatus*, 15 April 1949, 4 and 9.
5.2. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis begins with a consideration of the encounter between Dr Theodor Herzl, effective founder of Zionism, and Pope Pius X, Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church, at the Vatican on 25 January 1904. For me, the intriguing question which this episode should pose for the historian is, what was the Holy See’s subsequent response to being made aware of the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine? Did the Holy See take it seriously, and develop a policy and strategy for dealing with a proposal whose implementation would ultimately lead to the establishment of the State of Israel? Was the Holy See’s response shaped by anti-Semitism? And all of these questions invite the initial question, just what was the Holy See’s policy regarding the Holy Land, Palestine, up to the time of this momentous Audience between Pius X and Dr Herzl in 1904? And did that policy subsequently change as the implementation of the Zionist project unfolded with vigour and determination through the pontificates of Popes Pius X, Benedict XV and Pius XI?

As Appendix 1 seeks to demonstrate, by the commencement of the Twentieth Century the Holy See had two principal policies in place for the Holy Land, firstly, the protection of the Christian Holy Places, for which the responsible agency was the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa; and secondly, the nurturing of the indigenous Catholic population, for which from 1847 the responsible agency was the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem.

The Audience granted by Pope Pius X to Dr Theodor Herzl on 25 January 1904, the Feast of the Conversion of St Paul, should have placed the Holy See on constructive notice that the Holy Land was about to become the subject of one of the greatest socio-political campaigns of the Twentieth Century, the Zionist project for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine whose ultimate objective was the creation of a separate Jewish state. This encounter offered Pope Pius X, and his Secretary of State, Cardinal Merry del Val, the opportunity to engage with this movement, to consider what it was about and what it might mean for the two key operative papal policies for Palestine, and in particular to consider whether the
proposed internationalization, or ‘extraterritorialization’, of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, might form a useful reinforcement for the Holy See’s overriding policy objective, the security of the Christian Holy Places. The evidence supports the view that, as Great Britain and France did not develop policies for the partition of the Ottoman Empire until after the outbreak of World War One, and as British governmental support for the Zionist project did not emerge until 1915/1916, it was not unreasonable for Pope Pius X and his inexperienced Secretary of State in 1904 to conclude that there was little chance of success for the scheme Dr Theodor Herzl so enthusiastically placed before them.

So, as my initial question poses, what was the Holy See’s subsequent response to being made aware of the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine? Did the Holy See take it seriously, and develop a policy and strategy for dealing with a proposal whose implementation would ultimately lead to the establishment of the State of Israel? Was the Holy See’s response shaped by anti-Semitism? And, in the light of our understanding of what the key policies of the Holy See were towards the Holy Land in 1903/1904, did those policies subsequently change as the implementation of the Zionist project unfolded with vigour and determination through the pontificates of Popes Pius X, Benedict XV and Pius XI? I consider these for each of the three pontificates covered by this thesis.

5.2.1. CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE PONTIFICATE OF POPE PIUS X

At the fateful encounter with Pope Pius X on 25 January 1904 Theodor Herzl outlined the broad scope of the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine, though without foreshadowing the intention that it lead to a Jewish state, and offered some form of internationalization of the Christian Holy Places in and around Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Pope Pius X vigorously rejected any papal endorsement of this concept and promised that, if large-scale Jewish immigration to Palestine was to occur, the Catholic Church would be ready with both churches and priests to greet and baptise the new arrivals. Whilst the Pope’s response was manifestly negative towards the Zionist project, I would argue that it was not anti-Semitic. There is no evidence that the Holy See developed an internal policy position at this time to give
consideration to the Zionist project and its possible ramifications for the Holy See and its policies for the Holy Land. Pope Pius X gave no further public pronouncements about the Holy Land during his pontificate. One must look at such actions as he undertook with regard to Palestine to attempt some discernment of a policy response to Theodor Herzl’s explication of the Zionist project.

In fact, there were only two actions which Pope Pius X subsequently carried out which had any direct or material bearing on the Holy Land. The first was his filling of the office of Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem by the appointment of Monsignor Camassei in November 1906. The fact that the Holy See left the office of Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem vacant for almost two years when it had, the previous January, been apprised of the Zionist plans for Palestine, suggest that this was not an issue with any real priority for the Holy See at this time, when both the Pope and his Secretary of State were struggling with the split between Church and State in France. During this period Pope Pius X told one enquirer that he was searching for “a saint for Jerusalem”, evidencing his intention to find a person of the highest calibre for the office, a “holy” man, a “saint”. We are entitled to conclude that, despite the distractions of the French dispute, Pope Pius X gave very serious attention to the selection of the best person for the office of Latin Patriarch and resolved the matter by removing a recently appointed bishop from his see because the Jerusalem appointment was a far greater priority and Camassei was seen as being particularly well-suited to the position.

The second significant action which Pope Pius X undertook which related to the Holy Land was the issuing of his Apostolic Letter, *Quam multa*, on 3 May 1907 reforming the Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulchre and proclaiming himself Grand Master of that Order, an office previously held by the previous two Latin Patriarchs of Jerusalem. When Monsignor Camassei was appointed Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem the Grand Mastership of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre was withheld from him and, shortly afterwards, the Pope himself had taken this office for himself. What was the meaning of this action? Did it foreshadow some grand and visionary chivalric role for the Supreme Pontiff in relation to the Holy Land? The evidence shows that Pope
Pius X took some interest in appointments to the Order of the Holy Sepulchre from 1907 until his death in 1914 but otherwise took no action to indicate any significant level of involvement in the affairs of this Order, let alone that he sought to use it to develop some form of response to the pursuit by the Zionists of their plans for the Holy Land. The facts support the conclusion that the 1907 reform of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre had no connection whatsoever with Pope Pius X’s Audience with Dr Herzl in 1904 or with any resultant concerns about the Zionist project for Palestine. Rather, the 1907 reform of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre derived from attacks on the Order by the Italian Consulta Araldica which sought to have the Italian Government withdraw recognition of the Order on the basis that its knighthoods were paid for and that appointments to its ranks were not made by a sovereign head of state. Had this attack been successful it would have seriously eroded the standing of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre and reduced its capacity to generate revenue for the work of the Catholic Church in Palestine, undermining the financial viability of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem. The 1907 reform was therefore directed solely at bolstering the credentials of the Order by emphasising that the Supreme Pontiff himself was its head as Grand Master and that he approved all appointments to membership in the Order. It appears that this strategy was entirely successful at the time and brought to an immediate end attempts to undermine this ancient chivalric Order and thereby ensured that it could go on underwriting the operations of the Latin Catholic Church in the Holy Land. This was therefore not a new policy or a new strategy to respond to the Zionist project, but rather the strengthening of a strategy in support of the second of the Holy See’s long-established policies for the Holy Land, the nurturing of the indigenous Catholic population of Palestine through the pastoral and mission work of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem.

It is necessary now to examine the way in which Monsignor Camassei conducted himself as Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem to determine whether his own policies and practices on the ground in Jerusalem gave any sign of a response to the Zionist project for Palestine in compliance with some instructions from the Holy See. Whilst it is evident that Monsignor Camassei was, indeed, a worthy “saint for Jerusalem”, being almost universally revered and admired by all who came in contact with him,
there is no evidence that he either pursued policies intended to respond to the Zionist project and its anticipated effects or was ever asked by the Holy See to do so. No correspondence between him and the Holy See ever made mention of the Zionist project or such issues as Jewish immigration and its actual or potential effects in Palestine. His concerns were never about matters to do with Jews and Muslims, but were constantly about the relationship between Latin and Greek or Oriental Catholics, and with the Greek Orthodox ‘schismatics’ and the Protestant ‘heretics’. Monsignor Camassei’s work was focussed on the very slow growth of the indigenous Latin Catholic population of the Holy Land and of missions, schools, hospitals, orphanages, and the like to assist that population in Palestine and in the Trans-Jordan regions. In response to Monsignor Camassei’s May 1910 Report on the state of his diocese, Cardinal Gotti of Propaganda Fide raised only three concerns, the need for a diocesan synod, the need for the Latin Patriarch to visit the Trans-Jordan region, and the need to reduce the number of marriages between Latin Catholic women and men of other Christian rites, which resulted in the loss of those women and their children to the Latin rite. There is no suggestion in the correspondence of the least sense of awareness of the unfolding of the Zionist project. There is no correspondence or documentation between the Holy See and the Latin Patriarchate from 1907 to 1914 which could be categorised as anti-Zionist, let alone anti-Semitic. These sorts of matter were simply not on the radar of the Holy See or the Latin Patriarchate at this time. Rather, it was the continual recital of rivalries with other Christian denominations, whether Greek Catholic, Orthodox or Protestant.

One may therefore conclude that the Holy See’s subsequent response during the pontificate of Pope Pius X to being made aware of the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine was to do nothing. The Holy See appears not to have taken the Zionist project seriously and neither at the level of the Supreme Pontiff himself, nor at that of the Secretary of State nor of the Prefect of Propaganda Fide nor within any other dicastery of the Roman Curia during the pontificate of Pope Pius X were policies and strategies developed for dealing with the Zionist project and its promoters. The Holy See made no change during the pontificate of Pope Pius X to its two historic policies for the Holy Land, the protection of the Christian Holy Places
and the nurturing of the indigenous Palestinian Catholic population. Whereas one might conclude that Pope Pius X showed some signs of being anti-Zionist in his response to Dr Herzl on 25 January 1904 there was no sign of anti-Semitism and Pope Pius X never again expressed any view on the subject. I would suggest that he gave it no further thought because he did not consider that it had the least likelihood of realization. In this the Pope was very like many other people of the day. For the Holy See and the Latin Patriarch there was no consideration of the likely or remotely possible consequences of the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. This only arose with the outbreak of World War One, an event swiftly followed by the death of Pope Pius X, the Pope who met the Father of the State of Israel and declined to help him.

5.2.2. CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE PONTIFICATE OF POPE BENEDICT XV

The outbreak of World War One, followed shortly by the election of Pope Benedict XV, presented the Holy See with an immediate and grave crisis which threatened both of the Holy See’s two long-term policies for the Holy Land, the protection of the Holy Places and the guarding of the interests of the indigenous Catholic population of the Holy Land and the conduct there of the Catholic Church’s pastoral and mission work. France lost its traditional historic role as Protecting Power of the Catholic interest in the Ottoman Empire through the unilateral revocation of all Capitulations by the Sublime Porte in September 1914. The successive seizures of Catholic properties in Palestine controlled by French and Italian religious orders in 1914 and 1915 could have had the effect of destroying in a short period all that had been achieved, not least by the Franciscan Order, in securing the key Christian Holy Places for the Catholic Church since 1217.

The difficulties in communication between Jerusalem and the Vatican due to the war and the need to work through the Apostolic Delegation in Constantinople/Istanbul could have proven fatal to the interests of the Holy See. Instead, supported by the neutral Spanish Government’s half-Jewish Consul in Jerusalem, and through the diplomatic and representational skills of Monsignor Dolci, the Apostolic Delegate in Constantinople, and of Monsignor Camassei, the Latin Patriarch in Jerusalem, the Holy See was able to advance its case that all these properties were actually owned
by the Holy See itself, which was neutral, and that they should be able to be
entrusted to his principal representative in Jerusalem, the Latin Patriarch. This
approach highlighted the importance to the Holy See of effective representation on
the ground in Jerusalem as well as having a skilled negotiator in Constantinople/
Istanbul. The clear view was that the Catholic Church fared better in Palestine than
elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire due in no small part to the skills and personal
stature of Monsignor Camassei.

In the vacuum which surrounded Monsignor Camassei from 1916 to 1918 pursuant
to his isolation and abduction, the Holy See showed no sign of awareness of, let
alone developed a policy response to, Britain’s Balfour Declaration of November
1917 as it struggled to reassert its authority over the Catholic Church in Palestine.
Only with the assumption of office by Monsignor Luigi Barlassina in July 1919,
coincidental with the installation of the new British High Commissioner for Palestine,
Sir Herbert Samuel, did the Holy See have back in place the two key institutions for
the administration of its two historic policies for the Holy Land, the Franciscan
Custode to administer the Holy Places and the Latin Patriarch to oversee the care of
the indigenous Latin Catholic population of Palestine and the Trans-Jordan and the
pastoral and mission work of the Catholic Church. The Holy See had little opportunity
to review or fine-tune those two policies in this period and simply responded to the
unfolding of circumstances imposed upon it, the British capture of Jerusalem and the
establishment of a British mandate over Palestine subject to the terms of the Balfour
Declaration.

Pope Benedict XV had met with the Zionist leader, Nahum Sokolow, in May 1917 and
had expressed great good-will for the Zionist project, voicing the hope that the
Catholic Church and the inflowing Jewish settlers in Palestine would be “good
neighbours”. The Holy See did not, during the period covered by this thesis, ever
resile from that official position of accepting the Zionist project for a Jewish national
home in Palestine subject to the rights and privileges of the pre-existing
communities of that territory. At no point can its position ever be taken to be anti-
Zionist, let alone anti-Semitic. Rather, it sought to make the best of events and to
work with the British government in London and with its mandate officials in Jerusalem to ensure the ongoing attainment of its two long-term policy objectives for the Holy Land. Just as it had accommodated itself to Ottoman rule for almost five hundred years, so now the Holy See accommodated itself to British rule, about which Pope Benedict XV felt very sanguine, trusting in the fairness of British institutions.

The Holy See was not, however, merely passive in the last years of the pontificate of Benedict XV, though it was often reactive rather than proactive in responding to events. For Pope Pius X it had seemed sufficient to appoint a “saint” as Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem and then leave him to administer his See. Now the Holy See must be far more active in the affairs of and relating to Palestine, in particular, and must seek to influence major international treaty outcomes. In this period, the Holy See resisted British attempts to influence the appointment of a British or American candidate as Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Pope Benedict XV making his own choice of Monsignor Barlassina. Yet at the same time the Holy See began the involvement of the Irish-American, and distinctly pro-British, Father Robinson in reviewing various matters in the Holy Land to provide it with the necessary advice to guide its own responses. This began what would accelerate in the next pontificate, the progressive diminution by the Holy See of the role of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem as the key representative of the Holy See in Jerusalem. In this we may see, not the development of a new policy but rather a different way to pursue the second of the key historic policies of the Holy See for the Holy Land, the care for the indigenous Catholic population of the Holy land and the pastoral and mission work of the Catholic Church in the Holy Land. This highlighted that the Holy See’s principal policy for the Holy Land in this period remained the security of and care for the Holy Places. It was determined that, however events turned out with the British administration in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, it would maintain a good working relationship with the British authorities so that it could influence the outcomes it wanted for the Holy Places.
Caught up in the wake of events leading to the conclusion of the war the Holy See missed significant opportunities which arose to shape outcomes that might have been in its own policy interests. The most important of these was the proposed creation, by the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, of an international zone encompassing Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth. Given that the internationalization of Jerusalem would become the Holy See’s preferred policy position in 1947 and onwards to secure the Holy Places, it may be seen as a serious missed opportunity that the Holy See was not to take this up as its preferred policy position in 1917-1919, though Cardinal Gasparri did show some sign of recognizing it as a worthwhile goal. Because the Holy See was reactive rather than proactive in this period, it simply failed to capitalize on the unfolding circumstances to seize any kind of initiative, especially in the vacuum which existed as General Allenby settled into Jerusalem and Francois Georges-Picot was chafing at the bit at the Jaffa Gate to be French Commissioner of the proposed international zone around Jerusalem with the aid of a restored French Protectorate.

However reactive, rather than proactive, the Holy See was in this last period of the pontificate of Pope Benedict XV, there is no doubt that the Supreme Pontiff himself was deeply interested in what was happening in Palestine and wanted to ensure outcomes acceptable to the Holy See. His Allocution of 10 March 1919, his Motu Proprio Nuper ex venerabilis of the following day, and his Allocution Causa nobis of 13 June 1921, given in the wake of the Jaffa Riots of May 1921, all sought to appeal to the whole Catholic world to support outcomes acceptable to the two key long-term policies of the Holy See and the evidence is that they were listened to and did have real influence. The Holy See’s Secretary of State, the wily Cardinal Gasparri, was tireless in seeking to influence outcomes in relation to the draft Palestine Mandate which would facilitate achieving the Holy See’s desired goals for the Holy Places, especially in regard to the proposed Holy Places Commission, its purpose and membership. In this period the Holy See eschewed support for the reestablishment of the French Protecorate in the former Ottoman territories, determined to take responsibility for protecting its own interests in those places. It was the reading by the Italian Foreign Minister Sonnino at the San Remo Conference in April 1920 of a
letter from Cardinal Gasparri which sealed the demise of any serious French strategy to revive the Protectorate. Whilst Pope Benedict XV adopted an approach which never criticized the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine in any of his public or private statements, Cardinal Gasparri did engage in off the record briefing which sought to contain the more extreme manifestations of Zionism at this time, and made quite clear that the Holy See did not support an independent Jewish state in Palestine. The Holy See also helped influence the eventual confinement of the scope of the Balfour Declaration to Palestine west of the Jordan, and to exclude its application in the Trans-Jordan.

In response to the original questions posed by this thesis, one may take it that the May 1917 Audience between Nahum Sokolow and Pope Benedict XV most definitely made the Holy See aware of the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine, but that the Holy See did not take it seriously at the time, and made no effort to develop a policy and strategy for dealing with the Zionist project. It was therefore taken unawares by the Balfour Declaration in November 1917 and its preoccupations both in Europe and in Palestine from late 1917 to late 1918 left it absolutely unable to develop such a policy or do more than react to the dramatic and unfolding events. At no time does it appear that the Holy See in this period took stands which were anti-Zionist, let alone anti-Semitic. It did urge that the more extreme aspects of the Zionist project should be contained, and it was tireless in its efforts both to secure the best outcomes for the Holy Places and to ensure that the non-Jewish, and especially Catholic, indigenous population of Palestine should receive equal treatment by the new British administration in Palestine as the Palestine Mandate came to be implemented. In this it sought only to ensure the precise protections guaranteed by the Balfour Declaration itself.

What really changed in the last years of the pontificate of Pope Benedict XV was that, with the global war now concluded, the Holy See could begin to give serious attention to questions such as Palestine. This it did, both within the Secretariat of State and by sending trusted emissaries to the Holy Land, notably Father Robinson,
to help keep it informed and rather than relying only on its own diocesan bishop, the Latin Patriarch.

The evidence supports the conclusion that, by the end of the pontificate of Pope Benedict XV, the two key historic policies of the Holy See for the Holy Land remained firmly in place, the protection of the Holy Places and the protecting of the indigenous Catholic population’s interests and the pastoral and mission work of the Catholic Church. However, the Holy See now fully accepted, and was totally engaged with, the radically altered geopolitical dynamic which flowed from the defeat and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the assumption by Great Britain of unrivalled power and influence in and over the Middle East at the Paris Peace Conferences and thereafter. London had replaced Constantinople/Istanbul as the hegemonic seat of power in relation to the Holy Land which the Holy See must placate, and Jerusalem was occupied by usually fair-minded ‘Englishmen’ seeking to make sense of the promises given in the Balfour Declaration to both Jewish and non-Jewish peoples in Palestine whilst they gave Garden Parties and Costume Balls. The policies did not change, but the operating environment had changed for ever and the Holy See worked with all its will to be able to influence the outcomes from that changed operating environment to ensure the attainment of its key policies, of which the first and foremost was always the protection of the Christian Holy Places.

5.2.3. CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE PONTIFICATE OF POPE PIUS XI

The pontificate of Pope Pius XI is marked by an intense period of engagement by the Holy See in the affairs of the Holy Land in its earlier and later years, with a long period of disengagement in between which reflects the intensity, firstly, of the Supreme Pontiff’s interest in the resolution of the “Roman Question” with the Kingdom of Italy; and, secondly, of the Holy See’s absorption in the rise of totalitarian dictatorships, virulent anti-Semitism and the drift towards renewed global war. The pontificate of Pope Pius XI did not open a new era for the Holy See, with Cardinal Gasparri continuing as Secretary of State for the next seven years, until after the Lateran Treaty was signed. There was thus considerable continuity at the outset in the way in which the Holy See approached the issues before it. The new
Pope had visited the Holy Land for himself and he regularly manifested a keen interest in the affairs pertaining to Palestine. However, initially it was Cardinal Gasparri who set the pace of papal policy with regard to the Holy Land.

In the first period of intense papal engagement in this pontificate, 1922-1923, the Holy See through its Secretariat of State undertook a major role in international negotiations regarding the establishment of Britain’s Palestine Mandate. It successfully delayed the international endorsement of the draft Mandate and procured, in the end, the outcome it saw as vital to its own principal policy for the Holy Land, the protection of the Holy Places, by preventing the acceptance and implementation of the provisions relating to the proposed Holy Places Commission, and brokering the agreement to the ongoing application of the historic Status Quo for the Holy Places, a regime which remains in place to this day. In this period the Holy See also set itself firmly on a path of accommodation to the incoming British power in Palestine, and the Middle East, with a view to ensuring that its concerns about the Holy Places would always be addressed favourably by the British authorities. Overall, the record suggests that this policy was quite successful, the Catholic Church remaining in possession of the greater majority of the Christian Holy Places of Palestine throughout the period of British rule. In this initial period, the Holy See gave a far lesser emphasis to its second historic policy for the Holy Land, the care for and welfare of the indigenous Catholic population and the pastoral and mission work of the Catholic Church in the Holy Land. Despite the occasional signs of the local Catholic populace wanting more indigenous priests and an indigenous bishop, these issues never captured the attention of the Holy See. Rather, the serious discussion was often about whether a bishop should be French, or Italian, or ‘English’, the saga of the appointment of the completely unsuitable Father Godric Kean as Auxiliary Bishop of Jerusalem in order to placate British wishes highlighting the primacy of the first policy consideration over the second in this period.

What this initial period of the pontificate of Pope Pius XI does show is that the Holy See was fully alive to the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine and that it pursued all of its strategies for the Holy Land in the light of that awareness.
Once again, as under Pope Benedict XV, the Supreme Pontiff never decried the Zionist project, nor manifested anti-Zionist, let alone anti-Semitic, tendencies. There was never, in this pontificate a call by the Holy See to withdraw or restrict the terms of the Balfour Declaration nor to moderate the volume of Jewish immigration to Palestine. The Holy See’s Secretary of State, Cardinal Gasparri, would make off-the-record remarks which made clear that the Holy See opposed the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine and the more extreme manifestations of Zionism, but he never called for an end to the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine.

In the long period from 1924 to 1936 which marked the less intense middle period of this pontificate’s engagement with the Holy Land we continue to see the two historic policies of the Holy See remaining firmly in place but being pursued in a more measured way. In this period the Holy See definitely did develop strategies for the Holy Land, but they were all directed at the ongoing attainment of the two historic policies rather than at the development of alternative policies. The most remarkable of these new strategies was the progressive divestment of the Latin Patriarch, Monsignor Barlassina, of functions and status, reducing him ultimately to a purely pastoral role and precluding his capacity to speak for the wider Catholic Church in relation to the affairs of the Holy Land. The Holy See’s *eminence grise* in this process was the Irish-American Father, later Monsignor, Robinson, though the deliverer of the ultimate *coup de grace* was Cardinal Tisserant in 1938. This process served both of the two historic policies of the Holy See. The Latin Patriarch, the ebullient and often belligerent Monsignor Barlassina, frequently alienated British officials, and his outspoken attacks on the more extreme manifestations of the Zionist program, whilst never calling for the revocation of the Balfour Declaration, were relentless in their pursuit of the protection of the historic rights of the Catholic Church and its members in Palestine. He therefore posed a threat to the accommodation the Holy See wished to maintain with the British authorities. The Holy See, whilst it virtually never removed a bishop from office, wanted so to limit and circumscribe Barlassina’s scope of action that he would pose no danger to the key relationship of the Holy See with the new hegemonic power in the Holy Land,
Great Britain. In doing this to Barlassina it reduced his capacity to provide useful briefing to the Holy See but it is evident that under both Cardinals Gasparri and Pacelli this was thought a price worth paying. The removal of his capacity to speak for the Holy See and the establishment of an Apostolic Delegate for Palestine, albeit based in Egypt, completed one aspect of the local diocesan bishop’s disempowerment with a view to limiting the amount of negative impact he could have on relationships with the British authorities in London and Jerusalem.

Linked to this creeping strategy aimed at attainment of the principal historic policy was a second strategy pursued by the Congregation for the Eastern Churches within the Holy See from about 1924. Its aim was to facilitate the attainment of the Holy See’s second historic policy, the nurturing of the local Catholic population and the pastoral and mission work of the Catholic Church, especially in Palestine and the Trans-Jordan. This strategy proposed the drawing together of all parts of the Catholic Church and its mission in the Holy Land into the operational oversight of the Congregation for the Eastern Churches with a view to better addressing the needs of the Oriental or Greek rite population in the hope of receiving significant numbers of the Orthodox population of the Holy Land into the Catholic Church. At no point in the period covered by this thesis did the Holy See or the Latin or Greek Catholic bishops in the Holy Land focus any missionary effort on the Jewish and Muslim populations. The strictures of Popes and Patriarchs of the period were rather directed at the “schismatic” [Orthodox] and “heretical” [Protestant] churches and populations in the Holy Land, the erection of the YMCA “Palace” in Jerusalem being the particular focus of the Catholic Church’s ire. Barlassina fought this proposed transfer of oversight for almost fifteen years and faced his ultimate disempowerment in May of 1938 when he learned, belatedly, that by the Motu Proprio Sancta Dei Ecclesia of 25 March 1938, Pope Pius XI had signed over the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem into the control of Cardinal Tisserant at the Congregation for the Eastern Churches. By then Monsignor Barlassina was a spent force, though he lingered on in dignity until his death in his Patriarchal Palace at Jerusalem in 1947.
The record of these relationships during the pontificate of Pope Pius XI highlights that the polices of the Holy See are not necessarily those of the local diocesan bishop and that the Holy See’s capacity to curb and control a local bishop, other than for patent misconduct, is extremely limited and very reluctantly resorted to. The Holy See, in the period from 1924 to 1939, engaged in some extreme wiles and strategems to curb and confine its own principal diocesan bishop in Palestine, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem.

The revocation by Pope Pius XI in 1928 of his title as Grand Master of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre, whatever its substantive justification, suggested a lessening of interest by that Pope in affairs pertaining to the Holy Land. The failure of the Holy See to send a Papal Legate for the closure of the Holy Year of the Redemption in 1935 further signalled the distraction of its attention from the Holy Land as the situation in Europe deteriorated.

The last frenetic burst of activity by the Holy See in relation to the Holy Land in the period covered by this thesis was prompted not by the outbreak of the Great Arab Revolt in Palestine in April of 1936, which it appears to have ignored, but rather when it became belatedly aware of the Peel Report’s proposals in July 1937 for the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish territories with a small remaining British Mandate over Jerusalem and Bethlehem linked to the port at Jaffa by a land corridor. The long period of disempowerment of its local diocesan, the Latin Patriarch, had led to his failure to brief the Secretariat of State about the likelihood of this development and meant that the Holy See was ignorant of the imminence of this proposal, leaving it without any immediate response to what the Peel Report put forward. The Holy See was caught completely flat-footed. When it did become aware of what now stood in prospect, placing in jeopardy its historic policies for the Holy Land, it was in defense of both those policies that it now vigorously campaigned.

Having been utterly overlooked by the members of the Peel Commission when conducting its enquiry, the Holy See was now accorded some real priority by the British Government as it sought such allies as it could find in the difficult situation brought about by its determination to implement the Balfour Declaration in
Palestine from 1917. The Holy See once again considered the possible advantages of an international zone administering Jerusalem and Bethlehem under British control, but its adherence to both of its historic long-term policies for the Holy Land, the security of the Holy Places and the welfare of the indigenous Catholic community and Catholic pastoral and mission work, left it reluctant to agree to any outcome which broke Palestine up into three separate territories. Opposition by the Holy See simply compounded that from elsewhere to the notion of division, and the Woodhead Commission went through its remedial exercise and recommended that partition of Palestine be abandoned.

If there was ever a time for the Holy See to have engaged in a strategic rethink of its policies for Palestine, and the best ways to achieve them, this was the time. For the third time the Holy See failed to recognize the potential advantages of internationalization of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, “exterritorialization” in the word of Herzl to Pope Pius X in 1904. Instead, it pushed for the maintenance of the British Mandate over a united Palestine, in the face of the abundant evidence that British rule in Palestine must come to an end very soon. This was the time to help shape an acceptable outcome to secure the great majority of the Holy Places under an international regime. The Holy See, perhaps to its credit, gave equal weight in this period to both its historic policies and did not wish to agree to partition on the grounds, inter alia, that this would harm the indigenous Catholic community and the pastoral and mission work of the Catholic Church. However, there is no sign that a serious analysis ever took place within the Holy See in this period as to the likely trend of events. In fact, as the historical record tells us, the May 1939 White Paper moved Britain towards the establishment of an independent Arab state in Palestine within ten years, whilst actual events, including the horrors of global war and the Holocaust, pushed the Zionist project inexorably towards its final goal, the establishment of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948. As this political and military reality unfolded, the Holy See at last decided in 1947 to support a policy for an independent international zone around Jerusalem and Bethlehem. It was too little and far too late.
5.3. RESPONSES TO THE HYPOTHESIS

I commenced this thesis with a primary and a subordinate hypothesis:

that the Holy See adhered throughout the period covered by this thesis to its two long-established policies towards the Holy Land of protecting the Christian Holy Places and nurturing the indigenous Catholic population, never adopting a different policy in response to the unfolding of events in Palestine from 1903 to 1939;

and:

that whilst the Holy See never clearly supported the Zionist project, neither did it oppose it during the period traversed by this thesis in any meaningful manner, and that its responses to the unfolding of the Zionist project for a Jewish national home were never driven by anti-Semitism, but rather were guided by its two long-established priorities for Palestine, the protection of the Holy Places and the care for and nurturing of the indigenous Catholic population.

My response to these hypotheses is that the historical record of the period considered in this thesis confirms them. The primary hypothesis is born out on the face of the record as is the subordinate hypothesis.

At the outset of the pontificate of Pope Pius X in August 1903 there were two long-established policies of the Holy See for the Holy Land, the protection of the Christian Holy Places and the nurturing of the indigenous Catholic population and the pastoral and mission work of the Catholic Church in the Holy Land, especially in Palestine and the Trans-Jordan regions. The response of Pius X to Herzl on 25 January 1904 may be taken to have been unwelcoming to the Zionist project, but it was not followed by any policies or strategies which can be labelled anti-Zionist, let alone anti-Semitic. Pope Pius X developed no new policies for the Holy Land and neither Propaganda Fide, the responsible dicastery in Rome, nor the Latin Patriarch in Jerusalem pursued any policies or strategies which opposed the Zionist project or Jewish immigration to Palestine in any way. It was as if the encounter between Dr Herzl and Pope Pius X had
never occurred. It left no mark on the record of the Holy See. It is to the Central Zionist Archive in Jerusalem that one must go to find any record of the event. For the Holy See, it was a non-event.

The two historic policies of the Holy Land for the Holy See remained firmly in place at the outset of the pontificate of Pope Benedict XV in September 1914 but were thrown into disarray by the revoking of the French Capitulations and the subsequent seizure of Catholic Church properties in Palestine. The work done by the Holy See, in Rome, Constantinople/Istanbul and Jerusalem, from 1914 to 1916 was firmly directed at the protection of the Holy Places, always the Holy See’s first priority for the Holy Land. The record of the Holy See’s engagement with the post-war peace negotiations and the drafting of the Palestine mandate all show that the Holy Places remained the Holy See’s first concern, followed next by its concern for the rights of the indigenous Catholic population and the pastoral and mission work of the Catholic Church, proselytizing continuing to be confined to the local Orthodox and Protestant populations, and not to Jews or Muslims. The very warmth of Pope Benedict XV’s reported encounter with the Zionist leader, Nahum Sokolow, in 1917 demonstrates, upon the evidence of the Zionist records themselves, that this Pope was not anti-Zionist, let alone anti-Semitic. In all of the post-war negotiations relating to the Holy Land, Benedict XV never uttered one word decrying the Balfour Declaration or calling for the confinement of its scope. Secretary of State Gasparri was left to counter the notion that a separate Jewish state should one day emerge in Palestine.

The two historic policies of the Holy See for the Holy Land continued undisturbed throughout the pontificate of Pope Pius XI from 1922 to 1939, the eve of renewed global war. They informed and underpinned the final negotiations by the Holy See for the Palestine Mandate and the securing of the ongoing maintenance of the historical Status Quo for the Holy Places. Following a long period of quiescence by the Holy See with regard to the Holy Land, the 1937 Peel Report’s recommendation of partition for Palestine into Arab and Jewish states with a continuing international zone under British rule drew the Holy See back into a final burst of activity over Palestine. In this process the Holy See did not give any fresh consideration to whether its two historic
policies for the Holy Land needed reviewing or continued to be appropriate. Rather, the Holy See pursued both of those policies, allowing them to shape its decision to reject partition and the concept of an internationalized Jerusalem and Bethlehem, site of the principal Christian Holy Places. At no time during this pontificate did the Supreme Pontiff utter a single word to decry the Zionist project or to call for the containment of the Balfour Declaration and the reduction of Jewish immigration. The consistent theme of the Holy See was always that the Balfour Declaration should be implemented and pursued according to its letter, which guaranteed the existing rights of local communities as the project for the Jewish national home took shape.

At the death of Pope Pius XI on 10 February 1939 the policies of the Holy See for the Holy Land remained what they had been at the outset of the pontificate of Pope Pius X on 4 August 1903. The protection of the Christian Holy Places of Palestine remained the principal of the two historic policies, and the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa remained, as it does today, the body principally responsible on the ground in Palestine to ensure its viability and success. The nurturing of the local indigenous Catholic community and the pastoral and mission work of the Catholic Church remained the second of the two historic policies in place, but the strategies for achieving this policy had changed. The principal local bishop, the Latin Patriarch, had been divested of powers and functions and confined to a purely pastoral role. The Propaganda Fide dicastery had lost its responsibility for the Latin Patriarchate and this had been secured by the Congregation for the Eastern Churches, placing the Latin Catholic rite on the same footing as the Eastern Catholic churches in Palestine. Both of these two historic policies of the Holy See for the Holy Land had stood the test of time. The question which arises with regard to them is whether the Holy See might have developed better strategies to secure them for the future.
APPENDIX 1.

THE ROADS TO THE HOLY SEPULCHRE

PAPAL POLICY ON PALESTINE FROM THE CRUSADES TO THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

A SYNOPSIS BASED ON SECONDARY MATERIALS

1.1.1. THE STARTING POINT FOR LOOKING BACK

On 25 January 1904, the Feast of the Conversion of St Paul, His Holiness Pope Pius X met in Audience at the Vatican Palace with Dr Theodor Herzl, leader of the Zionist movement and Father of the modern State of Israel.¹ In that historic encounter Herzl sought support from the Holy See for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, with Jerusalem being “exterritorialized”, “not to be placed in Jewish hands”, intending to anticipate and address Catholic concerns about the Christian holy places in Jerusalem.² Herzl recorded in his Diary the next day that the Pope “answered in a stern categorical manner: ‘Noi non possiamo favorire questo movimento’” ['We are not able to favour this movement’], and concluded with the promise that “if you come to Palestine and settle your people there, we will be ready with churches and priests to baptize all of you”.³

The Israeli diplomat and historian Sergio I. Minerbi has observed of this encounter that:

Politically, Zionism posed a greater threat to the Holy Places in Jerusalem than did the Islamic regime there. On this point centers the main problem of the Vatican’s attitude towards Zionism, for the Catholic Church saw itself as the only possible truth. After a struggle of hundreds of years for the safeguarding of Catholic rights

² Lowenthal, 428.
³ Lowenthal, 428, 430.
in the Holy Places against other Christian communities and against the Ottoman regime, the Vatican was now confronting a new element: Zionism.4

This section seeks to explore what the Holy See’s policy had been towards Palestine from the late Eleventh Century to the beginning of the Twentieth Century in order to lay a proper foundation for understanding the reaction of Pope Pius X towards the Zionist project and the subsequent unfolding of Vatican policy towards the Holy Land in the pontificates of Popes Pius X, Benedict XV and Pius XI leading up to the establishment of the modern State of Israel in 1948.

1.1.2. POPE URBAN II AND THE CRUSADES AS THE INSTRUMENT OF PAPAL POLICY IN PALESTINE

It goes without saying that the Holy Land was a place of foremost interest for the Catholic Church because it was the place in which Jesus Christ lived, conducted his public ministry, died, rose from the dead and ascended; it was the place in which the Emperor Constantine through the agency of his mother, the Empress Helen, established major shrines at the key sites connected with Christ, notably the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. From the Fourth Century Christians from Europe made pilgrimages to the Holy Land, the Lady Egeria leaving a vivid account of her pilgrimage in the Fifth Century.5 In 614 a Persian-Jewish army ended the golden age of Christian Jerusalem, and in 638 Jerusalem was occupied by the Muslim Caliph ‘Umar/Omar.6 Christian pilgrimages continued to Palestine under Muslim rule with varying degrees of toleration and difficulty until the reign of the Fatimid Caliph Hakim, who in 1009 oversaw the destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. In 1071 Palestine was occupied by a vassal of the Seljuq Turks and this aroused renewed concerns in Europe about the possible intentions of a new and unknown Muslim power. This was the geopolitical environment in which Pope Urban II

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6 Kildani, Hanna, *Modern Christianity in the Holy Land*, (Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2010), at 4-8, sets out an excellent account of the approach of the Caliph Omar and his successors to Christianity in Jerusalem.
launched his campaign for a Christian Crusade to seize the Holy Land from its latest Islamic rulers.

Odo de Lagery, a French nobleman and ecclesiastic, was elected as bishop of Rome in 1088 with the regnal name of Pope Urban II. On 27 November 1095 in the French town of Clermont Pope Urban II addressed a large gathering of nobles and ecclesiastics from Western Europe, urging them to:

Let the Holy Sepulchre of the Lord our Saviour, which is possessed by unclean nations, especially incite you, and the Holy Places which are now treated with ignominy and irreverently polluted with their filthiness. ... Enter upon the roads to the Holy Sepulchre; wrest that land from the wicked race, and subject it to yourselves.\(^7\)

The driving concern of Pope Urban II’s policy towards Palestine was thus the perceived need to free the Christian Holy Places from alien rule and to secure the capacity of Christian pilgrimages to take place there without interference. On 15 July 1099 Godfrey de Bouillon led the resulting army of Western European Crusaders in occupying the Holy City of Jerusalem, and his kinsmen ruled the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem until its surrender to the Muslim leader Saladin on 2 October 1187. Various Popes would seek to encourage further Crusades to capture Jerusalem until the death of Pope Pius II at Ancona on 15 August 1464, awaiting the arrival of a Venetian fleet to take a Christian army to the Holy Land.\(^8\) Crusades as a papal weapon to address the concerns of the Holy See regarding Palestine were effectively dead. The Holy See would need to find other means of addressing its concerns about the Holy Land and the Holy Places, and it found these readily at hand in the Franciscan Order.


1.1.3. THE FRANCISCAN PRESENCE IN PALESTINE AND THE FRANCISCAN ORDER’S ROLE AS AGENT OF PAPAL POLICY

Whilst the principal policy implementation strategy that the Holy See had used for four hundred years had been the Crusade to secure the control of the Holy Places in Palestine, only the first of which was actually successful in attaining the Holy See’s objectives, the means by which the objectives of the Holy See could be pursued took shape almost imperceptibly with the establishment of the Franciscan Order’s presence there. In May of 1217, at the first Chapter meeting of the Friars Minor of Francis of Assisi, the recently established Franciscan Order created as one of its eleven regions one for the Orient which would comprise the Byzantine Empire, Syria, Palestine and Egypt.\(^9\) In late 1217 Franciscan friars landed at Acre/Akka and founded their first convent, the Order growing throughout the region by means of its work serving the spiritual needs of the Crusaders, of European merchants in the area, and of Christian prisoners who had fallen into the hands of Muslims.\(^10\) The Franciscans established a convent in Jerusalem in 1229 during the brief period of negotiated Christian rule there under Emperor Frederick II and withdrew to Acre/Akka when that rule ended.\(^11\) The last bastion of the Crusader presence in Palestine collapsed with the fall of Acre/Akka in 1291, following which the Franciscans withdrew from Palestine to Cyprus, preparing themselves for a return to the Holy Land, which they quietly began under dangerous circumstances and without any official approval from the Islamic authorities, their apostolate focussing on the assistance of Christian pilgrims.\(^12\)

This work of the Franciscan Order in Palestine was greatly assisted by a treaty of friendship entered into in 1290 by King Alfonso II of Aragon with the Mamluk Sultan in Cairo, Al-Malik Al-Ashraf Khalil, by the terms of which twelve Franciscan friars of Spanish origin were given the right to celebrate Mass in the Church of the Holy

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\(^10\) Pieraccini, 45.

\(^11\) Pieraccini, 46.

\(^12\) Pieraccini, 46.
Sepulchre in Jerusalem and the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. This provided the foundation for the development of the Spanish protectorate of the Franciscan Order in the Holy Land and for the Franciscan Order’s unique role in relation to the protection of the Christian Holy Places in Palestine.\textsuperscript{13} From the Fourteenth Century the Kings of Aragon, and subsequently of Spain, have specifically protected the Spanish Franciscans in the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{14}

The incremental, almost accidental, growth in the role and power of the Franciscan Order in the Holy Land was further advanced in 1333 when the Egyptian Sultan, Al-Nasr Mohammad, entered into an agreement with King Robert of Naples by which the latter acquired from the former “the Coenaculum, traditionally the place of the Last Supper and of the day of Pentecost”.\textsuperscript{15} Pursuant to that agreement the Franciscan presence in the Holy Land was officially recognized and the Franciscan Order received permission to build a new convent on Mount Sion, site of the Cenacle/Coenaculum holy place. The Sultan also permitted a Catholic presence, in the form of the Franciscans, at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and tomb of the Blessed Virgin in Jerusalem, and in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem.\textsuperscript{16} In 1342 Pope Clement VI by \textit{Bullarium peculiare Terrae Sanctae} granted papal recognition of these arrangements, recognizing the legitimacy of the actions the Franciscan Order had taken in Palestine. This laid the foundation for the Franciscan Custody of the Christian Holy Places in the Holy Land, the \textit{“Custodia francescana di Terra Santa”}, vested in the Franciscan Guardian [\textit{Custos/Custode}] of Mount Sion.\textsuperscript{17} The work of this Franciscan Custody was to provide for the care and governance of the Christian

\textsuperscript{14} Ballobar, 16. 
\textsuperscript{15} \texttt{G.1.1.27. FO 371/7671 Registry No. C 15334/8227/22 Report of Count de Salis to Marquess Curzon, 25 October 1922, page 22} 
\textsuperscript{16} Pieraccini, 46-47; \texttt{G.1.1.27. FO 371/7671, Report of Count de Salis to Marquess Curzon at page 22. Mount Sion is the name given from this period to the site of the Franciscan convent in Jerusalem, and is quite different than the original Mount Sion which is encompassed in the Temple Mount of Jerusalem.} 
\textsuperscript{17} Pieraccini, 47. Pieraccini points out that this Custody’s juridical status and scope was not clear or apparent at the outset but developed over a long period of time. Giovanelli, 2 fn 3, specifies that the two papal Bulls were entitled \textit{Gratias agimus} and \textit{Nuper carissimae}. 
holy places and to assist pilgrims in Palestine.\(^{18}\) By this stage this had become the primary concern of the Holy See with regard to Palestine, and the Franciscan Order was the only implement it had to hand with which to achieve it.

**1.1.4. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OTTOMAN CONTROL OVER PALESTINE AND THE NEGOTIATION OF THE CAPITULATIONS WITH FRANCE**

The discreet role of the Franciscan Order as the instrument of papal policy in Palestine was consolidated over the next century and a half until control of Palestine was seized in 1516 from the Mamluk Caliph in Cairo by the Ottoman Sultans whose capital was now Constantinople.\(^{19}\) It was the specific policy of the Ottoman Sultan Mohammad II to favour the Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Constantinople against the Latin Catholic Church whose headquarters was in Rome.\(^{20}\) Ottoman rule in Palestine therefore favoured the Greek Orthodox Patriarch against the Franciscan Custody of the Holy Land and its centuries old jurisdiction over the Christian Holy Places.\(^{21}\) The Church of the Holy Sepulchre was now placed under the jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Church which thereafter appointed its own Patriarch of Jerusalem, and the Hagiotaphite Confraternity of the Holy Sepulchre was established to secure Orthodox control of that key Holy Place.\(^{22}\) From 1543 to the present day the Orthodox Patriarchs of Jerusalem have been Greeks, or “Byzantine Hellenes”.\(^{23}\) In 1524 the Ottoman rulers seized the Coenaculum from the Franciscan Custode, converting it to a mosque. The Franciscan Custode continued, from his new location close to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, to be the key instrument by which Latin Catholic influence in relation to the Christian Holy Places was exercised in Palestine, and the instrument through which the Holy See was able to pursue its concerns about the Holy Land.

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\(^{18}\) Pieraccini, 48. Giovanelli, 7-10.
\(^{19}\) Pieraccini, 51.
\(^{20}\) Pieraccini, 72.
\(^{21}\) Pieraccini, 72.
\(^{23}\) Medebielle, 25.
In the aftermath of the Crusades France had been the European power which had most successfully maintained an effective relationship with the Mamluk Sultans in Cairo. France now set about securing the same relationship with the Ottoman Sultans in Constantinople, procuring a treaty with the Sublime Porte in 1535, “l’Alliance des Lys et du Croissant”, which conferred on France a protectorate over all the Catholic churches, monasteries and Franciscan religious operating within the Ottoman Empire. This was the first of the Capitulations between France and the Ottoman Empire which secured for France the predominant position amongst European powers within the Ottoman domains, not least the protection of the Christian Holy Places in Palestine.

The treaty provided for subsequent ratification by the Pope in Rome but this never occurred and the Supreme Pontiffs appear, with varying degrees of good or bad grace, to have accepted that the French ambassadors in Constantinople would represent the Catholic interest on their behalf.

From 1535 papal policy in relation to Palestine, which was primarily directed towards the protection of the Christian Holy Places and of Christian pilgrims to the Holy Land, was achieved on the ground through the Franciscan Custode in Jerusalem, based at originally at the Mount Sion convent of the Cenacle and later at the St Saviour Convent. At a government to government level this was necessarily conducted through the Holy See’s relationship with France. The historic role of Spain in relation to the protection of the Franciscan Order in the Holy Land also had to be taken into account by the Holy See. The interaction between the Holy See, the Franciscan Order, and the governments of the Ottoman Empire, France and Spain therefore set the parameters within which papal policy towards Palestine was pursued in this period from 1535 until 1847. The assumption by the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of control of the Jerusalem patriarchate inevitably led to a change in approach by the Franciscan Order towards non-Latin Christians from this period. From 1555 the

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25 Dinechin, 90.
26 Dinechin, 91 et seq.
Franciscan missionaries in the Holy Land began to make conversions to Latin Catholicism from amongst the Orthodox community in Palestine. In 1562 the entire Nestorian Christian community of Jerusalem was received into the Latin Catholic church there. What did not, and could not occur, was the conversion of Muslims to Christianity and this at no point was pursued as an objective of the Franciscan Order in Palestine. Latin Catholic proselytizing was, from the mid-Sixteenth Century, directed solely towards non-Latin Christians.

In 1604 France and the Sublime Porte renewed the 1535 Capitulations for the first time, and a new clause was inserted stipulating that “the subjects of the Emperor [sic] of France, his friends and allies, would be able to visit the Holy Places of Jerusalem without hindrance, and being entitled to be well-received, protected, aided and succoured” by the Ottoman authorities. On 6 May 1617 “the French Ambassador at the Court of the Sublime Porte obtained from Osman I an ordinance ... in which the Sultan orders that the ancient usage in the celebration of the sacred rites in the Holy Places is to be maintained and says explicitly that the Frankish [ie Franciscan/Latin] priests have precedence both in processions and in the lighting of candles”. It was in the carrying out of ritual and liturgical actions within the Holy Places that the right to precedence between the competing Christian denominations found its foremost expression. Defence of Franciscan rights to precedence in the Holy Places against the Orthodox clerics was an essential part of the Franciscan strategy to maintain their historic dominance over the Christian Holy Places in Palestine. The Holy See supported that strategy through its own diplomatic relations with France, whose Ambassador in Constantinople was the agent for securing outcomes from the Sublime Porte which fulfilled papal policy towards Palestine for much of the Ottoman period. This highlights the extent to which the Holy See was, throughout this period, a subordinate player in relation to Palestine, dependent upon the influence of major powers, most notably France and the Ottoman Empire.

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27 Pieraccini, 51.
28 Dinechin, 92.
29 A.13. Latin Patriarchate Archives LB 1.6-1.3 Barlassina 2 1920-1940, (Dossier B-7), Appendix A, which recites the history of precedence amongst ecclesiastics in Jerusalem from Ottoman times.

In 1622 Pope Gregory XV established the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith [Propaganda Fide] to consolidate the missionary efforts of the various Orders under the umbrella of the Latin Catholic Church, and in 1627 Propaganda Fide declared the mission of the Franciscan Custode in the Holy Land to be subject to its direct jurisdiction. The Franciscan Order’s activities in Palestine therefore came under the direct oversight of the Holy See and was subject to the Holy See’s new emphasis on overseas mission work and the expansion of the Latin Catholic Church. This therefore added both a new papal policy objective for Palestine, the expansion of the Latin Catholic Church at the expense of non-Latin churches, and a new instrument for achieving that policy, Propaganda Fide’s oversight of the Franciscan mission in the Holy Land. At the behest of Propaganda Fide the Franciscan Custody increased the level of its own missionary activities and the number of its parishes and its pastoral activities. As a result of this activity numbers of Christians from Oriental rites were progressively converted to Latin Catholicism from the mid-Seventeenth Century onwards. In 1678 the Franciscan Custode reported that there were now about 200 Latin Catholics in Jerusalem and another 300 or more in Bethlehem.

In 1678 France secured a further renewal of the Capitulations with the Sublime Porte, including additional provisions which recognized formally the French protectorate over the Catholics of the Ottoman Empire. Pursuant to a firman [Ottoman decree] of 10 May 1690 the Latin Catholics secured primary responsibility for the care and use of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre:

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30 Pieraccini, 51.
31 Pieraccini, 53.
32 Pieraccini, 53.
33 Dinechin, 93.
The precedence of the Franciscans during the functions of Holy Week and on other days in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre is established, and Christians of other denominations are forbidden to hold services during the rites of the Frankish priests.\(^3^4\)

In the first decades of the Eighteenth Century there was a slight shift in papal policy in Palestine with regard to Greek-Catholics who acknowledged the authority of the Pope. In 1724 the first Greek-Catholic patriarch was appointed, with jurisdiction over a territory similar to that of the Franciscan Custody. In 1743 Pope Benedict XIV in his apostolic letter *Demandatam caelitus* authorized the reestablishment of the Byzantine rite in its pure form within the Greek-Catholic patriarchate.\(^3^5\) This signified a growing appreciation within the Holy See of the Byzantine liturgical heritage and the need to support and foster it within the Catholic Church through the Greek Catholic tradition. Thereafter the Holy See had two vehicles for missionary expansion and growth in Palestine, the Franciscan Custody and the Greek-Catholic patriarchate. The relationship between these two was not easy, disputes arising almost daily, not least canon law difficulties arising from marriages between Greek and Latin Catholics. Whilst toleration and appreciation were growing in Rome for the Greek Catholic tradition, it was not necessarily shared on the ground in Palestine.

In 1740 France secured the third renewal of the Capitulations with the Sublime Porte, and obtained a number of new provisions specifically dealing with the Christian Holy Places, including a guarantee to the Franciscan Custody of the right to govern those Holy Places in the name of the Catholic Church.\(^3^6\)

On 7 January 1746 Pope Benedict XIV, by means of his Breve *In supremo militantis*, put in place new statutes to govern the Franciscan Custody of the Holy Land under the jurisdiction of the Franciscan Custode, including provisions regarding the rights of Spain in relation to the Franciscan Order in Palestine and requiring that six convents in Palestine should have a Spanish superior, and that the Procurator

\(^{34}\) Dinechin, 95; A.13. Latin Patriarchate Archives LB 1.6-1.3 Barlassina 2 1920-1940, Dossier(B-7), Appendix A.

\(^{35}\) Pieraccini, 55.

\(^{36}\) Pieraccini, 73-74; Dinechin, 94-95.
General of the Franciscan Custody should be Spanish. On 26 June 1755 Pope Benedict XIV issued a further constitution to the Franciscan Custody, *Allatae sunt*, in which the Pope specified that the role of the Franciscan missionaries in the Holy Land was to return “schismatic” [ie Orthodox] Christians to the “Catholic” [ie Latin] faith. This marked a significant departure from the long-established papal policy towards Palestine, which had been focussed on the protection of Christian Holy Places and Christian pilgrims, and strengthened the attention which the Holy See wished to direct towards the indigenous people of Palestine by securing the conversion of non-Catholic native Christians to the Latin Catholic Church. Implicit in this was that the Franciscans should not be seeking to convert Greek rite Catholics to the Latin rite. Once again one must note that there was no missionary mandate to convert Muslims or any other non-Christians to Catholicism. By 1766 the Franciscan Custode reported there were 961 Catholics in Jerusalem, the majority observers of the Latin rite, 1030 in Bethlehem, and 870 in Nazareth who were all of the Latin rite.

The role of France in protecting and advancing the policies and interests of the Holy See in relation to Palestine suffered a major reversal in 1757 when, as the result of a huge bribe being payed by the Greek Orthodox patriarchate in Constantinople, the Capitulations were unilaterally modified by the Sublime Porte in favour of the Greek Orthodox Church, the entire Tomb of the Virgin Mary in Jerusalem, large parts of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem were thereby handed over to the Greek Orthodox Church. The control by the Franciscan Custody of numerous other Holy Places in Palestine, notably those in Nazareth, remained undisturbed by this unilateral change and these arrangements from 1757

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37 Ballobar, 16; Giovanelli, 48.
38 Pieraccini, 56.
39 Muslims constituted the greater part of the population of Palestine at this time, the only other non-Christian religion represented being a small population of Jews.
40 Pieraccini, 56.
41 Pieraccini, 74; Dinechin, 95.
have come to constitute the famous status quo which governs the Christian Holy Places in Palestine to the present day.42

1.1.6. CONFLICT GROWS WITHIN THE FRANCISCAN CUSTODY DUE TO SPANISH INTERFERENCE AND THE TEMPORARY DECLINE OF FRENCH INFLUENCE

On 17 December 1772 the Kingdom of Spain, concerned that the Holy See had not shown sufficient respect for Spain’s historic right of patronage over the Franciscan Order in the Holy Land, issued a Real Cedula in which Spain asserted its own direct and exclusive patronage of the Franciscan Custody of the Holy Land and the Holy Places. This right was never recognized either by the Holy See or the Franciscan Custody.43 Spain’s persistent efforts to enforce this statute over five decades was to hamper the decision-making of the Holy See and of the Franciscan Custody in relation to the Holy Places and more generally in relation to the Catholic Church in Palestine, ultimately reducing the Franciscan Custody almost to a condition of ungovernability.44 The plight of the Holy See and of its principal agent in Palestine, the Franciscan Order, in the late Eighteenth Century was exacerbated by the French Revolutionary Wars which disrupted the flow of funds to the Franciscan Custody and removed the French Government from any involvement in France’s historic role as Protector of the Latin Church in the Ottoman Empire, a role France only resumed after the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty in 1814.45 In this atmosphere the Holy See, through Propaganda Fide in the early Nineteenth Century, placed specific restrictions upon the Franciscan missionary activity in the Holy Land, confining admissions of Christians to the Latin rite solely to those who came from Christian “heretical” churches [i.e. Orthodox, rather than Greek Catholic] and expressly forbidding the preaching of the Gospel of Jesus Christ amongst Muslims for fear of endangering lives and suffering the loss of the Christian Holy Places.46 The traditional

42 Pieraccini, 74.
43 Giovanelli, 48-49.
44 Pieraccini, 68-71.
45 Pieraccini, 78-82.
46 Pieraccini, 56.
policy priority of the Holy See in relation to Palestine was thus reasserted, the
security and protection of the Christian Holy Places. By 1826, when the Franciscan
Custody had only 54 priests and 36 lay brothers to support its entire mission in
Palestine, the Franciscan Custody was in grave crisis, so that by 1830 Catholic
pilgrims returning from Jerusalem reported to Propaganda Fide in Rome the
deplorable state of affairs in the Holy Land.⁴⁷ Amongst the principal causes of the
crisis was the virtual rebellion of the Spanish Franciscans in Palestine, who ignored
the authority of Rome generally and of Propaganda Fide specifically and insisted
upon the enforcement of the Spanish Real Cedula of 1772.⁴⁸ This crisis was a legacy
of the low ebb to which the power, prestige and influence of the Holy See had sunk
in the Eighteenth Century, leading to the resurgence of rivalries between France and
Spain over Palestine. Its resolution reflected the resurgence of papal prestige in the
international arena following the Congress of Vienna in 1814 and the remarkable
work of Cardinal Consalvi, papal Secretary of State, in achieving the restoration of
the papal states and the recognition of the historic rights of the Holy See in the
diplomatic realm.

The situation of Jerusalem was highlighted when, in December of 1831, the army of
Muhammad Ali, semi-independent ruler of Egypt, seized control of Palestine from
the direct authority of the Ottoman Sultan, which led to improvements in the rights
of the Christian communities of the Holy Land.⁴⁹ A desire amongst European powers
to prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire led to the re-establishment of
Ottoman authority in the Holy Land in 1840. During the negotiation for this the
French government put forward the proposal for the establishment of a “Christian
Free City of Jerusalem”, with the principal Holy Places being contained in a neutral
international zone.⁵⁰ The other European powers did not support this idea and it
came to nothing.

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⁴⁸ Pieraccini, 101.
improvements was the granting of keys to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre to the Latin, Orthodox and
Armenian communities for the first time since 1289, Wasserstein, 27.
⁵⁰ Wasserstein, 28-29.
By 1846 it had become apparent to Propaganda Fide in Rome that the problem of the “dura situazione” [harsh situation] in the Franciscan Custody could only be resolved through a renewal by the Holy See of Pope Benedict XIV’s 1746 statutes In supremo militantis. The request for this to occur was contained in a Breve of 18 August 1846, Romani Pontifices. Whilst there had not, at this stage, been a significant failure in the maintenance of long-term papal policies towards Palestine, especially with regard to the securing and protection of the Holy Places, there appeared to be a failure in the key instrument for maintaining that policy, the Franciscan Custody of the Holy Land. That failure was largely due to the attempts by Spain to enforce historic claims to the protection of the Franciscan Order in Palestine. France's historic Protectorate over the Latin Catholic Church within the Ottoman Empire was of no assistance in resolving this crisis because its scope of operation was with the Sublime Porte in Constantinople and not within the Franciscan Order or the Holy See. It was now up to the Holy See itself to determine a way out of the seeming impasse with regard to its affairs in Palestine.

1.1.7. THE REVIVED LATIN PATRIARCHATE OF JERUSALEM AND THE FRANCISCAN CUSTODY AS JOINT INSTRUMENTS OF PAPAL POLICY IN PALESTINE FROM 1847 TO 1903

Whilst it was the scandalous situation with regard to the Franciscan Custody which had first engaged Propaganda Fide’s earnest attention to the situation in the Holy Land, leading to the 1846 Breve Romani Pontifices, what actually emerged from the resulting process was not reform or renewal of the Franciscan Custody as such but an entirely different concept altogether. This concept was the establishment of a revived Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem resident in the Holy Land. The reasons for this outcome related not to the decline within the Franciscan Custody, spiritually and pastorally, but to the activities of the various major European powers in the Holy Land, notably Russia, Prussia and the United Kingdom. In 1842 France and Piedmont/Sardinia became concerned that Russia was seeking to establish a Russian

51 Pieraccini, 110-112.
Orthodox archbishopric in Palestine, and in the same year the Prussians and British cooperated in the establishment of a Lutheran/Anglican bishopric in Jerusalem without regard to France’s Protectorate over Catholic interests in the Ottoman Empire pursuant to the Capitulations. 52

In January of 1847 Propaganda Fide, responsible for all missionary territories of the Catholic Church, considered a proposal relating to the establishment of a Latin Catholic bishop at Jerusalem, prompted by the complaints of an Italian painter called Costantino Giusti. This gentleman had returned to Rome after a long period of residence amongst Jesuits and Melkites in the Holy Land and who had submitted that, since non-Catholic Christian nations now had bishops in Jerusalem, it was appropriate and timely that the Catholic Church should mark its presence there by the appointment of a Latin bishop drawn from the ranks of the Franciscan Order. 53

The January 1847 Ponente refers specifically to the establishment in Jerusalem of a new Protestant [i.e., Lutheran/Anglican] bishopric and the desirability of having a Latin Catholic bishop in that place to assist in the advance of the Catholic mission work there and to counter the Christian “schismatics” and “heretics” there, including recently arrived Anglicans. 54 In March of 1847 Cardinal Acton, 55 the Prefect of Propaganda Fide, issued a further Ponente recommending the establishment of a resident Latin bishop in Jerusalem, and its details show that the driving force for the reestablishment of a resident Latin Patriarch in Jerusalem related to the interplay of European politics and the competition between Latin Catholic and Protestant Churches in Europe which had now spilled over into Palestine. 56 Whilst the March 1847 Ponente refers to Catholic missionary work, the subtext makes clear the perceived need to counter Christian “schismatics” and “heretics” present in

52 Pieraccini, 163-165.
54 1847 Ponente, 5. The new Anglican bishop, Salomon Alexander, was a convert from Judaism who had been a rabbi.
Palestine, both Orthodox and Protestant. There is no reference whatsoever to any outreach to members of the Muslim or Jewish religions. This is entirely consistent with the history of the Franciscan Custody which had avoided proselytizing Muslims and Jews, and had focussed its missionary outreach on members of other Christian denominations.

Pursuant to the recommendations made by Cardinal Acton, on 23 July 1847, by the Apostolic Breve *Nulla celebrior*, Pope Pius IX determined that:

> today the reasons that prevented the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem from residing in his diocese and from watching over the safety of his flock no longer exist; for this reason We have judged it good and opportune to send once more into the city of Jerusalem, a Patriarch of the Latin Rite for the good of Religion, to renew the ancient dignity of the See of Jerusalem, to expand more abundantly the Catholic Faith,

and accordingly re-established “at Jerusalem the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Latin Patriarch” with “the obligation of residence” in Jerusalem.\(^{57}\) To assist the new Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem in the undertaking of his duties Pope Pius IX, on 10 December 1847, transferred control of the ancient Order of the Holy Sepulchre to the new Latin Patriarch, Monsignor Joseph Valerga, who arrived in Palestine on 15 January 1848.

From the end of 1848 the new government of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, elected President of France in December 1848, pursued a deliberately pro-Catholic foreign policy with the intention of boosting his government’s support amongst French Catholics.\(^{58}\) French intervention in the dispute in the Holy Land between the three principal Christian religious denominations over the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, with France supporting the Latin claims maintained by the Franciscan Custode, led the Ottoman Sultan to issue a new *firman* on 8 February 1852 “which reaffirmed the (pro-Orthodox) status quo of 1757 while making some minor

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\(^{57}\) Medebielle, 26-27, presents the text of *Nulla celebrior* in English.

concessions to the Latins”. The resulting outcome provided the basis of the Status Quo on the Christian Holy Places in Palestine from that time to the present day, recognized by the Treaty of Paris in 1856 and the Treaty of Berlin in 1878.

The additional ingredient injected into this matrix was the establishment by Pope Pius IX on 6 January 1862 by means of the Apostolic Constitution *Romani Pontifices* of the *Congregatio de Propaganda Fide pro negotiis ritus orientalis* for the purpose of nurturing the Oriental Catholic Churches, including those non-Latin, principally Melkite, congregations in Palestine. Whilst not of major significance in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries this dicastery would become a vital player in the Roman Curia from 1 May 1917 when Pope Benedict XV by his Motu Proprio *Dei Providentis* established the separate Congregation for the Oriental Churches, *Congregatio pro Ecclesia Orientali*. The Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem would then face a significant rival player in relation to the nurturing of the indigenous Catholic population of the Holy Land.

Whilst the injection of a resident Latin Patriarch to oversee the Latin Catholic population of the Holy Land was bound to create friction with the long-established Franciscan Custody, a letter from the Chancellor of the Latin Patriarchate of 11 March 1901 to an Irish bishop shows the way in which the areas of responsibility had been settled between the two entities: the Franciscan Custody of the Holy Land had as its object “the worship [in] and the preserving of the Holy Places”, whilst the Latin Patriarchate had for its purpose “the diffusion of the Catholic doctrine among the indigenous People” of Palestine, in which it was assisted by the contributions of the members of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre.

By the turn of the Twentieth Century it may therefore be seen that the concerns of the Holy See in relation to Palestine were twofold, the protection of the Holy Places, in relation to which its chosen vehicle was the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa,

59 Wasserstein, 40.
61 http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/orientalchurch/profile/rc_con_corient_pro_20030320_profile.html
and the nurturing and dissemination of the Catholic faith in Palestine amongst its indigenous peoples, in relation to which its chosen instrument was the resident Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, assisted by the generous contributions from the Order of the Holy Sepulchre.

1.1.8. CONCLUSION

From the Eleventh Century to 1900 the driving policy objective of the Holy See towards Palestine has been the securing and protection of the Christian Holy Places located there. When its Crusade strategy ultimately failed, it was the Franciscan Order which, almost by stealth and accident, became the preferred vehicle on the ground in Palestine for securing control of those Holy Places and for the protection of pilgrims to them. From the Seventeenth Century, through the new Roman Congregation of Propaganda Fide, there was an additional objective of papal policy, the nurturing of an indigenous Catholic community in Palestine to which converts were to be attracted from non-Latin Catholic Christian denominations but not from the Muslim populace, because that would jeopardize the predominant objective of securing the Holy Places. The key change in papal policy towards Palestine in the period from 1500 to 1900 was the decision to re-establish a resident Latin Patriarch in Jerusalem, a decision taken to ward off competing encroachments by Protestant and Orthodox powers interested in Palestine. This decision reflected the resurgence of a confident papacy ready to extend its influence well beyond its traditional sphere of influence in Europe. The establishment from 1848 of a resident Latin Patriarch in Jerusalem left the responsibility for the two key papal strategies in different hands, the acre of the Holy Places with the Franciscan Custody and the pastoral care of the indigenous Latin Catholic community in the spiritual, pastoral and administrative care of the Latin Patriarchate, whose missionary activities were focussed not on the indigenous Muslim population, or the small community of Jews already resident there, but on the members of the Orthodox and Protestant communities of Palestine. The establishment from 1862 of a separate unit in the Roman Curia for dealing with the Oriental Churches began the process of undermining of the Latin Patriarch’s primary responsibility for the indigenous Catholic populace of the Holy
Land which would emerge as a significant threat to the scope and purpose of that office by the 1920s.

From 1535 until after the First World War France would, except in the period 1790-1814, take its role as Protector of the Latin Catholic interests in Palestine very seriously and the Holy See had severe restrictions upon its own capacity to pursue its own interests in Palestine without the involvement of France. The Holy See made no effort in the period from 1535 to 1900 to disturb the fact of Ottoman, and therefore Muslim, control of Palestine. This was the environment into which Theodor Herzl sought to bring the plans of the Zionist project to the attention of Pope Pius X in his Audience on 25 January 1904. The Pope’s response suggested the potential for emergence of a new object of papal policy, opposition to the Zionist project and the conversion to Catholicism of the Jewish immigrants whom the Zionist project would encourage to come to Palestine.
APPENDIX 2.

THE ORIGINS OF ZIONISM AND OF THE ZIONIST PROJECT FOR A JEWISH NATIONAL HOME IN PALESTINE

The origins of Zionism lie in the deep-seated longing of all Jews for Zion, the ancient Jerusalem of King David, reflected in the words of Psalm 137:

By the rivers of Babylon – there we sat down and wept when we remembered Zion ... If I forget you, O Jerusalem, let my right hand wither.

Whilst the Jewish people had endured two thousand years of dispersion throughout the world there was no significant movement for Jewish people to return to Palestine until the latter part of the Nineteenth Century. By the year 1845 there were only twelve thousand Jews living in Palestine, largely confined to four towns, Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed and Tiberias. The real impetus for the growth of Zionism as a significant movement amongst Jews was the assassination of Tsar Alexander II of Russia and the subsequent punitive response of Tsar Alexander III towards Jews within the Russian Empire. The resulting pogroms within Russia, coupled with manifestations of ongoing or resurgent anti-Semitism in Western and Central Europe in the 1880s and 1890s, led to the rapid coalescence of interested people and groups into an international Zionist movement which had its first congress in Basle in 1897.

This movement, which nurtured significant emigration of Jewish peoples from Europe to Palestine, was led almost from the outset by Dr Theodor Herzl, a man of astonishing vision, drive, determination and prescience, rightly acknowledged as the father of the modern State of Israel.

Binyamin Ze’ev Herzl, known to history as Theodor Herzl, was born on 2 May 1860 and was raised in the largely secular and non-Jewish lifestyle of his parents, though

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1 Walter Laqueur, A History of Zionism, (New York: Schocken Books, 1989), at xix states that the word Zionism was first used publically as a term in 1890/91, being used by Nathan Birnbaum at a meeting in Vienna on 23 January 1892 as a political term for the first time; and see also Schvindlerman, 53-115, for a discussion of the rise of Zionism, Jewish nationalism, and the return of Jews to live in Palestine.


3 Schneer, 10.

4 Schneer, 10-11.
the family observed Shabbat and Jewish festivals and Theodor had his bar mitzvah in the local synagogue when he turned 13.\(^5\) Herzl’s sister died of typhus in 1878 and the family, grief-stricken, moved to Vienna when Theodor was aged 18.\(^6\) He enrolled to study Law in the University of Vienna that year and graduated in 1884, having briefly joined the prestigious Albia student fraternity, a hotbed of German nationalism, from which he resigned in protest at an anti-Semitic speech by a fellow member.\(^7\) Although he had qualified as a lawyer, Theodor Herzl turned to a literary and journalistic career, moved to Paris in 1891 as correspondent of a leading Viennese newspaper, and there witnessed at first hand a range of anti-Semitic episodes which climaxed in the Dreyfus Affair which began in 1894. Herzl attended the main Paris synagogue for the first time in 1895.\(^8\) He had reached the conclusion that “if such things could happen in republican, modern, civilized France, a century after the Declaration of Human Rights, the Jews as a whole had better look to themselves for salvation in a land of their own making”.\(^9\) As a result of the Dreyfus Affair in France and various other manifestations of anti-Semitism throughout Europe in the 1890s, Herzl had “concluded that Jews could never be safe without their own homeland”, declaring that “Palestine is our ever-memorable historic home”.\(^10\) In his 1896 book Der Judenstaat [The Jewish State] Herzl had stated that in a Jewish state in Palestine:

The sanctuaries of Christendom would be safeguarded by assigning them an extra-territorial status such as is well known to the law of nations. We [the Jewish people] should form a guard of honour about these sanctuaries, answering for the fulfilment of this duty with our existence. This guard of honour would be the great symbol of the solution of the Jewish Question after eighteen centuries of Jewish suffering.\(^11\)

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\(^6\) Early Steps.
\(^7\) Avineri, 52,56.
\(^9\) Lowenthal, xix.
At the first Zionist Congress in Basle in August 1897 Herzl presided, declaring in his Diary that: “At Basle I founded the Jewish State .... and certainly in fifty years, everyone will perceive it”. He proved a remarkably adept promoter of his cause, preaching it to the German Emperor Wilhelm II in Istanbul in 1898. From the time of the first Zionist Congress it had come to be believed in Zionist circles that the Pope and the Catholic Church opposed the Zionist objective of a Jewish state in Palestine with Jerusalem as its capital. Herzl therefore directed his efforts at trying to win the Catholic Church to the Zionist cause, seeking an audience with the Holy See’s Nuncio in Vienna, Monsignor Egidio Tagliani, with whom he finally met on 8 February 1899. Monsignor Tagliani gave Herzl “a very friendly reception, saying that he personally was not unfavourably inclined towards the [Zionist] matter [and that] incidentally, the Holy See had always been well disposed towards the Jews”. Herzl in turn assured Tagliani that “Jerusalem and Bethlehem would be given extraterritorial status, and the capital of the Jewish nation would be located elsewhere”.

Later that year, on 28 December 1899, the American Minister to the Sublime Porte, Oscar Straus, told Herzl that he “considered Palestine impossible to attain” as a Jewish national home because “the Greek and Roman Catholic Churches would not let the Jews have it”. In October 1903 Herzl was informed by the Chief Rabbi of Florence, Dr Margulies, that King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy would receive him if Herzl would come to Rome, and Herzl resolved to seek a declaration from that King.

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12 Lowenthal, 224; Sebag Montefiore, 375.
13 Sebag Montefiore, 379.
14 Minerbi, Sergio, *The Vatican and Zionism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 96-97, expresses this view. It should be noted that Minerbi accessed no archives of the Catholic Church in writing this work, and one ought to treat any statement he makes with real caution, bearing in mind the partisan position that it is clearly his purpose to present in what is otherwise an interesting and provoking work.
15 Minerbi, 97 and 219, fn14.
16 Minerbi, 97.
17 Minerbi, 97.
18 Oscar Solomon Straus (1850-1926), the first Jewish Cabinet Minister in the USA, serving as Secretary for Commerce and Labor under President Theodore Roosevelt from 1906 to 1909. Having been US Minister in Istanbul/Constantinople in 1887-1889 and again in 1898-1899, he served as US Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire from 1909 to 1910.
19 Minerbi, 97.
“in favour of Zionism”, following which Herzl intended to return to Vienna in order to procure from Count von Goluchowski, Austria’s Foreign Minister, “an introduction to the Pope”.20 Herzl intended to offer the new Pope, as an olive branch, that in any Jewish state in Palestine the Holy Places would be “extraterritorial”.21

Whether or not Theodor Herzl would have been successful in his campaign for a Jewish national home in Palestine without the overwhelming intervention and determination of Great Britain to support the Zionist project must be very doubtful. It is perhaps not possible to understand Great Britain’s involvement with this issue, and the subsequent British policy on Palestine, without acknowledging the deep strand of Christian Zionism and Adventism which had been a feature of English Protestantism at least since the Seventeenth Century when the Lord Protector, Oliver Cromwell, “believed that Christ could not come again unless the Jews returned to Zion and then converted to Christianity”.22 This belief, fuelled by the translation of the Bible into English,23 simmered as an undercurrent in the life of the Church of England and surfaced with full force in the early Nineteenth Century when the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews was founded in 1809.24 It has been observed that “one of the persisting undercurrents of English political and intellectual life in the Nineteenth Century was an aspiration to help bring about a Jewish revival in Palestine”.25 It found expression amongst leading

20 Lowenthal, Herzl’s Diary entry for 19 October 1903, written at Alt-Aussee.
21 Minerbi, 98 and 220, fn 19.
23 Michael J. Pragai, Faith and Fulfilment- Christians and the Return to the Promised Land, (London: Valentine, Mitchell and Company Limited, 1985, 10-12, deals with the role of the English translation of the Bible in this regard, and the writings of the English theologian, Thomas Brightman [1562-1607], in calling for the return of the Jewish peoples to Palestine as an essential precursor to the second Advent of Christ. Pragai traces these influences through to Lloyd George and Balfour and outlines, at 20-22, the strong belief in the “Jewish Return” in Nineteenth Century movements such as the Plymouth Brethren and the Christadelphians.
24 Sebag Montefiore, Jerusalem, 332; Kochav, Sarah, Le mouvement du témoignage adventiste et la Declaration Balfour, in Trimbur, Dominique, and Aaronsohn, Ran, Eds., De Balfour a Ben Gurion, (Paris: CRNS Editions, 2008), 71-90, at 71. It was estimated that in the 110 years following the foundation of the Society for the Conversion of the Jews more than 250,000 Jews had been converted to Christianity, being known as Christian Hebrews, Kochav, 78.
figures such as Charles Simeon, Edward Bickersteth, the novelist George Eliot,\textsuperscript{26} and the philanthropist Lord Shaftesbury. The latter was an evangelical Anglican who believed “that the return and conversion of the Jews would create an Anglican Jerusalem and the Kingdom of Heaven”. He wrote Lord Palmerston a memorandum on the subject entitled “There’s a country without a nation and God in his wisdom directs us to a nation without a country”.\textsuperscript{27} This would contribute to the later Zionist slogan: “a land without a people for a people without a land”.\textsuperscript{28} Lord Shaftesbury persuaded the British Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, “to back the creation of the first ever Anglican bishopric and church in Jerusalem”, Prussia and Britain jointly appointing the first Protestant bishop of Jerusalem in 1841, one Michael Solomon Alexander, a convert from Judaism.\textsuperscript{29} Lord Palmerston, not a man of religious sensibilities, himself favoured supporting the Jewish interest in Palestine as a means of undermining the growing French and Russian interests there.\textsuperscript{30} The Anglo-Italian magnate, Sir Moses Montefiore, a brother-in-law of Nathaniel Rothschild and an associate of Lord Shaftesbury, began the task of buying land in Palestine for Jewish settlers which would later be continued by the Rothschilds and others. He thereby made a major contribution to the Zionist movement and the plan for a Jewish national home in Palestine.\textsuperscript{31} The coalescence of English evangelical Christian and

\textsuperscript{26} Pragai at 23-24 explores the pro-Zionist ideas contained in George Eliot’s 1876 novel \textit{Daniel Deronda}.

\textsuperscript{27} Sebag Montefiore, \textit{Jerusalem}, 331-332; Kochav, 79-80. Charles Simeon [1759-1836] was co-founder of the Church Missionary Society; Edward Bickersteth [1786-1850] was a British Millenarianist and founder in 1845 of the Evangelical Revivalist Alliance; Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 7\textsuperscript{th} Earl of Shaftesbury, [1801-1885] was a leading social reformer and President of the British & Foreign Bible Society from 1851 to 1885; Henry Temple, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Viscount Palmerston, [1784-1865] was Foreign Secretary from 1830 to 1841 and again from 1846 to 1851, and Prime Minister from 1855 to 1858 and again from 1859 to 1865, and was the step-father-in-law of Lord Shaftesbury.

\textsuperscript{28} Sebag Montefiore, \textit{Jerusalem}, 331-332.

\textsuperscript{29} Sebag Montefiore, \textit{Jerusalem}, 334. Michael Solomon Alexander [1799-1845], first Anglican bishop of Jerusalem, had been a Jewish rabbi who had converted to Christianity, arriving in Jerusalem as Anglican/Lutheran bishop in 1842 and died in 1845, his entire episcopate in Palestine having been focussed on the Jewish community, thereby antagonizing the local Jewish community leaders whilst at the same time provoking both Catholic and Orthodox Churches, the subsequent re-establishment of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem in 1848 being largely a reaction to the Anglo-Prussian religious initiative in Palestine.

\textsuperscript{30} Sebag Montefiore, \textit{Jerusalem}, 331.

\textsuperscript{31} Sebag Montefiore, \textit{Jerusalem}, 352. Sir Moses Montefiore 1\textsuperscript{st} Baronet FRS [1784-1885] was President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews from 1835 to 1875 and was a key figure in the development of proto-Zionism. Nathaniel Mayer Rothschild, Feiherr von Rothschild, [1777-1836] was founder of the British branch of the Jewish banking dynasty and great-grandfather of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Baron Rothschild to
Jewish political and plutocratic interests and religious enthusiasms, each in their own way and for very different reasons Zionist in orientation, was vital to the unfolding of events in London in the months from mid-1917. This Zionist tendency was something completely absent from Catholicism and left the Holy See unaware of what was about to happen in relation to Palestine despite the full and ample warning given to Pope Pius X by Dr Herzl on 25 January 1904. Indeed the Holy See may have failed to understand the entire British policy on Palestine over the subsequent two decades due to its inability to comprehend the influence of this deeply ingrained Protestant Zionism amongst British political and intellectual leaders of the time.

Theodor Herzl died on 3 July 1904, only months after his meeting with the Pope, but his death did not mark the end of the Zionist movement or its aspirations. A succession of brilliant and energetic leaders, including Nahum Sokolow and Chaim Weizmann, oversaw its relentless advance through the securing of the Balfour Declaration by the British Government in November 1917, the capture of Jerusalem by General Allenby in December 1917, the negotiation by Weizmann and Emir Feisal in January 1919 of agreement to the implementation of the Zionist program in Palestine, the negotiation of the Palestine Mandate from the new League of Nations in the post-war Peace Negotiations, until the final establishment of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948, fulfilling almost to the year Theodor Herzl’s original prediction. The Zionist movement, and its leaders, ran rings around every European power during the first four decades of the Twentieth Century, the period covered by this thesis. Israel is the living testimony to this fact.

whom the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, would address the Balfour Declaration of 2/3 November 1917.

APPENDIX 3.

THE POLICIES OF THE PRINCIPAL EUROPEAN POWERS TOWARDS THE HOLY LAND FROM 1903 TO 1939

3.3.1. EUROPEAN GREAT POWER POLICIES TOWARDS THE HOLY LAND FROM 1800 TO 1900

The pursuit of the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine evolved in the context of the interaction between the various European Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire in relation to the Holy Land, Palestine. From the late Eighteenth Century to the early Twentieth Century the European powers had a preoccupation with the fate of the Ottoman Empire, often referred to as the “Sick Man of Europe”. The “Eastern Question” was a recurrent strand of European rivalry and conflict throughout the Nineteenth Century, manifesting itself in events such as the Crimean War of 1853-1856 which had its origins in rivalry between Russia and France over the Holy Places in Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Great Britain and France favoured the ongoing existence and reform of the Ottoman regime as the best means of preventing its partition and the seizure of Constantinople/Istanbul and control of access to the Black Sea through the Bosphorus by an expansionist Russia: “Anglo-Russian rivalry had preserved the integrity of the Ottoman Empire throughout the last-half of the nineteenth century”. France, except during the Revolutionary period, was ever eager to assert its rights and duties as Protecting Power of the Latin Catholic interest throughout the Ottoman domains pursuant to its historic system of Capitulations from 1535 with the Sublime Porte. This manifested itself not least in relation to the region of Syria, including the Lebanon and Palestine. The growth of Great Britain’s Indian and Far Eastern empire gave it an increasing interest in the lines of communication through the Mediterranean Sea to the Near, Middle and Far

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3 Joshua C. Baylson, *Territorial Allocation by Imperial Rivalry*, The University of Chicago Department of Geography Research paper No. 221, (Chicago: The Department of Geography University of Chicago, 1987), 42.
East. The development of the Suez Canal from 1859 to 1869 by French interests turned this into a crucial issue for Great Britain, marked by the implementation of an Anglo-French condominium over Egypt in 1875-1876. France’s defeat in 1870-1871 at the hands of the German states, and the resulting establishment of the German Empire, brought a new imperial interest to the fore with a desire to establish its interest in the Ottoman domains. By the late Nineteenth Century Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy all had a serious involvement in the economic, military and political affairs of the Ottoman Empire and by 1914 these powers “had divided the Ottoman Empire into de facto financial and economic spheres of influence”.

Within the Holy Land itself the rivalries of the European Powers played themselves out in more particular ways in a land which had little perceivable economic or strategic value. France protected the Latin Catholic interests in regard to the Holy Places whilst Russia took upon itself the championing of the Orthodox interests in those places. Britain and Prussia had cooperated in the 1840s over the establishment of an Anglican/Lutheran bishopric in Jerusalem. The German Emperor William II had a pronounced romantic/religious interest in Jerusalem and the Holy Places, manifested in his several visits there and support for the building of the Augusta Viktoria complex on the Mount of Olives and the Dormition Abbey on Mt Zion from 1900 to 1910. The Savoy Kings of Italy asserted their historic claim to be the successors of the Crusader Kings of Jerusalem. British statesmen such as Balfour and Lloyd George were enthralled by the prospect of an English conquest of the Holy City of Jerusalem, finally enacted by General Allenby in 1917. By then the long-standing British policy of upholding the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire had collapsed, brought to its final end by that shaper of so many national destinies, the First World War. The Ottoman Empire was dead, as was that of Russia, and it only now remained to partition the Ottoman remnants.

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4 Baylson, 43.
3.3.2. BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS PALESTINE FROM 1903 TO 1939

In 1904 Great Britain entered into the *Entente Cordiale* with France which secured Britain a continental ally whilst enabling it to continue with its own imperial policies.\(^5\) One of the first fruits of the *Entente* was “the securing of British rule in Egypt in exchange for a kind of *laissez-faire* for the French in Morocco”.\(^6\) This enabled Britain to have control of the Suez Canal, vital to its imperial interests in the Far East, and so referred to by Sir Henry Wilson as “the Clapham Junction of Imperial Communications”.\(^7\) In 1908 the discovery of oil in Iran gave the Middle East itself an additional strategic importance for Britain.\(^8\) Britain was acknowledged to have historic claims to an interest in the Mesopotamian region whilst France was acknowledged to have a particular interest in Syria.\(^9\) Prior to the First World War Britain adhered to its century old policy of avoiding partition of the Ottoman Empire.\(^10\)

The outbreak of that war, in which Britain, France, Italy and Russia were the principal Allied powers in conflict with Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, highlighted for Great Britain that its historic policy towards the Ottomans was no longer tenable. On 9 November 1914 Prime Minister Asquith, in a public address at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, predicted that “as a result of the war the Ottoman Empire would be dismembered”.\(^11\) The Suez Canal made possible the free transport of more than two million Dominion and Indian troops to fight for Britain in Europe and was clearly of vital ongoing importance for Britain, requiring that it be secured on both its banks.\(^12\) The German-supported Ottoman attempts to capture the Suez

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\(^6\) Nevakivi, 1.
\(^7\) Nevakivi, 7.
\(^8\) Richard Davis, *Britain’s Middle Eastern Policy, 1900-1931: Dual Attractions of Empire and Europe*, Histoire@Politique 2010/2 (No. 11), 4.
\(^9\) Nevakivi, 2-5.
\(^10\) Nevakivi, 2.
\(^11\) Nevakivi, 13.
\(^12\) Davis, 6; Michael J. Cohen, *The Origins and Evolution of the Arab-Zionist Conflict*, (London: University of California Press, Ltd., 1987), at 42, outlines the way in which the Ottoman forces crossed from Palestine into the Sinai Peninsula and reached the Suez Canal in February 1915, showing that the area of Palestine was vital to the security of the Suez Canal.
Canal from Palestine across the Sinai Peninsula in February 1915 and August 1916 highlighted the strategic importance of Palestine in securing the vital waterway for Great Britain.\textsuperscript{13} The collapse of the Ottoman Empire, rendered inevitable by the approach of Allied victory, made its partition a certainty. The view within the British government increasingly favoured the position that Great Britain should secure parts of the Ottoman domain for its empire.\textsuperscript{14}

Whilst Russia was an active participant with the Allies in the First World War it was free to pursue its own long-held ambition to reclaim Constantinople either directly for Russia or indirectly through Greek rule. The overthrow of the Romanov regime and the negotiation of a separate peace between Russia and the German/Austrian/Ottoman alliance in 1917 removed Russia and its policies from having any significant bearing in the Holy Land for the next two decades. The atheist Soviet Union had no wish to continue as the champion of Orthodox interests in the Holy Land and was preoccupied by its own internal difficulties. The defeat of Germany in 1918 and the overthrow of the Hohenzollern dynasty, which had manifested real interest in championing Lutheran/Protestant interests in the Holy Land, also removed Germany from being a significant player in the Holy Land through to the Second World War. Its anti-Semitic policies and programs from 1933 fuelled an exodus of Jews to Palestine and gave pronounced impetus to the realization of the Zionist project for an independent Jewish state in Palestine. By the time of the capture of Jerusalem by General Allenby’s forces in December 1917 Great Britain and France were left as the only two European powers of influence in relation to the Middle East generally and Palestine/Syria specifically. Their wartime ally, Italy, also had an interest in Palestine, its king having a remote and vestigial claim to the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem, and had secured a seat with the victors at the post-war Peace Conferences. Italy did not hesitate to assert its right to express its views on the fate of the Holy Land when the opportunity arose.

\textsuperscript{14} Davis, 7.
By the conclusion of hostilities in 1918 Great Britain was in control, with an army of almost a million soldiers, of a large part of the Ottoman domains in the Middle East. Prime Minister Lloyd George expressed the view that, as Britain “had practically single-handedly overthrown Turkey while ‘the number of French troops taking part in the campaign had been so small as to make no difference’ and that as Britain had paid the highest cost in the war in the Middle East it should therefore reap the greatest gains”. Even its principal ally, France, which actively sought to reclaim its historic role as Protecting Power over the former Ottoman domains abrogated in 1914, found difficulty in opposing the force of Lloyd George’s claims, Great Britain now had to make sense of the three conflicting commitments it had made regarding Palestine during the course of the First World War. Palestine had truly become the “thrice-promised land”.

The first of Britain’s alleged promises as to the post-war fate of Palestine resulted from the 1915 correspondence between Britain’s High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, and the Sharif of Mecca, Husain Ibn ‘Ali, which climaxied in a letter from McMahon to Husain of 24 October 1915 promising independence to the Arab peoples over a vast area of the Middle East, which may have included Palestine, in return for which the Arabs would support the Allies against the Ottomans in the present conflict. Countering this claim to a “Greater Arabia” were the negotiations conducted on behalf of France by Francois Georges-Picot and on behalf of Great Britain by Sir Mark Sykes from late 1915 and which led to the formalization of the May 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement for the post-war partition of the Middle East into French and British spheres of influence, with Palestine to be made the subject of “an international administration”. This was the second of Britain’s promises regarding

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15 Davis, 9.
16 Davis, 9.
18 Nevakivi, 40; Cohen, at 42, provides a very clear and useful map setting out the distribution proposed by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, an area of direct French control (including modern Lebanon); an area to be under French influence (including modern Syria); an area to be under British influence (including the Transjordan and parts of modern Iraq); an area of direct British control (including the
the fate of Palestine given during the course of the war. When it became aware of
the contents of this agreement in 1917, Italy was able to procure amendment of its
terms to give it a right, inter alia, to agree on “the form of international
administration in Palestine”. 19

The third of Britain’s promises as to the post-war destiny of Palestine was that
contained in the Balfour Declaration of 2/3 November 1917 for the “establishment
of a national home for the Jewish people”, a promise which France officially
endorsed but which the French appear not initially to have taken seriously. 20 Michael
J. Cohen says of the Balfour Declaration that it:

was not only ambiguous but also fatally vague. No borders were established
for the Jews’ national home; no machinery was created whereby the British
might “facilitate” its well-being and progress. Indeed, no one would ever be
able to determine the extent of the British commitment or at what point it
would be fulfilled. The basic significance of the declaration was that it opened
up new possibilities for the Zionist movement. It radically transformed the
Zionists’ international status and their position in Palestine itself, where the
Jews, previously aliens, were now an officially recognized community granted
certain privileges. The declaration gave the Jews their great chance – but the
consummation of the Zionist enterprise would depend on their own ability to
establish a viable Jewish community in Palestine and, in the process, to
accommodate, or ultimately overcome, Arab opposition. 21

It was the third promising of Palestine in the Balfour Declaration which ultimately
prevailed. Whether or not the French or anyone else took the promise of the Balfour
Declaration seriously, and even though the Arab interests championed by Colonel T.
E. Lawrence fulminated over “perfidious Albion” and its betrayal of its promises to
the Arab peoples for a “Greater Arabia” that would include Palestine, the

regions of Baghdad, Basra, Kuwait and the Arabian littoral of the Persian Gulf); and a comparatively
small area forming some type of “Allied Condominium” and containing Judea and Samaria and the
principal Christian Holy Places but excluding the Chula Valley and the Negev region to Aqaba.
19 Nevakivi, 54.
20 Nevakivi, 52-53.
21 Cohen, 55.
commitment made by the British government in the Balfour Declaration would remain the bedrock of British policy regarding the Holy Land for the next two decades, though Britain would change the way in which it enforced and pursued that policy from time to time. At a meeting with the Zionist leader in Lord Balfour’s London home in 1920, both Balfour and Lloyd George “assured Weizmann ‘that by the Declaration they had always meant an eventual Jewish state’”. 22

The British government throughout the various phases and aftermath of the post war Peace Conferences embedded the terms of the Balfour Declaration in peace treaties, the Charter of the League of Nations and the specific terms of the Palestine Mandate granted by the League of Nations to Great Britain. Winston Churchill, when Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1921-1922, tried to persuade the British Cabinet that Britain should withdraw from all of the “New Provinces” which it had gained from the Ottomans in the Middle East before the League’s mandates over Iraq and Palestine were granted.23 Lloyd George’s view prevailed over the advice of Churchill and Great Britain was committed to the terms of the Palestine Mandate granted by the League of Nations on 24 July 1922. This came into effect on 29 September 1923 following the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne with Turkey on 24 July 1923 which settled all claims of the Allies regarding the former Ottoman domains. The Trans-Jordan memorandum of 16 September 1922 had excluded the area east of the Jordan River from application of the provisions of the Balfour Declaration regarding the Jewish national home and effectively resulted in two separate administrative units with vastly different modes of operation, Palestine and the Trans-Jordan.

In the following decade, despite every difficulty, successive British governments adhered to the view that Palestine was vital to Britain’s strategic interests due to its

22 Andrews, 165.
23 Cohen, 62, citing Churchill’s letter of 2 June 1921 to Prime Minister Lloyd George which counselled that “the only wise and safe course would be to take advantage of the postponement of the Mandates and resign them both and quit the two countries at the earliest possible moment, as the expense to which we shall be put will be wholly unwarrantable”.

proximity to the Suez Canal. Yet implementation of the terms of the Palestine Mandate, including the promise of a Jewish national home in Palestine, provoked the rise of Arab/Palestinian nationalism which first flared in the Jaffa Riots of 1921 and erupted far more seriously and durably in the Arab Rebellion from 1936 to 1939. In response to the Jaffa Riots High Commissioner Samuel curbed the volume of Jewish immigration without stemming the steady implementation of measures which favoured the position of the Zionist cause in Palestine. Samuel influenced the findings of the so-called “Churchill White Paper” of July 1922 which sought “to define British commitments to the Jews and Arabs and above all to clarify what the Balfour Declaration had really meant”. The principles of this document “guided British policy until 1939”, having as its goal “to reassure and placate each community concerning its own security and future in Palestine”. Pursuing this approach procured eight years of peace for Britain in Palestine, only disturbed in 1929 by the sectarian violence between Jews and Arabs over the Western or Wailing Wall. The resulting Shaw Commission report of March 1930 “focused on Arab fears and disappointments with respect to the attainment of their national goals”. The subsequent Hope-Simpson enquiry into Arab concerns over land issues concluded that some two thirds of all arable land in Palestine was now in Jewish hands and that “some 30 percent of the Arab population was already landless”, and recommended that restrictions be placed on further Jewish immigration and land purchases.

The election of a new Labour Government in Britain in 1930 led to a review of what British government policy in Palestine should be. Lord Passfield [Sidney Webb], now Colonial Secretary, wrote a White Paper which was published in October 1930 and

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25 Cohen, 82. The authors of this new policy set out in the July 1922 White Paper were High Commissioner Herbert Samuel and Sir John Shuckburgh, head of the Colonial Office’s Eastern Department.
26 Cohen, 82.
27 Cohen, 86.
28 Cohen, 86, considers the agricultural enquiry by Sir John Hope-Simpson in 1930. Its secret annex was far more critical of the Zionists and the impact of the Zionist project on the Arab population of Palestine.
was heavily influenced by the then British High Commissioner in Palestine, Sir John Chancellor, who advocated “that all preferential treatment of the Jews be ended and that the Arabs be granted self-government” in Palestine.29 The Passfield White Paper was swiftly negated by an emotive letter from the Zionist leader, Chaim Weizmann, which was read out in the House of Commons by Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, who “reaffirmed the British government’s obligation to the whole Jewish people”, not just those in Palestine.30 The resulting continuation of Jewish immigration to Palestine, which expanded greatly in numbers following the rise of anti-Semitism in Germany from 1933, contributed inexorably to the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948.

The eruption of the Arab Rebellion in 1936 led to successive British governmental enquiries and reviews, notably the Peel and Wood Reports which explored concepts of partition of Palestine, but none of these resulted in any actual change to British government policy on Palestine in the period of this thesis. The May 1939 White Paper on Palestine “marked the end of Britain’s commitment to the Jews under the Balfour Declaration [and] provided for the establishment of a Palestinian (Arab) state within ten years and the appointment of Palestinian ministers to begin taking over the government as soon as ‘peace and order’ were restored to Palestine”.31 In fact, events were to overtake this fundamental change in British government policy on Palestine and it never bore any fruits for the Arab Palestinian peoples. The outbreak of world war in September 1939 and the subsequent mass Jewish migration which followed from that war led to the events, outside of the terms of this thesis, which resulted in the establishment of the State of Israel in May of 1948.

3.1.3. FRENCH POLICY TOWARDS PALESTINE FROM 1903 TO 1939

From 1535 France had exercised authority as Protecting Power over the interests of the Latin Catholic Church and its members throughout the Ottoman Empire pursuant to the Capitulations between France and the Sublime Porte. This interposed French

29 Cohen, 87.
30 Cohen, 89.
31 Cohen, 93.
political and diplomatic interests between the Holy See and its Latin Catholic faithful in the Middle East. Only during the period of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic regime did France fail to act in its role as Protecting Power of Latin Catholic interests in the Ottoman domains. In order to facilitate this relationship, France and the Holy See maintained direct diplomatic relations with each other, and the Holy See from 1868 maintained an Apostolic Delegation in Constantinople/Istanbul to liaise with the French emissaries there who had the direct diplomatic relationship with the Sublime Porte. It was a very awkward way in which for the Holy See to have to guard its interests in the Ottoman Empire but, almost without interruption, it had evolved and worked for almost four hundred years.

On 9 December 1905 the French Chamber of Deputies passed the Law for the Separation of Church and State which led to the breaking of direct diplomatic relations between France and the Holy See, a relationship not restored until 1924. This left the Apostolic Delegation to Constantinople, in formal operation since 1868, as the sole means of direct communication between the Holy See and France over matters concerning the Latin Catholic interest in the Ottoman Empire.32 Notwithstanding the break in direct diplomatic relations France continued to take its role as Protecting Power very seriously and guarded this status jealously. The Sublime Porte unilaterally terminated all Capitulations after the outbreak of World War One in 1914 and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, by its article 28, acknowledged that all Capitulations negotiated between the Ottoman Empire and foreign powers had ended.

French foreign policy was reduced to disarray by the First World War and French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, “the least colonial of all the French”, entered the post-war peace negotiations with a pronounced concern for France’s border with

Germany and scant regard for the fate of French interests in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{33} In December 1917, following the taking of Jerusalem by Allenby, Clemenceau asked Prime Minister Lloyd George what it was that Britain wanted from the French in the Middle East, to which Lloyd George responded that he “wanted Mosul attached to Irak and Palestine from Dan to Beersheba under British control”, to which Clemenceau agreed without hesitation.\textsuperscript{34} This attitude by the French leader inevitably resulted in France faring worse than Britain in the Middle East, “the most severe blow to their wartime ambitions [being] the loss of the Palestine mandate to the British”.\textsuperscript{35}

Successive French governments, often begrudgingly, were committed to supporting policies which favoured Britain’s authority in Palestine pursuant to the League of Nations Mandate that was one of the principal fruits of the post-war Peace Conferences. However, this did not prevent France from making a valiant effort to resuscitate the French Protectorate over Catholic interests in the Middle East in the immediate aftermath of the war. This manifested itself immediately to General Allenby following the occupation of Jerusalem in December 1917 when Francois Georges-Picot attempted to exercise authority in liberated Palestine as France’s High Commissioner of an incipient Anglo-French condominium over Palestine, an attempt to which Allenby gave short shrift. It took almost six years for France to be reconciled to the fact that the French Protectorate was at an end for ever and that no one but itself, and certainly not the Holy See, wished to see it revived.\textsuperscript{36} The struggle to secure liturgical honours for French consular officials was the key battle ground over which this campaign was fought and it is true to say that French liturgical honours still survive in Jerusalem to this day.\textsuperscript{37} France, which handled the question of the French mandate over Syria poorly, was inclined to resent what Britain had secured

\textsuperscript{34} Andrews, 159.
\textsuperscript{35} Andrews, 161.
\textsuperscript{37} The present writer has witnessed the according of liturgical honours to the French Consul General and his wife at the Feast of St Stephen in the Church of St Stephen, Jerusalem, on 26 December 2009.
for itself in the Middle East, but this sense of resentment, inherent in Anglo-French relations, led to no meaningful change in French policy towards Palestine before the Second World War.

3.1.4. ITALIAN POLICY TOWARDS PALESTINE FROM 1903 TO 1939

Italy, “the last among the great or the first among the little” of European powers, had aspirations to develop an empire around the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, first fully realised when it conquered Libya in 1911. Through its 1915 abandonment of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary in favour of the Entente with Great Britain and France, Italy hoped to secure territories both in Europe from Austria and in Asia Minor from the Ottoman Empire. Italy fared poorly from the post-war Peace Conferences and ended with nothing of worth from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The rise to power of Mussolini and the Fascists in Italy, once pledged to drive the British from the Mediterranean Sea, led to no significant immediate change to Italian policy which supported British interests in the Middle East as shaped by the post-war settlements. However, Mussolini encouraged Italian claims, arising from vestigial interests of the House of Savoy in the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem, to be the guardian of the Christian Holy Places in Palestine and sought to acquire the Coenaculum, site of the Last Supper, for the King of Italy. Pollard concludes that “Mussolini’s ultimate aim was ambitious: to bring about the transfer of the League of Nations Mandate over Palestine from Britain to Italy”, in respect of which “the Vatican was in fact much more moderate and circumspect in its view”.

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38 Andrews, 166-169.
39 Claudio G. Segre, Liberal and Fascist Italy in the Middle East, 1919-1939, The Elusive White Stallion, in Dann at 200-201.
40 Segre, 201.
41 Segre, 202.
42 Segre, 204. The Italian campaign to acquire the Coenaculum from the last Ottoman Caliph was ultimately unsuccessful and attracted little enthusiasm from the Holy See. It remains in Muslim hands to this day.
In the 1930s Mussolini formulated an expansionist imperial policy focussed on East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula which brought it into the 1936 Axis Alliance and led to the Italian conquest of Abyssinia. Pursuant to the Axis alliance, Germany would focus its ambitions on Europe and Italy would seek its “sphere of expansion [in] the Mediterranean, Africa, and the Middle East”. At the same time Mussolini declared that Italy was a “satisfied power” and “was prepared to commit himself ‘not to oppose British interests in Egypt or elsewhere’”, presumably including Palestine. However, the very nature of Italy’s actions in Abyssinia in 1936 highlighted the importance for Great Britain of its control of the Suez Canal and therefore contributed to Britain’s ongoing determination to hold what it had gained in Palestine.

At various times in the 1920s and 1930s Mussolini made efforts to reach out both to the Arabs and the Zionists but none of these efforts was successful or resulted in any material policy outcomes for Italy. By 1939 “British and French influence was still paramount throughout the Mediterranean and the Middle East”, “the Suez Canal was still in British hands, and Italy was still at Britain’s mercy to reach its East African empire”.

3.1.5. GERMAN POLICY TOWARDS PALESTINE FROM 1903 TO 1939

Until its defeat in 1918, Germany was committed to a close military and economic alliance with the Ottoman Empire. Emperor William II had a deep interest in the Holy Land, visited it twice and funded the erection of elaborate structures in Jerusalem, both Lutheran and Catholic, as a mark of his interest and commitment. Germany’s military alliance with the Ottoman Empire led to its close involvement with Palestine during World War One when it supported two Ottoman attempts to take the Suez Canal in February 1915 and August 1916. The German Generals Erich von Falkenhayn and Otto Liman von Sanders led combined Ottoman and German forces to defeat by

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44 Segre, 205.  
45 Segre, 205.  
46 Segre, 206-208.  
47 Segre, 209.
General Allenby in 1917 and 1918. The outcome of the post-war Peace Conferences was that Germany ceased to be a Great Power and its interests in the Middle East were reduced to insignificance: “Germany’s delicate political and economic situation after World War One made it necessary to avoid the slightest chance of antagonism or collision with the Western Powers in general and with Great Britain in particular”. The coming to power of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party in Germany in 1933, with its clearly stated anti-Semitic policies, created great hope in Arab circles that Germany would intervene on their behalf in Palestine, a hope counterbalanced by the active promotion of the emigration of German Jews to Palestine. In fact, until 1937, Germany actively sought to engage Great Britain as an ally in its international plans and therefore avoided actions which might antagonise British interests in the Middle East. When the Arab Rebellion broke out in Palestine in 1936 “the controlled German press placed the blame for the disturbances in Palestine on the Soviet Union and supported Britain in its efforts to restore order”. Germany opposed the notion of any form of separate Jewish state in Palestine at the time of the Peel Report but took no active steps to promote its views. In February 1938 Hitler again endorsed further emigration of German Jews to Palestine.

From the time that Germany entered the Axis Alliance with Italy in October 1936 it was committed to supporting Italy in establishing its own sphere of influence in the Mediterranean region, including Palestine. In early 1938 German intelligence services did enter into negotiations with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husseini, “for the delivery of small quantities of weapons to the Arabs in Palestine via Saudi Arabia and Iraq”, but the commitment to do this was broken off after Germany and Britain concluded the Munich Agreement on 29 September 1938.

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50 Andreas Hillgruber, *The Third Reich and the Near and Middle East, 1933-1939*, in Dann, 274-281, at 275.
51 Hillgruber, 276.
52 Hillgruber, 277.
53 Hillgruber, 277.
54 Hillgruber, 277.
55 Hillgruber, 278.
56 Hillgruber, 279.
Again in early 1939 Hitler contemplated secret arms sales to Saudi Arabia to foment trouble for Britain in the Middle East but these did not proceed, whereas German arms shipments did take place to Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq between 1936 and 1939. The significance of German policies towards Palestine from 1918 to 1939 may therefore be seen to have been primarily in relation to the increased German Jewish emigration to Palestine after 1933, which exacerbated the situation with the Arab Palestinians and contributed significantly to the inexorable progress of Palestine towards the establishment of an independent Jewish state in 1948.

3.1.6. RUSSIAN/SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS PALESTINE FROM 1903 TO 1939

Imperial Russia had a pronounced policy with regard to Palestine, which was to claim to be the protector of Orthodox interests there, especially with regard to the Holy Places, a policy which had led it indirectly into the Crimean War. The negotiation of a separate peace by Russia with Germany and the Sublime Porte in 1917 and the establishment of the Soviet regime from 1918 onwards removed the Soviet Union from any significant role in relation to the Middle East until the outbreak of war in 1939. The Soviet regime devoted considerable time and effort to the negotiation of relations with Turkey but largely ignored the Arab world, though it was the first nation to recognize Saudi Arabia in 1932. When the Secretary-General of the Communist Party in Palestine visited Moscow in 1931 “and met with Stalin, he discovered to his dismay that the latter had no idea of developments in Palestine and the Arab world”. Indeed, “it was not until 1955 that the Soviet Union began to address itself to the Middle East as a whole, as a single well-defined region that required an integral policy”. Whilst the Soviet Union would come to make its views known in Jerusalem about ownership of Russian properties with connection to religious sites during the period 1919-1939 it would never do so as claimant to any

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57 Hillgruber, 280.
58 Yaacov Ro’i, Official Soviet Views on the Middle East, 1919-1939, in Dann, 301-307, at 305.
59 Ro’i, 306.
60 Ro’i, 306.
protecting right, and the Soviet Union was therefore of no policy significance to the Holy Land in this period.

3.1.7. THE UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS PALESTINE FROM 1903 TO 1939

The United States had traditionally abstained from the politics of the Eastern Question and, apart from its role at the Paris Peace Conferences, it continued to do so until drawn into the Second World War.\footnote{John A. DeNovo, On the Sidelines: The United States and the Middle East between the Wars, 1919-1939, in Dann, 225-237, at 225.} However, both American Jews and American Protestant Churches had a great interest in Palestine which had a significant material bearing on life in the Holy Land from 1919 to 1939.\footnote{DeNovo, 226-227.}

3.2. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING GREAT POWER POLICIES TOWARDS PALESTINE FROM 1903 TO 1939

There can be few places in the world which have seen so dramatic a reversal of Great Power policies than Palestine in the period covered by this thesis, 1904 to 1939. Ruled by the Ottomans until 1917/1918 and subject to France’s role as Protecting Power for Latin Catholic interests until 1914, the very circumstances of the First World War and Britain’s realization of the crucial nature of Palestine for defence of the Suez Canal, coupled with Britain’s commitment to global Jewry in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and General Allenby’s capture of Jerusalem in that year, all served to create an entirely new set of policy imperatives for Palestine.

The outcome of the post-war peace settlement was that Great Britain secured Palestine as a mandated territory subject to the terms of the Balfour Declaration and pursued a policy of administration for that territory which remained substantially unchanged until the White Paper of May 1939. French policy, often begrudgingly, adhered to the maintenance of Britain’s position in Palestine whilst it pursued its own affairs in its own sphere of influence in the Middle East. Italy similarly pursued policies which either supported or were not hostile to Britain’s role in Palestine.
whilst it sought to develop its own East African empire, that activity only highlighting to Great Britain the importance of maintaining control of the Suez Canal. Following World War One Germany and the Soviet Union struggled to rebuild their countries in the wake of war and revolution and at no stage pursued policies which materially impacted on events in Palestine, other than as they contributed to the emigration of German and Russian Jews to Palestine in this period. The United States, withdrawing into itself following the Paris Peace Conferences, held aloof from Middle Eastern affairs, though its nationals, Jewish and Protestant alike, played significant roles in relation to life in Palestine during this period. One is entitled to conclude from these facts that the only Great Power whose policies materially affected the Holy Land in the period from 1919 to 1939 were those of Great Britain itself. As this thesis sets out to show, Britain’s pursuit of those policies was a matter of the greatest interest to the Holy See which had its own historic policies for the Holy Land which it was determined to defend.
APPENDIX 4 - GLOSSARY

**Anti-Semitism** – prejudice against, hatred of or discrimination/bias against Jews on the grounds of race and/or religion.

**Auxiliary Bishop** – A bishop appointed at the request of a diocesan bishop to assist at the episcopal level in the bishop’s work of administering a diocese and providing for its pastoral needs, see 1983 Code of Canon Law [CCL], Canon 403.

**Balfour Declaration** – A declaration given by means of a memorandum from the Right Honourable A. J. Balfour, British Foreign Secretary, to Lord Rothschild on 2/3 November 1917 in which the United Kingdom government indicated that “it viewed with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country”.

**Canon Law** – the ecclesiastical law of the Catholic Church presently embodied in the revised Code of Canon Law [CCL] issued by Pope John Paul II on 25 January 1983 and previously under the 1917 Pio-Benedictine Code of Canon Law which codified for the first time a vast array of Catholic ecclesiastical law.

**Capitulations** – Contracts entered into between the Ottoman Empire [Sublime Porte] and European powers, in particular those entered into between the Ottoman Empire and France from 1535, pursuant to which France was given the role of Protecting Power in relation to Catholics and Catholic institutions within the Ottoman Empire, often referred to as the French Protectorate.

**Catholic Church** – The Church established and ordered in this world as a society and which subsists as the entity known as the Catholic Church governed by the Bishop of Rome and all other bishops in the world who are in communion with him, see Canon 204, CCL. It is made up both of Latin rite and Eastern or Oriental rite Catholics.

**Curia** – the Roman Curia is the body through which the Bishop of Rome, as Supreme Pontiff, usually conducts the business of the Catholic Church, and is made up of the Secretariat of
State and a number of Congregations and Institutes located in Rome, all usually headed by a Cardinal, see 1983 CCL, Canon 360, CCL.

**Dicastery** – an institute within the Curia of the Holy See charged with a particular field of competence and responsibility in relation to the affairs of the Holy See, see Canon 360, CCL.

**Franciscan Order** – St Francis of Assisi [1182 – 1226] founded this religious congregation, which has split into three male Orders. For the purposes of this work it is the Observant Order of Friars Minor [OFM] which is referred to by the term “Franciscan Order”. This Order is governed by a Minister General located in Rome and, in Palestine, is headed by the Franciscan Custode/Custos, based in Jerusalem at the Saint Saviour Convent near the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

**Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa** – St Francis of Assisi oversaw the establishment of the Franciscan mission in Palestine in 1217 and it became known, from the time of Pope Clement VI’s *Bullarium peculiare Terrae Sanctae* in 1342, as the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa/Holy Land, progressively acquiring ownership of key Christian Holy Places in Palestine which its friars cared for, and continue to care for, often at the expense of their own lives.

**Franciscan Custode/Custos** – The Franciscan friar who was appointed Guardian of the Mount Sion Convent at the Coenaculum in Jerusalem became known as the Franciscan Custos/Custode of the Terra Santa, being now based at the Saint Saviour Convent in Jerusalem, and almost invariably an Italian Franciscan.

**High Commissioner** – from 1 July 1920 until 14 May 1948 the highest ranking United Kingdom government official in the British Mandate for Palestine was known as the High Commissioner for Palestine, and subsequently as High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan. The High Commissioner was based in Jerusalem, initially at the Augusta Viktoria Palace, built in 1907 by Emperor William II on the Mount of Olives, but from 1927 was headquartered at a new Governor’s Palace at Talpiot in southern East Jerusalem.

**Holy Land** – a term used within the Christian faith to describe the land of Palestine made holy by the life and ministry of Jesus Christ. The papal bull of Pope Clement VI in 1342 specifically referred to this geographical area as the “Terra Santa”, or Holy Land.
Holy See – this entity, recognized as a sovereign power by international law, inter alia, by the Treaty of Vienna in 1814, “means not only the Roman Pontiff” but also “the Secretariat of State” and a number of other Institutes or dicasteries which make up the Curia, see Canon 361, CCL. Thus the Holy See may be physically located anywhere in the world, wherever those entities are located. It is separate from the Vatican City State which only came into existence as a sovereign state in 1929. From 1870 to 1929 the Holy See possessed no physical territory but it remained a recognised sovereign power in international law and diplomacy.

Israel – the patriarch Jacob was referred to by the name “Israel”, meaning “May God rule” or “May God contend”. This came to be the name of the kingdom made up of the twelve tribes claiming descent from the eponymous Israel from approximately 1000 BCE until the end of the United Monarchy following the death of King Solomon in 924 BCE. “Eretz Israel”, the Land of Israel, was the name used by the Zionist movement to refer to the traditional historic homeland of the Jewish peoples within the Ottoman Empire and subsequently established as the British Mandate for Palestine in 1920. Dr Theodor Herzl [1860-1904], the outstanding leader of the Zionist movement, claimed to have founded the Jewish state at the first Zionist Congress at Basle in August 1897. The Zionist movement consistently used the term “Eretz Israel” to describe that Jewish national home to which the movement aspired. On 14 May 1948 the Jewish People’s Council in Tel Aviv proclaimed the establishment of the Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel.

Jewish National Home – following the 1896 publication by Theodor Herzl of his work The Jewish State, the 1897 first Zionist Congress at Basle resolved “to establish a home for the Jewish people in Palestine secured under public law”. In 1839 Sir Moses Montefiore had petitioned the Khedive of Egypt for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in the region of Palestine. Following relentless lobbying by the Zionist leaders, especially Chaim Weizmann and Herbert Samuel [later first British High Commissioner for the Palestine Mandate], the British Government issued its 2/3 November 1917 Balfour Declaration in favour of the establishing in Palestine of a “national home for the Jewish people”. The establishment of a “Jewish national home” in Palestine thereafter became fixed British policy which was incorporated in the various provisions of the Paris Peace Agreements and in the establishment of the League of Nations and of the Palestine Mandate.
Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem – the first bishop of Jerusalem, according to ancient Christian tradition, was St James the Just, known as “the brother of the Lord”. The Emperor Justinian in 531 specifically accorded the title of Patriarch to the Sees of Rome, Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem, according them superiority over other metropolitan archbishops and bishops. Following the establishment of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1099 the diocese of Jerusalem was converted from the Eastern Rite to the Latin Rite, Latin becoming the official language of the liturgy, and a Frenchman was appointed as Patriarch of Jerusalem, becoming the first Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. Following the surrender of Jerusalem to Saladin in 1187 the Latin Patriarch relocated to Acre/Akka, and following the fall of Acre/Akka in 1291 the Latin Patriarch moved again to Cyprus. From 1374 the office of Latin Patriarch was filled by men living in Rome at the Basilica of San Lorenzo fuori le Mura. From 1187 the Orthodox Church appointed a Patriarch residing in Jerusalem. From 638 the Armenian Orthodox Church had appointed its own Patriarch of Jerusalem. From 1847 the Catholic Church re-established a resident Latin Patriarch in Jerusalem. The Anglican Church also appoints a bishop of Jerusalem. There are thus presently three Patriarchs of Jerusalem [Orthodox, Armenian and Latin]. The Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem has jurisdiction over all of the territories over which the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem at various times ruled, made up of Palestine, Trans-Jordan/Jordan and Cyprus.

Latin Rite – the liturgical rites of those parts of the Catholic Church which historically used the Latin language rather than the Greek, Arabic or other languages in the liturgy.

League of Nations – the intergovernmental organization founded through the post-World War I Paris Peace Conferences and which came into formal legal existence on 10 January 1920 with 42 founding members. Amongst its roles was the allocation and oversight of the various mandated territories formed out of the colonial territories of the defeated powers, Germany and the Ottoman Empire.

Order of the Holy Sepulchre – immediately following the capture of Jerusalem by the Crusaders in 1099 the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, housing the relics of Calvary and the Tomb of Jesus in which the Resurrection is believed to have occurred, was entrusted to a new Chapter of Canons of the Holy Sepulchre. Whilst the Canons themselves were professed religious there grew up a community of lay men and lay women who lived in close community with the Canons. Some form of installation as knights developed at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Following the expulsion of the Canons in 1187, when the Franciscan
Order had secured control of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, this practice of illustrious pilgrims to Jerusalem being installed as knights at the Holy Sepulchre was continued. The lay Order of the Holy Sepulchre may thus be said to continue the traditions founded by the Canons of the Holy Sepulchre in 1099. In 1848 Pope Pius X entrusted oversight of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre to the first of the restored Latin Patriarchs of Jerusalem, Monsignor Valerga, and the moneys received from the knights and ladies of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre became the principal means by which the Catholic Church financed, and continues to finance, the work of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. The Order has been reformed several times since 1848. Pope Pius X appointed himself Grand Master of the Order in 1907, a position held by Popes Benedict XV and Pius XI, the latter vacating this title in 1928. From 1948 the head of the Order has been a Cardinal resident in Rome and its headquarters is located within the territory of the Vatican City State. Its official name now is the Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem.

**Palestine** – derived from the word for the territory ruled by the Philistines, the Roman Emperor Hadrian in 135 abolished the title of its Roman province of Judea, following the Bar-Kochba revolt, and substituted for it the title *Provincia Syria Palaestina*, or simply Palestine. This became the generally accepted title for this part of the later Ottoman Empire.

**Palestine Mandate** – on 24 July 1922 the Council of the League of Nations approved the granting of the Mandate for Palestine to the United Kingdom. This mandate came into legal effect on 29 September 1923 and ceased on 14 May 1948 when the State of Israel came into being. The Preamble of the Palestine Mandate document incorporated reference to the United Kingdom government’s commitment in the November 1917 Balfour Declaration to the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.

**Pope** – the person elected and accepting election as Bishop of Rome becomes the Roman Pontiff, head of the College of Bishops of the Catholic Church and “the Pastor of the universal Church here on earth”, holding “by virtue of his office ... supreme, full, immediate and universal ordinary power in the Church”, and also having “pre-eminent ordinary power over all the particular Churches”, that is, over all dioceses which are in communion with the Bishop of Rome, see Canons 331-333, CCL. The Code of Canon Law does not, within its Canons, refer to the Bishop of Rome by the title of “Pope”, this title being identified only in its Index. Rather he is generally referred to as the “Roman Pontiff” or the “Supreme Pontiff” in the Canons themselves.
**Pro Ecclesia Orientali/ Congregation for the Eastern Churches** – the dicastery of the Roman Curia responsible for dealing with the affairs of the Eastern or Oriental Catholic Churches, and now called the Congregation for the Eastern or Oriental Churches. It was founded by Pope Pius IX within Propaganda Fide in 1862 and became a separate dicastery in 1917 under Pope Benedict XV. In 1938 Pope Pius XI transferred oversight of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem from Propaganda Fide to Pro Ecclesia Orientali in order to overcome problems perceived to exist within the Catholic Church in Palestine and Transjordan due to frictions between the Latin and Eastern, principally Greek-Melkite, Catholics.

**Propaganda Fide** – founded by Pope Gregory XV in 1622 the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, Propaganda Fide, was entrusted with responsibility for the overseas mission work of the Catholic Church and for the regulation of Catholic affairs in non-Catholic countries. In the Middle East a strong focus of its missionary activity was amongst non-Catholic Christians, especially those of the Greek and Syrian rites. Whilst the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, Propaganda Fide, had been established early in the Seventeenth Century, the Congregation for the Eastern Churches, pro Ecclesia Orientali, had only been established as an independent dicastery of the Roman Curia only in 1917. Propaganda Fide had a vast remit covering all missionary work, and territories, of the Catholic Church. Pro Ecclesia Orientali had a very narrow and specific remit to nurture the Oriental, or Eastern, Catholic Churches, such as the Greek-Melkites, alongside the Latin Catholic Church and rite. There was clearly a struggle between Propaganda Fide and Pro Ecclesia Orientali in relation to the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem and the Greek-Melkite Catholic Church in Palestine, and the best way to advance the Catholic missionary interest in Palestine, in the period from 1922 to 1938.

**Secretariat of State** – the oldest and most important of the dicasteries of the Holy See, its origins date back to an Apostolic Constitution of 1487. The Secretariat of State, headed by a Secretary of State who is almost invariably a Cardinal, has traditionally performed the role of overseeing the government of the affairs of the Holy See and the handling of its foreign affairs, although since 1814 this latter function has come within the specific remit of the Sacred Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs.

**Secretary of State** – effectively the Pope’s Prime Minister, and almost invariably a Cardinal. Popes Benedict XV, Pius XII and Paul VI all made their ecclesiastical careers either as Secretary of State or as one of his deputies [Substitute/Sostituto].
**Substitute/Sostituto**—the Substitute Secretary was, in the words of Pollard, “the most important person in the Vatican after the Pope and the Secretary of State [who] in the absence of the Secretary of State dealt directly with the Pope himself”.¹

**Status Quo** – a vital term whose precise meaning is elusive. Enrico Molinaro in *The Holy Places in Jerusalem in Middle East Peace Agreements* at 138 defines this term to mean “the temporary legal regime to manage and suspend disputes on respective rights and interests with regard to several important sacred sites in the Jerusalem area (including Bethlehem), crystallized since Ottoman rule (1517-1917)”. However, Molinaro at 110 sets out a definition which may be more useful for the purposes of this present work in the period which it covers from 1903 to 1939 so far as relates to the relationship between the various Christian communities in Palestine: “The (1852) *firman* [Ottoman Imperial Decree] granted the various religious communities shared rights in the holy places, demarcating which areas came under whose control and establishing time schedules for officiating in areas shared by more than one religious group”. Those rights as they existed in 1852 constitute the Status Quo for the Christian Holy Places in the Holy Land. It is inherent in this outcome that the government applies the Status Quo pursuant to the Ottoman *firman* of 1852 to the Christian Holy Places, see Hammer, Leonard, *Israel’s Understanding of the Agreement with the Holy See*, in Breger, ibid, 78-79, which points out that in the period from 1948 to 1967, when Jordan controlled the Old City of Jerusalem, “the government essentially adhered to the Status Quo”, and that from the time that Israel took the Old City in 1967 Israel has applied the Status Quo, noting that “the Status Quo is not a firm and fast rule of law but is an attempt to accommodate all the religious interests and their conflicting claims [and] has been subject to change, and continues to evolve, depending on the influence of the authorities and the relevant religious parties”. Article 4 of the 30 December 1993 Fundamental Agreement between the Holy See and the State of Israel, Article 4, recites that: “The State of Israel affirms its continuing commitment to maintain and respect the ‘Status quo’ in the Christian Holy Places to which it applies and the respective rights of the Christian communities thereunder. The Holy See affirms the Catholic Church’s continuing commitment to respect the aforementioned ‘Status quo’ and the said rights”, see Breger, ibid, 359-364 at 361.

**Sublime Porte** – the Bab-i Ali, referred to by the French from 1536 as the Sublime Porte or Gate, was the entrance to the palace of the Grand Vizier who governed the Ottoman empire on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan. It leads into a walled compound which housed the various departments of government of the Ottoman Empire and became the term used by European nations to describe the very government of the Ottoman Empire itself.

**Supreme Pontiff/Sovereign Pontiff** – the English translations of the Latin phrase *Summus Pontifex Ecclasiae Universalis*, deriving from the ancient Roman title *Pontifex Maximus*, and listed in the *Annuario Pontificio* as one of the current titles of the Bishop of Rome, the Roman Pontiff. The pontifex maximus was the Roman high priest, *pontifex* being the term for a “bridge builder”. The current Code of Canon Law uses the title Supreme Pontiff, or *Summus Pontifex*, rather than Pope, to describe the Bishop of Rome.

**Vatican** – a metonym used in common parlance to describe variously, the government of the Holy See, the Vatican City State, and the residence of the Bishop of Rome in the Apostolic Palace of the Vatican. Usually in this work the term will refer to the residence of the Pope.

**Vatican City State** – the independent sovereign territory comprised of 44 hectares of land encompassing St Peter’s Basilica, the Vatican Palace and its Gardens, and a number of pieces of non-contiguous territory [including St Paul’s Basilica and Castel Gandolfo], which was brought into existence in international law by the 1929 Lateran Treaty between the Kingdom of Italy and the Holy See. It is a recognized sovereign state in international law, but it is not the Holy See, which is itself a sovereign entity in international law and which may exist wherever the Pope and his Curia are located.

**Zionism** – this term encompasses any of the various movements of thought and belief supporting the return of the Jewish people to “Mt Zion”, that is, Jerusalem and Palestine. Whilst Jewish peoples of the Diaspora have traditionally expressed the longing, at their *seder* meal, to be “next year in Jerusalem”, Protestants in England following the Reformation developed a firm belief in the need for the Jews to return to Jerusalem as the necessary precursor to the return of Jesus Christ. It is useful to remember this Christian Zionism, as well as the proto-Zionism of people such as Sir Moses Montefiore earlier in the Nineteenth Century, because the term Zionism has now been entirely appropriated by the Zionist movement largely founded by Dr Theodor Herzl from 1895 onwards. In these terms it means the movement of Jewish thought and belief, largely secular, advocating the return of Jewish peoples to Eretz Israel, the ancestral home of the Jewish people in the territory of the
Ottoman Empire known as Palestine, and having as its ultimate aim the establishment of a secular Jewish state in that land. Whilst the establishment of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948 might be thought to have accomplished the purposes of Zionism, it seems evident that the Zionist project continues through the expansion of Jewish settlements in Palestinian territory.

**Zionist project** – a study of the writings of Theodor Herzl makes absolutely clear that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, within borders on both sides of the Jordan River at least to the line of the Hejaz Railway, was always the ultimate goal of Zionism. In 1897 Herzl predicted the establishment of this state to within a year of its actual occurrence in 1948. A study of subsequent events in Israel/Palestine strongly suggests that the Zionist project remains a work in progress.
APPENDIX 5 – DRAMATIS PERSONAE

Cardinal Charles Januarius Acton [1803-1847], son of the English-origin Sir John Acton, Prime Minister of Naples; educated in England, proclaimed Cardinal in 1842. He was renowned for his piety and charity. His ill health prevented his rising to much higher office within the Roman Curia.

Michael Solomon Alexander [1799-1845], first Anglican bishop of Jerusalem, had been a Jewish rabbi who had converted to Christianity, arriving in Jerusalem as Anglican/Lutheran bishop in 1842 and died in 1845, his entire episcopate in Palestine having been focussed on the Jewish community, thereby antagonizing the local Jewish community leaders whilst at the same time provoking both Catholic and Orthodox Churches. The subsequent re-establishment of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem in 1848 was in no small part a reaction to the Anglo-Prussian religious initiative in Palestine.

Field Marshal Edmund Allenby, 1st Viscount Allenby of Megiddo, GCB GCMG GCVO [1861-1936] led the British Egyptian Expeditionary Force until 1918 and was thereafter High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan until 1925.

Arthur Balfour, 1st Earl Balfour KG [1848-1930], nephew of the 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, Prime Minister, and thus a descendant of the great Lord Burghley, chief minister to Queen Elizabeth I. He was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1902 to 1905. He became Foreign Secretary in the Lloyd George administration in 1916 and in that office was involved in the drafting and issuing of the Balfour Declaration on 2/3 November 1917. He retired as Foreign Secretary following the Versailles Peace Conferences in 1919 but later held office as Lord President of the Council in the second Baldwin administration. He made a tour of the Holy Land in 1925 where he defended the consequences of his famous Balfour Declaration. He once remarked that “nothing matters very much and few things matter at all”.
Antonio de la Cierva y Lewita, 2nd Conde de Ballobar, [1885-1971], son of a Spanish general and a Polish Jewish mother, he was appointed as Spanish Consul General in Jerusalem in the last years of the Ottoman Empire and served there throughout the First World War, in which conflict Spain was a neutral power. He left an entertaining and informative account of those years which has been published.

Monsignor Luigi Barlassina [1872-1947], a priest from Turin who worked at Propaganda Fide in Rome before becoming the Rector of St John Lateran, the Pope’s Cathedral, in 1912 and in which role he established friendly contact with Pope Benedict XV. In 1918 Pope Benedict XV appointed him as titular bishop of Capharnaum and auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem. In 1919, in the face of strong opposition from the British and Italian governments, he was appointed as the fourth Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem since the reestablishment of that office as resident in Jerusalem. In 1928 he became Rector and Administrator of the Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulchre which was the source of the larger part of funds for the Latin Patriarchate. A controversial figure, much criticized by British officials, there is much to admire about his energy, tenacity and outspoken honesty. He died in office in Jerusalem in 1947 only eight months before the establishment of the State of Israel, which event he had often predicted whilst he strongly opposed it.

Pope Benedict XV [1854-1922], formerly Cardinal Giacomo della Chiesa, a Genovese aristocrat trained in the diplomatic service of the Holy See. He was Substitute Secretary to the great Cardinal Rampolla, Secretary of State in the pontificate of Pope Leo XIII, and continued in this role under Cardinal Merry del Val during the early years of the pontificate of Pope Pius X. He was appointed Archbishop of Bologna in 1908 but was not appointed a Cardinal until 1914 due, it was alleged, to the animosity of Cardinal Merry del Val. His election as Supreme Pontiff at the Conclave in 1914 was seen by many as a victory for the forces of Cardinal Rampolla and for those who opposed Pope Pius X’s campaign against Modernism. Whilst he did do away with some of the more extreme manifestations of the anti-Modernist crusade he never actively opposed or denounced it. He devoted himself throughout
World War One to the cause of peace and to the relief of the sufferings of those affected by the hostilities, including prisoners of war and refugees.

Norman Bentwich OBE MC [1883-1971], was the son of one of the earliest leading English Zionists and was himself a delegate at the various Zionist Congresses from 1907 to 1912. He married a niece of Sir Herbert Samuel and served in the British administration in Palestine from its inception in 1917, becoming Attorney General of Palestine under Sir Herbert Samuel and continuing in that office until his removal by the British Government in 1931.

Cardinal Francesco Borgongini Duca [1884-1954], a Roman who became a priest, taught Theology at the Pontifical North American College where he became the patron of the American seminarian, Francis Spellman, afterwards the renowned Cardinal Archbishop of New York. He was appointed Secretary of the Sacred Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs in early October 1922, effectively becoming the Holy See’s Foreign Minister. He was involved in the negotiation of the Lateran Treaty with Italy in 1929 and was immediately thereafter appointed Papal Nuncio to Italy in which office he remained until 1953 when he was appointed a Cardinal by Pope Pius XII.

Cardinal Francis Bourne [1861-1935], Archbishop of Westminster from 1903 until his death in 1935, created a Cardinal in 1911.

Monsignor, afterwards Cardinal, Filippo Camassei [1848-1921], a Roman aristocrat who served as Rector of the Urbanian University within the oversight of Propaganda Fide. In 1906 Pope Pius X chose him as his “saint for Jerusalem” to take office as the third of the restored Latin Patriarchs of Jerusalem. He was very highly regarded but the outbreak of World War One in 1914 led to his isolation in Palestine. In November 1917 the Ottoman authorities removed him forcibly from Jerusalem and held him in the Franciscan Convent at Nazareth. He was able to return to Jerusalem when the Ottoman and German forces were driven out of Galilee but by then his health was
broken. He was appointed a Cardinal by Pope Benedict XV in 1919 and retired from office as Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, residing in Rome where he died in early 1921.

Sir John Chancellor GCMG GCVO GBE DSO [1870-1952], between 1911 and 1928 Governor successively of Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago and Southern Rhodesia, before being appointed in 1928 as the third British High Commissioner of Palestine. He became doubtful about various aspects of British government policy in Palestine and in 1930 helped Lord Passfield write his White Paper which recommended that Britain’s approach to the implementation of the Balfour Declaration should be revised, particularly with regard to the progress towards the establishment of a separate Jewish state. He concluded his term in Palestine in 1931.

Sir Winston Spencer Churchill KG [1874-1965], First Lord of the Admiralty responsible for the disastrous Gallipoli Campaign of 1915 against the Ottoman Empire. He was Secretary of State for the Colonies from early 1921 to early 1922 in the Lloyd George administration, during which time he had to deal with the Jaffa Riots of 1921 in Palestine and their aftermath.

George Nathaniel Curzon, 1st Earl and then 1st Marquess Curzon KG [1859-1925], Viceroy of India from 1899 to 1905, Chancellor of Oxford University, a member of the Lloyd George War Cabinet, Foreign Secretary from 1919 to 1924, but passed over for the office of Prime Minister by King George V upon the advice of Lord Balfour in 1923.

Cardinal Angelo Maria Dolci [1871-1939], a native of Lazio, appointed Bishop of Gubbio in 1906, Archbishop of Amalfi in 1911, and Apostolic Vicar in Constantinople [Istanbul] in 1914 where he remained until 1922. He was appointed Nuncio to Belgium in 1922 and immediately thereafter Nuncio to Rumania. He became a Cardinal in 1933.
Sir Cecil Dormer [1883-1979] was a Catholic who had been assistant private secretary to Foreign Secretary Balfour and was later to be British Minister to Norway from 1934 to 1941.

Sir James Eric Drummond GCMG CB [1876-1951], later 7th/ 16th Earl of Perth, inaugural Secretary General of the League of Nations 1919-1933, then British Ambassador to Italy, later Deputy Leader of Liberals in House of Lords, and, according to Cardinal Bourne, a “fervent Catholic”.

Monsignor Franz Fellinger [1865-1940] was an Austrian priest who served as Rector of the Austro-Hungarian Hospice in Jerusalem, became Vicar General of the Latin Patriarchate and then auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem and titular bishop of Nisyrus in 1929.

Cardinal Pietro Fumasoni Biondi [1872-1960], a Roman aristocrat, appointed Secretary of Propaganda Fide in 1922 and Prefect of Propaganda Fide in 1933, holding that office until his death in 1960. He was appointed Cardinal Priest in 1933, his titular church being Santa Croce in Gerusalemme, holding the relics of the True Cross.

Cardinal Pietro Gasparri [1852-1934], born of peasant stock in Le Marche, Secretary of State of the Holy See from 13 October 1914 to 1930, serving both Benedict XV and Pius XI. He had been created a Cardinal by Pius X in 1907. The 1917 Code of Canon Law was largely his work.

Cardinal Girolamo Maria Gotti [1834-1916], son of a dock worker of Genoa, he became a Discalced Carmelite and was appointed Cardinal by Pope Leo XIII in 1895, thereafter being briefly appointed Prefect of the Congregation of Bishops before being appointed Prefect of Propaganda Fide where he remained until his death in 1916. He was the main rival to Cardinal Rampolla at the 1903 Conclave and it was the shifting of his support to Cardinal Sarto of Venice that led to the latter’s election as Pope Pius X.
John Arthur Maundy **Gregory** (1877-1941), architect of the corrupt sale of English titles in the 1920s. From 1929 he moved his field of operations to the brokerage of membership in papal Orders, including that of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre, of which he was made a Knight Grand Cross.

**Sir John Hathorn Hall** GCMG DSO OBE MC (1894-1979), Chief Secretary of Palestine 1933-1940, later Governor of Aden and then of Uganda.

**Theodor Herzl**, born Benjamin Ze’ev Herzl [1860-1904], in Budapest to a secular Jewish family. He trained as a lawyer in Vienna and worked as a journalist in Paris where the worst manifestations of anti-Semitism throughout the Dreyfus Affair led him to the belief that a national home was required to provide a safe haven for people of Jewish background, whether practising Jews or not. In 1896 he published *Der Judenstaat*, the Jewish State, in which he argued the case for a Jewish national home, preferably in Palestine, the historic homeland of the Jewish people. He planned the First International Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland, in 1897 and was elected President of the Zionist Movement, which office he held until his death in 1904. In 1897 he called for the establishment of a Jewish State of Israel in Palestine and predicted that such a State would come into existence within fifty years. He was a relentless, tireless and successful campaigner for support for the concept of a Jewish national home and this led him to seek an Audience with Pope Pius X in late January 1904. Although he was rebuffed by Pope Pius X his campaign was ultimately successful and, following the establishment of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948, the remains of Theodor Herzl were transferred from Vienna to be interred with great honour on Mt Herzl in Jerusalem.

**Mohammad Ali Jouhar** [1878-1931], brother of Shoukat Ali, was one of the leaders of the All India Muslim League and of the Khilifat Movement in India, and died on 4 January 1931, requesting that he be buried near the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, a request that was granted by the Grand Mufti, Haj Amin al-Husseini.
Father, afterwards Bishop, Godric Kean [1866-1933], a priest of the diocese of Salford who served as a military chaplain in Palestine during World War One. His diocesan bishop, eager to find a place for him outside of the diocese, recommended him to Cardinal Gasquet in Rome as suitable to be appointed auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem at a time when Britain was eager to have a British person in that office to help guide the Latin Patriarch, Monsignor Barlassina. He was appointed titular bishop of Tavium and auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem in 1924 but, following a brief period of good relations with Monsignor Barlassina, their relationship swiftly broke down. The Latin Patriarch exiled him to Cyprus as Vicar General there but he resigned in December 1928, retiring to Durham from whence he wrote complaining letters about the difficulty of surviving on the income paid to him by the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem.

Cardinal Camillo Laurenti [1861-1938], Secretary of Propaganda Fide from 1911, created a Cardinal by Pope Benedict XV in 1921, and appointed by Pope Pius XI as Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of Religious.

Sir John Randolph [Shane] Leslie 3rd Baronet (1885-1971), a convert to Roman Catholicism, first cousin of Mr Winston Churchill, their mothers being sisters; a supporter of Irish Home Rule.

Count Berthold Dominik Lippay [1864-1919], born Bartholomaus Lipner in Turzovka, Moravia, on 21 September 1864, the son of a Jewish timber merchant. With the patronage of the Cardinal Archbishop of Esztergom the young Bartholomaus Lipner commenced his training as an artist, studying in Munich, Brussels and Paris. He converted to Catholicism and changed his name to Berthold Dominik Lippay or Lippai, settling in Venice where he married the half-sister of Countess Elizabetta Maria Adriana Widmann-Rezzonico [1878-1953], heiress of a leading Austro-Venetian noble family with close connections to the Holy See and to Pope Clement XIII [1693-1769]. Count Berthold Lippay died in Vienna on 17 December 1919 in straitened financial circumstances leaving a family who suffered after the Anschluss under the anti-Jewish racial laws of the Nazi regime.
David Lloyd George, 1st Earl Lloyd-George of Dwyfor OM [1863-1945], a Welsh statesman who was raised in part by his uncle, a Nonconformist minister, whose teachings on the Bible left an indelible mark on his famous nephew which undoubtedly shaped his enthusiasm for Britain’s involvement in Palestine and his support for the Balfour Declaration about a Jewish national home in Palestine. He was Prime Minister from 1916 to 1922 and was crucially involved in the decision to issue the Balfour Declaration in November 1917, in General Allenby’s occupation of Jerusalem in December 1917, and in the seeking and granting of the Palestine Mandate to Britain by the League of Nations.


Cardinal Rafael Merry del Val [1865-1930], of aristocratic Spanish, Irish, English and Dutch ancestry, his father having been Spanish Ambassador to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He was born at the Spanish Embassy in London and was raised and educated in England before going to study in Rome. He entered the diplomatic service of the Holy See, conducted the enquiry on the validity of Anglican Orders which led Pope Leo XIII to rule those Orders to be invalid. Almost by chance he became secretary of the Conclave in 1903, attracting the attention of Cardinal Sarto who, immediately upon his election as Pope Pius X, made Merry del Val his pro-Secretary of State, an appointment in which he was confirmed two months later when he was also appointed a Cardinal. He was replaced as Secretary of State when Cardinal della Chiesa was elected to the pontificate as Pope Benedict XV in 1914, but was then appointed Secretary and effective head of the Holy Office, which office he held until his death in 1930. He succeeded Cardinal Rampolla as Archpriest of St Peter’s Basilica in 1914. He was renowned for his piety and charity and the Litany of Humility was his creation. There is an active cause for his beatification.
Sir Moses Montefiore 1st Baronet FRS [1784-1885] was President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews from 1835 to 1875 and was a key figure in the development of proto-Zionism.

Hugh Edmund Langton Montgomery (1896-1971), Secretary at the British Legation to the Holy See 1933-1936, left the Diplomatic Corps in 1947, studied for the Catholic priesthood at the Beda College 1947-1941 and was ordained as a priest for Birmingham Archdiocese and ended his life as parish priest of St Augustine’s Church, Handsworth.

Baron Carlo Monti [1851-1924] was a childhood friend and fellow-student of Pope Benedict XV in Genoa. The grandmother of Benedict XV was his godmother. From 1882 he was employed by the Fondo per il Culto, an institution created by the Italian State to deal with the funds of abolished religious associations. In 1908 he became the Director General of the Fondo and, when Pope Benedict XV became Supreme Pontiff in 1914, the Pope chose to use his old school friend as his means of liaising with the Italian Government. Baron Carlo Monti kept a diary which was acquired by the Holy See after the Baron’s death in 1924, and which is held by the Holy See in the Historical Archives of the Second Section of the Secretariat of State (formerly of the Special Ecclesiastic Affairs).

Sir D’Arcy Godolphin-Osborne [1884-1964], afterwards 12th Duke of Leeds, a British career diplomat who was to become famous as the wartime British Minister to the Holy See, from 1936 to 1947, confined within the compass of the Vatican City State but from which he conducted an important mission to rescue thousands of Jews threatened by the Nazi regime in Italy.

Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli [1876-1958], afterwards Pope Pius XII, born into a family of senior administrators and lawyers in the service of the Holy See, his cousin Ernesto having overhauled the finances of the Holy See during the pontificates of Leo XIII, Pius X and Benedict XV, and his brother Francesco having negotiated the terms of the Lateran Treaty in 1929, for which he was made a papal Marquis and posthumously an Italian Prince. Eugenio Pacelli was ordained a priest in 1899 and
was almost immediately engaged in the service of the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, the Holy See’s Foreign Office, his career being nurtured by Cardinal Gasparri and by Pope Benedict XV, who sent Pacelli to Munich as Nuncio to Bavaria in 1917 and elevated him to the office of Nuncio to Germany in 1920. Pacelli spent almost thirteen years in Germany until, in the wake of the signing of the Lateran Treaty in 1929, he was ordered back to Rome by Pope Pius XI to succeed Cardinal Gasparri as Secretary of State, holding this office until the death of Pope Pius XI in 1939, following which he was elected Supreme Pontiff and Bishop of Rome on 2 March 1939.

William Robert Wellesley Peel, 1st Earl Peel, GCSI, GBE, PC [1967-1937], a former Secretary of State for India.

Francois Georges-Picot [1870-1951], son of a French historian and great-uncle of President Valerie Giscard d’Estaing, he became a diplomat and was Consul-General of France in Beirut before the outbreak of World War One. From late 1915 he negotiated with the English diplomat, Sir Mark Sykes, the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916 which proposed the partition of Syria, Palestine and Iraq between the British and French in the event of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by the Allies. The Sykes-Picot Agreement conflicted with the terms of the secret McMahon-Hussein Agreement of October 1915 which promised Palestine to the Arab interests in return for their support for an Allied victory over the Ottomans. He became French High Commissioner in Palestine and Syria in 1917 and ended his career as French Ambassador in Argentina.

Pope Pius IX [1792-1878], born Giovanni Maria Mastai-Ferretti to a noble family of Sennigallia. Precluded from a career as a soldier due to epilepsy he entered the priesthood under the patronage of Pope Pius VII, undertook papal diplomatic work in the new republics of South America before becoming Archbishop of Spoleto and then Bishop of Imola and a Cardinal. During revolutionary outbreaks in 1830-1831 he earned a reputation as a liberal. The Austrian Empire opposed his election as Supreme Pontiff in 1846 but the threatened imposition of the imperial veto actually led to a coalescence of moderate and liberal support for Mastai-Ferretti in the
Conclave, resulting in his election as Pope Pius IX. He was enormously popular in liberal and pro-Italian nationalist circles but his ousting from Rome by liberal revolutionaries in 1847 led to his conversion to a far more conservative position upon his reinstatement in Rome in 1848. Amongst his earliest actions was the reinstatement of the Latin Catholic hierarchy in Palestine with the appointment of Monsignor Valerga as the resident Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. He proclaimed the dogma of the Immaculate Conception in 1854 and summoned the Vatican Council of 1869-1870. The occupation of the papal territories and Rome in 1870 by the Italian forces led to Pope Pius IX’s self-imposed imprisonment in the Vatican. At his death in 1878 his funeral procession, held in the dark of night to avoid popular disturbances, was disrupted by a populist mob enroute to the Basilica of San Lorenzo fuori le Mura where his tomb is now located.

Pope St Pius X, Cardinal Giuseppe Sarto [1835-1914], son of a minor official of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Venezia region; had a long career as a pastor and parish priest before becoming Bishop of Mantua and then Patriarch of Venice. He was elected bishop of Rome at the Conclave following the death of Pope Leo XIII in 1903, due to the exercise of the Imperial veto power by Austria-Hungary against Cardinal Rampolla. Pius X took as his Secretary of State the young and comparatively inexperienced Monsignor Raphael Merry del Val. Early in his pontificate the split between Church and State in France occurred which preoccupied both the Pope and his Secretary of State for several years. This was followed by Pius X’s various encyclicals against the heresy of Modernism. Despite controversial aspects to his pontificate Pope Pius X was revered as a saint in his own lifetime, was acclaimed one at his death, and was canonized in 1954.

Pope Pius XI, Cardinal Achille Ratti [1857-1939], created Cardinal and Archbishop of Milan on 3 June 1921 and elected Supreme Pontiff as Bishop of Rome on 6 February 1922; son of a prosperous family of silk manufacturers, he gained three Doctorates and undertook a career as a Church librarian, working at and eventually heading the important Ambrosian Library in Milan from 1888 to 1911 when, at Pope Pius X’s request, he moved to the Vatican Library as Vice-Prefect and then Prefect from 1914
to 1918. At the request of Pope Benedict XV Monsignor Ratti undertook the role of Apostolic Visitor and then Nuncio to the newly recreated state of Poland where his energetic and diverse activities led to his recall to Rome in 1921, when Pope Benedict XV created him a Cardinal and Archbishop of Milan. He was elected as Supreme Pontiff in the longest and most difficult Conclave of the Twentieth Century and was, after the withdrawal of Cardinal Laurenti, the compromise candidate between the supporters of Cardinals Merry de Val and Gasparri. From the outset of his pontificate he signaled his desire to end the isolation of the Vatican and his determination to seek a *modus vivendi* with the Kingdom of Italy. An enthusiastic mountain climber, he was intellectually brilliant, politically astute and subject to outbursts of fiery temper. Following the rapprochement with Italy reached with the signing of the Lateran Treaty in 1929, Pope Pius XI was largely preoccupied with the difficulties arising from the spread of totalitarianism in Europe, the unleashing of virulent anti-Semitism in Germany, and the radical drift towards renewed global war. The first of the modern pontiffs to have visited the Holy Land, he was deeply interested in Palestine and the Holy Places but, beyond his early attentions from 1921 to 1923, he gave it little of his own time and largely left it to be dealt with by his Secretaries of State, Cardinals Gasparri and Pacelli.


Field Marshal Sir Herbert *Plumer*, 1st Viscount Plumer, GCB GCMG GCVO GBE [1857-1932], one of the few British Generals to emerge with credit from the campaigns on the Western Front, commanding the British Army in the victory at the Battle of Messines in 1917. He was Governor of Malta from 1919 to 1924 and his dealings with the Catholic Archbishop there enabled him to establish a sympathetic relationship with the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem Monsignor Luigi Barlassina, when he was appointed High Commissioner for Palestine in 1925. At the end of his term of office in Palestine in 1928 he retired from public life. His tenure as High Commissioner in Palestine was marked by a general calm to which his undoubted diplomatic and leadership skills undoubtedly contributed.

Father Paschal Robinson OFM [1870-1948] would become something of an *eminence gris* in the ongoing relationship between the British Government, the Holy See and the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem from 1919 to 1939, and was certainly thought by some on the British side to be the ideal pro-British candidate as Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. He was born in Ireland in 1870, was raised in the United States, and worked as a journalist before joining the Franciscan Order [OFM] in the United States in 1896. He became Professor of Medieval History at the Catholic University in Washington DC in 1913, having previously taught at the Franciscan Order’s own research institution at Quaracchi, near Florence, from 1904. In 1914 he became a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society in the United Kingdom. His career and researches led him to becoming an expert on the affairs of the Holy Land. In 1919 “the United States Government appointed him, together with other distinguished educators from Harvard, Princeton and Columbia, to attend the Peace Conference at Versailles in a special advisory capacity”. This brought him to the attention of the Holy See, which then recruited him for its own diplomatic service. He conducted special missions for the Holy See in Palestine in 1920, 1925, 1926 and 1927. He appears to have been looked on as the Latin Catholic expert on the affairs of Palestine by the Holy See. Whilst various campaigns to have him appointed Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem in place of Monsignor Barlassina were always unsuccessful, in 1927 he was appointed a titular Archbishop. He continued to give advice to the Holy See on Palestine until September of 1929. On 27 November 1929 Pope Pius XI appointed him as the first Apostolic Nuncio to Ireland since the Seventeenth Century, a role which he fulfilled with considerable distinction until his death on 27 August 1948, being buried at his own request in the Franciscan portion of Glasnevin Cemetery in Blackrock, Dublin, together with the members of the Franciscan Community of Merchants Quay, see *The Most Rev. Paschal Robinson O. F. M.* in *The Americas*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Oct., 1948), 217-220.
Cardinal Willem Marinus Van Rossum, [1854-1932], a Dutch Redemptorist, created a Cardinal Deacon in 1911 and a Cardinal Priest in 1915, his titular Church being Santa Croce in Gerusalemme, which houses the major relics of the True Cross. He was appointed Prefect of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, Propaganda Fide, in 1918 and held this office until his death in 1932.

Nathaniel Mayer Rothschild, Feiherr von Rothschild, [1777-1836] was founder of the British branch of the Jewish banking dynasty and great-grandfather of the 2nd Baron Rothschild to whom the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, would address the Balfour Declaration of 2/3 November 1917.

Lionel Walter Rothschild, 2nd Baron Rothschild FRS [1868-1937] was the head of the British branch of the Rothschild banking dynasty and was a minor politician as well as a zoologist.

Sir John de Salis, 7th Count de Salis, KCMG CVO [1864-1939], of aristocratic Anglo-Swiss origin, he owned large states in England and Ireland, and married Countess Helene Marie de Caraman-Chimay, connected with many of Europe’s greatest noble families, being a putative granddaughter of Emperor Napoleon I and also of Madame Tallien. De Salis was a third cousin of Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, through the Cust family, Barons Brownlow. He entered the British diplomatic service in 1886 and was Envoy Extraordinary to Montenegro from 1911 to 1916 before becoming Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Holy See from 1916 to 1923.

Sir Herbert Samuel, 1st Viscount Samuel, GCB OM GBE PC [1870-1964], first British High Commissioner of Palestine; member of a prominent Jewish banking family from Liverpool. He held office in the Asquith Liberal government from 1909 as Postmaster General and Home Secretary. He wrote a memorandum in 1915 entitled *The Future of Palestine* and campaigned for the concept of a Jewish national home in Palestine under British rule, influencing the drafting of the Balfour Declaration. In 1920 he was appointed High Commissioner for Palestine and held office until 1925, the first Jew to rule in Palestine for 2,000 years. The Zionist movement welcomed Samuel’s
appointment, but General Allenby thought it “highly dangerous”, suggesting that British rule would be entirely aimed at achieving Jewish rule in Palestine. The appointment of British Zionist Norman Bentwich, married to Samuel’s niece, as Legal Secretary in Palestine in 1920 contributed to the initial sense of a Zionist takeover of the British administration in Palestine at the outset. The Jewish populace of Palestine treated Samuel as a Messiah but his efforts at impartiality came to earn the reluctant respect of Muslim and Christian communities as well. Samuel reentered party politics in Britain and became Home Secretary in the Ramsay MacDonald Cabinet in 1931. He led the Liberal Party in the House of Lords from 1944 to 1955. His son settled in Palestine.

Cardinal Karl Joseph Schulte (1879-1941), Archbishop of Cologne 1920-1941, created a Cardinal in 1921, a fierce opponent both of Communism and of Nazism.

Cardinal Luigi Sincero (1870-1936), created Cardinal 1923, Secretary of Congregation for Oriental Churches 1927-1936.

Nahum Sokolow [1859-1936] was Secretary General of the World Zionist Congress from 1906, President of the Jewish Agency for Palestine 1931-1933, and President of the World Zionist Congress from 1931 to 1935.

Ronald Storrs, afterwards Sir Ronald Storrs KCMG CBE [1881-1955], son of an Anglican vicar and, through his mother, descended from the Cust family, Barons Brownlow. He had worked in Cairo on Arabic affairs and was revered by T. E. Lawrence for his brilliance. He held office from 1917 to 1925 as Governor of Jerusalem and claimed to be the “first military Governor of Jerusalem since Pontius Pilate”, strongly suggesting the place in history he felt was his. He went on to be Governor of Cyprus and then Governor of Northern Rhodesia. He was desperate to be liked by all sides in Palestine but was widely disliked by Jews, Christians and Muslims alike. His cousinage with Count John de Salis was useful in his dealings with the Holy See.
Oscar Solomon Straus [1850-1926], the first Jewish Cabinet Minister in the USA, serving as Secretary for Commerce and Labor under President Theodore Roosevelt from 1906 to 1909. Having been US Minister in Istanbul/Constantinople in 1887-1889 and again in 1898-1899, he served as US Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire from 1909 to 1910.

Sir Mark Sykes 6th Baronet of Sledmere [1879-1919], was a Catholic convert, Conservative politician and ardent promoter of both Arab nationalism and Zionism in the Middle East, dying of the Spanish flu in Paris during the peace negotiations in 1919.

Cardinal Giovanni Tacci Porcelli [1863-1928], had been Apostolic Delegate to Constantinople from 1904 to 1908, and was thereafter Papal Nuncio to Belgium. From 1918 he was Prefect of the Pontifical Household, being made a Cardinal in 1921. In 1922 he was appointed Secretary of the Congregation for Oriental Churches which handled the relationship between the Holy See and Eastern rite Catholics such as the Melkites. The Popes themselves served as Prefects of this particular Congregation until 1967, with the result that its Secretary was, to all intents and purposes, its operational head.


Monsignor Gustavo Testa [1886-1969], Apostolic Delegate to Egypt, Palestine, Arabia, and Abyssinia from 1934 to 1948, and then Apostolic Delegate to Jerusalem, Palestine, Transjordan and Cyprus from 1948 to 1954, covering the entire territory of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem; created a Cardinal in 1959.

Cardinal Eugene Tisserant [1884-1972], born in Nancy where he studied for the priesthood, becoming fluent in thirteen languages, including Amharic, Arabic and Hebrew. He later studied in Jerusalem. He followed a career in the Vatican Library of which he became Pro-Prefect in 1930. In 1936 Pope Pius XI created him a Cardinal
and appointed him to be Secretary, and effective head, of the Congregation for the Oriental Churches [Pro Ecclesia Orientali] where he immediately campaigned successfully to obtain control of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem. His career in the Church was long and distinguished. He became Dean of the College of Cardinals and Bishop of Ostia in 1951 and appeared on the balcony with Pope John XXIII following the latter’s election to the pontificate in 1958. He had an influential role in the lead-up to the Second Vatican Council and was appointed Grand Master of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre in 1962, holding that office until his death in 1972. He was one of the most formidable ecclesiastical warriors of his time.

Pope Urban II, Odo de Lagery [1042-1099], French monk who became prior of the Abbey of Cluny and supported the reform program of Pope Gregory VII, who appointed him a Cardinal and Bishop of Ostia in 1080. In 1088 he was elected to succeed Pope Victor III as Bishop of Rome and became Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church, taking the regnal name Urban II. Excluded from Rome by the presence there of an anti-Pope, Urban II pursued a vigorous program of travel throughout Italy and France in pursuit of his reform program for the Catholic Church. At the Council of Piacenza in March 1095 he received delegates from the Eastern Emperor Alexius I Comnenos who pleaded for western support for the Eastern Empire against the Muslim invaders. This led Pope Urban II to support for the concept of a Crusade which he proclaimed definitively at the Council of Clermont in November 1095. In 1097 one of the French armies passing through Italy en route for the Holy Land ejected the anti-Pope from Rome and installed Pope Urban II in authority there. Urban II also extended Catholic authority over southern Italy and Sicily, with lasting effect. He died on 29 July 1099, fourteen days after the conquest of Jerusalem by the Crusaders, but without knowing that this had occurred.

Monsignor Giuseppe Valerga [1813-1872], Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem from 1847 until his death. He was born in Savona in north-western Italy and studied for the priesthood there and in Rome. He entered the service of Propaganda Fide and was sent to assist the Chaldean Catholic Church in Mesopotamia, now Iraq, where he made a significant mark. When it was decided to appoint a resident Latin Patriarch at
Jerusalem in 1847 he was appointed to the role, having to travel to Rome from Mesopotamia for briefings and Episcopal ordination prior to taking up office in Jerusalem. He was given authority to install Knights of the Holy Sepulchre and became Grand Master of that Order. He was a strong pastor and re-established the Latin Catholic Church as a significant presence in the Holy Land amongst its indigenous population, complementing the work of the Franciscan Custody of the Terra Santa which controlled and cared for the principal Holy Places on behalf of the Catholic Church.

Cardinal Valerio Valeri [1883-1963], created Cardinal in 1953, Prefect of the Congregation for Religious in 1953. He was a native of Grossetto in Tuscany and studied for the priesthood in Rome. He worked in the Secretariat of State from 1920 and was appointed Apostolic Delegate to Egypt and Arabia in 1927, being given responsibility for Palestine as well. He became Papal Nuncio to France in 1936 and was removed from that post in 1944 at the request of General de Gaulle on the grounds that he was too close to the Vichy regime. He participated in the Conclaves of 1958 and 1963 and was present in the opening sessions of the Second Vatican Council.

General Sir Arthur Wauchope GCB GCMG CIE DSO [1874-1947] had been General Officer Commanding in Northern Ireland from 1929. He was appointed High Commissioner and Commander in Chief of Palestine and Trans-Jordan in 1931 and held office until 1937. His term as High Commissioner was considered the “heyday of Zionist history” in Palestine but its closing years were marred by the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in 1936.

Dr Chaim Weizmann [1874-1952], leader of the Zionist movement; born into a practising Jewish family in Belarus, Russia, and trained as a bio-chemist, inventing a form of acetone which was vital to the British war effort during World War One. He lived in Britain from 1904 until 1937 and only renounced his British nationality to become President of Israel in 1948. Weizmann and Arthur Balfour had first met in 1903, when Balfour offered Uganda as the site of a proposed Jewish national home.
Weizmann had again come into contact with the British government in 1914 due to his expertise in the production of acetone for use in cordite explosives. In December of 1914 Weizmann met with Mr David Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr Herbert Samuel [1870-1963, later 1st Viscount Samuel], a former Postmaster General and leading British Zionist, and put to them the case for a Jewish national home in Palestine, finding them sympathetic to his case.
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G.1.3.19. FO 380/36 1921 [243-400].
G.1.3.20. FO 380/37 1921 [415-723].

Following this there is a gap in this sequence in the National Archives from 1922 to 1936 inclusive.

G.1.3.21. FO 380/.
G.1.3.22. FO 380/39.
G.1.3.23. FO 380/40 1938.
G.1.3.24. FO 380/41 1938.
G.1.3.25. FO 380/68 1940.
G.1.3.26. FO 380/44 1939.

G.1.4. War Cabinet Papers:
G.1.4.1. CAB 23/3 (available digitally)
G.1.4.2. CAB 24/136 (available digitally)


G.1.6. Colonial Office (CO): Original correspondence, 1921:

G.1.6.1. CO 733/11 1921 Palestine correspondence September-December 1921 (including important documentation regarding the purported cession of the Coenaculum by the Sultan to the King of Italy in 1919 which suggests that no such donation was ever formally executed).

G.1.6.2. CO 733/16 1921 Palestine Miscellaneous Institutions including the Stein Report of September 1921.

G.1.6.3. CO 733/30 1922 Palestine correspondence January-June 1922.

G.1.6.4. CO 733/31 1922 Palestine correspondence with Foreign Office (including the campaign for an English auxiliary bishop).

G.1.6.5. CO 733/33 1922 Palestine correspondence.

G.1.6.6. CO 733/54 1923 Palestine correspondence.

G.1.6.7. CO 733/65 1924 Palestine correspondence.

G.1.6.8. CO 733/90 1925 Palestine correspondence.

G.1.6.9. CO 733/162/7 1928 Palestine.

G.1.6.10. CO 733/262/1 1934 Palestine – Apostolic Delegate.


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H.1. Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales, 8, Série Z Carton 406 Dossier 1A, 15 Octobre 1918-16 Février 1926, Saint-Siège, Documentation

H.2. Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales, 9, Série Z Carton 406 Dossier 2, 8 Juin 1918-17 Décembre 1928, Saint-Siège, Le Saint-Siège et le Traité de Londres du 26 Avril 1915

H.3. Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales, 5, Série Z Carton 406 Dossier 1, Janvier 1923 à Décembre 1928

H.4. Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales, 13, Série Z Carton 406 Dossier 3, 23 Septembre 1918-10 Février 1920, Saint-Siège, Relations avec la France

H.5. Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales, 17, Série Z Carton 406 Dossier 3, 18 Novembre 1920 – 20 Novembre 1921


H.7. Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales, 32 bis, Série Z Carton 406 Dossier 1 et s/d., 1 Janvier 1930-31 Décembre 1931, Saint-Siège, Dossier général


H.9. Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales, 37, Série Z Carton 406 Dossier 2a, 1 Juin 1932-31 Décembre 1938, Saint-Siège, Saint-Siège et la politique extérieure


I. Archives du Ministère des Relations Extérieures

I.1. St. Siege 1918; St. Siege 1919-20; Dossier 11414; Dossier 114477; Classement b/160.

J. Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri

2. Vatican Documents


2.3. Pope Pius X, Pontifical Letter on the Terra Santa, 3 February 1913.


2.15. Pope Pius XI, 6 January 1933, Indictio anni sancti extra ordinem ac generalis maximique iubilaei undevicesimo exeunte saeculo a peracta humani generis redemptione, Encyclical


2.19.Pope Pius XII, Motu proprio, 15 August 1945.

2.20.Pope Pius XII, Apostolic brief, Quam Romani Pontificis, 14 September 1949.

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